United States v. Jackson

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
May 24, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 06-8072
v. District of W yoming
(D.C. NO. 06-CR-083-B)
D U PRE LO N ELL JA CK SO N ,
Defendant-Appellant.
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 06-8073
District of W yoming
v. (D.C. NO. 06-CR-083-B)
G A RRETT D A V A RR ASS SM ITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before M U RPH Y, M cW ILLIAM S, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
On January 30, 2006, Dupre Lonell Jackson and Garrett Davarrass Smith
were driving cross-country in their borrowed Honda Accord, two friends out on
the road listening to music, seeing the country, and smuggling cocaine. Their
illicit adventure ended on Interstate 80 outside Pine Bluffs, W yoming. Trooper
Dave Chatfield stopped the pair for speeding; one question led to another and
then to a search, and within twenty minutes, both men were under arrest.
M r. Jackson and M r. Smith pled guilty to possession with intent to
distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, as well as aiding and abetting, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), 18 U.S.C. § 2. The defendants conditioned their pleas
on the right to appeal the district court’s denial of their motions to suppress. On
August 28, 2006, the trial court sentenced M r. Jackson to thirty months
imprisonment and four years supervised release. M r. Smith was sentenced to
sixty months in prison and four years supervised release. M r. Smith filed a timely
notice of appeal on September 1, 2006, challenging both the district court’s denial
of his suppression motion and its imposition of the statutorily mandated minimum
sentence. M r. Jackson followed suit seven days later, though he challenges only
the district court’s suppression ruling. 1 W e find that the district court properly
denied the defendants’ motion to suppress and did not err by sentencing M r.
1
The district court determined M r. Jackson qualified for the so-called
“safety-valve” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which allows the court to depart
downward from the mandatory minimum in certain instances.
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Smith to the statutory minimum. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court. 2
I. M otion to Suppress
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of citizens “to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has made clear that a traffic stop
“constitute[s] a ‘seizure’” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, however
brief the detention may be. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
These seizures do not offend the C onstitution, however, so long as they are
reasonable. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006) (“[T]he
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”). Because “a
routine traffic stop is more analogous to an investigative detention than [to] a
custodial arrest,” United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.
1998), we judge the reasonableness of these stops by the principles developed for
investigative detentions in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In brief, to be
reasonable, the law enforcement officer’s action must have been “justified at its
inception” and “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. In keeping with the
2
Appellants’ motions for a continuance of oral argument w ere denied.
Counsel are reminded that motions for continuance of argument should be filed as
soon as scheduling conflicts are known, and that in the absence of special
circumstances such motions, if made after the members of the Court have engaged
in substantial preparation in the case, are disfavored.
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deference ow ed the district court, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government and accept the district court’s finding of facts unless
clearly erroneous. Fourth amendment reasonableness we decide de novo. United
States v. Gregoire, 425 F.3d 872, 875 (10th Cir. 2005).
Detention of a motorist is justified at its inception in two circumstances:
W hen the officer has “(1) probable cause to believe a traffic violation has
occurred, or (2) a reasonable articulable suspicion that this particular motorist
violated any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations
of the jurisdiction.” United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir.
1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Neither defendant
challenges his detention at its inception, for good reason. Trooper Chatfield
clocked the defendants’ vehicle traveling seventy-nine miles per hour in a
seventy-five mile-per-hour speed zone, a relatively minor violation of W yoming’s
traffic laws, but a violation nonetheless. Having witnessed a traffic violation,
Chatfield was amply justified in stopping the offending motorists.
Terry’s second prong requires the officer’s subsequent actions to be
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the stop. 392
U.S. at 20. Put another way, the detention’s scope must be tailored to fit its
underlying justification. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d at 1199. M r. Smith contends that
Trooper Chatfield exceeded the permissible bounds of the traffic stop by
questioning Smith, the car’s passenger, about his travel plans. “There is no case
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law,” M r. Smith insists, permitting law enforcement officers to question the
passenger in a stopped vehicle. Smith Br. 12. This argument is wholly without
merit. Our precedent explicitly and repeatedly affirms the right of an officer to
question both the driver and her passenger as part of a routine traffic stop. See,
e.g., United States v. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261, 1263 (10th Cir. 1989) (“Officer
Keene could legitimately ask questions relating to the identity and travel plans of
M r. Rivera and M s. Jones [the passenger] . . . , regardless of O fficer Keene’s
underlying motivation.”). Accord United States v. Galindo-Gonzales, 142 F.3d
1217, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 1998). See also United States v. Foley, 206 F.3d 802,
805 (8th Cir. 2000) (officer may question vehicle occupants besides the driver).
The Supreme Court has never questioned an officer’s right to interrogate vehicle
passengers during a valid Terry stop. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975) (officers performing vehicular Terry stops along the
border may question “the driver and passengers”). Indeed, the high court has held
that an officer may do more than converse with a passenger during a stop, he may
order a passenger from the vehicle. M aryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15
(1997). Trooper Chatfield did not convert a legitimate traffic stop into an
unconstitutional detention by asking M r. Smith about his travel plans. 3
3
Adjusting his argument later in his brief, M r. Smith claims “the Courts are
restricting”— present tense— “interrogation of a passenger to those items
necessary to see if [the driver’s] story was correct as to the ownership of the
vehicle.” Smith Br. 37 n.3. For this proposition he cites United States v.
(continued...)
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Once an officer has returned the motorists’ licenses and other papers and
issued any citation he intends to give, he must usually allow them to proceed on
their way without additional questioning. United States v. Patterson, 183 F.3d
1190, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999). Further detention must be justified by an
objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, based on the totality of the
circumstances. U nited States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001).
