O'Shea v. Welch

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 21 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOHN O’SHEA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 03-3159
(D. Kansas)
ANTHONY J. WELCH; AMERICAN (D.Ct. No. 01-CV-2336-JWL)
DRUG STORES, INC., doing business
as Osco Drug,
Defendants,
AMERICAN MOTORISTS
INSURANCE COMPANY (Kemper
Casualty Insurance Companies),
Garnishee - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
John O’Shea filed a negligence claim for damages against Anthony J.
Welch and American Drug Stores, Inc., doing business as Osco Drug (Osco),
based on injuries he sustained when the car he was driving was struck by Welch’s
vehicle. Farmers Insurance Company (Farmers), O’Shea’s underinsured motorist
carrier, intervened. At the time of the accident, Welch, an Osco store manager,
was driving from his store in Lee’s Summit, Missouri, to the Osco District Office
in Overland Park, Kansas, to deliver Kansas City Chiefs tickets, which were
obtained from an Osco vendor, for distribution among Osco managers. En route,
Welch made a “spur of the moment” decision to turn into a service station for
repair work and, in doing so, struck O’Shea’s vehicle. (R., Appellant’s App.,
Vol. I at 31.) On March 20, 2002, the district court granted summary judgment to
Osco, finding “no reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Welch was acting
within the scope of his employment” and therefore, Osco was not vicariously
liable for his negligence. (Id. at 39.) O’Shea appealed. See O’Shea v. Welch,
350 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 2003).
Thereafter, O’Shea, Welch and Farmers entered into a “Consent to
Judgment, Assignment and Covenant Not to Execute” in which Welch and
Farmers stipulated to entry of judgment against Welch in an amount to be
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determined by the court at trial. 1 After a bench trial, the district court entered
judgment against Welch in the sum of $1,014,503.70. 2 O’Shea then filed the
instant garnishment action against American Motorists Insurance Company
(AMICO) seeking to recover any benefits applicable to Welch under the business
auto policy AMICO issued to Osco. AMICO contested coverage. O’Shea and
AMICO filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court denied
O’Shea’s motion and granted AMICO’s motion; judgment was entered
accordingly. This appeal followed. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291, AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part.
I. AMICO’s Motion to Dismiss, Remand or Stay Appeal
After the parties’ briefs were filed, another panel of this Court issued a
decision on O’Shea’s appeal of the district court’s summary judgement in favor of
dismissal of Osco. See O’Shea, 350 F.3d 1101. In that decision, the panel
concluded that the slight deviation rule applied in third-party liability cases in
Kansas and ruled that whether Welch was acting within the scope of his
1
In consideration of Welch’s concession of liability, O’Shea agreed not to execute
the judgment against Welch’s personal assets.
2
Pursuant to the “Consent to Judgment, Assignment and Covenant Not to
Execute,” neither Welch nor Farmers objected to any evidence introduced by O’Shea or
presented their own evidence at the bench trial. As the district court stated, “the ‘trial’
was more akin to a default judgment hearing . . . .” (R., Appellant’s App., Vol. I at 52).
It also “question[ed] whether it would [have] arrive[d] at the same result in a true
adversary proceeding . . . .” (Id.)
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employment at the time of the accident is a fact question for the jury. Id. at 1105-
1106. Consequently, the panel reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of
Osco and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 1109.
As a result of the panel’s decision, AMICO filed a motion to dismiss this
appeal, or in the alternative, to remand or stay the appeal. We deny AMICO’s
motion. This case is a garnishment action which asks us only to interpret whether
Welch is an insured under Osco’s business auto policy. It is ripe for review
because O’Shea has a judgment against Welch. 3 Additionally, a speedy resolution
of this appeal will result in judicial efficiency. As discussed below, we interpret
the policy to include Welch as an “insured” only if he was acting within the scope
of his employment at the time of the accident. This is the same fact issue which
was remanded for a jury determination by the previous panel. Accordingly,
whether Osco is liable to O’Shea and whether Welch is an insured under the
policy can be resolved in a single trial.
We now turn to the merits of this appeal.
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying
3
AMICO raises due process issues concerning this judgment. Specifically, it
contends if Welch is found to be covered under the policy, then it should be allowed to
contest damages. This issue will need to be addressed by the district court in the first
instance.
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the same legal standard used by the district court under F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c).
