Breidenbach v. Bolish

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
OCT 10 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
EDWARD A. BREIDENBACH,
MARY ELLEN BREIDENBACH,
FRANK D. BREIDENBACH,
GERALDINE E. BREIDENBACH,
EDWARD JOHN BREIDENBACH, No. 96-1270
SCOTT A. HARMS, GINA L.
BULLOCK, JASON BULLOCK,
CHRISTOPHER HARMS, NICOLE
HARMS, FRANCISCO SERRANO,
STEVEN G. HARMS, JENNIFER
HARMS, and CHAD HARMS,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
DON BOLISH, Sheriff of Logan
County, RAY NEVILLE, Deputy
Sheriff with Logan County Sheriff’s
Department, COUNTY OF LOGAN, a
county of the State of Colorado, and
JOHN DOES I THROUGH XL,
officers and agents of various
governmental entities including
Colorado National Guard,
Defendants,
and
NICOLA GESI, Drug Enforcement
Administration Special Agent, in his
official capacity,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 95-K-2148)
Nathan D. Chambers, Chambers, Dansky & Hansen, P.C., Denver, CO, for
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Barbara L. Herwig and Edward Himmelfarb, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., for Defendant-Appellant Nicola Gesi.
Before EBEL, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
HENRY, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from the plaintiffs’ civil rights action against Nicola
Gesi, a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency, alleging that Agent Gesi
knowingly or recklessly submitted false information in an affidavit used to obtain
warrants to search the plaintiffs’ homes. Agent Gesi moved to dismiss the action
on qualified immunity grounds, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts
sufficient to demonstrate that Agent Gesi violated a clearly established
constitutional right. The district court denied Agent Gesi’s motion to dismiss and
allowed discovery to proceed to resolve the qualified immunity question. We
have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
2
The plaintiffs are residents of six homes in Logan County, Colorado. On
August 21 and 22, 1993, in a series of pre-dawn raids, federal, state, and local law
enforcement agents executed warrants to search the plaintiffs’ homes and other
homes in Logan County. The searches of the plaintiffs’ homes failed to produce
any evidence of marijuana or contraband, and none of the plaintiffs were
criminally charged.
As a result of the events surrounding the searches, the plaintiffs filed this
civil rights action against the law enforcement agents, Logan County, and the City
of Sterling, Colorado, alleging the searches violated their Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Among other
things, the plaintiffs brought a federal action under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against DEA
agent Gesi who submitted the affidavit (or affidavits) to procure the warrants.
The plaintiffs allege that Agent Gesi “knowingly included false information in the
affidavit(s) or recklessly disregarded the substantial probability that certain
information in the affidavit was false.” Aplts’ App., doc. 1, at 3 (First Amended
Complaint dated Feb. 2, 1996). 1 However, because the warrant affidavit was
1
The full text of the plaintiffs’ factual allegations against Agent Gesi
state as follows:
23. Sometime before August 21, 1993, defendant
Nicola Gesi submitted affidavit(s) in connection with
3
sealed by the issuing judge as part of the defendants’ continuing criminal
investigation in Logan County, the plaintiffs have never seen Agent Gesi’s
warrant affidavit and did not offer specific facts related to the affidavit.
Agent Gesi moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on qualified
immunity grounds. He argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity because
the plaintiffs had failed to allege the violation of a clearly established
constitutional right in sufficient detail to meet the “heightened pleading” standard
required in qualified immunity cases. In response, the plaintiffs offered affidavits
from Edward Breidenbach and Mary Ellen Breidenbach swearing that they had
never been involved in the cultivation or distribution of any controlled
substances, or had controlled substances in their residences or on their property.
