Torres v. Heredia

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS September 9, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
GABRIEL TORRES,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 08-2110
(D. Ct. No. 07-CV-898-MCA-CG)
MIKE HEREDIA, Warden; GARY (D. N. Mex.)
KING, Attorney General of the State of
New Mexico,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before TACHA, KELLY, and MCCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Gabriel Torres, proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas
relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We DENY a COA and DISMISS this appeal.
In 1999, Mr. Torres was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison plus two years of
parole following his conviction in New Mexico state court for second-degree murder and
several lesser charges. In 2006, Mr. Torres filed a post-judgment motion, alleging that
the trial judge had erred in imposing two years, rather than one year, of parole. After
reviewing the matter, the state court entered an amended judgment and sentence,
sentencing Mr. Torres to twenty-six years’ imprisonment followed by one year of parole.
Mr. Torres appealed this decision to the New Mexico Supreme Court, which denied a writ
of certiorari.
Mr. Torres then filed this § 2254 habeas petition in federal district court, urging
that the amended judgment and sentence erroneously increased his sentence by one year
in violation both of his right to due process and the Double Jeopardy Clause. The
magistrate judge recommended denial of Mr. Torres’s petition, and the district court
subsequently adopted the recommendation.1
A petitioner may not appeal the denial of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254unless a COA has been granted. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). We will issue a COA “only
if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id.§ 2253(c)(2). This standard requires Mr. Torres to “demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). We conclude that Mr. Torres has
failed to meet this standard as to both claims.
First, as the magistrate judge observed, although a state court’s arbitrary disregard
of state sentencing law and imposition of an unauthorized sentence may violate a
1
Mr. Torres asserts that the district court should have held a hearing on his petition.
To the extent Mr. Torres takes issue with the district court’s adoption of the magistrate’s
recommended disposition, we note that the district court carefully reviewed Mr. Torres’s
objections to the findings and recommendation de novo before dismissing his case, see 28
U.S.C. § 636(b), and that federal law authorizes district courts to designate magistrate
judges to submit recommendations for disposition in this type of matter. See id.§ 636(b)(1)(B). To the extent Mr. Torres contends he is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing, the magistrate judge properly noted that all of the issues can be resolved on the
record, which renders an evidentiary hearing unnecessary.
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defendant’s due process rights, see Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980),
correcting an error that is plainly arithmetic does not constitute such arbitrary disregard.
Indeed, New Mexico law specifically authorizes this procedure by providing that
“[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the
record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and
after such notice, if any, as the court orders.” N.M.R.A., Rule 5-113(B). It is clear from
the record that the twenty-six-year sentence was imposed after the state court corrected a
mathematical error in the original twenty-five-year sentence. Thus, the increased
sentence does not violate Mr. Torres’s right to due process.
Second, we agree that the state court did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause2
when it corrected the arithmetic error in Mr. Torres’s sentence. Among other things, the
Double Jeopardy Clause “prevents a court from increasing a defendant’s sentence once he
has a legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence.” Ward v. Williams, 240
F.3d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). We have previously affirmed
that:
[A]ny expectation of finality in a sentence is wholly absent where . . . the
defendant requests that his prior sentence be nullified. The defendant has,
by his own hand, defeated his expectation of finality and the Double
2
The Fifth Amendment, in relevant part, provides: “nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .” U.S. Const. amend.
V. The general principle supporting the Double Jeopardy Clause is “that the State with
all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity . . . .”
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
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Jeopardy Clause, which guards against Government oppression, does not
relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice.
United States v. Welch, 928 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotations omitted). In this
case, Mr. Torres’s voluntary petition for an amended sentence defeated his expectation of
finality in his original sentence. Therefore, the state court did not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause by making the amendment.
After carefully reviewing Mr. Torres’s brief, the magistrate judge’s comprehensive
and well-reasoned recommendation, the district court’s disposition, and the record on
appeal, we conclude that Mr. Torres has not met the standard for obtaining a COA.
Accordingly, we DENY Mr. Torres’s request for a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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