United States v. Ramirez-Jimenez

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
September 1, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
__________________________ Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 05-1291
(D . Colo.)
M AN UEL RAM IREZ-JIM ENEZ, (D.Ct. No. 04-CR-58 RB)
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before TA CH A, Chief Circuit Judge, and BARRETT and BROR BY, Senior
Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant M anuel Ramirez-Jimenez pled guilty to illegal reentry into the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
United States of a deported alien previously convicted of an aggravated felony, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). He now appeals his forty-one-month
sentence, contending his sentence is unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) due
to the district court’s failure to: 1) properly consider the mitigation evidence he
presented; 2) articulate the factors in § 3553 on which it relied in sentencing; and
3) consider the disparity of his sentence w ith that of another individual with more
prior convictions. He further appeals, claiming the district court impermissibly
“double counted” his prior conviction under United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) § 2L1.2 in calculating both his offense level and
criminal history. W e exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s conviction and sentence.
On April 1, 2005, M r. Ramirez-Jimenez pled guilty to illegal reentry into
the United States of a deported alien previously convicted of an aggravated
felony. Following his guilty plea, a probation officer prepared a presentence
report, calculating his base offense level at eight under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a), and
applying a sixteen-level upward adjustment based on his prior conviction relating
to a felony drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded
thirteen months, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). 1 After applying a three-
1
M r. Ramirez-Jimenez first pled guilty to one count of possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute and one count of possession of cocaine with
(continued...)
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level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and factoring in M r.
Ramirez-Jimenez’s criminal history at Category II, the probation officer
calculated his sentencing range at forty-one to fifty-one months imprisonment.
However, based on the fact M r. Ramirez-Jimenez lived in the United States for
more than twenty-five years and illegally returned to the United States for the
sole purpose of caring for his two children, the probation officer recommended a
sentence of only twenty-two months imprisonment.
M r. Ramirez-Jimenez did not file any written objections to the presentence
report. However, one day before the sentencing hearing, he filed a motion for
downward departure, noting he did not object to the Guidelines calculation in the
presentence report, but was requesting a reduction of his sentence below the
advisory Guidelines range based on mitigating circumstances. In support of his
motion, M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s attorney argued a reduction was warranted based
on: 1) cultural assimilation grounds, given he lived in the United States over half
his lifetime; 2) his reentry into the United States for the laudable purpose of
1
(...continued)
intent to distribute, which resulted in a sentence of ten months imprisonment and
three years supervised release; but proceeded to trial on one count of carrying a
firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense. W hen M r. Ramirez-Jimenez later
waived his right to a jury trial on the third count of carrying a firearm in relation
to a drug trafficking offense and pled guilty, he received a sixty-month sentence,
and the other two sentences for the drug trafficking counts w ere reduced to six
months imprisonment.
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caring for his children, who are United States citizens; 3) his long-time adherence
to the laws of the United States, with the exception of his prior conviction; 4) the
fact a sentence of time already served would be consistent with other sentences
for similar offenders; and 5) the fact his plea agreement entered into during
prosecution of his prior offense was conditioned, in part, on the United States
government’s promise to assist him in remaining in this country in exchange for
his help in the investigation and prosecution of others, but that the government
never fulfilled its promise.