The district court denied Agent Gesi’s motion. The district court first
determined under the qualified immunity doctrine that the law was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation that the submission of false
a request for the issuance of approximately sixty-six
(66) search warrants. Defendant Gesi knowingly
included false information in the affidavit(s) or
recklessly disregarded the substantial probability that
certain information in the affidavit(s) was false. In
reliance upon this affidavit(s), approximately sixty-
six (66) search warrants were issued, including
warrants authorizing the entry and search of certain
plaintiffs’ property, as set forth more fully below.
Aplts’ App., doc. 1, at 3 (First Amended Complaint dated Feb. 2, 1996).
4
information in a warrant affidavit violated an individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights. Aplts’ App. doc. 4, at 3 (Dist. Ct. Order dated May 6, 1996). The court
then held that because the plaintiffs have been refused all discovery and have not
seen the sealed affidavit, their allegations were “sufficient to withstand a motion
to dismiss.” Id. at 4. The court ruled that the plaintiffs could proceed with
discovery limited to resolving the qualified immunity question. The court added
that if the plaintiffs failed “to adduce evidence to support their allegations of
Gesi’s falsity or reckless disregard for the truth in preparing the affidavit at issue,
summary judgment [would] enter forthwith.” Id.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the denial or grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, applying the
same standard used by the district court. See Liebson v. New Mexico Corrections
Dep’t, 73 F.3d 274, 275 (10th Cir. 1996). In the context of a qualified immunity
defense, however, the standard is somewhat different than in the typical Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) context. Once the defendant raises a qualified immunity defense,
the plaintiff assumes the burden of showing that the defendant has violated
clearly established law. See Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio,
847 F.2d 642, 645 (1988). To overcome the qualified immunity defense, the
plaintiff must identify a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of
5
which a reasonable person would have known, and then allege facts to show that
the defendant’s conduct violated that right. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982); Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc., 847 F.2d at 645.
The qualified immunity defense extends to government officials performing
discretionary functions. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. As explained by the
Supreme Court in Mitchell, qualified immunity represents
an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of
litigation, conditioned on the resolution of the essentially legal
question whether the conduct which the plaintiff complains violated
clearly established law. The entitlement is an immunity from suit
rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity,
it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.
472 U.S. at 526.
The qualified immunity analysis is the same whether the claims are brought
under Bivens or pursuant to the post-Civil War Civil Rights Acts. See Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (“[W]e deem it untenable to draw a
distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state
officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against
federal officials.”). Thus, in assessing whether the qualified immunity defense
should apply, we must make two inquiries: First, we must ask what was the
clearly established law with regard to the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights at the
time those rights were allegedly violated by Agent Gesi. If the law was not
clearly established at the time, then Agent Gesi is entitled to dismissal of the
6
action because he could not have known that he was violating that right. Second,
if the law was clearly established, we must ask whether Agent Gesi’s conduct was
“objectively reasonable” in light of this clearly established law.
A. Clearly Established Law
The first question under Harlow is whether the law regarding the
submission of false information in a warrant affidavit was clearly established at
the time of the alleged violation in August 1993. Neither party disputes that the
law was clearly established. As pointed out by the district court, the appropriate
standard for determining whether a constitutional violation occurred in this
instance is set out in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). This court has
previously held that “the law [is] clearly established that an officer would violate
a plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by knowingly or recklessly
making a false statement in an affidavit in support of [a] . . . warrant, if the false
statement were material to the finding of probable cause.” Bruning v. Pixler, 949
F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56). Accordingly,
we hold that the law concerning the plaintiffs’ claim against Agent Gesi was
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
B. The Objective Reasonableness of the Defendant’s Actions
7
The dispute in this case focuses on the second prong of the Harlow test —
that is, whether the plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that
defendants’ conduct was “objectively unreasonable” in light of clearly established
law. On appeal, Agent Gesi argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs failed to allege any facts to support their
allegation that he knowingly or recklessly submitted false information in his
warrant affidavit. Because this appeal arises on a motion to dismiss, we construe
the facts, and reasonable inferences that might be drawn from them, in favor of
the plaintiff. See Beard v. City Northglenn, Colo., 24 F.3d 110, 115 (10th Cir.
