United States v. Quary

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 28 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-3213
(D.C. No. 95-40083-08-SAC)
JAMES WARDEL QUARY, (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, McKAY and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
In March 1997, following a nine-day jury trial, defendant-appellant James
Wardel Quary was convicted on 80 counts of federal drug- and drug-related
offenses in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, and was
sentenced to life imprisonment. Quary now appeals his convictions, arguing that
the district court erred in (1) failing to declare a mistrial based on the
government’s intentional destruction of exculpatory evidence; (2) denying defense
counsel’s motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(b) to subpoena Lexie Smith, a
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
codefendant, to testify on Quary’s behalf; (3) granting the government’s motion to
quash defense counsel’s subpoena requesting documents relating to codefendant
Elinor Preston’s plea agreement with the government; and (4) permitting Renee
Watkins, a possible defense witness, to assert a blanket Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination after the government warned her that she was
subject to an ongoing criminal investigation. We affirm.
FACTS
Quary’s appeal is part of a trio of criminal cases before us involving a large
crack cocaine distribution ring in Kansas. In this case, a total of eight
defendants 1 were named in four iterations of a multi-count indictment charging
various drug trafficking offenses. Quary alone went to trial; the other seven
defendants entered pleas of guilty at various points in time, the last being Lexie
Lee Smith, who reached a plea agreement with the government during jury
selection. See companion case United States v. Smith, No. 97-3266. Betty
Watkins was indicted individually in a separate but related case, and was
convicted on possession and conspiracy charges. See companion case United
States v. Watkins, No. 97-3216.
1
These defendants were James Quary, Bernard Eugene Preston, Elinor
Preston, Demond Wesley Bridges, Lexie Lee Smith, Lori Smith, Lester Ervin
Smith, Jr., and Edward Tyrone Merritt.
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We present some of the background facts below; additional facts are set
forth in our discussion of the issues Quary raises on appeal.
In May 1994, the DEA began to assist local law enforcement in
investigating a suspected drug trafficking operation that encompassed the cities of
Paola, Ottawa, Lawrence, Topeka, Emporia, and Kansas City, Kansas. DEA
Agent Thomas Walsh worked with a confidential informant to gather information
on the distribution ring, and eventually was able to make controlled purchases of
crack cocaine from several members of the group.
Three of Quary’s alleged coconspirators – Bernard Preston, Elinor Preston,
and Demond Bridges – pled guilty to drug conspiracy charges and testified for the
government at Quary’s trial pursuant to plea agreements. According to their
testimony, Quary controlled the drug ring, which distributed crack cocaine
through several Kansas communities, and which involved approximately 25
coconspirators and as many as 75 sellers in various communities. The witnesses
testified that the coconspirators were members of a gang, of which Quary was a
founding member; the group considered itself affiliated with the “Bloods.” 2
2
Several of the gang members who were codefendants in this case are
related. Bernard Preston is a cousin of both Quary and of Lexie Smith; Bernard
Preston and Elinor Preston are siblings. In addition, Quary dated Renee Watkins
and fathered two of her children; Renee is the daughter of Betty Watkins, who, as
noted, was indicted separately in a companion case. Renee Watkins also dated at
various times Bernard Preston and Demond Bridges, two of the government’s
witnesses against Quary.
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Quary testified at trial, denying that he was aware of or participated in any
of the alleged crimes. Additional defense witnesses testified that he was neither a
drug dealer nor a gang member.
After deliberating a day and a half, the jury returned a verdict finding
Quary guilty on all counts. 3 Quary received a sentence of life imprisonment, and
he now appeals.
DISCUSSION
Quary raises four issues on appeal. We find each of his arguments to be
without merit, and affirm.
A. Government’s Intentional Destruction of Evidence
Quary first contends that the district court erred in failing to declare a
mistrial based on the government’s intentional destruction of an audiotape of
Betty Watkins’ post-arrest statements to law enforcement officers, in which
Watkins declared that Quary was not involved in drug dealing. This tape is the
centerpiece of one of the companion cases to this appeal, United States v.
Watkins, No. 97-3216.
Following her arrest, Betty Watkins was interviewed by Agent Thomas
Walsh and Tim Cronin, a local law enforcement officer. During this audiotaped
3
At the close of evidence, the government moved to dismiss Count 17, as
the controlled substance charged in that count had inadvertently been destroyed
before being tested. The jury convicted Quary on the remaining counts.
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interview, Watkins apparently admitted to possessing crack cocaine that the
officers discovered upon executing a search warrant at her house; however, she
also insisted that Quary did not have anything to do with drug trafficking.
After summarizing what he felt was significant from the interview into two
paragraphs of a report, Agent Walsh destroyed the tape itself. He testified at
Watkins’ trial that he did not consider Watkins’ statements to be exculpatory
because he believed she was lying about Quary.
Defense counsel in Quary’s trial did not learn of the existence of this tape
until mid-trial. When defense counsel sought Watkins’ testimony, she asserted
her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify.
