United States v. Fowler

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 12/23/96 TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. Case No. 95-1207
LESTER EUGENE FOWLER, (D.C. Nos. 94-CR-274-B,
95-B-518)
Defendant-Appellant. (District of Colorado)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Lester Eugene Fowler appeals from the denial of his motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.1 Mr. Fowler alleged in his § 2255 motion that the sentence he was serving
for unlawful possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), violated the United States Constitution. Mr. Fowler’s claim was
based on his contention that he was not subject to the provisions of § 922(g)(1) because,
although he had been previously convicted of a felony in Colorado, his civil rights had
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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Initially, Mr. Fowler appealed pro se. A panel of this court appointed counsel and
set the case for oral argument.
been restored under Colorado law before he possessed the firearm in question. Mr.
Fowler also contended that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The district court held that the first of Mr. Fowler’s claims was procedurally barred
because he had failed to raise it on direct appeal and, in any event, that the claim failed on
the merits. The court also observed that Mr. Fowler’s counsel was competent. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On September 15, 1994 a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Mr.
Fowler with four counts relating to his participation in an armed robbery, including:
unlawful possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (Count I); affecting commerce through robbery of a Gart Brothers Sporting
Goods store and taking thirty firearms by actual and threatened physical violence in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and (b) (Count II); use of a firearm during a crime of
violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count III); and theft of thirty firearms in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u) (Count IV). On the advice of his court-appointed
counsel, Mr. Fowler entered into a plea agreement whereby he pleaded guilty to Counts I
and III and agreed to assist the government with its investigation of the crime; in
exchange, the government agreed to dismiss Counts II and IV of the indictment and to
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request downward departures in sentencing on Counts I and III for substantial assistance
and acceptance of responsibility.
In the plea agreement, Mr. Fowler admitted that he had engaged in the following
conduct:
On June 27, 1994 Mr. Fowler participated in an armed robbery of
Gart Brothers Sporting Goods Store, a federally licensed firearms dealer
located at 14401 East Exposition Avenue, Aurora, Colorado. The
defendant who was armed with a firearm and an armed companion hid in
the store until it was closed, whereupon they emerged and held two store
employees at gunpoint. They forced the store manager to open the safe and
the gun vault, and left the store with approximately $7500 in cash and 30
firearms which were a part of the store’s firearms inventory. . . . Gart
Brothers does substantial business which affects interstate and foreign
commerce.
Rec. vol. I, doc. 9, ex. 2, at 3 (Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant to
Sentencing). The plea agreement also provided, and Mr. Fowler does not dispute, that
[o]n August 12, 1994 the defendant, LESTER FOWLER, was
arrested in an alley in Denver, Colorado by officers of the Denver Police
Department. At the time of his arrest the defendant knowingly possessed a
firearm . . . .
Mr. Fowler was previously convicted in case number 87-CR-1400 in
the City and County of Denver for the crime of First Degree Criminal
Trespassing, a felony, the punishment for which could exceed imprisonment
for more than one year.
Id. at 3-4.
The district court sentenced Mr. Fowler to sixty-three months’ imprisonment for
Count I and sixty months’ imprisonment for Count III, to be served consecutively, and
ordered that he pay restitution in the amount of $15,819.68 and a special assessment in
the amount of $100.00. During the sentencing hearing, at which Mr. Fowler’s counsel
3
was present, the court advised Mr. Fowler of his right to appeal the court’s sentencing
decision. Mr. Fowler did not appeal.
DISCUSSION
In this appeal, Mr. Fowler claims that his rights were violated in two different
ways. First, he appears to claim that his § 922(g)(1) conviction violated his due process
rights. Second, he argues that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel was violated.
I. Conviction under § 922(g)(1)
Mr. Fowler claimed in his § 2255 motion that he was not prohibited from carrying
a firearm under § 922(g)(1) because his civil rights had been restored by operation of
Colorado law upon his release from prison following his prior state conviction. However,
the district court held that Mr. Fowler was procedurally barred from raising this claim on
collateral review because he had “failed to demonstrate cause for his failure to present the
claim on appeal and prejudice suffered therefrom or that a reviewing court’s failure to
review the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 10,
at 2. The court went on to hold in the alternative that the claim failed on the merits
because Mr. Fowler was indeed subject to prosecution under § 922(g)(1). We engage in
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de novo review of the district court’s rulings on legal questions in § 2255 proceedings.
