Brown v. Eardley

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 12, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
B RIA N L. B RO WN ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-3174
(D.C. No. 04-CV -3216-JW L)
M . EARDLEY, Senior Correctional (D . Kan.)
O fficer, U SP-Leavenw orth; (FNU)
SEM ICK, Facility Lieutenant,
U SP-Leavenw orth; (FN U ) G A LLY,
Correctional Officer,
USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) M ULLINS,
Correctional Officer,
U SP-Leavenw orth; (FN U ) A SHM AN,
Unit M anager, UPS-Leavenworth;
(FN U) HOW ARD, Correctional
Counselor, U SP-Leavenworth; G. ,
Case M anager, USP-Leavenworth;
(FN U) CAVAJAL, Facility Captain,
U SP-Leavenw orth; (FN U )
NITCHELS, Former Associate
W arden, USP-Leavenworth; HELEN
M ARBERRY, Former Associate
W arden, U SP-Leavenw orth; (FNU)
M ELDNER, Unit M anager,
U SP-Leavenw orth; (FN U ) G O ODIN,
Special Investigator,
USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) RO SALU S,
Special Investigator,
U SP-Leavenw orth; (FN U ) LA CY,
Disciplinary Judge, USP-Leavenworth,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before POR FIL IO, B AL DOC K , and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Brian L. Brown, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s order dismissing his claims of cruel and unusual punishment
against federal prison personnel, brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unkown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The district
court ruled that dismissal was required because M r. Brown had not exhausted his
administrative remedies by completing the prison grievance procedures.
M r. Brown then filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. W e
affirm.
Appellate Jurisdiction
W e have appellate jurisdiction only over the district court’s order
dismissing M r. Brown’s claims. W hile his motion for reconsideration was
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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pending, M r. B row n filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of dismissal. H e
did not file a new or amended notice of appeal after the district court entered the
order denying reconsideration. Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction over the
order denying reconsideration. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Anderson v. State
Farm M ut. Auto. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2005).
Background
M r. Brown filed several prison grievances alleging that prison officials
harassed and injured him. The district court determined that he had not fully
exhausted any of the grievances. See Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d
1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that Prison Litigation Reform Act 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a) contains “a total exhaustion requirement;” accordingly, where
complaint contains unexhausted claims, district court is required to dismiss entire
action). Consequently, the district court dismissed the complaint. 1
On appeal, M r. Brown asserts (1) he followed the prison grievance
procedures dictated by 28 C.F.R. § 542.18 for emergencies, and he should be
excused from complying with the filing deadlines because prison officials did not
respond to his emergency grievances within the time provided by that section,
(2) under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), the district court should not have
dismissed his case, but should have granted him an opportunity to exhaust his
1
The district court also ruled on various other motions, none of w hich are
before us in this appeal.
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administrative remedies, (3) prison officials had a deliberate practice of failing to
process grievances in a timely manner, thus excusing him from complying with
the required time limits, (4) prison officials’ instructions on how to meet time
deadlines w ere so unclear and confusing as to excuse him from complying with
the required time limits, and (5) although a prisoner’s untimely filing may be
excused if the Bureau of Prisons provides a letter stating that the delay was not
the prisoner’s fault, prison staff refused to provide these letters.
Legal Framework
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), “[n]o action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is required “regardless of the relief offered
through administrative procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).
Federal prisoners are required to follow a four-step grievance procedure.
28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13 - 542.18; Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir.
2001). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing exhaustion. Steele v. Fed.
Bur. of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003).
“W e review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an inmate’s suit for
failure to exhaust his or her administrative remedies.” Patel v. Fleming, 415 F.3d
1105, 1108 (10th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff is representing himself on appeal so his
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pleadings will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972). Although we construe liberally M r. Brown’s pro se pleadings and hold
them to a “less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, [he]
must nonetheless set forth sufficient facts to support [his] claims.” Diaz v. Paul
J. Kennedy Law Firm, 289 F.3d 671, 674 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. Bellmon,
935 F.2d 1106, 1110-12 (10th Cir. 1991)). M oreover, this court generally does
not address issues that were not presented to the district court. Wilburn v.
M id-South Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 1280 (10th Cir. 2003).
Discussion
M r. Brown first asserts that his prison grievances w ere exhausted fully
under 28 C.F.R. § 542.18. He argues that because his grievances were
emergencies, the warden’s response was required within three days, rather than
twenty calendar days. He relies on the following language of § 542.18: “If the
[A dministrative Remedy] Request is determined to be of an emergency nature
which threatens the inmate’s immediate health or welfare, the W arden shall
respond not later than the third calendar day after filing.” The warden did not
respond within three days of the date he filed any of his six grievances.
Therefore, according to M r. Brown, he is excused from complying with the
grievance procedure time limits.
W e need not address how § 542.18’s provision for treatment of an emergency
grievance should be applied because even if it should have been applied to
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M r. Brown’s grievances, he was still required to exhaust fully those grievances.
Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding “inmate who
begins the grievance process but does not complete it is barred from pursuing a [civil
rights] claim under PLR A for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies”).
M r. B rown does not claim that he exhausted his grievances according to the
procedures mandated by 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13 through 542.18. Accordingly, w e
affirm the district court’s order dismissing M r. Brown’s claims for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
M r. Brown next argues that the district court should not have dismissed his
case but, instead, should have permitted him to exhaust his prison grievance
remedies. He asserts that under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), the
district court had the discretion to hold his case open until his claims were
exhausted. Rhines is inapposite. It addresses “the problem of a ‘mixed’ petition
for habeas corpus relief in which a state prisoner presents a federal court with a
single petition containing some claims that have been exhausted in the state
courts and some that have not.” 544 U.S. at 271. The district court correctly
dismissed M r. Brown’s claims pursuant to Ross, which requires a district court to
dismiss the entire action without prejudice when the complaint includes
unexhausted claims. Ross, 365 F.3d at 1189.
Finally, M r. Brown argues that he should be excused from the exhaustion
requirement because prison officials (1) engaged in a deliberate practice of failing
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to process grievances in a timely manner, (2) did not clearly instruct him on how
to meet the filing deadlines, and (3) refused to prepare the necessary letters to
explain that the filing delays were not his fault. W e do not address the merits of
these arguments because they were not presented to the district court or they were
raised for the first time in the post-judgment motion to reconsider. As noted
above, w e decline to consider issues not presented to the district court, and we
have no jurisdiction to review the order denying reconsideration. In making this
determination, we have carefully review ed the record on appeal, particularly
documents 91 and 92, which are M r. Brown’s response and brief in opposition to
defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The district court granted M r. Brown’s motion to proceed without
prepayment of costs and fees. He is reminded that he is obligated to continue
making partial payments until the entire fee has been paid.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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