United States v. Berrios

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 11 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. Nos. 03-4111 & 03-4142
ANTENOR BERRIOS, (D.C. No. 2:03-CR-264-TC)
(D. Utah)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BRISCOE, Circuit
Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Defendant Antenor Berrios appeals from two interlocutory orders issued by the
district court in his misdemeanor criminal case. In appeal No. 03-4111, Berrios appeals
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
the district court’s April 30, 2003, order compelling him to submit to a mental evaluation
as a condition of pretrial release and implicitly denying his objections to the same pretrial
release condition earlier imposed by a magistrate judge. In appeal No. 03-4142, Berrios
appeals the district court’s May 27, 2003, order mandating that he be placed in the
Attorney General’s custody and committed to an institution for a psychiatric examination
to determine his competency to stand trial, and continuing his trial. We affirm in part and
reverse in part.
I.
Berrios, a permanent resident alien and veteran of the United States military, went
to the Veterans’ Administration (VA) hospital in Salt Lake City on the morning of
January 22, 2003, in anticipation of a medical appointment scheduled the following day.
Berrios requested a voucher that would enable him to spend the night and have three
meals at a hotel affiliated with the hospital. A VA employee refused his request because
Berrios failed to produce written evidence that he resided more than 50 miles from the
hospital, as was necessary under hospital policy to qualify for a voucher. In response,
Berrios allegedly created a disturbance by acting in a disorderly manner and using loud
and profane language. A VA police officer intervened, but Berrios allegedly again began
using a loud voice. The officer issued Berrios two violation notices for disorderly
conduct, each of which imposed a $75 fine. Following issuance of the fines, an associate
medical director at the hospital approved Berrios’ request to stay overnight based on his
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oral statement that he had moved and now lived more than 50 miles away from the
hospital.
Two days later, the VA police learned that, approximately one hour prior to the
incidents that gave rise to the two citations, Berrios allegedly had approached a pharmacy
technician at the hospital and, in the course of obtaining a prescription, asked her to
change the hospital records to reflect that he lived more than 50 miles away from the
hospital. When the pharmacy technician refused to do so, Berrios allegedly
complimented the technician on her physical appearance, grabbed her hand and began
caressing it, and asked if he could kiss it. The technician pulled her hand away and told
Berrios to let go. In response, Berrios allegedly kissed her hand with his open mouth
several times before letting go. The technician summoned her supervisor, who advised
Berrios that the pharmacy could not change hospital records to reflect a change of
address.
On March 4, 2003, Berrios was charged in a four-count information with one
count of assaulting and intimidating a federal employee engaged in the performance of
her official duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111; two counts of disrupting the
performance of official duties by federal employees, in violation of 38 C.F.R.
§ 1.218(a)(5) and (b)(11); and one count of stealing or converting to his own use a thing
of value (i.e., the one-night stay and the three meals) belonging to the United States, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641.
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On March 6, 2003, the magistrate judge conducted what was designated as
Berrios’ initial appearance and arraignment on the criminal charges contained in the
information. At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate judge entered a not guilty
plea to the information on Berrios’ behalf, ordered Berrios to submit to a mental
evaluation, and appointed counsel to represent Berrios. After the hearing, the magistrate
judge issued a written order memorializing his rulings. In pertinent part, the order
directed Berrios to submit to a mental evaluation as a condition of pretrial release.
Berrios, appearing on his own behalf, filed objections to the magistrate judge’s
order directing him to submit to a mental evaluation. On April 24, 2003, the district court
held a hearing on Berrios’ objections. During the hearing, the district court expressed
concern as to whether Berrios would appear for trial and whether he was a risk to himself
and others. On April 30, 2003, the district court issued a written order directing Berrios
to immediately submit to a mental evaluation to determine his competency, whether he
was a flight risk, and whether he was a risk to himself or society.
Berrios did not submit to a mental evaluation. Accordingly, on May 12, 2003, the
district court issued a warrant for his arrest with instructions that upon apprehension he be
brought before the court. On May 14, 2003, the government filed a motion for
determination of mental competency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). On May 27, 2003,
pursuant to the government’s motion, the district court issued an order directing that
Berrios be placed in the custody of the United States Attorney and committed to a
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psychiatric facility for evaluation. The order also continued the trial on the charges
contained in the information.
II.
Appellate Jurisdiction
Before addressing Berrios’ challenges to the district court’s orders, we briefly
address whether we have appellate jurisdiction over these interlocutory appeals.
Generally speaking, our jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions of the district courts of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, the collateral order doctrine, outlined by
the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, 337 U.S. 541,
545-47 (1949), provides an exception to this rule. To establish jurisdiction under the
collateral order doctrine, an appellant must establish that the district court’s order (1)
conclusively determined the disputed question, (2) resolved an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the case, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment. See Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989).
“The requirements of the collateral order doctrine are easily satisfied in th[e] case
of an order of commitment for psychiatric examination.” United States v. Rinaldi, 351
F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 2003); see United States v. Deters, 143 F.3d 577, 581 (10th Cir.
1998) (stating “a commitment order issued for the purpose of obtaining an evaluation of
the defendant’s competency to stand trial as described in 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b) may be
immediately appealed”); United States v. Boigegrain, 122 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir.
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1997) (holding order committing defendant to custody of Attorney General to determine
whether competency to stand trial was likely to be attained was immediately appealable
under collateral order doctrine). Here, as in Rinaldi, the district court’s orders
“conclusively determined that [Barrios] should undergo a psychiatric evaluation,” and
determinations about his “mental capacity are separate from the issue of his guilt or
innocence” of the criminal charges against him. 351 F.3d at 288. “Finally, the order[s]
would be virtually unreviewable because there would be no effective relief for [his] loss
of liberty during the period of commitment.” Id. Thus, we conclude the collateral order
doctrine applies in this case and affords us jurisdiction over Barrios’ appeals.