United States v. Kissick, 69 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 1995).
“Section 2255 motions are not available to test the legality of matters which should
have been raised on direct appeal.” United States v. Warner, 23 F.3d 287, 291 (10th Cir.
1994). Mr. Fowler pleaded guilty to a violation of § 922(g)(1). He did not object to his
sentence, and he did not take a direct appeal. “A defendant’s failure to present an issue
on direct appeal bars him from raising the issue in his § 2255 motion, unless he can show
cause excusing his procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the errors of
which he complains, or can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if
his claim is not addressed. Id. We therefore consider whether Mr. Fowler has made the
showing necessary to excuse his procedural default.
A. “Cause”
Mr. Fowler argues that he has demonstrated cause for his failure to appeal this
issue in that his trial counsel prevented him from doing so. “An attorney’s error provides
cause to excuse a procedural default only if the error amounts to constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Rogers v. United States, 91 F.3d 1388, 1391 (10th Cir.
1996). We note at the outset that by arguing that § 922(g)(1) does not apply to him, Mr.
Fowler raises a substantial question as to the adequacy of his counsel. Therefore, we first
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consider whether § 922(g)(1) was erroneously applied to Mr. Fowler in order to assess
whether there was cause to excuse his procedural default.
Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(1) provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person--
(1) who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in
interstate commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The meaning of “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year” is clarified in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). First, “what constitutes
conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the
jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). Second:
Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person
has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a
conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement,
or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship,
transport, possess, or receive firearms.
Id.Mr. Fowler was convicted in 1987 in a Colorado court of First Degree Criminal
Trespass, a conviction which, the parties agree, would in the absence of a restoration of
civil rights have satisfied the requirements necessary to trigger § 922(g)(1). Furthermore,
the parties agree that Mr. Fowler’s civil rights were indeed restored pursuant to Article
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VII, Section 10 of the Colorado Constitution, which provides in relevant part that any
person
who was a qualified elector prior to . . . imprisonment, and who is released
therefrom . . . by virtue of having served out his full term of imprisonment,
shall without further action, be invested with all the rights of citizenship,
except as otherwise provided in this constitution.
Colo. Const. art. VII, § 10. Mr. Fowler argues, therefore, that his 1987 conviction should
not have been used as a predicate for his § 922(g)(1) prosecution.
In its response to Mr. Fowler’s § 2255 motion in the district court, the government
relied on Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108. That section was amended effective July 1, 1994,
several weeks before Mr. Fowler’s arrest, to expand the definition of the crime of
“possession of weapons by previous offenders.” Whereas before July 1, 1994 the statute
prohibited firearms possession by persons previously convicted of only particular kinds of
felonies, including burglary, arson and crimes of violence, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108(1986), the 1994 amendment widened the scope of the prohibition to include convictions
for any prior felony.2 The government argued that, because the statute now prohibited
possession of a firearm by one who had previously committed any felony, including the
2
The amended statute provides:
A person commits the crime of possession of a weapon by a previous
offender if the person knowingly possesses, uses, or carries upon his or her
person a firearm . . . or any other weapon that is subject to the provisions of
this article subsequent to the person’s conviction for a felony, or subsequent
to the person’s conviction for attempt or conspiracy to commit a felony,
under Colorado or any other state’s law or under federal law.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108(1) (1995 Supp.) (emphasis added).
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criminal trespass offense of which Mr. Fowler had been convicted, Mr. Fowler was
specifically prohibited by Colorado law from possessing a firearm. Therefore, the
government contended, his 1987 conviction could properly be used as a predicate
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because it did not fall within the category of
excepted convictions described in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). The district court was
persuaded by this argument, holding in its order denying the § 2255 motion that:
Fowler was convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year. Although his civil rights had been otherwise restored,
Colorado law expressly prohibited him as a convicted felon from possessing
firearms. Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-12-108, as amended. Accordingly, Fowler
had a prior felony conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Rec. vol. I, doc. 10, at 2-3 (Order of the district court denying the § 2255 motion).