M r. Smith and M r. Jackson claim Trooper Chatfield lacked reasonable suspicion
to detain them once he issued Jackson a citation and informed him he was free to
leave. W e disagree.
At the time Chatfield detained the two motorists in order to conduct a
canine sniff, he had observed “abnormal movement in the car by both driver and
passenger,” as if the men were concealing something beneath their seats. Smith
R. vol. 1, doc. 35 at 9-10. He knew that M r. Jackson did not have a driver’s
license. He knew that M r. Jackson’s claim never to have obtained a driver’s
license w as false— Jackson’s license w as, in fact, suspended. He had noticed M r.
Jackson sweating, fidgeting, and exhibiting other signs of extreme nervousness.
He had discovered that a third party owned the vehicle. And most significantly,
he had listened to the two men recite radically different versions of their travel
3
(...continued)
Guerrero-Espinoza, 462 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 2006). Guerrero-Espinoza says
nothing of the sort. That case dealt with a passenger’s freedom to leave the
traffic stop, not the scope of the officer’s questioning.
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history. M r. Jackson claimed the pair had been in Colorado for nearly a week
after driving a “cousin” out from Indiana to visit another “cousin” living in
Denver. Smith R. vol. 4, 14:16ff. W hile in the city, he said, the two men
attended the funeral of yet a third “cousin,” though Jackson admitted he and M r.
Smith were not related in any way. Smith R. vol. 4, 14:22ff. M r. Smith, on the
other hand, claimed he and Jackson had been in California and only recently
passed through Denver, where they got lost “for a couple of hours.” Smith R. vol.
1, doc. 35 at 10.
W e have held that nervousness, United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1556
(10th Cir. 1993), and ownership of a vehicle by a third party, United States v.
M endez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir. 1997), can lend support to a finding of
reasonable suspicion as part of the totality of the circumstances. The defendants’
implausible, inconsistent travel stories are the most important factor in this case,
however. M r. Jackson characterizes the differences in the men’s stories as minor,
but in fact the discrepancies are startling. Jackson and Smith could not agree
even on which state they had recently visited, much less the purpose of their trip.
W hen the driver asserts he has passed a week in Denver and the passenger claims
to have been in California, while both men insist they have been traveling
together the entire time, either there is a tear in the space-time continuum or
someone is not telling the truth. W e have found that inconsistent, unbelievable
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travel narratives can give rise to reasonable suspicion. United States v. Kopp, 45
F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (10th Cir. 1995). This travel story certainly qualifies.
The defendants argue that at least one of the district court’s factual findings
is clearly erroneous— namely, the court’s finding that they were moving about
suspiciously in the car before Trooper Chatfield first approached the vehicle.
They claim the videotape of the stop shows no such movement and that, further,
the district court promised from the bench it would not rely on nervousness in
ruling on the motion to suppress. Having reviewed the videotape of the stop, w e
conclude the district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous. The defendants can
be seen fidgeting in the car as the officer approaches, perhaps moving items at
their feet. M r. Smith continues to fidget and reach towards the floor while
Trooper C hatfield questions M r. Jackson in the patrol car.
As to the district court’s supposed promise not to take the defendants’
nervous behavior into account when ruling, we note that the statement in question
came in response to M r. Smith’s insistence that the court view the videotape in
full during the suppression hearing. Rather than halt the hearing to view the
recording, the court pledged to “assume” M r. Smith’s representations about his
conduct in the vehicle were accurate. W e do not understand the court’s comment
as a pledge to rule one way or another, or to make a particular factual finding, but
rather as an assumption arguendo made to facilitate the defendants’ presentation.
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The record supports the court’s factual finding, and in any event, nervousness is
but a minor factor in this case, which does not affect the result.
The defendants go on to suggest that none of the factors, standing alone,
justified Trooper Chatfield in detaining them. This argument is misconceived.
W e have said time and again that factors supporting reasonable suspicion must be
considered as a whole. Cortez v. M cCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1123 (10th Cir.
2007) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). As
it happens, the discrepancies in this case between the defendants’ travel tales
were so chasmic that factor alone would have given rise to reasonable suspicion.
Aggregating the factors only makes Trooper Chatfield’s suspicion that much more
reasonable.
Trooper Chatfield possessed reasonable suspicion at the time he returned
the license and registration papers to M r. Jackson and excused him from the
patrol car. M r. Smith’s contention that he w as not able to converse with M r.
Jackson before Chatfield began posing more questions, and therefore could not
offer valid consent for Chatfield to search the car, is irrelevant. Trooper
Chatfield did not need M r. Smith’s consent to conduct a canine sniff— the officer
possessed reasonable suspicion— and in any event, M r. Smith did not give it.
Based on the facts as found by the district court, we conclude Trooper
Chatfield did not violate the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights.
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II. M r. Sm ith’s Sentence
M r. Smith contends that the statutorily prescribed minimum sentence he
received violates his Sixth Amendment rights. His attorney refers this Court to
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Harris v. United States, 536 U.S.
545 (2002), and United States v. Booker, 543 U .S. 220 (2005). None of these
cases stands for the proposition he claims. In fact, the Supreme Court in Harris
upheld a mandatory minimum sentence even though it was premised on judicial
fact finding. 536 U.S. at 557. Booker did not purport to overrule Harris or the
Court’s line of cases, stretching back to M cM illan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,
93 (1986), which affirms congressional authority to prescribe mandatory
minimum sentences by statute.
W e have addressed this precise issue before, in precedent M r. Smith’s
attorney neglected to cite. Booker, we said in United States v. Harris, 447 F.3d
1300, 1307 (10th Cir. 2006), “does not apply to statutory minimum sentences.”
M r. Smith’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.
III. Conclusion
W e AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Entered for the Court,
M ichael W . M cConnell
Circuit Judge
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