Appeal No. 03-4111
In Appeal No. 03-4111, Barrios challenges the district court’s April 30, 2003,
order compelling a mental evaluation as a condition of pretrial release and implicitly
denying his objections to the magistrate judge’s previous order of the same nature. “We
apply de novo review to mixed questions of law and fact concerning [a] detention or
release decision, but we accept the district court’s findings of historical fact which
support that decision unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Cisneros, 328
F.3d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 2003).
Neither the challenged order, nor the underlying order issued by the magistrate
judge, cited any statutory basis for requiring Berrios to submit to a mental evaluation as a
condition of his pretrial release. Presumably, both orders were issued pursuant to the Bail
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Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142. The Bail Reform Act generally provides that, pending
trial, a criminal defendant must be released “on personal recognizance” or “upon
execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the court.” 18
U.S.C. § 3142(b). If, however, the district court determines such release “will not
reasonably assure the appearance of” the defendant “or will endanger the safety of any
other person or the community,” the court can condition the release on the satisfaction of
one or more of the conditions listed in § 3142(c)(1).
The problem here is that neither the magistrate judge nor the district court
determined that the release of Berrios on personal recognizance or upon execution of an
unsecured appearance bond would “not reasonably assure [his] appearance” or would
“endanger the safety of any other person or the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1).
Indeed, the magistrate judge made no determinations on these issues. Although the
district court expressed concern about the issues, it made no specific determinations.
Thus, lacking specific determinations on these issues, the magistrate judge and the district
court lacked authority to impose specific conditions on Berrios’ release. See United
States v. Martin-Trigona, 767 F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting the Bail Reform Act
“does not authorize a judicial officer to order as a condition of pretrial release a
psychiatric examination to determine a defendant’s dangerousness”). We therefore
reverse the April 30 order to the extent it conditioned Berrios’ pretrial release on
submission to a mental evaluation.
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Appeal No. 03-4142
In Appeal No. 03-4142, Berrios contends the district court erred in issuing the May
27 order mandating his placement in the Attorney General’s custody for a psychiatric
examination to determine his competency to stand trial. We review that order for abuse
of discretion. See United States v. Ramirez, 304 F.3d 1033, 1035 (10th Cir. 2002)
(“Whether to order a competency examination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”).
“Abuse of discretion occurs when a court has based its decision on an erroneous
conclusion of law or relies on clearly erroneous fact findings.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
Section 4241(a) of Title 18 affords a district court authority, either pursuant to its
own motion or that of the government, to order a hearing to determine the mental
competency of a criminal defendant if the court concludes “there is reasonable cause to
believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect
rendering him mentally incompetent.” Prior to such hearing, a district court “may order
that a psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant be conducted, and that a
psychiatric or psychological report be filed with the court.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b). Under
18 U.S.C. § 4247, the court may commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney
General for placement in a suitable facility where the psychiatric or psychological
examination may be conducted.
After examining the record on appeal, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of
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the district court in ordering that a psychiatric examination of Berrios be conducted, or in
committing Berrios to the custody of the Attorney General for purposes of having that
examination conducted. Although it would have been preferable for the district court to
make more specific factual findings in its order, the record indicates that, in addition to
the alleged unusual conduct giving rise to the criminal charges against him, Berrios
engaged in a variety of unusual behavior during the course of the criminal proceedings
against him, including (a) initially agreeing to submit to a mental evaluation and then
subsequently changing his mind, (b) refusing to cooperate with pretrial services
personnel, (c) accusing two court-appointed attorneys of conspiring against him and
deliberately proceeding in a manner contrary to his interests, and (d) making numerous ex
parte calls to the district court chambers. Considered together, we conclude this behavior
was sufficient to provide the district court with reasonable cause to issue the May 27
order.
Motion to Strike
In connection with Appeal No. 03-4142, Berrios has filed a separate motion to
strike the district court’s May 27 order, arguing the district court lacked jurisdiction to
issue the order and that the order violates the Speedy Trial Act.
In his challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction, Berrios asserts his appeal of the
district court’s April 30 order effectively removed jurisdiction over the case from the
district court and placed it in this court. Berrios is only partly correct. His appeal of the
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April 30 order deprived the district court of jurisdiction to make any further rulings
concerning the matters related to that appeal, i.e., requiring submission to a mental
evaluation as a special condition of pretrial release. See United States v. Distasio, 820
F.2d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 1987) (reversing order modifying sentence because order was
entered after notice of appeal filed); see also United States v. Queen, 847 F.2d 346, 350
(7th Cir. 1988) (holding court had jurisdiction to issue bench warrant when defendant
failed to surrender as ordered by district court). His appeal did not, however, “divest the
trial court of jurisdiction to continue deciding other issues in the case,” including the issue
of his competence to stand trial. Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171,
1174 (6th Cir. 1995). We therefore reject Berrios’ jurisdictional argument.
As for Berrios’ speedy trial arguments, we conclude we lack jurisdiction to
consider them. See, e.g., United States v. Tsosie, 966 F.2d 1357, 1361 (10th Cir. 1992)
(holding dismissal of indictment without prejudice under Speedy Trial Act was “not a
final decision either under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or the collateral order doctrine”).
The orders of the district court are AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part,
and the case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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