Buchheit v. Green

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 27, 2012
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES B. BUCHHEIT,
Plaintiff - Appellant/Cross-
Appellee,
v. Nos. 12-3154 and 12-3158
CAROL G. GREEN, Clerk of the
Appellate Courts State of Kansas,
Defendant - Appellee/Cross-
Appellant.
DANIEL MITCHELL, Shawnee
County Court Judge,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 5:12-CV-04038-CM-KGS)
Submitted on the briefs: *
Charles B. Buchheit, Pro Se.
Stephen Phillips, Assistant Attorney General, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant -
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The cause therefore
is ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellee/Cross Appellant.
Before KELLY, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Charles Buchheit, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s sua
sponte dismissal of his complaint against defendant state officials pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Buchheit v. Green, No. 12-4038-CM-KGS, 2012 WL
1673917 (D. Kan. May 14, 2012). Carol Green, the defendant clerk of the Kansas
state appellate courts, cross-appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to
review the magistrate judge’s order granting Mr. Buchheit in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) status. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Background
Mr. Buchheit filed his “Petition for Injunctive Relief Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, As Well As, the Equal Access to Justice Act” naming as defendants
Ms. Green and Shawnee County Court Judge Daniel Mitchell. He alleged that the
Kansas state appellate courts had denied his request to proceed IFP and had
refused to docket his state appeals. See R. 8–9, 11–12, 80–81. A magistrate
judge granted Mr. Buchheit’s motion to proceed IFP in federal court. Id. at 97.
Ms. Green objected on the grounds that the magistrate judge failed to screen the
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complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). R. 42; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The
district court overruled the objection but dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Mr. Buchheit sought retrospective relief
against the state that is barred by sovereign immunity. Buchheit, 2012 WL
1673917, at *1, 4.
Discussion
The issues involved in the appeal and cross-appeal are entirely questions of
law and our review is de novo.
A. Whether Mr. Buchheit’s Suit is Barred by Sovereign Immunity
If the claims against Ms. Green and Judge Mitchell in their official
capacities are claims against the State of Kansas, then sovereign immunity
applies. See Moore v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 507 F.3d 1257, 1258 (10th Cir.
2007). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages and other forms of relief
against state defendants acting in their official capacities. Fed. Maritime Comm’n
v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002). There is an exception to
state sovereign immunity, however, for suits seeking prospective injunctive relief.
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908); Chamber of Commerce v.
Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 760 (10th Cir. 2010).
Mr. Buchheit maintains that he is seeking prospective injunctive relief.
Aplt. Br. 4, 6. We disagree. Determining whether a request for injunctive relief
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is prospective requires a “straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint
alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized
as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 645
(2002) (quotation omitted). Although Mr. Buchheit’s complaint states that he is
seeking prospective injunctive relief, he wants an order allowing him to proceed
IFP and docket his appeal in state court. R. 12. Because he is merely seeking to
address alleged past harms rather than prevent prospective violations of federal
law, we can only reasonably categorize such relief as retrospective. As such, it
does not fall into the Ex Parte Young exception to state sovereign immunity, and
we must affirm the dismissal of his complaint.
B. Whether the District Court Must Screen Non-Prisoner Complaints Before
Granting IFP
In her cross-appeal, Ms. Green argues that the magistrate judge was
required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen Mr. Buchheit’s complaint
before granting IFP and authorizing service. Aplee. Br. 12. She argues that the
purpose of § 1915(e)(2) is to discourage the filing of baseless law suits that
paying litigants would not file (due to the cost of bringing suit) and that
represented clients would not file because of the potential for Rule 11 sanctions.
Id. at 12–13 (citing Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006)).
The dismissal of Mr. Buchheit’s claim may normally render such a cross-
appeal moot. See Bannister v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 692 F.3d 1117,
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1120 (10th Cir. 2012) (dismissing defendant’s cross-appeal as moot where it
affirmed the district court ruling in defendant’s favor); Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd.
of Educ., 565 F.3d 1232, 1251–52 (10th Cir. 2009) (dismissing defendant’s cross-
appeal as moot where Court of Appeals was unable to grant any effective relief).
There is an exception to the mootness doctrine, however, where the underlying
dispute is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.
