Snyder v. Harris

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
January 4, 2011
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
LANE L. SNYDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 10-1143
(D.C. No. 1:07-CV-00998-PAB-KMT)
SANDRA HARRIS; DOCTOR (D. Colo.)
RICKTER; DOCTOR LOPEZ;
WILLIAM A. KLENKE,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, ANDERSON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Lane L. Snyder brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against physicians and
officials of the Colorado Department of Corrections, alleging they were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs during his incarceration. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. In particular the
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
court dismissed Mr. Snyder’s claim against Dr. William A. Klenke in his
individual capacity without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. The court dismissed his claims against the remaining defendants with
prejudice.
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. See Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir.
2002). We also review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court. Martinez v. Beggs,
563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 259 (2009). Under this
standard, summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
1. Dr. William A. Klenke
Mr. Snyder entered the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC)
custody in April 2005. About a year later, in April 2006, he put in a request for
medical attention because of his intense lower back and abdominal pain.
Dr. Klenke saw him for the pain and ordered x-rays. The x-rays revealed that
Mr. Snyder had a bullet or bullet fragment lodged in his spine. He admitted he
had been shot in April 2004 during a robbery, prior to the time he became an
inmate of CDOC. He thought that the doctor who operated on him after the
shooting had removed the bullet, but the x-rays showed it was still there.
-2-
In his amended complaint, Mr. Snyder charged that Dr. Klenke showed
deliberate indifference to his health by failing to remove the bullet. 1 He alleged
that he later “put in [a] Grievance because nothing had been done” about the
bullet but the grievance “was not retur[n]ed.” R., Vol. I at 20. After that he
“started having problems with HIV and shingles then stopped [the] Grievance
[process] for [the] bullet” and pursued other grievances. Id.Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Mr. Snyder was required
to exhaust completely his available administrative remedies prior to bringing his
claim against Dr. Klenke in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). CDOC
regulations provide for a three-step administrative grievance process. “Step 1
grievances shall be investigated and answered by the involved DOC employee,
contract worker, or volunteer, together with a DOC employee appointed by the
administrative head, or designee.” Admin. Reg. # 850-04(IV)(C)(1)(a.),
reproduced at R., Vol. I at 77. Step 2 grievances are investigated and answered
by the administrative head, or his designee. Id. # 850-04(IV)(C)(1)(b). Step 3
grievances are investigated and answered by CDOC’s grievance officer.
Id. # 850-04(IV)(C)(1)(c). An inmate who has properly pursued all three
grievances has exhausted his administrative remedies through the CDOC and may
1
He named a Doctor Mike Conly rather than Dr. Klenke as the responsible
party. The magistrate judge noted that “Dr. Klenke was substituted for the
nonexistent Dr. Conly on November 20, 2007.” R., Vol. I at 195 n.1.
-3-
proceed in federal court. See Howard v. Waide, 534 F.3d 1227, 1244 (10th Cir.
2008); Whitington v. Ortiz, 472 F.3d 804, 807 (10th Cir. 2007).
In connection with their motion for summary judgment, defendants
submitted the affidavit of Anthony DeCesaro. In it, Mr. DeCesaro stated that he
was the Step 3 Grievance Officer for CDOC. R., Vol. I at 171. He had checked
CDOC’s grievance records and “found no Step 3 Grievance filed by Inmate Lane
L. Snyder, # 126117 regarding the medical treatment for a gunshot bullet
fragment in his spine.” Id. This fits Mr. Snyder’s representation that he
abandoned the grievance process concerning the bullet fragment before
completing it.
Mr. Snyder made vague responses to this evidence, none of which create a
genuine issue of material fact. In his response to summary judgment, he claimed
that “[t]he grievances on the gunshot [claim] seemed to always vanish.” Id.
at 114. 2 He further asserted that he had some step 2 grievances on other claims
sent back with no response at all, that he filed some “step 3 grievances I never
seen again” and that the prison library did not permit him to copy his grievance
2
These representations were made in connection with Mr. Snyder’s response
to defendants’ first motion for summary judgment, which they filed with regard to
his original complaint. The district court later required defendants to file another
motion for summary judgment with respect to his amended complaint. The
DeCesaro affidavit accompanying each motion for summary judgment was
identical. Mr. Snyder apparently did not respond to the second motion for
summary judgment.
