United States v. Chavarria

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
October 26, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 06-2070
v. (D. New M exico)
EN RIQ U E C HA V A RR IA , (D.C. No. CR-05-1329-RB)
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before TACH A, Chief Judge, A ND ER SO N and BROR BY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant/appellant Enrique Chavarria was indicted on one count of
possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine, and
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
one count of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture
or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, as well as aiding and
abetting, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
His motion to suppress was denied following an evidentiary hearing. Chavarria
proceeded to trial and was found guilty by a jury of both counts. He was
sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. Chavarria appeals his conviction. W e
affirm.
BACKGROUND
On April 8, 2005, at approximately 9:50 p.m., Chaves County, New
M exico, Sheriff’s Deputy Raul Valderaz was on patrol when he observed a pickup
truck, driven by defendant Chavarria, cross through an intersection and narrowly
avoid colliding with other vehicles. Valderaz accordingly pulled Chavarria’s
truck over. Deputy Valderaz approached the driver’s side of the truck and asked
Chavarria for identification. W hen Chavarria produced his identification card, the
deputy noticed that Chavarria’s hands were shaking “very uncontrollably.” Tr. of
M ot. to Suppress Hr’g at 5, R. Vol. III. Additionally, when the deputy asked for
his insurance information, Chavarria passed over it several times before finally
handing it to the officer.
W hen Valderaz asked for his driver’s license, Chavarria responded he did
not have one. Valderaz testified he told Chavarria not to be so nervous, that this
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was a normal traffic stop and that he (Valderaz) would probably give Chavarria a
citation for not having a driver’s license.
Valderaz then returned to his patrol car to check the validity of Chavarria’s
identification card and to see if he had a valid driver’s license. W hile sitting in
his patrol car, V alderaz “noticed furtive movements inside [Chavarria’s] vehicle,”
including Chavarria “reaching down.” Id. at 6. Valderaz requested a back up and
Deputy Ralph M oore responded.
Upon arrival, Deputy M oore briefly spoke to V alderaz. M oore also
observed Chavarria “moving continuously” and “looking back at Deputy Valderaz
and myself.” Id. at 40. M oore walked up to the passenger side of the truck to
watch Chavarria while Valderaz remained in his patrol car and wrote a citation
for driving without a driver’s license. After Valderaz finished writing the
citation, he walked back to the driver’s side of the truck and asked Chavarria to
step out of the truck and walk to the front of Valderaz’s patrol car. At that point,
while in front of Valderaz’s patrol car, Valderaz returned Chavarria’s
identification card to him, gave him the citation and then explained the citation.
W hile V alderaz was explaining the citation to Chavarria, Deputy M oore
continued to stand by the passenger side of the truck, looking through the window
into the cab of the truck. When M oore shone his flashlight into the cab, he saw a
blue W al-M art bag lying on the passenger-side floorboard. The bag had been cut
in half, the sides w ere gone and the handles were missing. Deputy M oore
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observed bundles inside the bag, some containing a dark substance and some
containing a white powdery substance. Based upon his ten years as a law
enforcement officer, M oore believed the W al-M art bag contained narcotics.
W hen Valderaz finished explaining the citation to Chavarria, Valderaz
asked if he could search the truck. Chavarria refused consent, stating that the
truck was not his. M oore then walked back to where Valderaz and Chavarria
were standing and asked Chavarria if he knew what a “plain view search” was.
W hen Chavarria responded that he did, M oore told Chavarria about the bag
visible on the passenger-side floor board and asked Valderaz to go look in the
truck cab. Valderaz looked into the cab, using his flashlight, and also saw the
bundles of what appeared to be narcotics inside the W al-M art bag.
W hile V alderaz looked into the truck cab, M oore conducted a pat-down
search of Chavarria. 1 M oore found nothing during the search. After Valderaz
saw the suspected narcotics, he told M oore to place Chavarria under arrest.
Valderaz then seized the W al-M art bag. Inside the bag, he found bundles
containing a crystal-like substance which he believed was methamphetamine and
1
The precise sequence of events is not completely clear. At the suppression
hearing, Valderaz testified that he returned Chavarria’s ID and gave him the
citation after M oore conducted the pat-down of Chavarria. Tr. of M ot. to
Suppress Hr’g at 32, R . V ol. III. M oore testified that he conducted the pat-dow n
search after Valderaz had returned the ID and explained the citation, id. at 45,
although he testified that Chavarria had not yet signed the citation when the pat-
down occurred. Id. at 52. In any event, it is clear that the pat-down occurred
after M oore observed the contraband.
