United States v. Ferguson

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 30, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 10-5034
ANTONIO RAFAEL FERGUSON, (D.C. No. 4:09-CR-00128-GKF-1)
(N. D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, TACHA, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is,
therefore, submitted without oral argument.
Antonio Rafael Ferguson pled guilty to a single count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
and 924(a)(2), and was sentenced to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, Ferguson’s counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw as
counsel. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Ferguson was
provided with copies of these pleadings and was advised that he could file a pro
se brief. He has not, however, filed a pro se brief. Nor has the government filed
a response. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.
I
On July 18, 2009, Ferguson was stopped by a Tulsa County Sheriff’s
deputy for traffic violations. Because Ferguson lacked a driver’s license or
insurance, he was placed under arrest. During the ensuing pat-down, the deputy
determined that Ferguson, a convicted felon, was in possession of a loaded pistol.
On September 9, 2009, a federal grand jury indicted Ferguson on one count
of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Ferguson pled guilty to that charge on
October 30, 2009. The initial presentence investigation report (PSR) was
prepared by the probation office and submitted to the district court and parties on
December 14, 2009. A revised PSR was prepared and submitted to the district
court and parties on January 21, 2010. Neither Ferguson nor the government had
any objections to the revised PSR. On February 19, 2010, the district court
adopted the revised PSR’s sentencing calculations and sentenced Ferguson to
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thirty-seven months’ imprisonment, a term at the bottom of the advisory guideline
range. Judgment was entered in the case on February 25, 2010. Ferguson
subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
In Anders, the Supreme Court held that if appointed counsel “finds his case
to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so
advise the court and request permission to withdraw.” 386 U.S. at 744. Counsel
must submit to the court a brief “referring to anything in the record that might
arguably support the appeal.” Id. When counsel submits an Anders brief
accompanied by a motion to withdraw, we “conduct a full examination of the
record to determine whether defendant’s claims are wholly frivolous.” United
States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 2005). If we concur in counsel’s
evaluation of the case, we may grant the request to withdraw and dismiss the
appeal. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
Ferguson’s counsel provided Ferguson with copies of both the Anders brief
and the motion to withdraw. Aplt. Br. at 15; Motion at 3. In accordance with
10th Cir. R. 46.4(B)(2), this court also provided notice to Ferguson of his
opportunity to file a pro se brief. As noted, Ferguson did not respond.
The only arguable basis for appeal identified by Ferguson’s counsel is that
the district court failed, during the course of the plea colloquy, to advise Ferguson
of the court’s obligation, in determining his sentence, to “calculate the applicable
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sentencing-guideline range and to consider that range, possible departures under
the Sentencing Guidelines, and other sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) . . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(M). Ferguson’s counsel concedes,
however, that this issue was not raised below and is thus subject to review only
for plain error. United States v. Cano-Varela, 497 F.3d 1122, 1131 (10th Cir.
2007). “To show Rule 11 plain error, a defendant must show (1) error that (2) is
plain which (3) affected his substantial rights and (4) seriously affected the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Ferguson’s counsel further concedes, and
we agree after reviewing the record on appeal, that Ferguson cannot establish the
district court’s error affected his substantial rights because “the Petition to Enter
Plea of Guilty furnished the requisite information” regarding sentencing, and
because “Ferguson did not move to withdraw his guilty plea” at any time during
the district court proceedings. Aplt. Br. at 5. Thus, we conclude the Rule 11
error identified by Ferguson’s counsel is frivolous.
As for the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence
imposed by the district court, Ferguson’s counsel concedes he “has not identified
any basis for arguing that the Sentencing Guideline calculations were erroneous,
or that the sentence at the minimum of the Guideline range was unreasonable.”
Id. And, after conducting our own independent examination of the record on
appeal, we agree. As noted, the district court adopted, without objection, the
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Sentencing Guideline calculations outlined in the revised PSR. Our review of the
revised PSR and the sentencing hearing transcript reveals nothing procedurally
irregular about those calculations. Further, because the sentence imposed by the
district court fell at the bottom of the advisory guideline range, we must presume
it to be substantively reasonable, United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054
(10th Cir. 2006), and nothing in the record on appeal persuades us to abandon this
presumption. In addition, Ferguson’s counsel asked the court at sentencing to
impose a sentence at the bottom of the range. For the court to have sentenced
Ferguson to a lesser sentence would have required the court to vary sua sponte
from the advisory guideline range.
III
Upon a full examination of the record as required by Anders, we find no
nonfrivolous basis for Ferguson to challenge his conviction or sentence.
Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw, and DISMISS the
appeal.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
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