United States v. Johnson

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 23, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. Nos. 09-3007, 09-3012,
09-3013 & 09-3016
ROBERT EARL JOHNSON; (D.C. No. 2:04-CR-20039-CM-JPO)
CLEVELAND GARRETT; (D. Kan.)
MARK SCAIFE; JOE GARRETT,
Defendants-Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, PORFILIO, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Robert Earl Johnson, Cleveland Garrett, Mark Scaife, and Joe Garrett
appeal from orders of the district court denying their individual motions for
sentence reductions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Because defendants were
co-defendants in the original district court case and because their appeals raise the
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). These cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
same issues, we will consider their appeals together. We affirm the district
court’s denial of defendants’ § 3582(c)(2) motions.
I. Background
Defendants are serving terms of imprisonment in federal prison for
distribution of cocaine base, also known as crack cocaine. Mr. Johnson was held
responsible for 13.2 kilograms of crack cocaine and he was sentenced to
78 months in prison. Mr. Cleveland Garrett was held responsible for
35.7 kilograms of crack cocaine and he was sentenced to 70 months in prison.
Mr. Scaife was held responsible for 35.7 kilograms of crack cocaine and he was
sentenced to 168 months in prison. Mr. Joe Garrett was held responsible for
28.9 kilograms of crack cocaine and he was sentenced to 84 months in prison.
Defendants all individually filed § 3582(c)(2) motions for a reduction in
sentence under guideline Amendment 706, which reset the crack cocaine
guidelines. The district court denied all of the motions, concluding that it lacked
jurisdiction to reduce defendants’ sentences because Amendment 706 did not
lower the guideline range for any of the defendants. Defendants now appeal.
II. Discussion
We review de novo the district court’s scope of authority in a resentencing
proceeding under § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833, 837
(10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2052 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2009).
“We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to deny a
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reduction in sentence under . . . § 3582(c)(2).” United States v. Sharkey, 543 F.3d
1236, 1238 (10th Cir. 2008).
a. Applicable Authority
Section 3582(c)(2) allows a sentence reduction “in the case of a defendant
who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range
that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . .”
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In such a case, “the court may reduce the term of
imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the
extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. (emphasis added).
The applicable policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, provides that where
“the guideline range applicable to [a] defendant has subsequently been lowered as
a result of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual listed in subsection (c) below,
the court may reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment as provided by
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a) (2008). Subsection (c) includes
Amendment 706 among the enumerated amendments. Id. § 1B1.10(c).
Amendment 706 generally adjusted downward by two levels the base offense
level assigned to quantities of crack cocaine.
In determining the extent of any reduction under § 3582(c)(2), “the court
shall determine the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to
the defendant if the amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in subsection (c) had
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been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1).
The policy statement further provides that: “A reduction in the defendant’s term
of imprisonment is not consistent with the policy statement and therefore is not
authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) if . . . an amendment listed in subsection
(c) does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline
range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
b. Defendants’ arguments
At defendants’ initial sentencing, the base offense level for the quantity of
drugs attributable to each defendant was level 38. The new crack cocaine
quantity for a base offense level of 38 is 4.5 kilograms. Because all of the
defendants were held responsible for more than 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine,
Amendment 706 did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline
range. The district court determined that it lacked authority to modify
defendants’ sentences because their base offense level and guideline range
remained the same.
Defendants first argue that treating U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 as a jurisdictional
limit violates the Sixth Amendment because it preserves one last mandatory
guideline. Defendants acknowledge that this argument is foreclosed by our
decision in Rhodes, but they respectfully submit that Rhodes was wrongly decided
and the better approach was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2007).
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The defendants here raise the same arguments as the defendant in Rhodes.
In Rhodes, the defendant relied on Hicks, contending that “the district court erred
in concluding that, in modifying his sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), it lacked
the authority to impose a sentence . . . less than the minimum of the amended
guideline range . . . .” Rhodes, 549 F.3d at 837 (quotation omitted). The
defendant in Rhodes argued further that “because a hearing pursuant to
§ 3582(c)(2) is a new sentencing hearing, Booker is applicable and the
guidelines—including § 1B1.10—must be advisory.” Rhodes, 549 F.3d at 839(quotation omitted).
