United States v. Orr

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 1, 2006
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 05-3185
(D.C. Nos. 03-CR-40024-01-JAR;
v.
04-CV-3094-JAR)
(D. Kan.)
KORY FLYNN ORR,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Kory Flynn Orr, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, requests a certificate
of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition.
Orr claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel both during sentencing
and while negotiating the waiver of his appeal and post-conviction rights. For
substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court, we DENY Orr’s
request for a COA and DISMISS.
Orr pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than fifty grams
of a mixture containing methamphetamine and was sentenced to sixty months
imprisonment. In his plea agreement, Orr waived his rights of appeal and his
rights to post-conviction remedies. Notwithstanding the waiver, Orr filed a
§ 2255 petition in federal district court challenging his plea as unknowing and
involuntary. Orr claimed that his counsel, Jerold Berger, was ineffective in
representing him in the plea negotiations because Berger misinformed Orr of the
likelihood that he would receive a sentence adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2
for being a first time offender.
On Orr’s arrest, authorities recovered a handgun from his car. In
discussion with Berger prior to making a plea, Orr asked if the government was
likely to bring a firearms charge. Orr claims that Berger told him that the “gun
issue” was “over with.” In that same conversation, Berger allegedly advised Orr
that he was eligible for a “safety valve” reduction in sentence. Specifically,
Berger informed Orr that there were three requirements for receiving the “safety
valve” reduction under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 and that Orr met each of these
requirements. Orr claims that he relied on this conversation in making his
decision to plead guilty. At sentencing, the court found that Orr possessed a
firearm in connection with his offense and thus failed to qualify for the § 5C1.2
sentence reduction. The district court denied Orr’s habeas petition, reasoning that
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even if Berger’s performance was deficient, Orr was not prejudiced, and
subsequently denied Orr’s request for a COA. 1
Orr argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in negotiating
the plea agreement, thereby making the waiver of his appellate and post-
conviction rights unknowing and involuntary. He claims that his attorney advised
him to waive his post-conviction rights on the basis of inaccurate information
about the sentencing guidelines. He requests that we grant COA and remand for
an evidentiary hearing into whether counsel was ineffective in negotiating the
waiver of appeal and post-conviction rights.
Even if he has waived his post-conviction rights, a defendant may file a
habeas petition under § 2255 if he presents the basis for a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and if that claim “pertains to the validity of the plea.”
United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). Orr’s petition
does so, permitting review of the merits.
1
Because Orr’s petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of
the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), AEDPA’s
provisions apply to this case. See Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1282 n.1
(10th Cir. 1999). AEDPA conditions a petitioner’s right to appeal a denial of
habeas relief under § 2255 upon a grant of a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). A
COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). This requires Orr to demonstrate
“that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted).
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To establish that his plea was based on ineffective assistance of counsel,
Orr must demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was so deficient that it “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, ” Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 688 (1984), and that “but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” United States v.
Harms, 371 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).
Orr argues that Berger was ineffective because he did not have an
“understanding of the sentencing guidelines in relation to the facts.” United
States v. Rumery, 698 F.2d 764, 766 (5th Cir. 1983); see also United States v.
McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 108 (D.C. Cir. 2000). However, under our precedent, a
“miscalculation or erroneous sentence estimation by defense counsel” does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d
1567, 1570 (10th Cir. 1993). Moreover, “a defendant’s erroneous expectation,
based on his attorney’s erroneous estimate, likewise does not render a plea
involuntary.” Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935, 937 (10th Cir. 1970). Thus, Orr
has not demonstrated a “substantial showing of the violation of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
As a second argument, Orr claims that his counsel was ineffective at
sentencing because he did not challenge the government’s allegations in
connection with enhancements applied due to his alleged possession of a firearm.
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Because this argument does not relate to counsel’s performance in negotiating the
plea, it is barred by Orr’s plea agreement.
We GRANT Orr’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. His petition for
COA is DENIED and his case is DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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