Rohrbaugh v. Celotex Corp., 53 F.3d 1181, 1182 (10th Cir. 1995). Summary
judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c). “We consider the ‘factual
record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment.’” Rohrbaugh, 53 F.3d at 1182-83 (quoting Blue
Circle Cement, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs., 27 F.3d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir.
1994)).
“A federal court sitting in diversity . . . must apply the substantive law of
the forum state, including its choice of law rules.” Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 127
F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1997). Thus, Kansas law controls here. Because the
interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law in Kansas, Marshall v.
Kansas Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 73 P.3d 120, 130 (Kan. 2003), we review de novo.
Kaw Nation v. Springer, 341 F.3d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003).
III. Discussion
The sole issue on appeal is whether Welch is an “insured” under the
business auto policy issued by AMICO to Osco. Both parties agree the pertinent
policy language is in Amendatory Endorsement #5, which provides in relevant
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part:
It is agreed that the following is added to the LIABILITY
COVERAGE, WHO IS AN INSURED provision[:]
Who is an Insured is extended to include as an Insured any employee
of the Named Insured while such employee is using his own
automobile in your business . . . .
(R., Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 426) (emphasis added). The district court
determined this language extended coverage to an Osco employee only when that
employee was using a personal vehicle within the scope of his or her employment.
Based on its previous decision that Welch was not acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident, the district court concluded Welch was
not an “insured” under the policy.
“An insurance policy is construed as to give effect to the intention of the
parties.” Schartz v. Kansas Health Ins. Ass’n, 66 P.3d 866, 869 (Kan. 2003). “If
the language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, it must be
construed in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense and according to the sense and
meaning of the terms used.” Marshall, 73 P.3d at 130. An insurance policy is
ambiguous when there is “genuine uncertainty as to which of two or more
possible meanings is proper.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lane, 961 P.2d
64, 68 (Kan. App. 1998) (quotations omitted). “Courts should not[, however,]
strain to find an ambiguity where common sense demonstrates there is none.”
Marshall, 73 P.2d at 130. In interpreting a contract, the terms of a contract as a
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whole must be considered, not individual provisions. Id. If any part of the policy
is ambiguous, it is given the construction most favorable to the insured. Schartz,
66 P.2d at 869.
To determine whether Welch is covered under AMICO’s policy to Osco, we
begin with the policy’s language.
Section II(A) of the policy provides in relevant part:
We will pay all sums an “insured” legally must pay as damages because of
“bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance applies,
caused by an “accident” and resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or
use of [any auto].
(R., Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 415.) Under Section II(A)(1), the policy defines
“Who Is An Insured.” If Amendatory Endorsement #5 is added to the “Who Is An
Insured” provision, it states:
The following are “insureds”:
a. [Osco] for [any auto].
b. Anyone else while using with [Osco’s] permission [any auto] [Osco]
own[s], hire[s] or borrow[s] except:
...
2) [Osco’s] “employee” if [any auto] is owned by that “employee” or
a member of his or her household.
...
c. Anyone liable for the conduct of an “insured” described above but
only to the extent of that liability.
[d.] [A]ny employee of [Osco] while such employee is using his own
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automobile in [Osco’s] business. . . . 4
(R., Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 415-16, 426.)
Welch is not an insured under Section II(A)(1)(a); O’Shea does not contend
otherwise. Welch is also not an insured under Section II(A)(1)(b) or (c). Under
Section (A)(1)(b), the “insured” is the permissive user of a vehicle owned, hired
or borrowed by Osco. Here, Welch was driving his own vehicle, not a vehicle on
loan to Osco. Therefore, he is expressly excluded as an insured under subsection
(b)(2). Consequently, in order for Welch to be considered an insured under the
policy, he must meet the requirements of Amendatory Endorsement #5;
specifically, he must have been using his vehicle “in [Osco’s] business” at the
time of the accident.
The term “in your business” is not defined in the policy. The district court
construed Amendment Endorsement #5 to apply only to situations in which Osco
would be vicariously liable. O’Shea claims this was error, asserting Osco’s
vicarious liability is adequately insured by the language “[Osco] for [any auto].”
(Id. at 415, Section II(A)(1)(a).) Because Osco can only act through its agents
4
For ease of reading, we have substituted policy definitions for certain words; our
substitutions are indicated in brackets. For instance, we substituted “any auto” for
“covered auto” because under the policy, “covered auto” means “any auto,” the broadest
possible definition of “covered auto” under the policy. (R., Appellant’s App., Vol. II at
413-14.) We also changed “you” and “your” to “Osco.” (R., Appellant’s App., Vol. II at
414.)