-4-
forms. Id. It is unclear whether the alleged disappearing Step 3 grievances
related to the gunshot bullet claim or the other claims he mentioned.
Mr. Snyder renewed his argument in his response to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation that his claim against Dr. Klenke be dismissed for failure to
exhaust. He stated:
[M]any times I tried to get the Grievance [copied] but they would not
let me. If I could [have copied] the Grievance I could show the
Honorable Judge at present that I sent the Grievance in and it just is
gone[.] [Nobody knows] what happen[ed] to the Grievance[.] I was
even denied [the] right to go to the Law Library bec[a]use I wanted
to . . . copy the Grievance on William Klenke.
Id. at 246-47.
As evidence of this, Mr. Snyder submitted a “Legal Access Program Denial
Form.” Id. at 250. This form does state that “[t]he legal access program will not
copy . . . grievances.” Id. But that is not the reason Mr. Snyder’s request was
rejected. According to the boxes checked on the form, he filed the wrong form,
because he should have requested “legal assistance/access into the law library.”
Id. He was encouraged to resubmit his request on the proper form. This form
reveals nothing about whether Mr. Snyder actually filed a grievance.
Next, he submitted “photocopy request form[s]” which show that his
amended prisoner complaint and “motion to see another doctor” were copied by
the Legal Access Program at the prison. Id. at 251-52. The form to copy his
complaint shows he was charged for five copies of a twelve-page complaint
-5-
together with a one-page certificate of mailing. His amended complaint is indeed
twelve pages long, and contains no grievance forms. See id. at 15-26. But there
is no indication that he had any grievance forms to copy to accompany the
complaint, other than his handwritten notation on the copy form that “I was told
that I [can’t] photocopy grievance.” Id. at 251.
Mr. Snyder also claimed that his journal entries proved he filed grievances
that were returned without a response. But these entries relate to time periods
after he filed this suit, not before filing when he should have exhausted. See id.
at 262. Particularly in view of his admission in his amended complaint that he
did not complete the grievance process with regard to his claims against
Dr. Klenke, the district court’s determination that he failed to exhaust should be
and is affirmed.
2. Dr. Jay Richter
In his amended complaint, Mr. Snyder asserts that Dr. Richter was
deliberately indifferent to his need for treatment of his HIV and his infection with
Hepatitis-C. Id. at 21-22. The magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Snyder had
also failed to exhaust his remedies as to this claim. But, noting that dismissal for
failure to exhaust is without prejudice, the magistrate judge also addressed the
merits of the claim, finding that Mr. Snyder had failed to establish deliberate
indifference. The district court, observing that Mr. Snyder had failed to object to
the magistrate judge’s conclusions concerning his failure to exhaust, upheld that
-6-
determination. But it also adopted the magistrate judge’s conclusion that his
claim failed on the merits.
The general rule is that “no unexhausted claim may be considered.” Jones
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 220 (2007). 3 Therefore, even if the district court could
enter a disposition dismissing for lack of exhaustion and alternatively dismissing
because the claim failed on the merits, this court should not affirm the merits
determination if Mr. Snyder in fact failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
The failure to exhaust is quite plain from the record; it has not been waived
by Dr. Richter; and summary judgment should be upheld on that basis. There is
evidence that Mr. Snyder filed a Step 3 grievance concerning his allegations
against Dr. Richter. R., Vol. I at 171. But he signed this grievance on May 10,
2007, and it was received by the prison authorities on May 25, 2007. Id.Mr. Snyder filed this lawsuit on May 14, 2007, before the grievance officer
received his Step 3 grievance. An inmate is not permitted to complete the
administrative exhaustion process after he files suit. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones,
3
PLRA permits a district court to dismiss a claim that fails on its face even
though it has not been exhausted, provided that the claim is “frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2). But
that is not what happened here. Here, the district court denied the claim on the
merits because it determined the summary judgment evidence did not establish
that Dr. Richter was deliberately indifferent to Mr. Snyder’s serious medical
needs. R., Vol. I at 434.
