United States v. Angilau

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 14, 2013
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 12-4025
SIALE ANGILAU,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. Nos. 2:12-CV-00138-TC, 2:08-CR-00758-TC-SA-6 and
2:08-CR-00431-TC-3)
Michael J. Langford, Law Office of Michael J. Langford, P.C., Salt Lake City,
Utah, for Defendant - Appellant.
Diana Hagen, Assistant United States Attorney (David B. Barlow, United States
Attorney, with her on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from the latest in a series of four prosecutions by Utah
and federal authorities of Defendant Siale Angilau on charges stemming from the
shooting of two deputy United States marshals in August 2007. In the case now
before us, Defendant was indicted on four counts by a grand jury for the United
States District Court for the District of Utah. One count charged racketeering
conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). The other three were based on the marshals
shooting: assaulting a federal officer, see id. § 111(a) (the assault count); assault
with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering, see id. § 1959(a) (entitled
“Violent crimes in aid of racketeering [VICAR] activity”) (the VICAR count);
and using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence (namely, the VICAR
offense), see id. § 924(c)(1)(A) (the firearm count).
Defendant moved to dismiss the three shooting-related charges as barred by
double jeopardy. He founded his argument on events in the first case brought
against him by the federal government (the First Federal Case), in which
prosecutors dismissed charges of assaulting the marshals, see id. § 111(a), and
using a firearm during a crime of violence (namely, the § 111(a) offense), see id.
§ 924(c). Later, the district court ordered that the dismissal be with prejudice,
because the government had not provided sufficient reasons for seeking dismissal.
Defendant argued that the three counts in this case must therefore be dismissed
because they are based on the previously dismissed charges. The court granted
his motion as to the assault count, which it ruled was identical to the assault
charge in the First Federal Case, but it denied the motion as to the VICAR and
firearm counts. Also, it rejected Defendant’s separate argument that all charges
-2-
against him should be dismissed because the government had violated his due-
process rights by repeatedly bringing and dismissing charges against him.
Defendant appeals while his case is pending trial. He continues to press his
due-process challenge to both the firearm and VICAR charges. He also maintains
that the Double Jeopardy Clause compels dismissal of the firearm count, because
it is the same offense as the firearm charge dismissed with prejudice in the First
Federal Case. And he adds the new argument that the double-jeopardy doctrine of
collateral estoppel bars the government from prosecuting the VICAR and firearm
charges because facts necessary to convict him on these charges were found in his
favor when the charges in the First Federal Case were dismissed with prejudice.
We hold that (1) we have jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s double-jeopardy
claims but we lack jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s due-process claim before final
judgment in the criminal proceedings; (2) there is no merit to his double-jeopardy
claim that the firearm count in this case is the same as the firearm count
dismissed with prejudice in the First Federal Case, because the predicate crime of
violence in the prior case (the § 111(a) offense) has different elements than the
predicate crime of violence in this case (the VICAR offense); and (3) neither the
firearm charge nor the VICAR charge is barred by collateral estoppel because the
previous dismissal did not resolve in his favor any element of the two charges.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Prior Prosecutions
-3-
The first charges against Defendant arising out of the August 2007 shooting
of the marshals were brought in Utah state court in March 2008. He pleaded
guilty to obstruction of justice and failure to stop at the command of police. At
his change-of-plea and sentencing hearing in state court, both the prosecutor and a
representative of the United States Marshals Service agreed to recommend against
federal charges in connection with the shooting, although the court explained to
Defendant that this was merely a recommendation.
Shortly thereafter, in July 2008, Defendant was indicted in the First Federal
Case on charges arising from the July 2007 robbery of a 7-Eleven store, which
predated (and is apparently unrelated to) the shooting of the marshals. One count
alleged a violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (interference with
commerce by violence), and one alleged use of a firearm during the robbery, see
18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)(A). For reasons not disclosed by the briefs or the record,
the government then changed its mind several times about how to prosecute
Defendant for the marshals shooting. In September a second indictment brought
two charges against him based on the assault on the marshals (the Second Federal
Case): assaulting the two officers, see id. § 111(a), and using firearms during the
assault, see id. § 924(c). But then in January 2009 the government obtained a
superseding indictment in the First Federal Case, adding the two charges brought
in the Second Federal Case. Again changing course, that May the government
dismissed without prejudice the two added charges (relating to the marshals
-4-
shooting) in the First Federal Case and Defendant pleaded guilty to the original
charges arising from the 7-Eleven robbery. Three months later the government
dismissed the marshals-related charges in the Second Federal Case, leaving no
charges pending against Defendant.