In making these arguments at the sentencing hearing, M r. Ramirez-
Jimenez’s attorney stated M r. Ramirez-Jimenez was not collaterally attacking his
prior conviction but bringing the issue up in order to apprise the court of his
assistance to the government during his prior conviction. W hen the district court
asked how the matter fit within the 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) factors, his counsel
explained it showed M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s extreme helpfulness to law
enforcement and “that’s as far as it goes.” After M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s counsel
suggested his prior single wrongful act committed many years ago should not
continue to blight his life, the district court noted double counting of the prior
conviction in both the computation of the offense level and the criminal history
category was lawful, to which M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s counsel stated, “I am not
arguing with the fact that the guidelines don’t properly take that into
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consideration, the fact that it is a double penalty, but what I am arguing, your
Honor, is the larger context of [M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s] life.” M r. Ramirez-
Jimenez’s attorney then pointed out M r. Ramirez-Jimenez had “been law
abiding,” and only committed the offense of illegal reentry to provide for his
children. Finally, M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s counsel complained about the disparity
of his sentence as compared to at least one other defendant in another case
presided over by a different judge in which the defendant received forty-one
months imprisonment even though he had a more egregious criminal history of
three prior offenses, including sexual assault. 2
In rendering the sentence, the district court exhaustively articulated the
relevant matters of fact and law it considered, including the plea agreement of the
parties; the nature and circumstances of the offense, “focusing on its real
conduct,” as required by the court in United States v. Booker 3 ; M r. Ramirez-
Jimenez’s history and characteristics; the sentence permitted by law under 18
U.S.C. § 3551; the presentence report and addendum; the purposes and goals of
sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553; the factors which must be considered under
2
The government cursorily explained it did not oppose the motion for
downward departure, given the initial prosecutor in the case resigned his position
and left no documentation as to whether an agreement was entered into
concerning time M r. Ramirez-Jimenez had already served in custody.
3
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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18 U.S.C. §§ 3582(a) and 3553(a)(1)-(7); the applicable provisions of the
advisory Guidelines; the kind of sentence and sentencing range established
thereunder, together with § 3553(a)(4); the important need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities and to ensure similar sentences for those committing
similar crimes; the pertinent policy statements of the United States Sentencing
Commission; the critical need to impose sentences under § 3553(a)(2) to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence by protecting the public
from further crimes committed by the defendant or other defendants similarly
situated and inclined, and provide needed educational or vocational training or
other correctional treatment; the Congressional goal of fairness and uniformity in
sentencing and the principle under § 3553(a) of imposing a sentence sufficient but
not greater than necessary to achieve those goals; the positions of the probation
department, the government, defense counsel, and the defendant himself; the
motion for downward departure based on cultural assimilation grounds; and the
authorities cited by the parties in their arguments to the court.
Next, the district court articulated why a sentence at the bottom of the
Guidelines range at forty-one months would meet these factors and other relevant
criteria it considered. The district court explicitly stated that while it had
discretion to depart from the advisory Guidelines range, no good cause or reason
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existed and noted M r. Ramirez-Jimenez committed a serious offense and then
entered the country illegally while on supervised release, demonstrating he
learned nothing from his experience. The district court also stated the advisory
Guidelines logically and fairly applied to M r. Ramirez-Jimenez and his
circumstance, and explained a forty-one-month sentence at the bottom of the
Guidelines range would avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities in ensuring
similar sentences for those who commit similar crimes in similar ways. The
district court further explained it imposed a forty-one-month sentence in a case
“almost on all fours” w ith M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s case only the w eek before. In
addition, the district court re-articulated the other sentencing factors in § 3553(a),
pointing out, in part, that a forty-one-month sentence in this case would promote
respect for the law , provide just punishment for the offense, hopefully afford
adequate deterrence by protecting the public from M r. Ramirez-Jimenez or other
defendants similarly situated and inclined to commit further crimes, and provide
M r. Ramirez-Jimenez with needed vocational training or other correctional
treatment. W hile the district court noted M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s love and
concern for his children were admirable, it questioned where his love and concern
for his children were at the time he committed the prior drug-related felony
offense. Finally, the district court discounted M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s argument
mitigation was warranted because he lived a law-abiding life in this country for
an extended period of time, pointing out abiding the law is a minimum
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requirement of all persons in this country. The district court then denied M r.
Ramirez-Jimenez’s motion and sentenced him to forty-one months imprisonment.
