Deutsch v. Gallegos

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 1 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
FRANCIS T. DEUTSCH,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 03-1489
v. (D. Colorado)
E.J. GALLEGOS, Warden, F.P.C. (D.C. No. 03-Z-1836)
Florence,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER
Before KELLY, HENRY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Francis T. Deutsch, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, appeals following
the district court’s dismissal of his Bivens action and the denial of his motion to
reconsider. Because the district court properly found that Mr. Deutsch voluntarily
dismissed his claims, we conclude that we have no jurisdiction, and we dismiss
this appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 9, 2003, Mr. Deutsch submitted to the district court a pro se
“Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”
However, the district court determined that Mr. Deustch was asserting civil rights
claims rather than habeas corpus claims, by alleging that he was denied his right
to free exercise of religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment.
Rec. doc. 2, at 2 (Dist. Ct. Order, filed Sept. 18, 2003). Therefore, the district
court liberally construed Mr. Deutsch’s suit as asserting civil rights claims
pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), and directed him to file a “Prisoner Complaint” form. Id.In response to the district court’s order, Mr. Deustch filed a document on
October 15, 2003, titled “Applicant’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
Withdrawal of Civil Action Without Prejudice, and Adequate Time and
Opportunity to Cure Any Deficiencies.” Rec. doc. 4, at 1. Mr. Deutsch’s
requests were contradictory. He first conceded that his action was more
appropriately filed as a Bivens action, which must be preceded by total exhaustion
of administrative remedies. He then admitted that he had not yet exhausted the
administrative appeals process and stated that “he must withdraw his action at the
present time.” Id. at 3. Then, Mr. Deutsch requested the district court to issue an
injunction requiring the Federal Bureau of Prisons to allow him to exercise his
religion freely “while [Mr. Deutsch] exhausts administrative remedies and these
issues ripen for judicial review in a Bivins [sic] action.” Id. at 6.
The district court construed Mr. Deutsch’s motion as a Notice of Voluntary
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Dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) and ordered that
the dismissal was effective as of the motion’s date of filing, October 15, 2003.
The court dismissed the complaint and the action without prejudice and denied
Mr. Deutsch’s other requests as moot. Rec. doc. 5, at 2-3 (Dist. Ct. Order, filed
Nov. 4, 2003).
On November 12, 2003, Mr. Deutsch filed a “Motion for Reconsideration”
asserting that even though his action had been dismissed, he should be able to
obtain his desired injunctive relief, citing Jackson v. District of Columbia, 254
F.3d 262 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Rec. doc. 8, at 2 (Motion for Reconsideration, filed
Nov. 12, 2003). The district court construed the motion as a motion to alter or
amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and
denied it, finding that Mr. Deutsch had misread Jackson and that the court had no
authority to grant injunctive relief without a pending related action. Rec. doc. 18,
at 3-4 (Dist. Ct. Order, filed Dec. 24, 2003).
Mr. Deutsch now appeals to this Court, asserting that (1) the district court
misapplied Jackson and erroneously denied him injunctive relief pending
exhaustion of his administrative remedies, (2) he has now exhausted his
administrative remedies, and the district court should reinstate his Bivens action
and grant him injunctive relief, and (3) the district court erred in “rais[ing] the
exhaustion of remedies defense sua sponte,” Aplt’s Br. at 9.
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II. DISCUSSION
“We review a district court’s ruling on a F ED . R. C IV . P. 59(e) motion under
an abuse of discretion standard.” Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th
Cir. 1997). “Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court’s decision will
not be disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that
the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of
permissible choice in the circumstances.” Id.Upon a review of the record, we hold that the district court properly
construed Mr. Deutsch’s motion filed on October 15, 2003, as a notice of
voluntary dismissal. Mr. Deutsch filed this motion before the defendants filed an
answer, see F ED . R. C IV . P. 41(a)(1), and he admitted that he had not exhausted
his administrative remedies and stated that “he must withdraw his action at the
present time.” Rec. doc. 4, at 3. Mr. Deutsch does not contest the finding that he
voluntarily dismissed his case in order to first exhaust his administrative
remedies. See Aplt’s Br. at 2, 6.
Under Rule 41(a)(1)(i), a plaintiff has an absolute right to dismiss
without prejudice and no action is required on the part of the court. The
[filing of a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) notice] itself closes the file. . . . The effect
of the filing of a notice of dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i) is to
leave the parties as though no action had been brought. Once the notice
of dismissal has been filed, the district court loses jurisdiction over the
dismissed claims and may not address the merits of such claims or issue
further orders pertaining to them.
Janssen v. Harris, 321 F.3d 998, 1000 (10th Cir. 2003). Therefore, when Mr.
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Deutsch filed his voluntary dismissal, the district court was rendered powerless to
issue his requested injunctive relief. However, a voluntary dismissal constitutes a
dismissal without prejudice, see F ED . R. C IV . P. 41(a)(1), and if Mr. Deustch has
exhausted his administrative remedies as he claims, he may refile his Bivens
action in the district court. See Steele v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d
1204, 1214 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement to
Bivens claims); Jackson, 254 F.3d at 270-71 (“Because the prisoners failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies, the district court should have dismissed the
complaint without prejudice, allowing the prisoners to refile once they have
completed the [prison] grievance procedures.”).
Because Mr. Deustch had voluntarily dismissed his claims, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying his Rule 59(e) motion. Because the action
has been properly dismissed, we are unable to reach the merits of Mr. Deutsch’s
issues on appeal. Accordingly, we DISMISS this matter.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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