B. The Present Case
But that was not the end of the government’s attempts to prosecute
Defendant for the marshals shooting. Apparently desiring to charge the shooting
as part of a broader RICO case against additional defendants, the government
filed a second superseding indictment in May 2010 in the case now before us. It
included numerous charges against members of the Tongan Crip Gang, a criminal
organization to which Defendant is alleged to belong. As previously noted, four
counts name Defendant. The racketeering-conspiracy charge makes no mention
of the marshals shooting in the overt acts it sets forth. The other three
counts—the assault count, the VICAR count, and the firearm count—arise out of
the marshals shooting.
Defendant moved to dismiss all four counts. He argued that the
government’s dismissal in the First Federal Case of the two charges related to the
marshals shooting should have been with prejudice because the government failed
to provide sufficient reasons for seeking to dismiss the charges without prejudice.
He also argued, briefly and with little focus and less analysis, that such a
dismissal with prejudice would preclude prosecution of all but the conspiracy
-5-
charge under principles of double jeopardy. Further, he summarily claimed that
due process and the Double Jeopardy Clause required dismissal of all four charges
because of the government’s course of conduct in repeatedly bringing charges
against him.
The district court granted Defendant partial relief. It held that Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 48(a) and our decision in United States v. Derr, 726 F.2d
617 (10th Cir. 1984), require the government to provide reasons for seeking a
dismissal without prejudice, found that the government had failed to provide
adequate reasons, and therefore ruled that the dismissal of the assault and firearm
counts in the First Federal Case must be with prejudice. The court also granted
Defendant’s double-jeopardy motion in part, dismissing the identical assault
charge in this case; but it otherwise denied Defendant’s motions to dismiss.
Defendant appeals. He argues (1) that the district court should have
dismissed the VICAR and firearm counts on the ground that the government, by
repeatedly charging and dismissing counts arising from the marshals shooting,
engaged in prosecutorial harassment so severe as to constitute a violation of his
due-process rights (he no longer challenges the conspiracy count on this ground);
(2) that the Double Jeopardy Clause compels dismissal of the firearm count
because it is the same offense as the firearm count dismissed with prejudice in the
First Federal Case; and (3) that the court should have dismissed both the firearm
and VICAR counts under the Double Jeopardy Clause’s collateral-estoppel
-6-
doctrine because they contain factual elements that were determined in his favor
by the dismissal with prejudice of the assault and firearm counts. We begin our
analysis by addressing our jurisdiction. We hold that we have jurisdiction to
consider Defendant’s second and third arguments but not the first. We then reject
the second and third arguments on the merits.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
The prosecution of Defendant is still pending in the district court.
Ordinarily, we cannot hear appeals in criminal cases before final judgment.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 our jurisdiction extends only to “appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts.” And “courts have consistently given effect” to “a
firm congressional policy against interlocutory or ‘piecemeal’ appeals.” Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977).
But there are exceptions. Under the collateral-order doctrine, we can hear
immediate appeals of decisions before final judgment that “[1] finally determine
claims of right [2] separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,
[and] [3] too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause
itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
Among such orders are “pretrial orders rejecting claims of former jeopardy.”
Abney, 431 U.S. at 662. Such an order satisfies the collateral-order doctrine
-7-
because (1) the district court’s order finally determines the double-jeopardy issue,
(2) the issue is separable from the principal issue at trial—the guilt or innocence
of the defendant, and, most importantly, (3) a later appeal cannot vindicate a
central component of the protection against double jeopardy, the “guarantee
against being twice put to trial for the same offense.” Id. at 661. As Abney
explained: “[E]ven if the accused is acquitted, or, if convicted, has his conviction
ultimately reversed on double jeopardy grounds, he has still been forced to endure
a trial that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to prohibit.” Id. at 662.
