Freeman v. Davis

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 1, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
MARCUS L. FREEMAN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 10-1330
v. (D.Ct. No. 1:09-CV-02493-DME-MJW)
(D. Colo.)
BLAKE R. DAVIS, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
______________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, BRORBY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Marcus L. Freeman, a pro se litigant and federal inmate, appeals
the district court’s dismissal of his application for a writ of habeas corpus
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He also seeks leave to proceed on appeal without
prepayment of costs and fees (in forma pauperis). Construing his pro se
application liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), we deny
the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss his appeal as frivolous.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In 1996, Mr. Freeman was convicted in a federal court in Texas on two
drug counts and received a mandatory life sentence which was upheld on appeal
and on his motion for rehearing en banc. See United States v. Freeman, 164 F.3d
243 (5 th Cir.), reh’g denied, 172 F.3d 871 (5 th Cir. 1999). By his own admission,
he has “since ... filed several motion [sic] to attack his sentence,” which were all
filed in a Texas federal court, including: (1) at least one unsuccessful motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255; 1 (2) at least one unsuccessful
motion to file a successive § 2255 motion; (3) an unsuccessful motion to attack
his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); 2 and (4) an unsuccessful motion
brought under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). 3 Mr. Freeman’s
1
See Freeman v. United States, 2001 WL 492401 (N.D. Tex. May 3,
2001).
2
See United States v. Freeman, 2010 WL 4272919 (5 th Cir. Oct. 26, 2010)
(per curiam).
3
See United States v. Freeman, 158 F.App’x 568, 2005 WL 3427507 (5 th
Cir. Dec. 14, 2005) (per curiam).
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multiple attacks on his sentence have prompted the Fifth Circuit to warn him that
“any further repetitious or frivolous attempts to circumvent statutory restrictions
on filing second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions to vacate, whether
pursued by him pro se or with the assistance of any other person (including any
attorney) ... may result in the imposition of sanctions against him,” and “may
include dismissal, monetary sanctions, and restrictions on his ability to file
pleadings in this court ....” Freeman, 2005 WL 3427507, at *1.
Mr. Freeman is currently incarcerated at a federal facility in Florence,
Colorado. On November 12, 2009, he brought the instant application in a
Colorado federal court, seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 and
claiming errors in his presentence report led to his life sentence and caused the
Bureau of Prisons to classify him as a high-risk inmate. More specifically, Mr.
Freeman claimed certain portions of his presentence report, pertaining in part to
his involvement in the conspiracy, criminal history points, and drug quantities,
were inaccurate, unreliable, untrue, unsupported by reliable evidence, and
improperly used to calculate his sentence. As to his claim such errors improperly
caused his classification as a high-risk inmate, he simply alleged “[t]he Federal
Bureau of Prisons is using that same information for the purpose of making
decision [sic] adverse to [him] that effect [sic] security, custody, and
classification in the execution of the sentence.”
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The district court adopted the federal magistrate judge’s recommendation
Mr. Freeman’s application be denied and dismissed with prejudice. In so doing, it
agreed with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that even though Mr. Freeman
labeled the action as a § 2241 motion, it was “a thinly-veiled collateral attack on
the validity of [his] sentence,” which should have been brought as a successive
motion under § 2255.
Undeterred, Mr. Freeman sought an order for reconsideration, which the
district court considered as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and denied. On February 10, 2011, the district
court also denied Mr. Freeman’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
stating his appeal was not taken in good faith because Mr. Freeman has not shown
the existence of a reasoned, non-frivolous argument on the law and facts in
support of the issues raised on appeal.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Mr. Freeman makes the same or similar arguments raised in his
§ 2241 application dismissed by the district court. He continues to claim his
presentence report contained factual errors, including information he was a
member of a conspiracy during the time alleged, which improperly led to the
imposition of his life sentence. He also contends none of the errors surfaced until
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2007 when he was incarcerated and finally allowed to review his presentence
report and addendum. Mr. Freeman again seeks leave to appeal the district
court’s dismissal of his pleading without prepayment of filing fees pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
Because Mr. Freeman is a federal prisoner (rather than a state prisoner)
proceeding under § 2241, he does not need a certificate of appealability. See
Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 542 n.1 (10 th Cir. 2010); McIntosh v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 810 n.1 (10 th Cir. 1997). We review de novo the legal
conclusions of a district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. See Rogers v.
Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10 th Cir. 1999). “A petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 attacks the execution of a sentence rather than its validity and must be
filed in the district where the prisoner is confined,” whereas a “28 U.S.C. § 2255petition attacks the legality of detention, and must be filed in the district that
imposed the sentence.” Haugh v. Booker, 210 F.3d 1147, 1149 (10 th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10 th Cir. 1996)). When a
defendant is challenging his conviction and sentence, and not the execution
thereof, such challenges must be brought pursuant to § 2255 unless this “remedy
by motion is inadequate or ineffective.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Bradshaw, 86 F.3d
at 166.