On appeal, M r. Ramirez-Jimenez continues to argue his sentence is
unreasonable under § 3553 because of the mitigation evidence he presented and
the fact his sentence is dissimilar to at least one defendant sentenced in another
case. Astonishingly, he also contends the district court failed “to articulate the
factors upon which it relied for sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” For the
first time on appeal, M r. Ramirez-Jimenez also claims the district court erred “by
rejecting any consideration of ‘double counting’ which resulted in unwarranted
sentencing disparities.” Thus, while M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s counsel repeatedly
represented M r. Ramirez-Jimenez did not object to the Guidelines calculation of
forty-one to fifty-one months imprisonment, he is now claiming the district court
impermissibly double counted his prior conviction, which resulted in the
sentencing disparity he claims. 4
W hile w e recognize the Guidelines are now advisory rather than mandatory
4
In its arguments in response to M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s appeal, the
government suggests he untimely filed his appeal. W e disagree. The district
court docket shows the criminal judgment was entered June 13, 2005. The date of
entry is the beginning point for w hen the time period begins to run. See Fed. R.
App. P. 4(b)(6). The ten-day filing deadline expired June 27, 2005. See Fed. R.
App. P. 4(b)(1)(A) and 26(a)(2). Because M r. Ramirez-Jimenez filed his appeal
on June 21, 2005, it was timely filed before the expiration of the filing deadline.
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under the principles announced in Booker, they continue to be a factor the district
court must consider in imposing a sentence. See United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d
1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Since Booker, we review for
reasonableness the ultimate sentence imposed. Id. W e require reasonableness in
two respects – “the length of the sentence, as well as the method by which the
sentence was calculated.” Id. at 1055. If the district court “properly considers
the relevant Guidelines range and sentences the defendant within that range, the
sentence is presumptively reasonable,” but “[t]he defendant may rebut this
presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the
other sentencing factors laid out in § 3553(a).” Id. In determining whether the
district court properly considered the applicable G uidelines range, we review its
legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Id. at 1054.
W e begin with M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s double counting argument. He did
not raise the issue before the district court, although the district court itself
briefly referred to the lawfulness of double counting at the sentencing hearing.
W e have long declined to rule on issues not raised in the district court when the
defendant cannot show an impediment precluded his raising the issue or that the
ground not raised constituted plain error resulting in manifest injustice. See
United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1508 (10th Cir. 1988). However, even if w e
considered the issue in this case, the application note to § 2L1.2 of the Guidelines
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expressly states “[a] conviction taken into account under subsection (b)(1) [i.e.,
for drug trafficking crimes] is not excluded from consideration of whether that
conviction receives criminal history points ....” See cmt. n.6. W e have generally
upheld the use of prior convictions to calculate both criminal history categories
and sentence enhancements where the Guidelines permit such application, and
M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s argument does not persuade us we should question our
clear and long-held precedent. See United States v. Alessandroni, 982 F.2d 419,
423 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Florentino, 922 F.2d 1443, 1447-48 (10th
Cir. 1990). M oreover, while this circuit has not directly considered whether
§ 2L1.2 allows impermissible double counting in a published opinion, other
circuits have addressed M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s argument and soundly rejected it
because the application note to § 2L1.2 expressly allows a sixteen-level
enhancement in addition to criminal history points for such a conviction. See
United States v. Hernandez-Fierros, 453 F.3d 309, 312-13 (6th Cir. 2006); United
States v. M artinez, 434 F.3d 1318, 1323 n.4 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2946 (2006); United States v. Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 698-99 (2d Cir.
1997). Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the district court
to defer to § 2L1.2 and its application note and follow the same approach of using
M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s prior offense to both calculate his criminal history points
and enhance his offense level. Because § 2L1.2 pertains to like offenders who
illegally reenter the United States after deportation and conviction for an
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aggravated felony, M r. Ramirez-Jimenez has not established the district court
erred “by rejecting any consideration of ‘double counting’ which resulted in
unwarranted sentencing disparities.”
