Folsom v. Franklin

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
May 17, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
GLEN FOLSOM ,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
v. No. 06-6172
(D.C. No. CIV-05-1240-W )
ER IC FR AN K LIN , (W .D. Okla.)
Respondent-Appellee,
and
STA TE OF O K LA H O MA ,
Respondent.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before L UC ER O, M cKA Y, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
An Oklahoma trial court convicted Glen Folsom of committing nine
felonies, including armed robbery, kidnaping, and rape, sentencing him to 424
years of incarceration. M r. Folsom’s direct appeal and state petition for
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
post-conviction relief proved of no avail. Eventually, M r. Folsom filed a petition
for a w rit of habeas corpus, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District
Court for the W estern District of Oklahoma. The district court denied relief, and
M r. Folsom filed with us a request for a certificate of appealability (“COA”). W e
granted review to hear M r. Folsom’s contention that the trial court infringed his
Sixth Amendment rights by allowing him to shed his appointed counsel and
proceed pro se at trial, as well as his argument that the court failed to afford due
process when assessing his competency at sentencing. After a full vetting of
M r. Folsom’s arguments and for reasons explored below, we affirm the district
court’s judgment.
* * *
On August 17, 2002, Glen Folsom, armed with a handgun, entered a video
rental store in Tecumseh, Oklahoma, robbed two female clerks, fired his weapon,
forced the clerks into his car, drove them into the country, and sexually assaulted
them. In response, the State of Oklahoma charged M r. Folsom with two counts of
robbery with a firearm; two counts of kidnaping; one count of rape by
instrumentation; two counts of attempted first-degree rape by force and fear; one
count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; and one count
of possession of a firearm after former conviction of a felony.
Just before his scheduled trial, M r. Folsom told his attorney Cregg D. W ebb
that he wished to proceed pro se. After the state trial court afforded M r. Folsom
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the chance to mull his request over the weekend, M r. Folsom reaffirmed his desire
to proceed pro se, though with M r. W ebb’s continued assistance and advice. I
Trial Tr. at 6. The trial court explained to M r. Folsom that he had a Sixth
Amendment right to represent himself, but that the court first needed to ensure
M r. Folsom made this “very serious” decision “freely,” “voluntarily,” and
“knowingly.” Id. at 6-7. Toward that end, the court supplied M r. Folsom a
written questionnaire, instructed him to complete it, and adjourned the
proceedings to give M r. Folsom time to contemplate his answers. See id. at 7.
Upon returning from recess, the trial court asked M r. Folsom to take the
stand and proceeded to examine him under oath. See id. at 8-17. The court first
ensured that M r. Folsom had read, understood, and answered truthfully “each and
every question” on the written questionnaire, id. at 8, learning in the process,
among other things, that M r. Folsom previously represented himself in a civil
case and had earned a General Equivalency Diploma. See I Trial Tr. at 8, 13-14.
The court thoroughly discussed with M r. Folsom the disadvantages of proceeding
pro se and the advantages of representation by counsel. See id. at 9-13. The
court then ensured that M r. Folsom had received, read, and understood the
charges against him, along with the possible penalties associated with a guilty
verdict. See id. at 13.
At no time did M r. Folsom or his counsel inform the court of any medical
history that might preclude M r. Folsom from proceeding pro se. To the contrary,
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the court directly asked M r. Folsom, “[h]ave you ever been under the care of a
psychiatrist, psychologist, or other mental health professional?” id. at 14, to
which M r. Folsom responded, “[y]es, sir.” Id. The court followed up, inquiring,
“[w]ould that in any way interfere with your ability to proceed here today?” Id.M r. Folsom answered flatly, “[n]o, sir.” I Trial Tr. at 14. Pursuing the subject
further, the court then asked a series of questions to ensure that M r. Folsom knew
his location, had not taken mind-altering drugs or medications during the course
of the proceedings, and then again asked in four different ways – both in the
affirmative and negative – whether M r. Folsom was certain he wanted to proceed
pro se. See id. at 14-15. Only after all this did the court rule M r. Folsom
“knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” waived his right to counsel and
granted M r. Folsom's request to proceed pro se. Id. at 15-16. The court also
directed that M r. W ebb would continue to serve as M r. Folsom’s legal advisor,
and that M r. Folsom could turn over the representation of his case to M r. W ebb at
any time. See id. at 16-17.
During trial, M r. Folsom made opening and closing statements to the jury,
examined the prosecution’s witnesses, responded to the evidence at the close of
the prosecution’s case, took the stand on his own behalf, and called an additional
witness. Despite his efforts, the jury found M r. Folsom guilty on nine counts. 1
1
Counts 6 and 7 of the indictment charged M r. Folsom with two counts of
(continued...)