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a white powdery substance believed to be cocaine. Laboratory analysis revealed
that they were in fact methamphetamine and cocaine.
At trial, after the close of the government’s case, Chavarria moved for a
verdict of acquittal, arguing that the government had failed to show that he had
possession and control of the contraband. The district court denied the motion,
stating that the “nervousness described by the two officers, if believed, could be
the link between him and the drugs of guilty knowledge.” Tr. of Jury Trial at
106, R. Vol. IV. The jury found Chavarria guilty, and he was sentenced to 151
months’ imprisonment.
Chavarria appeals, arguing (1) there was insufficient evidence of
possession and knowledge of the contraband, where the defendant and contraband
were in a borrowed vehicle and the government relied exclusively on the
defendant’s nervousness to establish possession and knowledge; and (2) the
district court erred in denying Chavarria’s motion to suppress because the
contraband was found during a prolonged detention conducted ostensibly to
protect officer safety even though the officers testified they did not fear for their
safety.
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D ISC USSIO N
1. Sufficiency of the evidence
“W e review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo.” United
States v. Isaac-Sigala, 448 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2006). In conducting that
review, “we consider only whether, taking the evidence— both direct and
circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom—
in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (further quotation omitted). “A
conviction should be reversed only if no reasonable juror could have reached the
disputed verdict.” Id. (further quotation omitted).
Chavarria argues there was insufficient evidence establishing that the
contraband was his or that he was even aware it was in the truck. He further
argues that the truck was not his and he presented evidence to the jury that the
truck’s owner, Rudy Archuleta, “was stopped two months after Chavarria’s stop,
in another Archuleta-owned truck, in the same city, with the same type of
narcotics (methamphetamine and cocaine), roughly the same amount of
methamphetamine (48 grams in the vehicle Chavarria was driving, 66 grams in
the vehicle Archuleta was driving), and with the narcotics located in the same
place in the truck (floorboard).” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 13. Chavarria argues
the only evidence establishing a nexus between Chavarria and the drugs w as his
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alleged nervousness and that is insufficient. We disagree. The record reveals
sufficient evidence linking Chavarria and the drugs.
First, while Chavarria was not the owner of the truck, he was the driver and
sole occupant when the drugs were discovered in plain view in the truck cab. W e
have “held that it is permissible to infer that the driver of a vehicle has knowledge
of the contraband found within it.” United States v. Cota-M eza, 367 F.3d 1218,
1224 (10th Cir. 2004). The fact that the actual owner was himself later found
also transporting drugs in a different truck does nothing to minimize Chavarria’s
culpability when he was found with drugs in the borrowed truck he was driving.
Second, both officers testified that they observed Chavarria, after his truck
was pulled over, moving around in the truck, reaching down towards something,
and generally engaging in what appeared to be furtive movements. Such
movements can constitute evidence linking the person making the furtive
movements in a vehicle to contraband in the vehicle. See United States v. Bowen,
437 F.3d 1009, 1015-16 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that among the evidence
supporting a nexus between defendant and contraband in car was officers’
observation of defendant making “furtive movements around the passenger seat”);
United States v. Springfield, 196 F.3d 1180, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that
“furtive actions” in rear of van supported nexus between defendant and
contraband in van).
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Third, Chavarria was extremely nervous throughout his encounter with law
enforcement authorities. W e have on numerous occasions discussed the
significance of a defendant’s nervousness when determining whether there was
reasonable articulable suspicion to continue an investigative stop. In general, we
have held that the significance of a defendant’s nervousness can vary, depending
on the particular circumstances and the degree of nervousness. See, e.g., United
States v. Bradford, 423 F.3d 1149, 1157 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[W ]e have repeatedly
emphasized that nervousness and its signs should not be overcounted in our
analysis.”); United States v. W est, 219 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting
extreme and continued nervousness “is entitled to somew hat more w eight”);
United States v. W ald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding
nervousness is “of limited significance” in determining whether reasonable
suspicion exists); but cf. United States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447, 1458 (10th Cir.
1992) (noting that officer’s statement that defendant was very nervous was
“nothing more than an inchoate suspicion or hunch”), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994( (en banc). Our reservation
about giving too much weight to a defendant’s nervousness during an
investigative stop is partially explained by the fact that “nervousness is a
sufficiently common— indeed natural— reaction to confrontation with the police.”
United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1127 (10th Cir. 2005).