We rejected these arguments as well as the rationale of Hicks:
[T]he Ninth Circuit, in a decision on which Rhodes now relies, held
that “Booker’s requirement that the district courts treat the United
States Sentencing guidelines as advisory applies to the resentencing
of defendants pursuant to . . . § 3582(c).” [Hicks, 472 F.3d at 1168].
As a result, the Ninth Circuit concluded, “district courts are
necessarily endowed with the discretion to depart from the
Guidelines when issuing new sentences under § 3582(c)(2).”
Id. at 1170. The problem with the Hicks decision, in our view, is that
it failed to consider that, as outlined above, sentence modification
proceedings have a different statutory basis than original sentencing
proceedings. As a result, the Ninth Circuit erroneously concluded
that the remedial portion of the Booker decision, which rendered the
guidelines effectively advisory for purposes of original sentencing
proceedings, applied to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings as well.
Rhodes, 549 F.3d at 840-41 (footnote omitted). We “conclude[d] that Booker
simply has no bearing on sentencing modification proceedings conducted under
§ 3582(c)(2).” Id. at 840.
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We went on to consider whether district courts have the authority to
sentence defendants below the amended guideline range in the § 3582(c)(2)
context, or whether they are bound to mandatorily apply § 1B1.10, which
disallows sentence reductions if the amendment “does not have the effect of
lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). We concluded that § 1B1.10 was mandatory, thereby
divesting district courts of authority to impose a below-Guidelines sentence:
The Sentencing Commission’s policy statements regarding
modifications of previously imposed sentences are set forth in
§ 1B1.10. Under the current version of that guideline, the
Sentencing Commission has clearly indicated that a sentencing court
shall not, in modifying a previously imposed sentence on the basis of
an amended guideline, impose a sentence below the amended
guideline range. Because this policy statement is binding on district
courts pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), the district court when sentencing
Rhodes correctly concluded that it lacked the authority to impose a
modified sentence that fell below the amended guideline range.
Rhodes, 549 F.3d at 841 (emphasis added).
We reaffirmed our holding in Rhodes in United States v. Pedraza, 550 F.3d
1218 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 2009 WL 811581 (U.S. May 18, 2009).
In Pedraza, we explained that
[l]ike Mr. Pedraza, Mr. Rhodes disputed the extent of the
resentencing judge’s authority to reduce his sentence. He argued that
after Booker, the sentencing judge had the authority not only to
reduce his sentence to the amended guidelines range but to reduce it
even further if the § 3553(a) factors so warranted a variance. We
rejected this position. Although Booker excised from the statute
§ 3553(b)(1), which had mandated that judges impose
within-guidelines sentences in original sentencings, we noted that
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Booker had not touched § 3582(c)(2), which covers sentence
modification proceedings. A resentencing proceeding is an entirely
different animal that does not implicate the Sixth Amendment
concerns that drove the Booker remedy. After our holding in Rhodes,
therefore, Mr. Pedraza’s argument that Booker and the Sixth
Amendment mandate discretion to impose a below-guidelines
sentence at resentencing has been settled: they do not.
550 F.3d at 1220 (citation omitted; emphasis added).
Defendants acknowledge in their briefs that their argument has been
foreclosed by our precedent and that this panel is bound by the decisions of prior
panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the
Supreme Court. But Defendants point out that there is a circuit split on this issue
because of Hicks and that they are filing the instant appeals to preserve their
ability to benefit from Supreme Court review of this question. After the filing of
these appeals, however, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Rhodes and
Pedraza. Accordingly, defendants’ argument on this issue is foreclosed by our
prior precedent, as there has been no intervening en banc decision in this court or
a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court. See In re Smith, 10 F.3d
723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
Defendants next argue that the jurisdictional limit in § 1B1.10
impermissibly invests the Sentencing Commission with power to determine which
cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider. Because this argument was
not raised in any of defendants’ motions for reduction of sentence, our review is
for plain error. See United States v. Dryden, 563 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir.
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2009). In Dryden, which was issued after briefing was completed on these
appeals, the defendant raised the same issue that defendants raise here. See id.We rejected defendant’s argument, holding that § 1B1.10 does not create an
unconstitutional restraint on resentencing jurisdiction because the language of
§ 1B1.10(a)(2) “is merely a paraphrase of Congress’s own language.” Dryden,
563 F.3d at 1170-71. As with defendants’ first argument, this argument has been
foreclosed by our precedent.
The district court properly denied defendants’ motions for reduction of
sentence under § 3582(c)(2). The judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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