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and employees, O’Shea claims this provision covers Osco and its employees
driving any vehicle, including the employee’s own vehicle. Therefore, O’Shea
contends Amendatory Endorsement #5 can only be construed to provide additional
coverage beyond that already provided to Osco for its vicarious liability. That
extension of coverage can only mean, according to O’Shea, that the policy
provides personal coverage for Osco’s employees, in this case Welch. He also
claims the phrase “in your business” is ambiguous and should be construed in his
favor.
We agree with O’Shea that the “[Osco] for [any auto]” language provides
coverage for Osco’s vicarious liability. Although Kansas corporations are legal
entities which can sue and be sued, K AN . S TAT . A NN . § 17-6102(2), the only way
Osco can be deemed liable for “causing an ‘accident’. . . resulting from the
ownership, maintenance, or use of [any auto]” is through its agents and
employees. (R., Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 415.) Accordingly, and contrary to
the district court’s understanding, Amendatory Endorsement #5 does not provide
any protection to Osco for its vicarious liability; it makes sense only if it provides
something more. Its plain language makes employees “insureds” under the policy
when they are using their own vehicles “in [Osco’s] business.” Therefore,
Amendatory Endorsement #5 does not provide any additional protection to Osco
but covers its employees using their personal vehicles in Osco’s business.
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That brings us to the crux of this case: what does “in your business” mean?
Kansas has not answered; therefore, we interpret it as we believe the Kansas
Supreme Court would. Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767, 775 (10th
Cir. 1999) (in a diversity action, a court has an obligation to apply the applicable
state law or, if such state’s law is silent, rule as it believes that state’s highest
court would rule). We believe the Kansas Supreme Court would find “in your
business” to be unambiguous and interpret it to mean “scope of employment.”
This construction of the policy is clearly what the contracting parties intended.
By adding Amendatory Endorsement #5, Osco contracted to provide coverage for
its employees when using their own vehicles. Obviously, however, it did not seek
to provide global coverage for all employee negligence, only negligence occurring
while the employees furthered Osco’s business, which they can do only while
acting within the scope of their employment. It is evident the base policy covers
Osco for vicarious liability and Amendatory Endorsement #5 personally covers
Osco’s employees in those situations where Osco would be vicariously liable for
their actions.
This interpretation is also consistent with that of courts from other states
which have addressed the issue. These courts have found that “in your business”
or “in connection with your business” is equivalent to “scope of employment.”
See, e.g., Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Baillie, 281 F.Supp.2d 1307, 1316
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(M.D. Fla. 2002) (“in your business or your personal affairs” means “scope of
employment”), aff’d, 82 Fed. App. 218 (11th Cir. 2003); Lawler v. Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Co., 163 F.Supp.2d 841, 852-53 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (term “in connection
with your business” is equivalent to “scope of employment”), aff’d, 322 F.3d 900(6h Cir. 2003); Bamber v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 680 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996) (“in connection with your business” is synonymous with “in the
course of employment”); Price v. Colony Ins. Co., 520 So.2d 964, 967 (La. App. 3
Cir. 1987) ("in connection with your business" is equivalent to the legal phrase
"course and scope of employment").
Based on the above, the district court correctly interpreted “in your
business” to mean “scope of employment.” However, because it relied on its
previous ruling that Welch was not acting within the scope of his employment at
the time of the collision, which has been reversed, and because there are questions
of fact as to whether Welch was acting in the “scope of his employment” at the
time of the collision, as that term is defined by the previous panel’s decision, this
case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. 5
5
O’Shea cites to Kansas workers compensation and permissive use cases in
support of his argument that “in your business” should be read broadly, in particular, that
the “slight deviation rule” should be applied to the facts of this case. Based on the
previous panel’s decision that Kansas would apply the slight deviation rule in third-party
liability tort cases, which is the law of the case, we need not make any analogies to cases
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IV. Conclusion
We DENY AMICO’s motion to dismiss this appeal, or in the alternative, to
remand or stay the appeal. We AFFIRM the district court’s interpretation of the
policy but REVERSE its judgment in favor of AMICO. This case is
REMANDED to the district court.
Entered by the Court:
Terrence L. O’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
outside the tort arena. See In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 354 F.3d 1246, 1258 (10th Cir.
2004) (law of the case doctrine states that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that
decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same
case).
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