We disagree. We believe that the 1994 Colorado statutory amendment did not
render Mr. Fowler’s 1987 trespass conviction a proper predicate for a subsequent §
922(g)(1) prosecution because the amendment did not negate the full restoration of his
civil rights under the prior law for the purposes of § 921(a)(20). The decisions of other
circuits and our interpretation of the relevant statutes convince us that this is the correct
application. Indeed, the government now responsibly concedes this in its Supplemental
Brief. See Aple’s Supp. Br. at 9.
This Circuit has held that the automatic restoration under Colorado law of various
rights of citizenship to felons convicted of state offenses once they have completed their
sentences constitutes a “restoration” for purposes of § 921(a)(20). United States v. Hall,
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20 F.3d 1066, 1068-69 (10th Cir. 1994). Such a restoration ordinarily precludes use of
the prior conviction to support a § 922(g)(1) firearms possession charge. 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(20). However, this Circuit has never considered whether a conviction for which
civil rights had been restored, but were later restricted by a subsequent legislative act
prohibiting previously convicted persons from possessing firearms, can be used to support
a § 922(g)(1) indictment.
The Ninth Circuit was confronted with this question in United States v. Cardwell,
967 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1992). There, the defendant had had his civil rights restored at
the time of his release from prison, but a subsequently enacted state law amendment had
barred felons from possessing firearms. The government argued in Cardwell that the
court should base its application of § 921(a)(20) on whether state law had prohibited the
defendant from possessing a firearm at the time that he was alleged to have violated §
922(g)(1), rather than at the time his civil rights had been restored. But the court rejected
this argument, reasoning that:
Section 921(a)(20) states that section 922(g)(1) applies if the pardon,
expungement, or restoration of civil rights “expressly provides” that the
defendant may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms. The plain
meaning of this use of the present tense is that the courts must determine the
effect of the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights at the time it
is granted and cannot consider whether the defendant’s civil rights later
were limited or expanded.
Id. at 1350-51 (citation omitted). We are similarly convinced that the use of the present
tense in the quoted portion of § 921(a)(20) clearly indicates that we are to consider only
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whether the law viewed at the time civil rights were restored “expressly provides” that the
defendant may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms. See United States v.
Haynes, 961 F.2d 50, 52-53 (4th Cir. 1992) (adopting the same interpretation of §
921(a)(20)); United States v. Traxel, 914 F.2d 119, 124-25 (8th Cir. 1990) (same). If the
law did not so expressly provide, then it is irrelevant whether the defendant’s civil rights
were subsequently limited. Because there was no such limiting provision in Colorado law
applicable to Mr. Fowler at the time his civil rights were restored, we conclude that the
government improperly relied upon his 1987 trespass conviction to support his §
922(g)(1) prosecution.
As we have noted above, Mr. Fowler’s counsel never raised the issue of the
invalidity of the § 922(g)(1) charge during the plea proceedings, and he did not appeal
the § 922(g)(1) conviction. When an attorney allows a defendant to plead guilty to a
charge that is not a crime, substantial questions arise as to the constitutional sufficiency of
his or her performance. Nevertheless, in instances in which a defendant is charged with
more than one offense, a proper assessment of counsel’s conduct requires consideration
of the disposition of all of the charges against the defendant, not only the ones to which
the defendant pleads guilty. The conduct of an attorney who allows a defendant to plead
guilty to a charge that is not a crime will be deemed constitutionally deficient on
collateral attack only if, upon consideration of all of the charges against the defendant, the
conduct prejudiced the defendant. Cf. United States v. Andrews, 790 F.2d 803, 814 (10th
10
Cir. 1986) (holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by his attorney’s conduct
because, among other reasons, “there is every reason to believe that [the defendant],
under the Plea Agreement, accomplished a net reduction in likely or possible felony
charges”), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987). Thus, in terms of the procedural default
inquiry in cases such as this, the resolution of the “cause” question depends upon the
resolution of the “prejudice” inquiry. In order to determine whether Mr. Fowler may
pursue his challenge to the § 922(g)(1) conviction through the instant § 2555 motion, we
therefore proceed to the prejudice prong of the procedural default inquiry.