Thus, we have jurisdiction to review Defendant’s challenges on appeal under the
Double Jeopardy Clause, including the collateral-estoppel claims.
We cannot, however, review Defendant’s due-process challenge. Our
jurisdiction to hear the double-jeopardy claims does not extend to other issues.
“[W]e have no ‘pendent’ appellate jurisdiction.” United States v. Wittig, 575 F.3d
1085, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009). We can review the due-process claim only if it
independently “fall[s] within Cohen’s collateral-order exception to the final-
judgment rule.” Abney, 431 U.S. at 663. In our view, it does not.
To support jurisdiction, Defendant relies on our opinion in United States v.
P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848 (10th Cir. 1992). That reliance is misplaced. P.H.E.
was a very narrow decision. We held that we had jurisdiction to review the
pretrial denial of the defendants’ claim that their prosecution was motivated by
the government’s desire to “burden [defendants] with massive costs of defending
-8-
themselves so as to drive them out of business” and prevent them from
disseminating materials protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 854. We said
that the case
present[ed] an unusual, perhaps unique confluence of factors:
substantial evidence of an extensive government campaign, of which
this indictment is only a part, designed to use the burden of repeated
criminal prosecutions to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights.
Under these circumstances we are persuaded that the district court’s
order implicates important rights which would be lost, probably
irrevocably, if review had to await final judgment.
Id. at 855 (emphasis added) (brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Whatever the merits of P.H.E. under current Supreme Court law,
Defendant’s issue is quite different. No First Amendment claim is at play.
Defendant asks us to dismiss the VICAR and firearm counts simply “based on
prosecutorial harassment,” contending that he has been subjected to “the continual
and undue burden of defending four prosecutions for the same alleged criminal
act.” Aplt. Br. at 17.
In our view, the issue raised by Defendant is like one that the Supreme
Court has already found not to satisfy the Cohen requirements. In United States
v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., Inc., 458 U.S. 263 (1982) (per curiam), the Supreme
Court considered an attempted appeal of the denial of a motion to dismiss an
indictment on the ground that prosecutorial vindictiveness denied the defendants
due process. See id. at 264. The defendants alleged that the government had
-9-
secured a superseding indictment with additional charges against them in
retaliation for their obtaining a change of venue. See id. The Court held that
such an appeal did not satisfy Cohen’s third requirement because the order was
not effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See id. at 267.
The Court wrote that “[o]bviously, it is wholly desirable to correct prior to trial
any substantive errors noticed at that time.” Id. at 268. But relief on appeal is
generally all one is entitled to, “[e]ven when the vindication of the defendant’s
rights requires dismissal of charges altogether.” Id. at 269. The Court concluded
that “[t]he right asserted by respondents [the right to have charges dismissed for
prosecutorial vindictiveness] is simply not one that must be upheld prior to trial if
it is to be enjoyed at all.” Id. at 270.
As in Hollywood, Defendant cannot point to authority that protects him
from being subjected to a trial caused by the alleged prosecutorial misconduct. In
contrast to the Double Jeopardy Clause, which does preclude the government
from subjecting the defendant to a second trial, the prohibition on prosecutorial
misconduct guarantees only (at least absent a “unique confluence of factors,” as
in P.H.E., 965 F.2d at 855) that any conviction from an improper prosecution will
be set aside. Particularly in light of what appears to be the Supreme Court’s
increasing reluctance to expand the collateral-order doctrine, see United States v.
Wampler, 624 F.3d 1330, 1334 (10th Cir. 2010), we hold that we lack jurisdiction
to review Defendant’s due-process claim.
-10-
We now turn to Defendant’s arguments founded on the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
B. Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no
person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Difficulty can arise, however, in determining
whether two charges are for the same offense. The canonical test has been set
forth by the Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304
(1932): “[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are
two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not.” In assessing whether the crimes require proof of
different facts, we do “not focus on the acts charged in the indictment . . . but
rather on the elements of the crimes.” United States v. Davis, 793 F.2d 246, 248
(10th Cir. 1986).
