Sanders v. Mahaffey

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 22 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CHARLES RAY SANDERS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 00-6101
(W.D. Okla.)
DEBBIE MAHAFFEY, Warden, (D.Ct. No. 99-CV-1931)
Respondent-Appellee,
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Respondent.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Charles Ray Sanders, a state inmate appearing pro se, appeals the
district court’s decision denying his habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254as time barred. We exercise our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, deny Mr.
Sanders a certificate of appealability and permission to proceed in forma
pauperis, and dismiss his appeal.
In February 1991, after pleading nolo contendere, Mr. Sanders received
state convictions for second degree burglary, first degree rape, forcible oral
sodomy, larceny of an automobile, robbery with a dangerous weapon and
attempted anal sodomy, each after former convictions of two or more felonies.
The state sentenced Mr. Sanders to twenty-five years imprisonment on each count,
to run concurrently. On March 27, 1992, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals denied his request for a writ of certiorari. On February 11, 1999, Mr.
Sanders filed a state habeas application for post conviction relief. On June 21,
1999, the state district court denied the application, and the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed its decision on August 18, 1999.
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On December 8, 1999, Mr. Sanders filed his § 2254 petition challenging his
convictions. The district court assigned the matter to a magistrate judge who
issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending denial of Mr. Sanders
petition as time-barred by the one-year limitation period proscribed under 28
U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The magistrate judge explained the limitation period for filing
Mr. Sanders’ petition began April 24, 1996 and ended one year later. The
magistrate judge further explained that no tolling under § 2244(d)(2) occurred
because Mr. Sanders did not file his state habeas application until February 11,
1999 – well after the one-year limitation period ended. Finally, the magistrate
judge determined Mr. Sanders failed to show any circumstances warranting
equitable tolling of the one-year limitation period.
After considering Mr. Sanders’ objections to the magistrate judge’s Report
and Recommendations and the state’s response thereto, the district court issued an
Order determining Mr. Sanders untimely filed his petition and that no equitable
tolling was warranted. In so doing, the district court rejected Mr. Sanders’
contention he did not know about the time restrictions for filing his federal habeas
petition and that the prison denied him access to a current version of the United
States Code. In rejecting Mr. Sanders’ contentions, the district court relied on an
affidavit of the prison law librarian who stated she posted a notice of the one-year
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limitation period on the prison law library bulletin board shortly after enactment
of the 1996 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), and that following the
amendment, the library contained the Criminal Law Reporter and the October
1996 cumulative supplement to the United States Code–both containing the
amendment at issue. Given these circumstances, the district court determined Mr.
Sanders failed to provide any specificity as to his alleged lack of access or that he
took steps to diligently pursue his federal claims. Accordingly, the district court
denied the petition and Mr. Sanders’ request for a certificate of appealability.
On appeal, Mr. Sanders contends that in denying his appeal, the district
court failed to rely on Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) and improperly
denied his request for appointment of counsel. He also renews his contention he
did not know about the one-year limitation period until March 3, 2000 when he
claims the prison law library first posted notice of its existence and that the prison
kept the United State Code Annotated pocket parts in the law library office area
which restricts access to inmates, other than law clerks. In support of his
contentions, Mr. Sanders submits an affidavit of a law clerk inmate, which he did
not provide the district court.
When reviewing the denial of a § 2254 petition, we review the district court
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factual findings for clear error and its legal rulings de novo. See Rogers v.
Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 944(2000). After a careful review of the record, we conclude Mr. Sanders’ petition is
time barred and not subject to tolling under § 2244(d)(2). As to any equitable
tolling of the one-year limitation period, the district court properly addressed and
rejected Mr. Sanders’ allegations. For equitable tolling to apply, we have held it
is not enough to say the prison “lacked all relevant statutes and case law or that
the procedure to request specific materials was inadequate.” Miller v. Marr, 141
F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 891 (1998). Nor is a pro se
inmate’s ignorance of the one-year limitation period sufficient to equitably toll
the limitation period. See Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000)
(relying on Miller, 141 F.3d at 978). Moreover, we point out that the affidavit
submitted by Mr. Sanders on appeal to support equitable tolling was not before
the district court for consideration. It is well established this court generally will
not consider an affidavit on appeal which was not before the district court. 1 See
1
Even if we considered the affidavit submitted by Mr. Sanders, it acknowledges
that shortly after the amendment of § 2244(d), the prison law library received the
Criminal Law Reporter and Cumulative Case and Statutory Case Service containing the
new amendment and placed them on the shelf for use by the general inmate population.
Even if these sources were subsequently placed in the law library office for safe keeping,
as the affidavit contends, Mr. Sanders has not shown he inquired about the possibility of
any supplement or pocket parts, that the prison denied him or other inmates access to
review them on request, or what other steps, if any, he personally took to diligently pursue
his state or federal post-conviction claims over the seven-year period following the direct
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United States v. Kennedy, 225 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 2000) (relying on Fed.
R. App. P. 10(e)).
As to Mr. Sanders’ complaint he is entitled to an attorney, we have held no
constitutional right to counsel extends beyond appeal of a criminal conviction and
“that generally appointment of counsel in a § 2254 proceeding is left to the
court’s discretion.” Swazo v. Wyoming Dep’t of Corr., 23 F.3d 332, 333 (10th
Cir. 1994). Finally, even if we construe Mr. Sanders’ pro se pleadings liberally
under Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), it is clear he fails to make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as required under 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) for a certificate of appealability. Specifically, Mr. Sanders
fails to demonstrate that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right or the district
court was correct in it procedural ruling. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
___, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000).
Accordingly, for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district
court’s April 25, 2000, March 8, 2000, and January 19, 2000 Orders, and the
appeal of his conviction.
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magistrate judge’s December 15, 2000 Report and Recommendation, we deny Mr.
Sanders’ motion for a certificate of appealability, deny his motion to proceed in
forma pauperis, and DISMISS his appeal.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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