B. “Prejudice”
We conclude that Mr. Fowler was not prejudiced by his procedural default because
he substantially benefited from his guilty plea. This conclusion is supported by several
state supreme courts and appellate courts which have held that if a defendant substantially
benefited from a plea bargain that he entered into voluntarily and intelligently, even if he
pleaded guilty to a charge that was not a crime, he is not permitted to collaterally attack
that conviction. See Carter v. Neal, 910 F. Supp. 143, 148 (D. Del. 1995); Downer v.
State, 543 A.2d 309, 312 (Del. 1988); People v. Bernard, 656 P.2d 695, 697 (Colo. 1983)
(en banc); People v. Waits, 695 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984), rev’d on other
grounds, 724 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1986) (en banc); People v. Castro, 356 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50
(N.Y. App. Div. 1974), aff’d mem., 339 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1975); People v. Burgan, 183
11
N.W.2d 413, 414 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); People v. Foster, 225 N.E.2d 200 (N.Y. 1967).
We believe that the substantial benefit that Mr. Fowler derived from pleading guilty to the
§ 922(g)(1) offense precludes a determination that any prejudice resulted from his
counsel’s failure to appeal the § 922(g)(1) conviction.
Mr. Fowler benefited from his guilty plea by avoiding prosecution for the more
serious robbery and theft charges. Those charges, had Mr. Fowler been convicted of
them, would have carried penalties substantially heavier than the sentences actually
imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951; 18 U.S.C. § 922(u); U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1; id. § 2K2.1;
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, “Sentencing Table” (Nov.
1993). Furthermore, by pleading guilty Mr. Fowler received the benefit of a § 5K1.1
motion for reduction of sentence for substantial assistance and a government
recommendation of a three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. We agree
with the state courts that have held that “since the defendant . . . ‘used the plea as a tool
for avoiding a more serious conviction . . . it would be the height of sophistry to vacate
the defendant’s plea of guilty.’” Downer, 543 A.2d at 313 (quoting Bernard, 656 P.2d at
697). On the other hand, if the attorney had appealed the § 922(g)(1) conviction and had
“won,” the appropriate remedy would have been to vacate the entire plea agreement and
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remand for a new trial, a result that probably would have inured to Mr. Fowler’s
detriment.3 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971).
Because we hold that no prejudice resulted from Mr. Fowler’s failure to raise this
issue previously, he is now procedurally barred from raising it on collateral review. See
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68, 175 (1982); Warner, 23 F.3d at 291.
C. “Fundamental miscarriage of justice”
Mr. Fowler contends that, even if he has not demonstrated cause and prejudice
excusing his procedural default, this court is compelled to reach his substantive claim
because a failure to do so would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See
Warner, 23 F.3d at 291. In this regard, he argues that his conviction under § 922(g)(1)
was a legal impossibility because, as the government concedes, his civil rights had been
restored without limitation. The legal impossibility of guilt, he urges, renders him
“factually innocent.”
We have previously explained what is required to satisfy the “fundamental
miscarriage of justice” standard:
3
An alternative remedy, which may be imposed in some cases where a plea
agreement is determined on appeal to be defective, is specific performance by the
breaching party. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263; United States v. Thomas, 580 F.2d
1036, 1038 (10th Cir. 1978). However, in the instant case, where the issue is not a failure
of the government to perform on a promise, that remedy could not sensibly have been
imposed.
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The standard for demonstrating a “fundamental miscarriage of
justice” is, as the words connote, quite stringent. It is not enough for
Appellant merely to establish that, absent the error, he would have been
acquitted (i.e., his “legal innocence”). Rather, appellant must make a
colorable showing of factual innocence. In the context of a noncapital case,
this means appellant must make a colorable demonstration that he is
factually innocent of the offense for which he was convicted.