1994).
Agent Gesi correctly notes that in the context of a qualified immunity
defense, this court has traditionally required plaintiffs to meet a heightened
pleading standard. See Sawyer v. County of Creek, 908 F.2d 663, 667 (10th Cir.
1990) (“Once a qualified immunity defense has been raised . . . , the plaintiff is
held to a heightened standard of pleading.”). The purpose of the heightened
pleading requirement is rooted in the purpose of the qualified immunity doctrine
itself. When the Supreme Court reformulated its qualified immunity test in
Harlow to focus on the “objective reasonableness” of an officer’s actions as
opposed to his or her subjective intent, the Court sought to shield government
officials not only from the “substantial costs” of subjecting officials to the risks
8
of trial, but also from “[j]udicial inquiry into subjective motivation,” including
“broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons.” 457 U.S. at
816. The Court held that such inquiries “can be peculiarly disruptive of effective
government.” Id. In keeping with this important concern for shielding
government officers from burdensome discovery in cases where subjective intent
is at issue, this court and several other circuits have imposed a more stringent
pleading requirement where a qualified immunity defense is asserted. 2 See
Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc., 847 F.2d at 646. See also Crawford-El
v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 816-17 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), petition for cert.
granted, No. 96-827 (June 16, 1997); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 452 (9th
2
We disagree with the plaintiffs’ argument that the Supreme Court
altered this heightened pleading requirement with regard to civil rights actions
against individual officers in its decision in Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). In
Leatherman, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s heightened pleading standard in
a section 1983 action alleging municipal liability because it held such a standard
was inconsistent with the liberal standard of “notice pleading” required under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In doing so, however, the Court expressly
stated that “[w]e . . . have no occasion to consider whether our qualified immunity
jurisprudence would require a heightened pleading standard in cases involving
individual government officials.” Id. at 166-67. In declining to extend its
holding to suits against individual officers, the Court emphasized that, “unlike
various government officials, municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit —
either absolute or qualified — under § 1983.” Id. at 166. Because the Court
declined to rule that its holding applied to individual government officers and we
find no reason to do so here, we are compelled under the doctrine of stare decisis
to continue to apply our heightened pleading standard in cases concerning
individual government officers.
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Cir. 1994); Gooden v. Howard County, Md., 954 F.2d 960, 969-70 (4th Cir. 1992)
(en banc); Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1991);Dominque v.
Telb, 831 F.2d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1987).
The heightened pleading standard requires that a plaintiff do more than
assert bare allegations of a constitutional violation. As we explained in Sawyer,
“[t]he complaint must include ‘all the factual allegations necessary to sustain a
conclusion that defendant violated clearly established law.’” 908 F.2d at 667(quoting Dominque, 831 F.2d at 676). If the original complaint is deficient, the
plaintiff must amend his or her complaint to include specific, non-conclusory
allegations of fact sufficient to allow the district court to determine that those
facts, if proved, demonstrate that the actions taken were not objectively
reasonable in light of the clearly established law. In the context of a Franks claim
alleging the knowing or reckless submission of false information in a warrant
affidavit, this court has previously held that if the plaintiff “is able to prove the
necessary deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard to impeach a facially valid
warrant, the reasonableness inquiry has to be resolved against the defendant since
no reasonably competent officer could believe [a search] legal where it was his
deliberate reckless deception that led the magistrate to issue the warrant.” Beard,
24 F.3d at 115. On the other hand, if the plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to
demonstrate a Fourth Amendment violation, “there is no need to proceed any
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further; [and] the case ends in defendant’s favor.” Id. at 115.