Defendant asserts that the current firearm charge against him under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) states the same offense as the previously dismissed charge
-11-
under § 924(c) in the First Federal Case. 1 We review de novo the district court’s
ruling. See United States v. Ahrensfield, 698 F.3d 1310, 1322 (10th Cir. 2012).
As relevant, § 924(c) states:
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence
. . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States, uses or carries a firearm . . . shall, in addition to the
punishment provided for such crime of violence . . . [, be
imprisoned].
(If the use or carrying involves brandishing or discharging a firearm, the penalty
is increased. See id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), (iii).) Thus, the elements of § 924(c) are
(1) using or carrying a firearm (2) during and in relation to (3) any federal crime
1
The district court considered itself bound by our decision in United States
v. Mintz, 16 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 1994), to give double-jeopardy effect to the
dismissal with prejudice in the First Federal Case. In Mintz we stated, without
discussion, that when a prior drug-conspiracy charge against defendants had been
dismissed with prejudice before trial, “to subject Defendants to a trial on the same
charge in Kansas would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.”
Id. at 1106. The government has conceded the point on appeal. But Mintz
appears to be in tension with other decisions of this court, both earlier, see United
States v. King, 581 F.2d 800, 801 (10th Cir. 1978) (jeopardy did not attach to
district court’s pretrial dismissal of criminal information on defendants’ motion,
because the dismissal occurred “before the trier of fact commenced to take
evidence”), and later, see United States v. Marchese, 46 F.3d 1020, 1022–23 (10th
Cir. 1995) (jeopardy did not attach to dismissal of indictment on defendants’
motion because district court had not yet begun to receive evidence relevant to
guilt or innocence). See also United States v. Dionisio, 415 F. Supp. 2d 191,
196–97 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (rejecting Mintz). Ultimately, Mintz makes no difference
to our disposition of this case because, as we proceed to explain, Defendant’s
double-jeopardy claim fails even assuming that jeopardy attached to the dismissal
with prejudice.
-12-
of violence. Section 924(c)(3) defines crime of violence. 2 We need not decide
whether some form of scienter is also a required element because it would not
affect our analysis.
The § 924(c) charge in the First Federal Case alleged that “[o]n or about
August 11, 2007, . . . [Defendant], . . . during and in relation to the crime of
violence alleged in Count III of this Indictment, did knowingly use, carry,
brandish and discharge a firearm . . . .” R., Vol. 1 pt. 1 at 158. Count III alleged
an assault on a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a). The elements of
§ 111(a) are (1) assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or
interfering with (2) an officer or employee of the United States (3) while the
victim is engaged in, or on account of the performance of, official duties. See
18 U.S.C. § 111(a). Hence, in order to convict on the § 924(c) charge in the First
Federal Case, the government would have had to prove that Defendant (1) used or
carried a firearm (2) during and in relation to (3) assaulting, resisting, opposing,
2
Section 924(c)(3) states:
For purposes of this subsection the term “crime of violence” means
an offense that is a felony and—
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another, or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another
may be used in the course of committing the offense.
-13-
impeding, intimidating or interfering with (4) a federal officer (5) engaged in, or
on account of the performance of, the officer’s duties.
In this case, in contrast, the crime of violence alleged in support of the
§ 924(c) charge is a VICAR offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). The firearm
count alleges that “[on] or about August 11, 2007, . . . [Defendant], . . . during
and in relation to the crime of violence alleged in Count[] XVII of this . . .
Indictment, did knowingly use, carry, brandish and discharge a firearm . . . .” R.,
Vol. 1 pt. 1 at 66. The elements of the VICAR offense charged in Count XVII are
(1) assault with a dangerous weapon (2) of any person (3) for the purpose of
maintaining or increasing the perpetrator’s position in a racketeering enterprise.
See id. § 1959(a). Hence, to obtain a conviction on the firearm charge, the
government must prove that Defendant (1) used or carried a firearm (2) during
and in relation to (3) assaulting with a dangerous weapon (4) any person (5) for
the purpose of maintaining or increasing Defendant’s position in a racketeering
enterprise.
Comparing the elements of the two firearm offenses, we see that the fourth
and fifth elements of the § 924(c) charge from the First Federal Case—that the
victim was a federal officer, and that the assault was undertaken while the victim
was engaged in, or on account of the performance of, the victim’s duties—do not
need to be proved to obtain a conviction on the § 924(c) charge in this case.
