United States v. Gabaldon

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 20, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 09-2142
v. (D.C. Nos. 06-CV-00343 and
1:02-CR-01056-WJ-1)
FRANK GABALDON, (D.N.M.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Frank Gabaldon, a federal inmate appearing pro se,
seeks to appeal from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Because Mr. Gabaldon has not made “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2), we deny his request for a certificate of appealability (“COA”) and
dismiss the appeal. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000).
Background
We previously set forth the factual background of this case in United States
v. Gabaldon (Gabaldon I), 389 F.3d 1090, 1093-94 (10th Cir. 2004). A jury
convicted Mr. Gabaldon of second degree murder and kidnaping resulting in
death. This court affirmed his conviction upon direct appeal. Gabaldon I, 389
F.3d 1090. Mr. Gabaldon then sought § 2255 relief, asserting claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and incomplete jury instructions. The district
court denied Mr. Gabaldon’s § 2255 motion, ruling that it was time-barred. On
appeal, this court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the matter
for further proceedings concerning equitable tolling of the limitations period.
United States v. Gabaldon (Gabaldon II), 522 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2008).
Upon remand, the government argued that Mr. Gabaldon’s § 2255 motion
should be denied as untimely and without merit. 1 R. 245. The magistrate judge
then recommended that the motion be considered timely but without merit. 1 R.
429, 433, 449, 458. After considering Mr. Gabaldon’s objections, the district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations and denied the § 2255
motion and a subsequent motion to reconsider. 1 R. 603-05, 616-17.
Discussion
Mr. Gabaldon raises five separate claims for which he requests a COA. In
reality, four claims revolve around his contention that the trial court should have
instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication is a defense to charges of aiding
and abetting second-degree murder and kidnaping. He contends that the court’s
instructions deprived him of a fair trial, that his trial counsel was ineffective for
-2-
failing to object or otherwise move to remedy the instructions, and that his
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. He
additionally contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective on direct appeal
for failing to claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to prepare
and investigate for trial. Mr. Gabaldon’s trial counsel served as his appellate
counsel. Aplt. Br. at 2.
In order to obtain a COA, Mr. Gabaldon must make a “substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), such that
“reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484; see Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003). The instruction at issue provided:
You may consider evidence of intoxication in deciding whether
the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant acted with the intent to commit first degree murder or the
offenses charged in Counts III, IV and V.
1 R. 50. The instruction did not include the lesser included offense of second
degree murder (located under Count I, first degree murder, on the verdict form) or
Count II (kidnaping resulting in death). Although Mr. Gabaldon argues that this
instruction precludes consideration of an intoxication defense on the omitted
offenses, Aplt. Br. at 21, 25, that is by no means certain. In argument, the parties
did not separate voluntary intoxication from any of the crimes. 1 R. 445.
The failure to explicitly reference second degree murder or include a
-3-
reference to kidnaping in the voluntary intoxication instructions would be subject
to harmless error review for instructional errors. See Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 129 S.
Ct. 530, 532 (2008); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1999); California
v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996). Thus, Mr. Gabaldon must prove that the error “had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quotation marks and citation
omitted); United States v. Dago, 441 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 2006). We do
not think that the magistrate judge’s apparent conclusion that this standard cannot
be met is reasonably debatable. 1 R. 446-49. Here, the jurors received an aiding
and abetting instruction specifically linked to Counts I and II alerting the jurors to
the requirement of specific intent for aiding and abetting liability. Merely
because they acquitted on the counts referenced in the voluntary intoxication
instruction, hardly suggests that they believed Mr. Gabaldon voluntarily
participated in, but lacked the specific intent to violate the law due to
intoxication. As discussed below, there was overwhelming evidence of both
principal and aiding and abetting liability on both counts at issue.
The magistrate judge correctly recognized that (1) the jury was correctly
instructed on aiding and abetting, (2) voluntary intoxication could be a defense to
aiding and abetting second degree murder and kidnaping, and (3) a more inclusive
jury instruction on voluntary intoxication might have been given had it been
requested. See United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1292 (10th Cir. 2000);
-4-
United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1997). Although a
defendant is entitled to an instruction given evidence supporting his theory of a
legally-recognized defense, counsel did not request a more explicit instruction 1
and probably for good reason.
Contrary to the views of the magistrate judge, 1 R. 441, 444, aiding and
abetting was not the sole theory of liability in this case. Rather, as we indicated
in our prior opinion and as Mr. Gabaldon raised in his petition for certiorari,
powerful evidence suggested principal liability—that Mr. Gabaldon had the
capacity to plan and execute both the kidnaping and the second degree murder.
Mr. Gabaldon recognized this in his § 2255 motion. 1 R. 19. In fact, in affirming
the sufficiency of the evidence on the kidnaping count, we did not mention aiding
and abetting. Gabaldon I, 389 F.3d at 1094-98. We did mention evidence
suggesting Mr. Gabaldon’s direct participation: he joined Mr. Begay in beating
the victim unconscious and provided a shoelace to Mr. Begay and instructed him
on how to strangle the victim. Id. at 1093. Mr. Gabaldon’s petition for certiorari
echoes this evidence. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gabaldon v. United States,
No. 04-1111, 2005 WL 415080, at *3-*4 (Feb. 11, 2005). Had counsel requested
a more explicit voluntary intoxication instruction on aiding and abetting these two
offenses, that surely would have resulted in flagging that while voluntary
1
Counsel’s proposed voluntary intoxication instruction, Aplt. Br. at 4-5,
mistakenly included the substantive offense of kidnaping which the district court
properly omitted, 1 R. 50.
-5-
intoxication could be a defense to aiding and abetting, it could not be a defense to
the substantive offenses themselves. Such a focus could well have been counter-
productive given the substantial evidence of guilt on both theories. Thus, we
cannot agree that Mr. Gabaldon’s counsel rendered deficient performance by not
clarifying the reach of the voluntary intoxication jury instruction. See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (ineffective assistance requires a
showing of deficient performance and prejudice). Accordingly, Mr. Gabaldon has
not established ineffective assistance of counsel, either in its own right
concerning his trial and appellate counsel, or as cause for procedural default, see
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Insofar as the failure to call trial
witnesses, we do not think the magistrate judge’s conclusions are reasonably
debatable; we only add that it is highly doubtful that securing a similar vehicle for
Dr. Watts to test his theory would have resulted in a different outcome of this
issue on appeal. Gabaldon I, 389 F.3d at 1099.
Accordingly, we DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
-6-