In the present case, the plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege any facts to
support their claim that Agent Gesi knowing or recklessly submitted false
information in his warrant affidavit. The only statement supporting the plaintiffs’
Franks claim reads as follows: “Sometime before August 21, 1993, defendant
Nicola Gesi submitted affidavit(s) in connection with a request for the issuance of
approximately sixty-six (66) search warrants. Defendant Gesi knowingly included
false information in the affidavit(s) or recklessly disregarded the substantial
probability that certain information in the affidavit(s) was false.” Aplts’ App.,
doc. 1, at 3 (First Amended Complaint dated Feb. 2, 1996). This allegation is a
conclusory statement with no foundation in any specific facts arising from the
warrant affidavit on which the claim is predicated. While we recognize that the
plaintiffs have not had access to the warrant affidavit — which the issuing judge
sealed in an unrelated criminal proceeding — we cannot subject a government
official to discovery based on a complaint which is supported only by conclusory
allegations and speculation of a constitutional violation.
Furthermore, the mere fact that no contraband was discovered during the
searches of the plaintiffs’ residences has nothing to do with whether or not Agent
Gesi knowingly or recklessly submitted false information in submitting his
warrant affidavit. The plaintiffs are incorrect that, because nothing was found,
11
there could not have been probable cause to search the houses unless that
probable cause was based on false information. Probable cause need not be based
on actual guilt. Rather, probable cause to obtain a search warrant is based on a
showing of a reasonable degree of suspicion that the suspected items will be
found — not an actual showing that such items will be found. See Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (“The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to
make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”). Therefore, we decline
to consider the plaintiffs’ actual innocence as related to the question of whether
or not Agent Gesi knowingly or recklessly submitted false information in his
warrant affidavit.
In sum, the plaintiffs’ complaint fails to offer specific, non-conclusory
factual allegations sufficient to allow the district court to determine that those
facts, if proved, demonstrate that Agent Gesi violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth
Amendment rights. Accordingly, we conclude that Agent Gesi’s motion to
dismiss on qualified immunity grounds must be granted.
Our conclusion, however, does not leave the plaintiffs without recourse.
We are sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ “Catch-22” situation in which they seek to
allege a constitutional violation based on a warrant affidavit but cannot offer any
12
facts related to that affidavit because it has been sealed as a result of the
defendants’ on-going criminal investigation in Logan County. Not only does this
situation make it difficult for the plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss — such
as that presented in this instance — but it also exposes the plaintiffs’ counsel to
possible sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 for presenting a pleading containing
allegations lacking evidentiary support. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
In a case such as this, the plaintiffs should pursue every possible avenue to
obtain the necessary facts to support their legal claims prior to filing a complaint
in federal court. The plaintiffs have not done this. While the plaintiffs assert in
their answer brief that they “have been denied every opportunity to review or see
[the warrant affidavit],” Aples’ Br. at 8, the plaintiffs have never sought an order
from the judge who sealed the affidavit to allow an unsealing or limited unsealing
of the affidavit for use in preparing their civil complaint. The plaintiffs should
have sought to obtain the facts in this manner rather than filing a civil complaint
and asking another court to oversee the discovery of documents sealed in a
separate criminal matter. In the event that the plaintiffs’ efforts to unseal the
affidavit were to prove fruitless, the plaintiffs would have recourse by seeking
appellate review of that decision in this court. See generally Lawmaster v. United
States (In re Search of 1638 E. 2nd Street, Tulsa, Okla.), 993 F.2d 773 (10th Cir.
1993) (involving civil plaintiff’s appeal of denial of petition to unseal affidavit
13
used to obtain search warrant). 3
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the district court
denying Agent Gesi’s motion to dismiss. We remand this matter to the district
court with instructions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice and
with leave to amend. Such disposition should provide the plaintiffs a reasonable
amount of time to obtain the necessary factual allegations, if such exist, to
support their Franks claim against Agent Gesi.
3
We noted in Lawmaster that a district court has various options
available to it in unsealing all or portions of affidavits or other documents. These
include: in camera hearings, findings under seal, and redacted versions of the
document. See 993 F.2d at 775-76 & n.3.
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