Rodriguez v. Soares

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 5 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ANTONIO HERNANDEZ
RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 01-3081
v. (D.C. No. 97-CV-3499-DES)
(D. Kan.)
RICHARD SOARES, Warden, Limon
Correctional Facility; ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
KANSAS,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , ANDERSON , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Antonio Hernandez Rodriguez filed a habeas petition pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he alleged his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary and, therefore, “void” because the state trial court had misinformed him
of the consequence of entering the plea. Specifically, he argues that although the
state district court assured him he could raise his defense related to his lack of a
speedy trial on appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court refused to hear such appeal.
The federal district court denied the petition and granted him a certificate of
appealability, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), (B), thus permitting him to proceed
on appeal. We determine that, although the state trial court erred in representing
to petitioner that he could directly appeal the issue of whether his speedy trial
rights were violated despite entering a guilty plea, that error was harmless, in
light of the fact that the Kansas Supreme Court eventually did consider the speedy
trial arguments. We affirm the district court’s decision.
I. Background
In 1990, petitioner pled guilty in Kansas state court to one count of
aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to forty-five years to life as an habitual
criminal. The Kansas sentence was imposed to be served consecutively to
sentences previously assessed in Colorado and Texas. Before entering his plea,
petitioner informed the court that he wished to appeal the issue of whether his
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speedy trial rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act had been
violated. The court assured him that, as the speedy trial issue went to the
question of whether the court had jurisdiction to accept his plea, it would not be
waived by the court’s acceptance of the plea.
The Kansas Supreme Court, however, held that petitioner had waived the
speedy trial issue by entering a guilty plea because the issue was not
jurisdictional. The court advised petitioner he could have the issue heard by
moving to have his guilty plea vacated. Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his
guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that, as he was not
asserting his innocence, petitioner could not withdraw his plea. On appeal the
Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court also reached
the merits of petitioner’s speedy trial claim and determined it was without merit.
Petitioner then brought this action in federal district court. The district
court denied relief, holding that petitioner had failed to meet the statutory
requirements which would entitle him to habeas relief. On appeal, petitioner
reiterates his contention that his guilty plea was invalid because the state court
misinformed him about the material consequences of his plea. He argues that the
courts reviewing his claim have erroneously applied the “hindsight harmless error
test” in order to determine that his claim had no merit. Petitioner’s Br. at 8.
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II. Analysis
Because this petition is governed by the provisions of AEDPA, our review
hinges on the state courts’ treatments of petitioner’s claim. Since the Kansas
Supreme Court adjudicated the claim on the merits,
petitioner will be entitled to federal habeas relief only if he can
establish that the state court decision was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.
Toles v. Gibson , 269 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations and citation
omitted). Further, we presume that the state court’s determinations of historical
fact are correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
A guilty plea must “represent[ ] a voluntary and intelligent choice among
the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v.
Alford , 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). Whether a guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary is a question of federal law, Marshall v. Lonberger , 459 U.S. 422, 431
(1983), which we review de novo, Laycock v. New Mexico , 880 F.2d 1184, 1186
(10th Cir. 1989).
A plea may be involuntary either because the accused does not
understand the nature of the constitutional protections that he is
waiving or because he has such an incomplete understanding of the
charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.
Without adequate notice of the nature of the charge against him, or
proof that he in fact understood the charge, the plea cannot be
voluntary in this latter sense.
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Henderson v. Morgan , 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976) (citations omitted).
Although the state trial court’s assurance to petitioner that he could raise
the speedy trial issue on direct appeal resulted in petitioner not knowing the true
consequence of his plea, that error was harmless. See, e.g. , Chapman v.
California , 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (concluding that some constitutional errors
may be “so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the
Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of
the conviction”); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619, 634 (1993)
(federal habeas relief will be granted to “[t]hose few who are . . . persons whom
society has grievously wronged and for whom belated liberation is little enough
compensation”) (quotations omitted).
The Kansas Supreme Court did address petitioner’s claim and found it to be
without merit. Thus, petitioner actually received review he desired when he
decided to enter the plea. That the review occurred in a later proceeding than
anticipated, does not alter the fact that petitioner received all the review he was
entitled to in the state courts.
In reviewing petitioner’s claim on the merits, we cannot say that the Kansas
Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law or was based on an unreasonable
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determination of the facts. Further, petitioner does not argue on appeal that the
court erroneously decided that his speedy trial rights had not been violated.
III. Conclusion.
Relief under § 2254(a) can be granted only if the state court’s
determination “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or . . . was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Even
though petitioner was misinformed of his appeal rights, the speedy trial claim was
ultimately heard by the Kansas Supreme Court. Thus, no error cognizable on
federal habeas review occurred.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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