Bone v. State of New Mexico

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 14, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SAM BO NE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-2354
(D.C. No. CIV-04-121-JH/LCS)
STATE OF NEW M EXICO, M ARTIN (D . N.M .)
LU TH ER KIN G CO M M ISSIO N,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before T YM KOV IC H, BARRETT, and A ND ER SO N, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Sam Bone appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of the State of New M exico’s M artin Luther King Commission
(Commission) and dismissing his complaint with prejudice. W e exercise
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1921 and affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Background
M r. Bone served as the executive director of the Commission as an “exempt
employee” 1 from 1994 until 2003. In November 2002, Bill Richardson was
elected as the governor of New M exico. Although Governor Richardson did not
have the power to directly appoint the Executive Director of the Commission,
plaintiff alleges that he made it clear to the members of the Commission that he
w anted one of his political supporters, Jo Ella Redmon, to replace M r. Bone. A s
events unfolded, the Commission did appoint M s. Redmon to replace M r. Bone.
Thereafter, M r. Bone filed suit for sex discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 2 As the district court found, “[t]he
graveman of [his] complaint is that [the Commission] improperly terminated his
employment because he is male and for the purpose of replacing him with a
woman.” Aplt. A pp. at 308.
Relying on our decision in Notari v. Denver Water Department, 971 F.2d
585, 589 (10th Cir. 1992), the district court held that M r. Bone failed to present
any evidence concerning the first element of a prima facie case for reverse
discrimination, namely that the C ommission “is one of those unusual employers
1
The New M exico Personnel Act, N.M . Stat. Ann. 1978, § 10-9-4(C)
excludes “exempt employees” from the protections that the Act generally extends
to other public employees.
2
M r. Bone also sued for violation of his First Amendment rights. However,
these claims were dismissed by stipulation of the parties.
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who discriminates against the majority.” Id. Therefore, it granted the
Commission’s motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
Reverse Discrimination
Generally in a discriminatory discharge case, a plaintiff must establish the
elements of a prima facie case as set forth in M cDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green,
411 U .S. 792 (1973). These elements are: (1) he belongs to a protected class;
(2) he w as qualified for the job; (3) he w as terminated despite his qualifications;
and (4) the job was not eliminated after his discharge. Perry v. Woodward,
199 F.3d 1126, 1135 (10th Cir. 1999). However, because M r. Bone does not
belong to a protected class, the district court was required to follow the standards
set forth in Notari for claims of reverse discrimination. To establish a prima facie
case under Notari, M r. Bone was required to “establish background circumstances
that support an inference that the defendant is one of those unusual employers
who discriminates against the majority,” or to present “indirect evidence
sufficient to support a reasonable probability, that but for [his] status the
challenged employment decision would have favored [him].” Notari, 971 F.2d
at 589-90.
Standard of Review
W e review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the evidence and drawing the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Stover v. M artinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1070
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(10th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Id.Analysis
M r. Bone’s only argument on appeal concerns whether he had sufficient
notice that he needed to come forward with evidence to prove a prima facie case
of reverse discrimination. 3 He claims that because the parties did not specifically
brief the issue of reverse discrimination, the district court’s order is tantamount to
a sua sponte order for summary judgment. W e disagree.
In its motion for summary judgment, the Commission argued that M r. Bone
“has a number of problems with the proof requirements for his prima facie case.
The only evidence [he] puts forward is the evidence that he is male and a female
replaced him.” Aplt. App. at 19. W hile the Commission never cited Notari or
any other reverse discrimination cases in its pleadings, it nonetheless squarely
raised the failure to prove a prima facie case in its motion. Thereafter, M r. Bone
was given an opportunity to respond and come forward with his evidence and
arguments to defeat the motion. Aplt. App. at 76-265.
Nor are we persuaded by M r. Bone’s argument that if he had known that he
needed to prove a prima facie case of reverse discrimination, he “might easily
3
On appeal, M r. Bone does not dispute the district court’s factual findings or
its interpretation and application of the law of reverse discrimination.
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have been able to gather evidence that, but for his gender, the Commission would
have retained him as executive director.” Aplt. Br. at 10. Setting aside the fact
that it was incumbent on M r. Bone to know what was necessary to prove a
prima facie case, he never explains w hy he failed to ask the district court to
reopen discovery to allow him to gather such evidence, or what this evidence
might have been. Instead, M r. Bone was given ample opportunity to present his
evidence and arguments as to why he was replaced by a female, and the district
court properly found that the “evidence, taken together, is not enough to support
a reasonable inference that either the State of New M exico in general, or the
Commission in particular, is an employer that discriminates against men such that
[M r.] Bone would still be employed as executive director had he been female.”
A plt. A pp. at 311. The judgment is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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