Zabrinas v. McKune

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 18 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DAVID JOHN ZABRINAS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 05-3026
(District of Kansas)
DAVID McKUNE; ATTORNEY (D.C. No. 03-CV-3072-JAR)
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
KANSAS,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on David John Zabrinas’ pro se request for a
certificate of appealability (“COA”). Zabrinas seeks a COA so that he can appeal
the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. See 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that no appeal may be taken from a “final
order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises
out of process issued by a State court,” unless the petitioner first obtains a COA).
Because Zabrinas has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right,” id. § 2253(c)(2), this court denies his request for a COA and
dismisses this appeal.
Zabrinas was convicted in Kansas state court of aggravated indecent
solicitation of a child in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3511; he was sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of sixty months. After exhausting his state court
remedies, Zabrinas brought the instant § 2254 petition raising the following
claims: (1) because the crime charged could be committed in more than one way,
the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree
on the act underlying the conviction; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to give a
lesser included offense instruction; (3) his conviction was not supported by
sufficient evidence; (4) the trial court’s upward departure from the presumptive
sentencing range violated the Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004);
and (5) his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in failing
to object to certain statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments.
In concluding Zabrinas was not entitled to habeas relief, the district court
reasoned as follows: (1) the state court’s determination that no unanimity
instruction was necessary because each alternative means of committing the crime
was supported by substantial evidence is consistent with Schad v. Arizona, 501
U.S. 624 (1991); (2) failure to give a lesser included offense instruction in a non-
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capital case, whether or not warranted, is not grounds for federal habeas relief,
Spears v. Mullin, 343 F.3d 1215, 1236 (10th Cir. 2003); (3) the state court’s
determination that Zabrinas’ conviction was sufficiently supported by the
testimony of the officer recounting the statements the young victim made
contemporaneously with the crime was not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); (4) Apprendi and Blakely
are not retroactively applicable on federal habeas review 1; and (5) trial counsel
was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct with
regard to the prosecutor’s closing argument because the prosecutor’s statements
were permissible comments on the evidence presented at trial.
To be entitled to a COA, Zabrinas must make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make the requisite
showing, he must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
1
We note that in concluding that Blakely is not retroactively applicable on
federal habeas review, the district court relied on Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656
(2001); Leonard v. United States, 383 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2004); and Browning
v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Each of these cases,
however, deals with the standards this court employs in analyzing whether to
grant an applicant permission to file a second or successive habeas petition or 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion. They do not deal with the question whether Blakely is
retroactively applicable to a first habeas petition, such as that in this case. In any
event, this court has specifically applied the retroactivity analysis set out in
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) and concluded that Blakely is not
retroactively applicable to a first habeas petition. United States v. Price, 400 F.3d
844 (10th Cir. 2005).
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for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quotations
omitted). In evaluating whether Zabrinas has satisfied his burden, this court
undertakes “a preliminary, though not definitive, consideration of the [legal]
framework” applicable to each of his claims. Id. at 338. Although Zabrinas need
not demonstrate his appeal will succeed to be entitled to a COA, he must “prove
something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith.”
Id.
Having undertaken a review of Zabrinas’ application for a COA and
appellate filings, the district court’s order, and the entire record before this court
pursuant to the framework set out by the Supreme Court in Miller-El, this court
concludes that Zabrinas is not entitled to a COA. The district court’s resolution
of Zabrinas’ § 2254 petition is not reasonably subject to debate and the issues he
seeks to raise on appeal are not adequate to deserve further proceedings.
Accordingly, this court DENIES Zabrinas’ request for a COA and DISMISSES
this appeal.
Entered for the Court
PATRICK FISHER, Clerk of Court
By
Deputy Clerk
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