United States v. Denny

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 13, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 11-1187
v. (D. Colorado)
MARK JUSTIN DENNY, (D.C. No. 1:06-CR-00471-CMA-1)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
After being indicted for assault causing bodily injury to an employee of a
federal high-security penitentiary engaged in the performance of official duties, in
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) and (b), defendant and appellant Mark Justin
Denny pled guilty and was sentenced to forty-two months’ imprisonment. He
appeals his sentence, which we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
Following his indictment, Mr. Denny underwent extensive pre-trial mental
health examinations and competency determinations. Ultimately, he was
determined to be competent to enter into a plea agreement with the government,
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). The agreement provided for a sentence
not to exceed forty-two months, based on Mr. Denny’s documented mental health
problems and the parties’ estimate of the applicable advisory sentencing range
under the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (“USSG”),
derived from the facts of the offense and Mr. Denny’s then-known criminal
history.
When the United States Probation Office prepared a presentence report
(“PSR”) in anticipation of sentencing, it was discovered that, because
Mr. Denny’s extensive criminal history included multiple felony convictions for
crimes of violence, and because the instant offense was a crime of violence,
Mr. Denny was a career offender under USSG §4B1.1. This resulted in assessing
him a total offense level of 29, which, with a criminal history category of VI,
yielded an applicable advisory guideline range of 151 to 188 months. Mr. Denny
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made numerous objections to the PSR, including challenging virtually his entire
criminal history.
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Denny filed a motion for a downward departure to
a two-year sentence. He then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment against him
entirely.
At sentencing on April 21, 2011, the district court found that the guideline
calculations in the PSR were correct, including the classification of Mr. Denny as
a career offender. Despite that, the court accepted the plea agreement and
sentenced Mr. Denny to forty-two months, in accordance with the agreement.
Mr. Denny’s various motions were denied.
Mr. Denny filed this appeal, and the government has filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Denny claims that the district
court’s application of the two-level enhancement for “bodily injury” under
USSG §2A2.4(b)(2), in a case where enhanced penalties for “bodily injury” had
already been automatically applied in accordance with the statute of conviction,
18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a) and (b), resulted in impermissible double-counting, rendering
his sentence unreasonable.
The government argues that (1) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and (c), we
lack jurisdiction to review a sentence imposed by a district court pursuant to a
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement; (2) even if, arguendo, the sentence
had been imposed under the Guidelines, as opposed to the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea
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agreement, and we had jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the application of the two
“bodily injury” sentencing enhancements did not constitute impermissible double-
counting. We address the jurisdictional question first, as it may be dispositive.
DISCUSSION
Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), the defendant and the government may,
in structuring a guilty plea, “agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is
the appropriate disposition of the case, . . . (such a recommendation or request
binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement.).” United States v.
Silva, 413 F.3d 1283, 1284 (10th Cir. 2005). “Where a defendant agrees to and
receives a specific sentence, that defendant may only appeal the sentence if it was
(1) imposed in violation of the law, (2) imposed as a result of an incorrect
application of the guidelines, or (3) is greater than the sentence set forth in the
plea agreement.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and (c)); see also, United States
v. Denogean, 79 F.3d 1010, 1013-14 (10th Cir. 1996). Otherwise, we lack
jurisdiction over the appeal.
The government has filed a motion to dismiss this case on the ground that
Mr. Denny cannot establish any of those three requirements to enable him to
appeal. Mr. Denny responds that, because the plea agreement provided for a
sentence “of no more than 42 months,” it was not a “specific sentence” for
purposes of § 3742, and therefore he was not bound by the strictures of that
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statute. Mr. Denny concedes there are no Tenth Circuit cases on this issue, and
points to one case from another Circuit which suggests that a sentence similar to
Mr. Denny’s could not qualify as a “specific sentence.” See United States v.
Newsome, 894 F.2d 852, 855 (6th Cir. 1990). We, and many other Circuits, have
allowed sentencing ranges to qualify as specific sentences. See United States v.
Veri, 108 F.3d 1311, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases).
In the particular and unusual circumstances of this case, we choose not to
delve into this issue and resolve whether a sentence of “up to 42 months”
qualifies as a “specific sentence” for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 1 Nobody
below raised an issue about whether this plea agreement involved a specific
sentence; rather, it is clear that everyone assumed it was. Thus, in the extremely
strange factual situation of this case, we will follow the usual rule when there is a
valid Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and thus conclude we lack jurisdiction over
this appeal. 2
1
This case is partly unusual because Mr. Denny complains about a sentence
which, in fact, bestowed a huge windfall on him. He should have been sentenced
as a career offender, facing a long, multi-year sentence. Yet, due to the initial
oversight by the government, he received a forty-two month sentence, which the
government acquiesced in.
2
Were we to assume we have jurisdiction, we would still uphold Mr.
Denny’s sentence. He argues about a modest double-counting issue, whereas, as
the government points out, any sentence calculated, with or without the double-
counting of a “bodily injury” circumstance, would have been trumped by the
career offender provisions. So, any error in the double-counting issue would have
been harmless.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS this case for lack of jurisdiction.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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