United States v. Wilson

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 27, 2012
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 12-8020
(D.C. No. 2:05-CR-00078-ABJ-3)
LEVI A. WILSON, (D. Wyo.)
Defendant - Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 12-8026
(D.C. No. 2:05-CR-00078-ABJ-3)
LEVI A. WILSON, (D. Wyo.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, O'BRIEN, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
*
The parties have waived oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). This case is submitted for decision on the briefs.
This order and judgment is an unpublished decision, not binding precedent. 10th
Cir. R. 32.1(A). Citation to unpublished decisions is not prohibited. Fed. R. App. 32.1.
It is appropriate as it relates to law of the case, issue preclusion and claim preclusion.
Unpublished decisions may also be cited for their persuasive value. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Citation to an order and judgment must be accompanied by an appropriate parenthetical
notation B (unpublished). Id.
Levi A. Wilson, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, is a busy man; he has
recently filed three appeals with this court, all relating to one conviction. He pled guilty
to cocaine trafficking charges pursuant to a binding plea agreement. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(1)(C). He appeals from the district court’s denial of the latest of his attempts to
modify his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).1 We affirm.
BACKGROUND
This is Wilson’s third appeal from denials of collateral relief from the agreed
sentence. In 2005, he pled guilty to the charge of conspiracy Count I: to traffic in
cocaine base (more commonly known as “crack cocaine” or “crack”), and to use a place
for the manufacture, distribution, and use of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 856(a)(1), (b), and 846.2 (Vol. II at 189.) Wilson agreed to plead
1
In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) states:
[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon
motion of the defendant . . ., the court may reduce the term of
imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) . . . .
2
Section 841(b) mandates a 10-year to life imprisonment sentence for convictions
involving certain quantities of drugs. It also provides: “If any person commits such a
violation after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such person
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years and not
more than life imprisonment . . . .” Section 851 requires the government to file a notice
that it intends to apply the § 841 enhancement and to “stat[e] in writing the previous
convictions to be relied upon.” The government filed its § 851 notice on August 8, 2005.
United States v. Wilson, 421 Fed. App’x 822, 823 (10th Cir. 2010), cert denied, 132 S.
Ct. 370 (2011) (Wilson II).
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guilty to the single count charged in exchange for a 20-year sentence of imprisonment
followed by 10 years of supervised release. He did not file a direct appeal but in 2006, he
filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. The district court denied relief and we denied a
Certificate of Appealability. United States v. Wilson, 337 Fed. App’x 747, 748 (10th Cir.
2009) (Wilson I). We concluded his claims of actual innocence, as well as his challenges
to the voluntariness of his plea, the ineffectiveness of his counsel, and the
constitutionality of his sentence, were unsupported by law or facts.
In 2010, Wilson filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to reduce his
sentence. United States v. Wilson, 421 Fed. App’x 822, 824 (10th Cir. 2010), cert
denied, 132 S. Ct. 3701 (2011) (Wilson II). He argued for a sentence reduction based on
Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines. Alternatively, he contended his sentence
violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court
rejected both arguments. First, it concluded it lacked the authority to reduce Wilson’s
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) because his sentence reflected the statutory
mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 851. Second, it
determined the Eighth Amendment claim was not cognizable under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).
Id. at 824-25. We affirmed, stating: “As Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines
did not reduce the statutorily defined mandatory minimum, the district court necessarily
lacked the authority to reduce Wilson’s sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).” Id.
at 825. We also concluded Wilson’s additional argument—that the court’s sentence was
procedural error—was properly the subject of a [second or subsequent] § 2255 motion.
Id.
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On February 16, 2012, Wilson moved to reduce his sentence based on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2693 (2011)
(applying Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines in a Rule 11 plea context),3 and
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, (FSA) (increasing the threshold
quantities of narcotics which trigger mandatory-minimum sentences), effective
November 1, 2011. The district court rejected these arguments because, as we stated in
Wilson II, his previous drug conviction required a 20-year, mandatory-minimum
sentence. 421 Fed. App’x at 825; see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Thus, his sentence was
not based on the Guidelines but on a statutory minimum. Second, the increased drug
quantities necessary to apply mandatory minimum under the FSA, which became
effective after Wilson’s sentencing, did not affect the minimum sentence required under
§ 841(b). The FSA would not apply to Wilson because he pled to possessing and
distributing quantities which exceeded even its increased levels. (Appeal No. 12-8020.)
On March 12, 2012, Wilson filed a “Motion to Enforce the Plea Agreement in
Reply to Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Reduction of Sentence.”
In this motion/reply, he argued there was no § 841 enhancement associated with his plea
agreement, the prosecution had agreed the minimum sentence was 10 years, and the
district court impermissibly interfered with the plea discussions by suggesting the
enhancement applied. The government moved to dismiss the motion/reply because it was
3
In Freeman, a plurality of the Supreme Court held “the district court has
authority to entertain § 3582(c)(2) motions when sentences are imposed in light of the
Guidelines, even if the defendant enters into an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement.” Freeman, 131
S. Ct. at 2693.
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not related to the motion to reduce his sentence. Rather, it was a “straightforward
challenge to the legality of his conviction and sentence” and “[a]s such, it constitute[d] a
second or successive 2255 motion.” (Vol. II at 185.) The court agreed, and determined
the motion did not involve new evidence or a new, retroactive constitutional rule of law.
(Id. at 192.); see 28 U.S.C. 2255(h). As a result, it dismissed the motion. (Appeal No.
12-8026.)
DISCUSSION
Wilson’s current appellate briefs in Appeal Nos. 12-8020 and 12-80264 abandon
the sentence reduction arguments made to the district court. Instead, he contends the
court erred when it interfered in the plea negotiations by applying a 20-year mandatory
minimum. He claims the prosecutor had forgotten the § 851 notice had been filed and,
therefore, when the plea agreement was reached, it contemplated a 10-year mandatory
minimum sentence. Even if this argument had been timely made to the district court, it
fails for several reasons. First, it is foreclosed by our decision in Wilson II, which held
the plea agreement was valid and based upon a 20-year statutory minimum sentence. 421
Fed. App’x at 825 (“The record, however, indicates that the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea
agreement did include consideration of Wilson’s prior felony conviction in his sentence
computation.”). Second, the argument is properly the subject of a § 2255 motion. See
4
Appeal Nos. 12-8020 and 12-8026 have been consolidated. On February 21,
2012, Wilson filed a motion for the dismissal of his indictment and alleged that, because
there was no non-governmental co-conspirator, the court was without jurisdiction. The
denial of this motion was the subject of another appeal, Appeal No. 12-8036, which was
dismissed on August 8, 2012, “for lack of prosecution”; the mandate was issued
August 28, 2012.
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United States v. Torres-Aquino, 334 F.3d 939, 941 (10th Cir. 2003) (“An argument that a
sentence was incorrectly imposed should be raised on direct appeal or in a motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.”).
Because Wilson has already filed one unsuccessful § 2255 motion, he must
receive certification from this court before filing another. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). A second
or successive motion is certified only when “newly discovered evidence” clearly and
convincingly establishes that no “reasonable fact finder” would find Wilson guilty of the
offense or Wilson demonstrates the Supreme Court has iterated a new, retroactive rule of
Constitutional law “that was previously unavailable.” Id. Wilson has not attempted to
meet this standard and cannot do so.
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Wilson’s motion for reduction of
sentence and its dismissal of his motion to enforce his plea agreement.
The district court permitted Wilson to proceed on appeal without the payment of
fees. His motion to this court for the same relief is dismissed as moot.
Entered by the Court:
Terrence L. O’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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