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Prior to his sentencing, M r. Folsom sent a letter to the Oklahoma trial court
requesting appointed counsel on the basis that he suffered from a medical
condition that he believed might interfere with his continued ability to proceed
pro se. At the sentencing hearing, the court promptly re-appointed counsel for
M r. Folsom and then asked for details about the medical condition. M r. Folsom
disclosed to the court for the first time that he had been diagnosed with paranoid
schizophrenia in 1987 and bipolar disorder in 2002, and he indicated that he
doubted his mental competency to proceed with sentencing. The trial court
scheduled a threshold competency hearing at which M r. Folsom testified that,
since his trial, he had twice attempted suicide, been unable to recall previous
court proceedings, and was no longer able to understand the legal process or
assist his counsel on sentencing issues. 2 By contrast, three jail guards testified
that, despite some of M r. Folsom’s erratic behavior, 3 they believed that
1
(...continued)
attempted first-degree rape. The jury found M r. Folsom guilty of the attempted
first-degree rape charged in Count 6, but not guilty of the attempted first-degree
rape charged in Count 7. The jury instead found M r. Folsom guilty of the
lesser-included crime of sexual battery.
2
On cross-examination, M r. Folsom admitted his understanding that the jury
had recommended his long period of incarceration, and he understood at least
some of the charges against him. He also corrected an Oklahoma prosecutor on
the mistaken assertion that Oklahoma charged M r. Folsom for his firing a weapon
during the course of the alleged assault.
3
The guards testified that M r. Folsom had been angry, frustrated, confused,
and depressed; fought with other inmates; punched out a w indow at the city jail;
(continued...)
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M r. Folsom’s mental health and understanding of the legal process had not
deteriorated since the jury found him guilty.
At the close of the competency hearing, the Oklahoma trial court found –
especially after observing firsthand M r. Folsom’s pro se performance and
acknowledging that he had previously represented himself in court – that “[t]here
is absolutely no doubt in my mind [M r. Folsom] is competent within the meaning
of the law,” and that M r. Folsom’s competency claim was “an effort to delay the
efforts of justice.” VI Trial Tr. at 775. The Oklahoma trial court sentenced
M r. Folsom to, inter alia, 424 years of incarceration.
M r. Folsom appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
(“OCCA”), alleging the O klahoma trial court erred by, among other things,
allowing him to proceed at trial pro se without adequately inquiring into his legal
ability to do so (“w aiver-of-counsel claim”), and failing to hold a full-blown
competency examination before sentencing (“competency hearing claim”).
The OCCA affirmed, holding as to M r. Folsom’s waiver-of-counsel claim that
“the record as a whole demonstrates [that M r. Folsom] was competent to proceed
pro se at trial”; that the “trial court made appropriate inquiries to make that
determination”; and that “[t]he record as a whole suggests and supports a valid
waiver of the right to counsel, by a competent defendant.” OCCA Summary Op.,
3
(...continued)
and threatened suicide.
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R. doc. 17, ex. 3, at 3. As to M r. Folsom’s competency hearing claim, the OCCA
held that the Oklahoma trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that
M r. Folsom failed to “raise sufficient doubt as to his competency to warrant an
examination” before sentencing. Id. at 2-3. M r. Folsom’s subsequent efforts to
obtain post-conviction relief in Oklahoma state courts proved unfruitful.
After exhausting his state court remedies, M r. Folsom filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the W estern District
of Oklahoma. In this petition, M r. Folsom again pursued his waiver-of-counsel
claim and competency hearing claims. As to the former, the district court held as
“a reasonable application of federal law” the OCCA’s determination that the
entire record, including the Oklahoma trial court’s examination of and warning to
M r. Folsom, sufficed to establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of
counsel. As to the latter, the district court, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), ruled
that competency is a factual issue for the state courts and federal courts must treat
as presumptively correct the Oklahoma court’s findings. Because the Oklahoma
trial court held a threshold competency hearing and found M r. Folsom competent,
and because M r. Folsom failed to rebut the presumption of his competence with
clear and convincing evidence, the district court found itself powerless to grant
M r. Folsom’s requested habeas relief.
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M r. Folsom thereafter sought from us a COA, essentially lodging the same
arguments, and we granted his request for review in part. 4
* * *
“In habeas cases, we review the federal district court’s legal conclusions
de novo, applying the same review of the state court decision as the district
court.” Jackson v. Ray, 390 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Under the relevant AEDPA standard, where factual and legal issues have already
been adjudicated in state court, a federal court may only grant a writ of habeas
corpus if that adjudication (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on
4
A panel of this court previously granted M r. Folsom’s COA on the
follow ing issues:
1) W hether the state trial court violated his procedural due process
rights by failing to conduct an adequate hearing on the issue of his
competency to stand trial;
2) W hether the state trial court violated his substantive due process
rights by finding him competent to stand trial; and
3) W hether Folsom was denied his Sixth Amendment right to be
represented by counsel at trial because he did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to counsel.
