Harvey v. Addison

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 17, 2010
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TIMOTHY JAMES HARVEY,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 10-6089
v. (D.C. No. 10-CV-00008-C)
(W.D. Okla.)
MIKE ADDISON, Warden;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Timothy James Harvey, a state inmate proceeding pro
se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) allowing him to appeal the district
court’s order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely. To
obtain a COA, Mr. Harvey must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 483-84 (2000). Because Mr. Harvey has not made the requisite showing, we
deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
On April 4, 2006, Mr. Harvey pled guilty in Oklahoma state court to two
counts of sexual abuse of a child, and two counts of unlawful possession of
controlled substances with intent to distribute. R. 3, 139. Mr. Harvey received
sentences of twenty-five years’ imprisonment on each count, to be served
concurrently. Id. at 3. Mr. Harvey did not directly appeal his convictions, but
instead filed a state application to pursue an out-of-time appeal on March 11,
2009. Id. at 3, 139. The state district court denied the application in April 2009,
and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) affirmed in July 2009.
Id. at 4-5, 140.
Filed January 4, 2010, Mr. Harvey’s federal habeas petition raised six
grounds for relief, including ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 3-12. In his
petition, Mr. Harvey argued that the one-year statute of limitations should not bar
his petition because: (1) he did not learn that he would have to serve 85% of his
sentence to be eligible for parole until the publication of an OCCA decision on
May 4, 2007; (2) his trial counsel would not file a direct appeal; and (3) his
prison legal resources are inadequate (the law library “is restricted to next to no
time,” the library staff cannot provide legal assistance, and the prison discourages
jailhouse lawyering). Id. at 11.
The magistrate judge found Mr. Harvey’s petition untimely, as it was filed
more than three years after his state judgment became final. Id. at 141-43. The
magistrate did not find the petition eligible for either statutory or equitable
tolling. Id. at 143-47. Over Mr. Harvey’s objections, the district court adopted
the magistrate’s report and recommendation and dismissed the petition as
-2-
untimely. Id. at 149-59.
In his application for a COA and accompanying brief, Mr. Harvey
essentially restates his objections to the magistrate judge’s report. He argues that
his deprivation of effective trial counsel was a procedural default attributable to
the state, and thus a state-created impediment which tolls AEDPA’s statute of
limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). Pet. Br. at 2-7 (citing Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Jackson v. Shanks, 143 F.3d 1313, 1318-19
(10th Cir. 1998); Breechen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1343, 1363-64 (10th Cir.
1994); Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 622-23 (10th Cir. 1988)). Further, Mr.
Harvey argues that the “deni[al of] access to the prison law library” and
“‘meaningful legal assistance’ from prison law clerks” are also defaults
attributable to the state. Id. at 2. “When the district court denies a habeas
petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying
constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim
of the denial of a constitutional right and . . . whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
Reasonable jurists cannot debate the correctness of the district court’s
procedural ruling for several reasons. At the threshold, we barely recognize Mr.
Harvey’s § 2244(d)(1)(B) argument in his original habeas petition or brief: the
introduction to the brief accompanying the petition claimed that Mr. Harvey “was
-3-
prevented from filing his action by actions of the State and that the impediment
created by State action is in violation of the Constitution . . . ,” without any
further elaboration. Id. at 18. Generally, “theories raised for the first time in
objections to the magistrate judge’s report are deemed waived.” United States v.
Garfinkle, 261 F.3d 1030, 1031 (10th Cir. 2001). Indeed, besides Mr. Harvey’s
late discovery that he would have to serve 85% of his sentence to be eligible for
parole, the magistrate found that Mr. Harvey had “not alleged anything else to
suggest” that § 2244(d)(1)(B) applies to his petition. R. 142. Nonetheless, even
if we give Mr. Harvey’s petition a most liberal construction, look past “confusion
of various legal theories,” and review the petition for “sufficient facts on which a
recognized legal claim could be based,” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110
(10th Cir. 1991), he is not entitled to a COA.
First, the district court did not rely on any state procedural default in
dismissing the petition, but rather the federal statutory time bar under § 2244(d).
The bulk of the legal argument and citations in the COA brief applies to situations
in which state courts deem a claim procedurally barred for some reason, like
failure to raise the claim on direct appeal. See Jackson, 143 F.3d at 1317-18.
Federal courts typically do not review such “procedurally defaulted” issues, id.;
Hammon v. Ward, 466 F.3d 919, 925 (10th Cir. 2006), but may excuse the bar
where one of the defaulted claims alleged ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. Hammon, 466 F.3d at 926. Because the district court’s dismissal did not
-4-
depend on a state procedural bar, this line of cases is inapposite.
Second, Mr. Harvey has not shown how the allegedly deficient library
facilities and law clerks constituted a state-created impediment, in violation of the
Constitution, to filing a timely habeas petition. The Constitution does not
guarantee prisoners “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal
assistance,” but only a “right of access to the courts.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 350-51 (1996). To establish a violation of the constitutional right to access
to the courts, Mr. Harvey must allege with some specificity how the state actually
hindered his access “and the steps he took to diligently pursue his federal claims.”
Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349-
50). Mr. Harvey has not provided anything more than generalized allegations of
restricted access. Further, as the magistrate observed, Mr. Harvey did not
diligently pursue his claims: he “became aware of the 85% requirement in May
2007,” but did not file his federal petition for another two-and-a-half years. R.
142.
Finally, we do not review the district court’s findings regarding statutory
tolling under § 2244(d)(1)(A), (D), or equitable tolling because Mr. Harvey
abandoned those issues in his COA application and brief. See Pet. Br. at 6-7; cf.
Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). Because Mr. Harvey has not
shown that the statute of limitations was tolled under § 2244(d)(1)(B), reasonable
jurists could not debate the district court’s dismissal for untimeliness.
-5-
We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
-6-