-7-
340 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2003). Therefore, Mr. Snyder never completed the
grievance process for his claim against Dr. Richter.
Mr. Snyder presented his own evidence concerning his grievances against
Dr. Richter, but this evidence does not contradict the sequence of events we have
described. For example, he attached a copy of the May 10, 2007, grievance to his
submissions to district court, with a note that “I received grievance 3 step [a]
week [later] with no response.” Id. at 119. It is unclear what he means by “a
week later,” but even if he means a week from the date he signed the grievance,
that would still be May 17, 2007, three days after he filed suit. The grievance
was therefore untimely.
One modification is needed to the district court’s decision on this point,
however. It dismissed Dr. Richter with prejudice on the merits. But if
Mr. Snyder did not exhaust his administrative remedies for his claim against
Dr. Richter, the dismissal should have been without prejudice. We will therefore
remand so that the district court can change its dismissal to be without prejudice.
3. Dr. Edward Lopez
Mr. Snyder alleged that Dr. Lopez was deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs because Dr. Lopez did not adequately treat his hemorrhoid
problem. Mr. Snyder admitted that Dr. Lopez prescribed treatment, but contended
he was indifferent to Mr. Snyder’s complaints that the treatment did not solve his
problem.
-8-
The magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment be denied on
this issue. He concluded “the defendant has left the record barren of evidence
even alluding to whether Dr. Lopez ever considered alternative treatment for
Plaintiff or knew that the treatment prescribed might not be working.” Id. at 210.
In his objections to the report and recommendation, Dr. Lopez provided
additional evidence with which to address the magistrate judge’s concerns.
Included in this evidence was the affidavit of Dr. Paula Frantz. Dr. Frantz
reviewed the record of Dr. Lopez’s treatment of Mr. Snyder. She detailed the
following events:
1. On June 19, 2006, Mr. Snyder was seen in the prison clinic with
complaints about blood in his stool. Stool sample tests revealed that he did not
have blood in his stool at that time.
2. Following his continued complaints of rectal bleeding, Mr. Snyder was
referred to Dr. Lopez for a colonoscopy. Dr. Lopez was a member of the CDOC’s
Panel of Medical Consultants, and provided services for them on a contract basis.
3. The colonoscopy, performed on December 18, 2006, revealed that
Mr. Snyder had 3+ internal hemorrhoids.
4. Dr. Lopez prescribed treatment with Anusol with hydrocortisone. Both
these medications are used to treat hemorrhoids and the resulting itching and
swelling. Mr. Snyder was also provided with stool softeners.
Id. at 230-31.
-9-
Dr. Frantz explained that “[c]onservative treatment using suppositories and
stool softeners is the mainstay of treatment of hemorrhoids.” Id. at 233. She
went on to describe additional treatment provided to Mr. Snyder after Dr. Lopez
conducted the colonoscopy and prescribed medication for him. But none of this
treatment was provided by Dr. Lopez, whose role in Mr. Snyder’s treatment had
ended.
The medical records attached to Dr. Frantz’s affidavit substantiate her
account of these events. This being the case, Mr. Snyder’s claims against
Dr. Lopez, which are based on the failure of the Anusol/hydrocortisone
prescription to solve his problem, fail for lack of personal participation. See, e.g.,
Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1196 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007). Essentially,
Mr. Snyder complained that Dr. Lopez’s treatment (the “mainstay” of hemorrhoid
treatment, according to Dr. Frantz’s uncontroverted affidavit) did not cure his
problem and that when he returned to the clinic and saw other physicians, they
did not help him. This does not represent a viable deliberate indifference claim
against Dr. Lopez. The district court therefore properly granted summary
judgment in his favor.
4. Sandra Harris
Mr. Snyder’s allegations against Ms. Harris in his complaint are somewhat
cryptic. He asserts that in February and March 2007 he was “seen by Sandra
-10-
Harris” who told him “she couldn’t do anything right now” about his rectal
bleeding. R., Vol. I at 23. He also complains that she denied his grievances.