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While we construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally, see Garza v.
Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1201 n.2 (10 th Cir. 2010), the fact Mr. Freeman is a pro se
litigant does not prohibit this court from dismissing his appeal as frivolous, see
Haworth v. Royal, 347 F.3d 1189, 1192 (10 th Cir. 2003). A claim or appeal is
frivolous under § 1915 if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McIntosh, 115 F.3d at 812-13.
We have held “[t]he right of access to the courts is neither absolute nor
unconditional, and there is no constitutional right of access to the courts to
prosecute an action that is frivolous or malicious.” Winslow v. Hunter (In re
Winslow), 17 F.3d 314, 315 (10 th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Applying our standard of review and the applicable legal principles, we
agree with the district court’s characterization of Mr. Freeman’s § 2241
application as “a thinly-veiled collateral attack on the validity of [his] sentence,”
which should have been brought as a successive motion under § 2255. Our
review of Mr. Freeman’s appellate brief and the record on appeal clearly shows
he is attempting to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence or otherwise
challenge his conviction improperly through § 2241, rather than § 2255, given his
previous lack of success in the Texas federal court in attacking his sentence under
§ 2255 and the Fifth Circuit’s admonition concerning his repetitious or frivolous
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attempts to circumvent statutory restrictions on filing second or successive § 2255
motions. In other words, Mr. Freeman is attempting to both obtain a favorable
result on an issue the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held meritless and skirt its prior
warning concerning any future requests to file a § 2255 motion.
Nevertheless, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 remains the proper avenue for Mr.
Freeman’s post-conviction challenge. “Where a statute specifically addresses the
particular issue at hand,” as § 2255 does here, “it is that authority ... that is
controlling.” Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996). Thus, any
attempt to file a successive motion under § 2255 must be filed in the federal
district court that imposed the sentence, which, in this case, is in Texas. The fact
Mr. Freeman has not been successful in his prior § 2255 motion and request to
file a successive § 2255 motion does not mean a procedural avenue has not been
available to him but simply that his arguments lacked merit or he failed to meet
the criteria required for authorization to pursue such filings.
It is also apparent the Fifth Circuit determined Mr. Freeman’s repetitious
and frivolous filings, for the purpose of circumventing statutory restrictions on
filing second or successive § 2255 motions, constituted abusive filing practices
and unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources. His instant § 2241 application
and appeal thereof in this court are similarly meant to circumvent such
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restrictions and are patently frivolous, an abuse of the judicial process, and the
cause of unnecessary expenditures of judicial resources on a matter which has
been definitively adjudicated and deemed meritless by that court.
We, like the Fifth Circuit, possess inherent authority “to regulate the
activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under the
appropriate circumstances.” Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 352 (10 th Cir.
1989) (per curiam). We have long held that where a party has engaged in a
pattern of litigation activity which is manifestly abusive, restrictions are
appropriate, but only after notice and an opportunity to respond are given. See
Werner v. Utah, 32 F.3d 1446, 1447-48 (10 th Cir. 1994); In re Winslow, 17 F.3d at
315. We may impose filing restrictions based on our inherent power to regulate
federal dockets, promote judicial efficiency, and deter frivolous filings. See Van
Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1437 (10 th Cir. 1986). Moreover, Rule 38 of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure allows this court to award damages to
the Appellee as a sanction for a frivolous appeal. See generally Stafford v. United
States, 208 F.3d 1177, 1179 (10 th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, we caution Mr. Freeman future frivolous appeals on this or
any other matter may result in summary disposition without discussion and/or an
order requiring him to show cause why this court should not impose both
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appellate filing restrictions and sanctions. We further deny Mr. Freeman’s motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the instant action based on the
frivolousness of his appeal and abuse of our judicial resources. We caution him
we may also limit permission to proceed in forma pauperis in the future,
regardless of his financial ability to pay such costs and fees. See In re McDonald,
489 U.S. 180, 183-85 (1989) (limiting petitioner from proceeding in forma
pauperis based on petitioner’s abuse of judicial resources); Thompson v. Gibson,
289 F.3d 1218, 1222-23 (10 th Cir. 2002) (explaining dismissal of frivolous action
or appeal constitutes a “strike” and if three strikes are accrued, the litigant may
no longer proceed in forma pauperis in any civil action filed in federal court
unless he is in imminent danger of physical injury). Again, the fact Mr. Freeman
is a pro se litigant does not prohibit this court from such summary disposition,
sanctions, or other limitations on frivolous or abusive filings. See Haworth, 347
F.3d at 1192.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mr. Freeman’s motion to proceed on
appeal without prepayment of costs or fees and DISMISS his appeal as frivolous.
For the same reasons, we further DENY Mr. Freeman’s request to file
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supplemental authorities, his motion to supplement the record on appeal, and his
motion to file out of time an addendum to his opening brief.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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