W e next proceed to M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s other arguments supporting his
claim his sentence is unreasonable because circumstances warrant a reduction
below the Guidelines range. In this case, after thoroughly considering the
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, as well as the applicable Guidelines, the
facts of the case, M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s criminal history, and other relevant
criteria, the district court refused to depart downward and concluded a forty-one-
month sentence “logically and fairly applied” to M r. Ramirez-Jimenez “in his
circumstances.” Given the district court “properly consider[ed] the relevant
Guidelines range and sentence[d] the defendant within that range, the sentence is
presumptively reasonable,” and it is up to M r. Ramirez-Jimenez to rebut this
presumption by demonstrating his sentence is “unreasonable in light of the other
sentencing factors laid out in § 3553(a).” Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
In this case, M r. Ramirez-Jimenez has not shown why he should be treated
differently than others who, like him, illegally reentered the country after
conviction for a serious felony drug trafficking offense and were sentenced within
the applicable Guidelines range. First, the Guidelines clearly advise “family ties
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and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure
may be warranted,” U .S.S.G. § 5H1.6, and we have determined family
responsibilities are a discouraged factor which the district court should consider
only in the most extraordinary cases. See United States v. M cClatchey, 316 F.3d
1122, 1130 (10th C ir. 2003). Similarly, his argument he abided by our laws
during his stay in the United States is essentially an aberrant behavior argument
under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20, which recommends a sentence outside of the Guidelines
range where the defendant lived an otherwise law-abiding life, other than
commission of the instant crime. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20(b). However, the same
Guidelines section advises aberrant behavior should not be considered if the
defendant, like here, has a prior federal felony conviction. See U.S.S.G.
§ 5K2.20(c)(4). Under the circumstances presented and the applicable law, it was
not unreasonable for the district court to determine a sentence imposed at the
bottom of the applicable G uidelines range sufficiently reflected the factors in
§ 3553, and M r. Ramirez-Jimenez has not otherwise demonstrated his sentence is
unreasonable.
Next, M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s verbal example of another defendant in a
different case who received the same sentence but allegedly possessed a more
egregious criminal history is not enough to establish disparity of sentencing in
this case for the purpose of showing M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s sentence is
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unreasonable. First, we have held that “[w]hile similar offenders engaged in
similar conduct should be sentenced equivalently, disparate sentences are allowed
where the disparity is explicable by the facts on the record.” United States v.
Davis, 437 F.3d 989, 997 (10th Cir.) (quotation marks and citation omitted), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 1935 (2006). In this case, M r. Ramirez-Jimenez has failed to
identify the characteristics of the other defendant, provide an account of his
instant offense and each of his prior offenses, identify his total criminal history
score, or otherwise present sufficient facts surrounding that defendant’s record for
the purpose of using his sentence as an equivalent comparison with M r. Ramirez-
Jimenez’s sentence.
In addition, consideration of sentencing disparities among defendants w ith
similar records found guilty of similar conduct is but one of several factors under
§ 3553(a) for a court to consider in determining a reasonable sentence. See
United States v. M orales-Chaires, 430 F.3d 1124, 1131 (10th Cir. 2005). In this
case, the district court considered the disparity of sentencing factors, together
with the other factors in § 3553(a), and was not required to single out or assign
more weight to that factor than any other factor. Finally, given M r. Ramirez-
Jimenez’s sentence is at the low end of the presumptively reasonable Guidelines
range, and the district court in this case carefully considered and rejected the
disparity of sentencing issue presented and, in fact, provided an explicit example
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of a forty-one-month sentence it imposed in a case “almost on all fours” w ith M r.
Ramirez-Jimenez’s, w e have no cause to conclude the sentence is unreasonable
for disparity of sentencing purposes.
For these reasons, we A FFIRM M r. Ramirez-Jimenez’s conviction and
sentence.
Entered by the C ourt:
W ADE BRO RBY
United States Circuit Judge
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