Defense counsel then moved to introduce the tape, only to discover that it had
been destroyed. The government provided defense counsel with transcripts of
Agent Walsh’s and Officer Cronin’s testimony at Watkins’ trial, and both officers
testified at Quary’s trial. Defense counsel nonetheless moved for a mistrial based
on the government’s destruction of the tape. The court denied the motion, ruling
that the tape was inadmissible hearsay, such that the government’s destruction of
the tape did not prejudice the defendant.
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We agree with the district court that, for purposes of Quary’s trial, the
government’s intentional destruction of the tape is irrelevant, because even if the
tape still existed, it would be inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
Rule 804(b)(3) provides:
Statement against interest. A statement against interest
which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the defendant’s
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the
declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by
the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the
declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless
believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant
to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (emphasis added).
Thus, “[a] defendant seeking to admit hearsay evidence under Rule
804(b)(3) to exculpate himself must show ‘(1) an unavailable declarant; (2) a
statement against penal interest; and (3) sufficient corroboration to indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.” United States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1460-61
(10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878, 882 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989)). “Rule 804(b)(3) itself states that
‘corroborating circumstances [must] clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement.’” Id. at 1461 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)) (emphasis added).
Having asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination,
Watkins was unavailable; in addition, her statements to the officers during the
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interview were at least partly against her penal interest, 4 to the extent that they
inculpated her on drug possession. However, Quary must still show that
Watkins’ statements were sufficiently trustworthy under Rule 804(b)(3) to warrant
admission.
We review a court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See Spring,
80 F.3d at 1460. Likewise, “[t]he determination of the sufficiency of such
corroborating evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, which is
aptly situated to weigh the reliability of the circumstances surrounding the
declaration.” Id. at 1461 (internal quotations omitted).
Here, although the district court mistakenly believed that Watkins’
statements were made after her conviction (rather than shortly after her arrest),
the court correctly observed that Watkins had a personal relationship to Quary
through her daughter, Renee. Further, Watkins’ denial of Quary’s involvement in
drug trafficking was, in fact, not a statement against her self-interest because it
tended to support her self-interest that she was not involved in any conspiracy
with Quary. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that Watkins had a motive
to lie about Quary’s involvement in order to protect both him and herself.
4
Watkins admitted possessing the drugs found as a result of the search of
her house, but she denied participation in any conspiracy with Quary or the other
charged defendants.
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Quary has not established any corroborating circumstances to show, let
alone corroborating circumstances sufficient to “clearly indicate,” the
trustworthiness of the statements. We therefore cannot conclude that the district
court abused its discretion in determining that Watkins’ statements did not bear
sufficient indicia of reliability to justify their admission. Because Watkins’
statement would have been inadmissible had it been produced, the government’s
intentional destruction of the audiotape did not prejudice Quary’s defense.
B. Defendant’s Rule 17(b) Motion
Quary next contends that the district court erred in denying defense
counsel’s motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(b) to produce Quary’s codefendant,
Lexie Smith, as a witness for the defense. 5 The district court denied the motion,
stating that “I’m not going to order this witness under 17(b) until you’ve had an
opportunity to express to the Court what his testimony will be by reason of your
personal knowledge.” Defense counsel only offered the uncorroborated
speculation of his client, Quary, that Lexie Smith, if called and found competent
5
Although defense counsel captioned his motion as one under Fed. R. Crim.
P. 17(b), it appears in essence to have been an application for a writ of habeas
corpus ad testificandum. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5), a federal court may in its
discretion, issue such a writ to secure the appearance of a state or federal prisoner
as a witness in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5); United States v. Cruz-
Jimenez, 977 F.2d 95, 99 (3d Cir. 1992). In any event, the procedural
considerations of Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(b) apply to a criminal defendant’s request
for the issuance of such a writ.
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to testify, would deny that he was involved with Quary in the sale of drugs. The
district court had offered defense counsel “help from the Marshals service or
anything else . . . to make arrangements for a conversation between [counsel] and
[Lexie Smith]” to see if his testimony would, in fact, be helpful to Quary and
thereby to determine whether a writ under § 2241(c)(5) would be warranted to
bring Lexie Smith to trial to testify. Notwithstanding this offer, the record before
us shows that defense counsel for Quary offered nothing other than Quary’s
personal belief as to what Lexie would say if called to testify.
We review the district court’s refusal to issue a subpoena under Rule 17(b)
for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hernandez-Urista, 9 F.3d 82, 83
(10th Cir. 1993).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(b) provides:
The court shall order at any time that a subpoena be issued for
service on a named witness upon an ex parte application of a
defendant upon a satisfactory showing that the defendant is
financially unable to pay the fees of the witness and that the presence
of the witness is necessary to an adequate defense.
To show that the witness is “necessary,” the defendant must establish that
the witness’ testimony would be “relevant, material, and useful” to his defense.
See id. at 84. Evidence is “material” if there is a “reasonable likelihood that the
testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact.” United States v.
