Pretlow v. McPherson

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 27, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSElisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
BARRY C. PRETLOW,
Plaintiff–Appellant, No. 12-6122
v. (D.C. No. 5:12-CV-00368-D)
RICHARD McPHERSON, (W.D. Oklahoma)
Defendant–Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, McKAY and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff was denied unemployment compensation benefits by the Oklahoma
Employment Security Commission. He filed a petition in the state court for judicial
review of the agency decision, but the state court dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction based on Plaintiff’s failure to name all necessary parties. The state appellate
court affirmed. Plaintiff then filed the instant action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
agency’s executive director, alleging the agency and state court decisions violated his
constitutional rights and seeking monetary damages for his alleged injury. The district
court dismissed the action without prejudice pursuant to the Rooker/Feldman doctrine.
The district court concluded that dismissal was appropriate on an alternate ground as
well—Plaintiff did not allege any facts that would establish Defendant’s personal liability
for the agency’s decision, and, to the extent the complaint was brought against Defendant
in his official capacity, it was barred by the state agency’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
Insofar as Plaintiff’s complaint directly challenged the state court proceedings, it
was appropriately dismissed under Rooker/Feldman. However, because the state court
did not review the merits of the state agency decision, the Rooker/Feldman doctrine does
not apply to the agency decision. “While the Rooker–Feldman doctrine recognizes that
the federal district courts may not review decisions by a state’s courts, it does not
preclude federal district court review of executive action, including determinations made
by a state administrative agency.” Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “If the decision of a state agency has been upheld by
a state court, then the Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies, because a challenge to the
agency’s decision necessarily involves a challenge to the judgment of the state court.”
Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1994). However, the doctrine is
inapplicable to state agency decisions that have not been reviewed by the state courts. Id.
at 1525-26; see also Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1349 (7th Cir. 1997)
-2-
(“If the Rooker–Feldman doctrine is to be extended to administrative judgments, it will
have to be done by the Court that created it.”).
Nevertheless, we affirm the district court’s ruling on the basis of the alternate
grounds the court gave for dismissal. As the district court correctly noted, Plaintiff’s
complaint does not allege any facts that would establish Defendant’s liability in his
individual capacity. As for Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant in his official capacity,
“when a suit seeks money damages against an official of a state agency, suing that official
in his or her official capacity, then the ‘real party in interest’ is the state, and the suit is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” ANR Pipeline Co. v. Lafaver, 150 F.3d 1178, 1187
(10th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002). Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, § 1983 does not affect this
principle. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675-77 (1974).
After carefully reviewing Plaintiff’s brief and the appellate record, we see no error
in the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant in his official
capacity were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, while his claims against Defendant in
his individual capacity failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We
therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the case.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
-3-