Ct. 2507, 2514–15 (2011). This exception applies if: “(1) the duration of the
challenged action [is] too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or
expiration; and (2) there [is a] reasonable expectation that the same complaining
party will be subjected to the same action again.” Hain v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1177,
1180 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Whether the district court has a statutory duty to screen complaints for
merit before granting a motion to proceed IFP is an issue that has already come
up in multiple cases against Ms. Green and other Kansas state officials. See, e.g.,
Landrith v. Gariglietti, No. 12-3048; Sommerville v. Kansas, No. 12-3015;
Adkins v. Kan. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications, No. 11-3353. Ms. Green and
other Kansas state officials continue to be served with these types of complaints.
Because the cases often have been dismissed by the district court after the grant
of IFP status, the complaint that the district court should screen these cases for
merit before issuance of summons cannot be addressed. Ms. Green’s predicament
falls squarely within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to
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our mootness doctrine. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2515. We, therefore, address it
now.
Ms. Green focuses on the change in language to the statute in 1996 as
evidence that the district court has an obligation to screen cases for merit under §
1915(e)(2) before granting a motion to proceed IFP. Prior to 1996, § 1915(d)
provided: “The court . . . may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is
untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d) (1994) (emphasis added). Subsection (d) was changed to (e) and now
provides:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have
been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). Ms. Green argues that the express
change in language from “may” to “shall” imposes a screening requirement on
magistrate judges when reviewing motions to proceed IFP. Aplee. Br. 12–14.
Moreover, in order for § 1915(e)(2) to have any meaning, she contends, screening
must be done sua sponte, prior to service of summons. Id. 14.
Though screening might be a good practice and more efficient, we find that
nothing in this language requires an assigned magistrate judge to screen a case for
merit or to make a recommendation for dismissal to the district court before
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granting IFP status. As the district court noted, “the language of § 1915(e)(2)
does not impose a duty to screen or review ‘before service of summons.’ Instead,
. . . [it] require[s] a court to dismiss a case filed by an ifp litigant at any time ‘the
court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . is frivolous [or] fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.’” Buchheit, 2012 WL 1673917, at *1
(citing Merryfield v. Jordan, 584 F.3d 923, 926 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (emphasis
added)). There is simply nothing in the language of the statute indicating that
such a dismissal must occur before grant of a motion to proceed IFP. Even the
screening requirement of § 1915A(a), which applies only to prisoner complaints
against government officials, is not that strict. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (“The
court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as
practicable after docketing, a complaint . . . .”). There are good reasons for
flexibility. Dismissing a complaint without benefit of an adversarial presentation
is often an uncertain and time-consuming task, and the district court should make
the call as to if and when it is appropriate.
The cases upon which Ms. Green relies do not support her position either.
For example, Ms. Green relies on an unpublished case from this circuit for the
proposition that § 1915(e)(2) requires a magistrate judge to screen IFP
applications for merit. See Phillips v. Layden, 434 F. App’x 774, 775 (10th Cir.
Oct. 14, 2011). But the court in Phillips explained that it was the “IFP status
[that] required the district court to evaluate [the plaintiff’s] claims sua sponte.”
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Id. In other words, once a litigant has been granted IFP status, the district court
is required to evaluate the claims for merit, but a magistrate judge is not
necessarily required to do so before such status is ever granted. In dismissing Mr.
Buchheit’s complaint, the district court here fulfilled this requirement.
Ms. Green also cites Lister v. Department of the Treasury, where we
repeated that “in order to succeed on a motion to proceed IFP, the movant must
show a financial inability to pay the required filing fees, as well as the existence
of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues
raised in the action.” 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005). Although such
language indicates that the movant is required to make a showing of a
nonfrivolous argument when applying to proceed IFP, we do not read it as
creating an affirmative obligation on the part of the district court to apply
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) immediately. Even assuming the “shall dismiss” language of
§ 1915(e)(2) places an affirmative obligation on the district court to review the
claims of litigants proceeding IFP, there is simply no indication that the
obligation attaches prior to the IFP determination.
We recognize that the purpose of § 1915(e) is to “‘discourage the filing of,
and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying
litigants generally do not initiate.’” Trujillo, 465 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). And we acknowledge that prompt
screening may be a good thing and conserve the resources of defendants forced to
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respond to baseless lawsuits. But the language of the present rule also provides
needed flexibility, even if it sometimes requires defendants like Ms. Green and
Judge Mitchell to respond to complaints that may soon be dismissed as without
merit. It simply does not require district courts to review the merits of every
claim that comes before them in an IFP motion, and we decline to read in such an
extensive duty absent statutory language to that effect.
AFFIRMED. We DENY Mr. Buchheit’s motion for sanctions.
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