Cruz-Jimenez, 977 F.2d 95, 100 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted). A
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defendant must demonstrate a particularized need for the testimony; “[t]he failure
to set forth the expected testimony of a witness is an adequate ground for the
denial of a request for a subpoena under Rule 17(b).” Hernandez-Urista, 9 F.3d at
84. Likewise, the necessity for the testimony is undermined where it would be
merely cumulative of other testimony. See id.Here, defense counsel informed the trial court that Lexie Smith had told
Quary that he would testify that Quary was not involved in drug trafficking. 6
Quary argues that Smith’s potential testimony would have gone to the heart of the
conspiracy charge, and would have refuted the testimony of Bernard Preston,
Elinor Preston, and Demond Bridges, the three indicted coconspirator witnesses
who testified against Quary pursuant to plea agreements.
However, we agree with the government that Smith’s proffered testimony
was purely speculative and would have been, in any event, merely cumulative of
other defense witnesses’ statements that Quary was not a drug dealer. Moreover,
although we discern nothing in Rule 17(b) or in this Circuit’s case law
interpreting that rule that requires counsel seeking a Rule 17(b) subpoena to make
a proffer to the court regarding the witness’ expected testimony based on
6
At oral argument on appeal, Quary’s counsel also represented that Lexie
Smith also proposed to testify that Bernard Preston – not Quary – was the leader
of the distribution ring. However, counsel has not referred us to any part of the
record demonstrating that this aspect of Smith’s potential testimony was made
known to the trial court.
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counsel’s personal knowledge, the judge’s assessment of counsel’s proffer is
subject to abuse of discretion review. We conclude that there was no abuse of
discretion in these circumstances, where counsel could offer only a vague
indication of Lexie Smith’s proposed testimony, and where the judge appears to
have made a trial management decision not to prolong an already lengthy trial.
In short, Quary’s counsel failed to establish that Smith’s testimony was
either material or necessary to his defense, and the trial court’s denial of his Rule
17(b) motion was not an abuse of discretion.
C. Defendant’s Subpoena Duces Tecum
Quary next contends that the district court erred in granting the
government’s motion to quash a subpoena seeking documents containing possible
impeachment evidence.
Elinor Preston, an indicted coconspirator, testified for the government at
Quary’s trial pursuant to a plea agreement. On cross examination, she stated that
she had no idea until after she had entered the plea agreement that the government
would require her to testify against Quary. Defense counsel subsequently served
her attorney with a subpoena duces tecum to gain access to communications
between Elinor Preston’s attorney and the government regarding the terms of
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Elinor’s plea agreement for purposes of impeaching her testimony with respect to
her knowledge that the government expected her to testify against Quary. 7
The district court granted the government’s motion to quash the subpoena
in part because it decided that the evidence sought was protected by the
attorney/client privilege.
“[W]e consider the circumstances and the correctness of the rulings on
subpoenas under the abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Greschner,
802 F.2d 373, 378 (10th Cir. 1986).
Assuming, without holding, that the communications were not protected by
the attorney/client privilege, and that the communications regarding the plea
agreement were otherwise admissible (in that Quary could somehow prove that
Elinor Preston had personal knowledge of any material that might be contained in
a letter between her counsel and the government), we nonetheless find that any
error was harmless, as Quary has failed to demonstrate how the exclusion of this
potential impeachment evidence – on the single point of whether Elinor Preston
knew before signing her plea agreement that she would be called to testify against
Quary – influenced the jury’s verdict.
7
We note that defense counsel rejected the government’s offer to stipulate
that Elinor Preston’s plea agreement stated that in order for her sentence to be
reduced, she would have to testify. (Tr. 1637-38.)
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D. Defense Witness’ Assertion of Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-
Incrimination
Finally, Quary contends that the district court erred in permitting Renee
Watkins to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
During trial, defense counsel indicated that he intended to call Renee
Watkins, Quary’s girlfriend and mother of two of his children, as a defense
witness. Defense counsel believed her testimony would refute statements by the
alleged coconspirators regarding Quary’s alleged drug activities. However, Renee
Watkins asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination after
being notified by the government that she was subject to an ongoing investigation.
Quary argues that the government’s action amounted to intimidation and
misconduct, and that the court erred in permitting her to assert a blanket Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
We find Quary’s contentions meritless. First, there is no credible evidence
in the record that the government told Renee Watkins that she was under
investigation in order to pressure her not to testify. Second, a court can order a
witness to testify when a witness desires to protect his or her Fifth Amendment
rights “only if it is perfectly clear that the witness is mistaken and the answers
cannot possibly tend to incriminate” him or her. United States v. Hart, 729 F.2d
662, 670 (10th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted). Given that defense
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counsel intended to question Renee Watkins regarding her connections to Quary
and the drug conspiracy, including whether Renee personally had distributed
crack cocaine, it is clear that counsel’s proposed questions might have elicited
incriminating statements. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that
Renee’s silence was justified, and properly allowed her to invoke her Fifth
Amendment privilege. 8
CONCLUSION
Because we find no merit in any of the issues raised on appeal, we
AFFIRM Quary’s convictions.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
8
We note that Quary would not have been permitted to force the witness to
take the stand just to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to
individual questions. See Hart, 729 F.2d at 670; United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d
485, 487 (10th Cir. 1975) (trial court did not err in refusing to permit witness to
be called to the stand and thus be compelled to invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege before the jury, where parties knew that witness intended to invoke the
privilege).
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