Id. (citations omitted). In deciding whether the “narrow exception,” McCleskey v. Zant,
499 U.S. 467, 502 (1991), applies in a particular case, we are guided by the “prototypical
example” in which “the State has convicted the wrong person of the crime” such that “it
is evident that the law has made a mistake,” Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2519-20
(1992). Application of this exception is “rare” and limited to the “extraordinary case.”
See Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 864 & n. 36 (1995). Mr. Fowler does not call our
attention to a single case in which a court has relied on the exception to consider the
merits of an otherwise procedurally defaulted challenge to a guilty plea, and independent
research reveals no such cases.
In light of this amplification of the meaning of the term, and the extreme
limitations on its proper invocation, we hold that Mr. Fowler’s predicament simply does
not fit the description. First, although Mr. Fowler was “factually innocent” of the §
922(g)(1) charge, he admitted that he was not “factually innocent” of the more serious
robbery and theft charges. Mr. Fowler admitted in the plea agreement that he and his
accomplice had held two store employees at gunpoint and had stolen thirty firearms and
$7500 in cash, conduct which the district court appropriately characterized at the
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sentencing hearing as “extremely serious,” Rec. vol. I, doc. 9, ex. 2. Second, the plea of
guilty to the two firearms counts was plainly a tactical decision to avoid prosecution for
the more serious crimes as to which he also admitted guilt. Third, after benefiting from
his plea in this way, Mr. Fowler then failed to take a direct appeal. That too was probably
a wise tactical decision. Had he prevailed on appeal, he would have had his plea vacated
and again risked facing prosecution for the charges dismissed as a result of the plea. He
now asks us on collateral review to excise from his plea agreement a conviction as to
which he has admitted guilt, from which he has gained a favorable plea bargain, and
which he has declined to challenge on direct appeal. Only a hypertechnical construction
of “factual innocence” could lead us to conclude that the facts of this case constitute a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. We decline to so hold.
II. Ineffective assistance of counsel
The second claim in Mr. Fowler’s § 2255 motion was that he had received
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment
rights. The government did not address this issue in its response to the § 2255 motion. In
denying the motion, the district court did not explicitly rule on this issue, perhaps because
it received so little attention in the briefs. However, the court did note that “Fowler was
represented by competent counsel at all stages of the criminal action.” Rec. vol. I, doc.
10, at 2. Even if this observation was not a ruling, we may still decide the issue because
15
“all of the pertinent facts are in the record before us.” See Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d
1386, 1394 (10th Cir. 1990). Further, there is no need in considering this issue to engage
in the kind of procedural default inquiry that we conducted above: the procedural bar rule
does not apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in a defendant’s first §
2255 motion. United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th Cir. 1995).
The record is sufficient for us to conclude, analyzing the issue de novo, that Mr.
Fowler did not receive constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, either in the
decision to accept the plea bargain or in the decision not to appeal his § 922(g)(1)
conviction, because he was not prejudiced by any error his counsel may have made, as
required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). A defendant who
claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in entering a guilty plea must
demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” See Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1570 (10th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1236 (1994). Such a showing “depend[s] largely on whether [he]
likely would have succeeded at trial.” See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Here, Mr. Fowler has
made no more than the bare formulaic assertion that, but for his counsel’s advice, he
“would not have plead [sic] guilty or waived his appeal rights.” See Aplt’s Opening Br.
at 12. However, we conclude that this claim is not credible given the seriousness of the
16
charges that Mr. Fowler avoided by not going to trial and the absence of any offered
reason why he might have been confident of an acquittal.
For these reasons, and because we conclude, as discussed above, that Mr. Fowler
was not prejudiced by the decision not to appeal, we reject his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, that is, because (1) Mr. Fowler is procedurally barred
from raising his § 922(g)(1) claim and (2) he has not demonstrated the prejudice
necessary to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we AFFIRM the order
of the district court.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
Judge Anderson concurs in the Order and Judgment, except for Part I.C., and concurs in
the disposition of the case set out in the conclusion.
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