Joel Polk v. David Parker

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 21, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
JOEL DEMONDE POLK,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 07-6261
v. (W.D. Oklahoma)
(D.C. No. CV-07-416-C)
DAVID PARKER, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE
OF APPEALABILITY
Before BRISCOE, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on Joel Demonde Polk’s pro se requests for
a certificate of appealability (“COA”) and for permission to proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis. Polk seeks a COA so he can appeal the denial of his 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 habeas corpus petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing no appeal
may be taken from a “final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the
detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court,” unless the
petitioner first obtains a COA). We grant Polk’s request to proceed in forma
pauperis. Nevertheless, because Polk has not “made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right,” this court denies his request for a COA and
dismisses this appeal. Id. § 2253(c)(2).
Polk was convicted in Oklahoma state court of one count of attempted
second degree burglary after previous convictions of two or more felonies. He
was sentenced to a thirty-year term of imprisonment. After exhausting his state
court remedies, Polk brought the instant § 2254 habeas petition raising the
following four claims: (1) his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence;
(2) the trial court’s sentencing instructions were erroneous; (3) the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct at trial, depriving him of a fair proceeding; and (4) trial
counsel was ineffective in (a) failing to impeach a prosecution witness with his
grand jury testimony, (b) failing to object to the trial court’s sentencing
instruction, and (c) failing to object to the prosecutor’s allegedly improper
questions and comments. Polk’s § 2254 petition was assigned to a magistrate
judge for initial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
The magistrate judge issued a comprehensive Report and Recommendation,
recommending that Polk’s § 2254 petition be denied. Applying the standards set
out in the AEDPA, the magistrate judge reviewed the trial record and concluded
the state court’s resolution of Polk’s sufficiency claim was not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), and
was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). The magistrate judge concluded Polk’s claim of instructional error
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failed because the trial court’s sentencing instruction was consistent with state
law and thus presented no federal habeas issue. Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 51.1(c)
(providing for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for habitual offenders);
Dennis v. Poppel, 222 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that federal
habeas review of a state sentence “ends once we determine the sentence is within
the limitation set by statute”). The magistrate judge concluded Polk’s claims of
prosecutorial misconduct failed because the questions and comments of the
prosecutor were proper avenues of cross-examination and/or comments on the
evidence adduced at trial. Finally, the magistrate judge noted that Polk’s claims
of ineffective assistance as to the failure to object to the sentencing instructions
and failure to object to the prosecutor’s improper comments failed because those
underlying claims failed on the merits. As to Polk’s ineffective assistance claim
relating to trial counsel’s failure to impeach a witness with his grand jury
testimony, the magistrate judge concluded that in light of the evidence presented
at trial, Polk could not demonstrate any prejudice flowing from this error. The
district court adopted the Report and Recommendation and dismissed Polk’s
petition.
To be entitled to a COA, Polk must make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make the requisite
showing, he must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
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manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quotations
omitted). In evaluating whether Polk has satisfied his burden, this court
undertakes “a preliminary, though not definitive, consideration of the [legal]
framework” applicable to each of his claims. Id. at 338. Although Polk need not
demonstrate his appeal will succeed to be entitled to a COA, he must “prove
something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith.”
Id.Having reviewed Polk’s application for a COA and appellate filings, 1 the
magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, the district court’s Order, and
the entire record before this court pursuant to the framework set out by the
Supreme Court in Miller-El, this court concludes Polk is not entitled to a COA.
The district court’s resolution of Polk’s § 2254 petition is not reasonably subject
to debate and the issues Polk seeks to raise on appeal are not adequate to deserve
further proceedings. In particular, we note that we have nothing to add to the
magistrate judge’s exceedingly well-stated Report and Recommendation.
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We hereby grant Polk’s motion for leave to supplement his pleadings.
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Accordingly, for those reasons set out in the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation and the district court’s Order, this court DENIES Polk’s request
for a COA and DISMISSES this appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker, Clerk
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