Likewise, the fifth element of the § 924(c) charge in this case—that the offense
-14-
was committed for the purpose of maintaining or increasing Defendant’s position
in a racketeering enterprise—need not have been proved to obtain a conviction on
the § 924(c) charge in the First Federal Case. Thus, these charges state separate
offenses under Blockburger.
This conclusion finds support in our precedents applying the Blockburger
test to charges under § 924(c). See United States v. Malone, 222 F.3d 1286,
1293–94 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding separate § 924(c) convictions when
predicate crimes of violence—robbery and carjacking—were committed during
one continuous course of conduct, because each crime of violence “require[d]
proof of different elements”); cf. United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302,
1316–17 (10th Cir. 1987) (requiring vacation of one of two convictions under
§ 924(c) because the predicate crimes of violence—robbery and felony murder in
the commission of same robbery—were the same offense under Blockburger).
Defendant argues that “[t]he factual event” underlying these two § 924(c)
charges was exactly the same: the August 2007 marshals shooting. Aplt. Br. at
12–13. He asserts that he can be convicted on the current § 924(c) charge “with
or without a reference to” the VICAR count but “cannot be convicted without
proving the August 2007 assault acts.” Id. at 13. He errs, however, in
“focus[ing] on the acts charged in the indictment . . . rather [than] the elements of
the crimes.” Davis, 793 F.2d at 248. That the underlying conduct charged in this
case is the same as the underlying conduct charged in the First Federal Case does
-15-
not affect our conclusion that the two charges state separate offenses under
Blockburger.
C. Collateral Estoppel
The Supreme Court has construed the Double Jeopardy Clause to
encompass aspects of collateral-estoppel doctrine. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436, 445 (1970). Under this doctrine, “when an issue of ultimate fact has once
been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Id. at 443. We assess
the record “with realism and rationality,” looking to what was “actually
determined in the prior prosecution.” United States v. Addington, 471 F.2d 560,
567 (10th Cir. 1973).
Because Defendant failed to make a collateral-estoppel argument to the
district court, we review only for plain error. “Under the plain error standard, a
defendant must show clear or obvious error that affected his substantial rights and
seriously affected the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Frierson, 698 F.3d 1267, 1269 (10th Cir. 2012) (brackets and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Defendant contends that “the facts upon which [the firearm count in this
case] are based are exactly the same as those upon which the dismissed counts in
[the First Federal Case] were based. These facts are the August 11, 2007 incident
[the marshals shooting].” Aplt. Br. at 14. In his view, this means that “the
-16-
government is barred from bringing any charges based on the facts of the August
11, 2007 assault incident.” Id. Similarly, he contends that because “the facts of
[the marshals shooting]” were determined by the dismissal with prejudice, the
VICAR count “cannot be proved at trial and must fail.” Id. at 15.
The problem for Defendant is that the dismissal with prejudice in the First
Federal Case was not based on a determination of the facts of the marshals
shooting. The district court ruled that the dismissal in the First Federal Case had
to be with prejudice because the government did not provide adequate reasons for
the dismissal. The only factual issue resolved by the district court’s order was
whether the government’s proffered reasons were sufficient to justify dismissal
without prejudice. No issue of fact relevant to Defendant’s guilt was resolved.
Collateral estoppel therefore imposes no bar to the present prosecution, and the
district court did not err, let alone plainly err, in rejecting Defendant’s motion to
dismiss the VICAR and firearm counts. Cf. United States v. Rivero, 532 F.2d
450, 457 (5th Cir. 1976) (indictment for providing sample of cocaine had been
previously dismissed with prejudice on government’s motion; collateral estoppel
did not bar government from introducing evidence of that incident in subsequent
trial for attempt to facilitate a related cocaine transaction because “the dismissal
of the indictment, with or without prejudice, does not amount to the determination
of any of the intrinsic underlying facts”).
-17-
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss
the charges against him on double-jeopardy grounds. We DISMISS Defendant’s
appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss the charges on the ground of
prosecutorial harassment.
-18-