In their summary judgment motion, defendants argued that Mr. Snyder’s
claims against Ms. Harris should be dismissed for lack of personal participation.
They contended that “Snyder merely alleged that Defendant Harris denied his
grievances” and that this was not enough to assert a claim against her. Id. at 139.
They also asserted that Ms. Harris, who is a nurse and works as a Health Services
Administrator for CDOC, “deferred to the medical professionals to make the
proper medical decisions as to the medical treatment that would be best for
Snyder.” Id. at 138. Ms. Harris’s responses to interrogatories supported this
contention; she stated that “I do not determine the treatment regime ordered for a
specific medical condition.” Id. at 151. She also later filed an affidavit in which
she indicated that she received Mr. Snyder’s Step 2 grievance and “referred the
matter to a doctor and then denied the grievance.” Id. at 244.
The magistrate judge recommended that Mr. Snyder’s claim against
Ms. Harris be denied because its “singular basis” was “her denial of his various
grievances.” Id. at 212. This ignores the admittedly cryptic allegation in
Mr. Snyder’s complaint that he was “seen by” Ms. Harris, who allegedly told him
she couldn’t do anything about his hemorrhoid problem. As the district court
noted, however, Mr. Snyder did not object to the magistrate judge’s
-11-
recommendation that his claim against Ms. Harris be dismissed. Id. at 433. The
district court nevertheless reviewed the claim for clear error, and found none. Id.
The district court’s “clear error” review does not preclude application of
this court’s “firm waiver rule,” “which provides that a litigant’s failure to file
timely objections to a magistrate’s report and recommendation waives appellate
review of both the factual and legal determinations.” Key Energy Res. Inc. v.
Merrill (In re Key Energy Res., Inc.), 230 F.3d 1197, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 2000)
(quotation and brackets omitted). This court may apply the rule, notwithstanding
the district court’s decision to consider claims which have been defaulted by
failure to object to a magistrate judge’s recommendation. See id. at 1201 n.3.
If the rule were applied here, this court would not reach the dismissal of
Mr. Snyder’s claims against Ms. Harris.
In any event, the district court correctly determined there is nothing to
these claims. Merely denying grievances is not “personal participation” that will
support a cause of action under § 1983. Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063,
1069 (10th Cir. 2009). Moreover, in one case at least, Ms. Harris states that she
did not simply deny the grievance; she passed on Mr. Snyder’s concerns to a
physician. Finally, Mr. Snyder presented no facts to dispute Ms. Harris’s
assertion that she was not in charge of his treatment and that treatment decisions
were made by doctors, not by her. Summary judgment is therefore affirmed for
Ms. Harris.
-12-
5. Pending Motions
Mr. Snyder has filed a number of motions in this court. Two of them
remain pending with the merits panel.
On May 10, 2010, he filed a “Motion to Supplement Opening Brief.” This
motion merely seeks to add prescription records, most or all of which date from
the time period after he left CDOC custody. This material was either already in
the district court record (and irrelevant to the issues on appeal) or not part of the
district court record and cannot be used to supplement the record on appeal.
On May 17, 2010, he filed a combined “Motion to Appoint Counsel” and
“Motion to Amend[] Opening Brief.” This court already denied his motion to
appoint counsel. The motion to amend his brief seeks to add some information
about exhaustion of administrative remedies, including a letter dated April 24,
2008 from Grievance Officer Anthony A. DeCesaro indicating that he has now
completed Step 3 of the grievance process. The problem with this letter, which
concerns the claim against Dr. Richter, is that it is dated after Mr. Snyder filed
this suit. Therefore, for the reasons we have already stated, it does not represent
valid exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to filing this suit.
We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment dismissing the claims against
defendants Klenke, Lopez, and Harris, for substantially the reasons stated in its
order of March 29, 2010. We REMAND to the district court with instructions to
-13-
modify dismissal of the claim against Dr. Richter to be without prejudice for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. All pending motions are DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
-14-