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part an Application for a Certificate of
Appealability, at 3.
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an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of evidence presented in the
state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2). For substantially the
same reasons as the district court, we agree that the Oklahoma courts’ resolution
of M r. Folsom’s claims did not represent an unreasonable application of federal
law or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.
W e start by acknowledging the bedrock constitutional principle that
M r. Folsom enjoys a right to waive his right to counsel “knowing[ly],
intelligent[ly], and voluntar[ily].” See Maynard v. Boone, 468 F.3d 665, 676
(10th Cir. 2006). Trial courts have “the serious and weighty responsibility . . . of
determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.”
See id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938)). To fulfill that
responsibility, “a judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the
circumstances of the case before him demand. . . . The fact that an accused may
tell him that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right
does not automatically end the judge’s responsibility.” Id. at 677 (citing Von
M oltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948)).
In this case, M r. Folsom informed the trial court that he had previously
been under the care of mental health professionals. In response, the court asked,
“[w]ould that in any way interfere with your ability to proceed here today?”; to
which M r. Folsom answered, “[n]o, sir.” Though the court proceeded to ask
M r. Folsom follow up questions, had the court delved more deeply (or had
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M r. Folsom and his counsel been more forthcoming) it might have learned that
M r. Folsom had been previously diagnosed with serious mental health conditions.
Like Von M oltke, this case thus serves to illustrate how a court may be left
“entirely unaware of the facts essential to an informed decision that an accused
has executed a valid waiver of his right to counsel.” Von M oltke, 332 U.S. at 724.
For this reason, we encourage trial courts to do more than recite a set of questions
by rote; we emphasize Von M oltke’s teaching that they must engage the accused
in a real effort to uncover the relevant facts, just as we emphasize that existing
counsel and the witness have an obligation to be fully forthcoming with relevant
facts uniquely in their hold.
Nevertheless, as acknowledged by the district court, the O CCA’s
determination that he w as afforded that right is difficult to assail under A EDPA’s
strict standards. M r. Folsom indicated that he had represented himself in a civil
case and had obtained a General Equivalency Diploma. In none of their written
or oral answers did M r. Folsom or his counsel give the court any reason to doubt
M r. Folsom’s competency at trial. And M r. Folsom’s conduct during trial, where
he presented his case fairly well, plainly bolstered the trial court’s conviction that
he was competent to waive his right to counsel. W e are pointed to no precedent
or fact, and have discerned none ourselves, suggesting the O klahoma courts’
disposition of M r. Folsom’s waiver of counsel claim under these circumstances
fell afoul of AEDPA’s twin “unreasonableness” standards. See generally
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M aynard, 468 F.3d at 671 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citation
omitted) (“[O]nly the most serious misapplications of Supreme Court precedent
will be a basis for relief under § 2254. . . . It is not enough that the decision is
clearly wrong or that the reviewing court would have reached a contrary decision.
. . . [T]he state court decision must be at such tension with governing U.S.
Supreme Court precedents, or so inadequately supported by the record, or so
arbitrary as to be unreasonable.”).
As to M r. Folsom’s competency hearing claim, and as the district court
correctly observed, Congress has instructed us that competency is a factual issue
for the state courts and that the Oklahoma courts’ findings are presumptively
correct. See id. at 673-74. M r. Folsom fails to supply us, as he must, with clear
and convincing evidence that the O klahoma courts’ factual findings were
erroneous. See id. W hile w e do not doubt the presence of evidence that could
have led a reasonable fact finder to question M r. Folsom’s mental faculties (e.g.,
M r. Folsom’s testified that he twice attempted suicide; guards testified of their
perception of M r. Folsom’s volatile emotions and violent behavior, such as
fighting with other inmates, punching out a window at the city jail, and
threatening suicide), neither can we shy at the presence of evidence tending in the
opposite direction (e.g., M r. Folsom’s admission of his understanding of some
charges and jury’s sentencing recommendation; M r. Folsom’s on-the-stand
correction of the state prosecutor about the charges against him; the guards’
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testimony of their observations of M r. Folsom). All of this is to say that, by
virtue of the conflicting and credible evidence on both sides of the ledger,
M r. Folsom has failed to carry his heavy burden of demonstrating by clear and
convincing evidence that the trial court erred in its factual findings about his
competency. See id. (“[W]e conclude a rational [factfinder] could have
concluded that [the evidence] weighed in favor of finding competence. The
determination in the first instance is for [factfinders,] and we are not free to
substitute our view of the evidence.”)
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. M r. Folsom’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
Entered for the Court
Neil M . Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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