Walters v. Beck

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 23, 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
CORTEZ DARNELL WALTERS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 04-7127
v. (D.C. No. CV-03-342-P)
(E.D. Okla.)
STEVEN BECK, Head Facility
Warden; RUSSELL GOLDEN, Case
Manager; ROYCE MELTON, Captain
over Segregation Unit; MELINDA
GUILFOYLE, Department of
Corrections Administrator,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, ANDERSON , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Cortez Darnell Walters, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on his claims
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserts that he was kept in
administrative segregation past the date he should have been released from
segregation, in violation of his constitutional rights and prison policy. We affirm.
Background
During the pertinent time period, Mr. Walters was in the custody of the
Oklahoma Department of Corrections at the Mack Alford Correctional Center. He
complains about the length of time he was required to serve in the Special
Housing Unit (SHU) as discipline. On June 14, 2002, he committed two
misconduct violations and was sentenced to thirty days in the SHU on each
charge. 1 On June 27, 2002, he committed one menacing violation and one
disobedience violation and was again sentenced to thirty days in the SHU on each
charge. Prison officials determined that his release date from the SHU was
October 14, 2002, running the disciplinary sentences consecutively. Mr. Walters,
on the other hand, asserted that the various thirty-day sentences ran concurrently
1
Mr. Walters also was docked various earned credits for each disciplinary
conviction. Those disciplinary actions are not before us in this appeal.
-2-
and, therefore, he was to have been released from the SHU on August 9, 2002.
He contended that keeping him in the SHU past August 9 without additional due
process protections, which he did not receive, violated his constitutional rights
and prison policies. 2
He was released from the SHU into the general population
on September 26, 2002.
The district court carefully reviewed the challenged disciplinary actions and
sentences, and concluded that Mr. Walters’ release from SHU on September 26,
2002, was within the range of his disciplinary sentence that expired on
October 14, 2002. Accordingly, the district court granted defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
Mr. Walters appeals, challenging the district court’s ruling on his claim that
he was wrongfully kept in administrative segregation past August 9, 2002.
Defendants do not dispute the district court’s finding that Mr. Walters exhausted
administrative remedies on the claims outlined above. Mr. Walters has abandoned
on appeal his remaining claims, which were dismissed without prejudice for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
2
Mr. Walters does not allege that he was denied due process in the
proceedings resulting in his placement in the SHU.
-3-
Pending motion
We first address Mr. Walters’ pending motion. He has filed a pleading
entitled “sworn affidavit,” which we construe as a motion to strike appellees’
brief. He maintains that the brief on appeal is akin to a prohibited successive
motion for summary judgment because it contains arguments and authorities not
presented to the district court. An appellee “may defend the judgment won below
on any ground supported by the record . . . .” Tinkler v. United States ex rel.
F.A.A. , 982 F.2d 1456, 1461 n.4 (10th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). The motion
is denied.
Merits
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Sealock
v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is
appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Mr. Walters is representing himself on appeal,
so his pleadings will be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972).
“To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff[] must allege that [he was]
deprived of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States
and that this deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Yanaki v.
-4-
Iomed, Inc. , 415 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Sullivan , 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999)).
The undisputed facts show that Mr. Walters was disciplined for various
violations, for which he was sentenced to the SHU for thirty days each. The
dispute is over whether the sentences were to run concurrently or consecutively.
See Aplt. Br. Part B, at 18a. The record establishes that defendants consistently
applied them to run consecutively. See, e.g. , R. doc. 31, Attach. G, at 4.
Mr. Walters has cited no authority and proffered no justification for his position
that the sentences were to run concurrently. In essence, he asserts a constitutional
right not to serve additional time in the SHU for additional violations. This does
not state a constitutional claim cognizable under § 1983. Accordingly, the district
court properly granted summary judgment to defendants.
The district court granted Mr. Walters’ motion to proceed on appeal
without prepayment of costs and fees. He is reminded that he is obligated to
continue making partial payments until the entire fee has been paid.
-5-
Mr. Walters’ motion to strike defendants’ appellate brief is denied. The
judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
-6-