Trevino v. Arellano

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 29, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL TREVINO,
Petitioner–Appellant, No. 09-1048
v. (Case No. 1:05-CV-02567-WYD)
MICHAEL ARELLANO, Warden, (D. Colo.)
Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility;
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents–Appellees.
ORDER *
Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner, a state prisoner represented by counsel, seeks a certificate of
appealability to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his § 2254 habeas petition.
In his petition, he argued that his guilty plea in the state court was invalid because
he was not competent when he pled guilty and that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise this competency issue. The district court initially dismissed
the petition as untimely, but we granted a certificate of appealability and reversed
and remanded the case for further proceedings. Trevino v. Watkins, No. 06-1291,
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
225 F. App’x 746, 748 (10th Cir. 2007). On remand, the district court appointed
counsel for Petitioner and ordered additional briefing. The court ultimately
denied the petition, holding that Petitioner had not demonstrated that he was
entitled to a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
To obtain a certificate of appealability, Petitioner must make “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In order
to meet this burden, he must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in
a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Petitioner argues that the “state courts ignored or failed to credit evidence
indicating that Mr. Trevino suffered from serious, irreversible dementia.”
(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 30.) However, as the district court noted, the
evidence in Petitioner’s favor was contradicted by a substantial amount of
evidence that Petitioner was competent. The state trial court’s factual finding of
competency is presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence. See Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1070-71 (10th Cir. 2008). And,
Petitioner’s disagreement with the appropriate weight to be given to the
conflicting evidence heard by the state court does not constitute clear and
convincing evidence that the state court’s finding was incorrect.
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Petitioner also argues that the state courts entirely ignored the
uncontroverted evidence that he did not remember the events underlying the
charges against him, and he argues that the state courts’ rulings therefore
represented an unreasonable application of Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,
402 (1960). In responding to this argument, the district court noted that the state
trial court specifically found that reports indicated that Petitioner was malingering
and actively misleading others regarding his condition and its effects. Moreover,
the state court had before it evidence that cast doubt on the other evidence that
Petitioner did not remember any of the facts of his crime. For instance, one
doctor reported that Petitioner said his attorney told him not to talk about the
crime with anyone. The doctor stated that Petitioner “went on to say that he did
remember some of the events concerning his crime but his attorney had told him
not to discuss these.” (State Record Vol. 1 at 105.) Furthermore, Dusky does not
hold, nor does other federal law establish, that failing to remember the facts of a
crime renders a defendant incompetent to proceed. The circuits that have
considered this question have all concluded that amnesia about a crime does not
render a defendant per se incompetent to stand trial. See United States v.
Andrews, 469 F.3d 1113, 1119 (7th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases); see also United
States v. Borum, 464 F.2d 896, 898-900 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that amnesia
does not cause a per se deprivation of due process and that the Dusky standard
was satisfied even if the defendant in this case suffered a genuine loss of
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memory).
As for Petitioner’s claim that counsel’s failure to raise the competency
issue constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, the state court of appeals held
that this claim must be dismissed because the competency claim upon which it
was based lacked merit. The district court agreed with this conclusion below,
noting that Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice from counsel’s failure to raise
the competency issue if he was in fact competent. Because we conclude that
reasonable jurists would not debate whether Petitioner has rebutted the state
court’s finding of competency by clear and convincing evidence, we likewise
conclude that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim must necessarily fail.
After carefully reviewing Petitioner’s brief, the relevant state court
decisions, the district court’s disposition, and the record on appeal, we conclude
that Petitioner has not met the standard required to obtain a certificate of
appealability. For substantially the reasons given by the district court, we DENY
Petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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