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In this case, by contrast, we are faced with the question of w hether a
defendant’s nervousness during a traffic stop can be used not just to provide
articulable suspicion to further detain the defendant, but as evidence that he
knowingly possessed contraband in the vehicle. The few cases from our circuit
suggest that it can. For example, we have held that a defendant’s nervousness,
with no police presence, “specifically directed at [a] package” can be used by a
jury as evidence that the defendant “knew the package contained a controlled
substance.” United States v. Johnson, 57 F.3d 968, 972 (10th Cir. 1995); see also
United States v. Cui Qin Zhang, 458 F.3d 1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“[N]ervous behavior, . . . when considered with all other evidence presented
against the defendant, [is] sufficient for a rational jury to find the defendant
guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine.”); United States v. Lazcano-
Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 844 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that defendant’s
nervousness at border checkpoint is, along with other factors, evidence of
knowledge of cocaine hidden in car). Thus, the jury could infer from Chavarria’s
extreme nervousness that he was aware of the contraband on the truck floor.
In sum, we hold that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that Chavarria knowingly possessed the contraband found on
the floor of the truck.
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2. Denial of motion to suppress
“In review ing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government, accept the district court’s findings of
fact unless clearly erroneous, and review de novo the ultimate determination of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Ladeaux, 454
F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir. 2006) (further quotation omitted).
Chavarria argues the district court erred in failing to suppress the
contraband “when it was discovered during a prolonged detention of Chavarria
conducted ostensibly for ‘officer safety’ purposes, notwithstanding explicit
officer testimony that there was no suspicion of danger.” Appellant’s Br. at 16.
A routine traffic stop is like an investigative detention and is accordingly
governed by the principles set out in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). “To
determine the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we make a dual
inquiry, asking first whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and
second whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.” United States v. Guerrero-Espinoza,
462 F.3d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 2006) (further quotation omitted). Chavarria does
not challenge the validity of the initial stop in this case. His argument is that the
officers unlawfully prolonged the stop beyond the time justified by the reason for
the stop.
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During a routine traffic stop, “a trooper may request a driver’s license,
vehicle registration and other required papers, run necessary computer checks,
and then issue any warning or citation.” Id. Once the trooper has accomplished
those tasks, “a driver must be allowed to proceed on his w ay unless reasonable
suspicion exists that the driver is engaged in criminal activity or the driver
consents to additional questioning.” Id.Chavarria concedes that “at the time that [he] was extracted from his
vehicle, all that was left to do was to present the citation and return Chavarria’s
documents.” Appellant’s Br. at 18. By his own admission, therefore, Chavarria
was removed from his vehicle prior to his receipt of the citation. Thus, the
investigative detention had not yet ended. And while Chavarria challenges the
officers’ authority to remove him from the vehicle, they were entitled to do that.
“An officer may order the driver and passengers out of the vehicle in the interest
of officer safety, even in the absence of any particularized suspicion of personal
danger.” United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
Further, it appears that Deputy M oore observed the contraband in plain
view on the vehicle floor while Chavarria was outside the vehicle receiving the
citation. 2 Once M oore observed the drugs, the officers had reasonable articulable
suspicion to further detain him and search him and/or his vehicle. Thus, M oore’s
2
Chavarria does not dispute that the contraband was in plain view. The
officers testified that the interior of the car was visible because of the lights from
their patrol cars, the street lights and their flashlights.
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pat-down of Chavarria was justified after the contraband was spotted. M oreover,
Chavarria’s conduct justified the pat-down: as Deputy M oore explained, “[h]e
kept placing his hands in his pockets, and I asked him to keep his hands out of his
pockets. And that’s w hen I conducted a pat-down search.” Tr. of M ot. to
Suppress H r’g at 45, R. Vol. III. 3
In sum, the record reveals that the officers in this case properly stopped
Chavarria’s vehicle after observing a violation of the traffic laws. The
investigative detention proceeded properly, and without undue delay, until one of
the officers observed contraband in plain view, which, in turn, justified further
investigation. The district court properly denied Chavarria’s motion to suppress.
C ON CLU SIO N
For the foregoing reasons, Chavarria’s conviction is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
3
W hile Chavarria asserts the officers testified at the suppression hearing
that they did not believe Chavarria ever posed a safety threat, he has misread that
testimony. The officers repeatedly testified that they removed Chavarria from the
truck because of safety concerns, and they did not let him return to the truck
because they did not know whether he had weapons in the truck. M oreover, the
pat-down was to assure the officers that Chavarria had no weapons on his person.
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