Romero v. Ploughe

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 11, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
EUGENE ROMERO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 12-1350
PAMELA PLOUGHE; THE (D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00686-PAB)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE (D. Colo.)
STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, McKAY and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Eugene Romero, a Colorado state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) in order to challenge the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. §
2241 petition for federal habeas relief.1 Because Romero has failed to satisfy the
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
1
Romero styled his petition as an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. But, because his petition effectively challenged “the execution of
[his] sentence” rather than its legality, the district court construed the petition as one
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ROA, Vol. 1, at 56. Romero did not object to this construction
of his petition in the district court, nor does he do so on appeal. And we have no reason
to question the propriety of the district court’s construction. See Montez v. McKinna,
208 F.3d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2000) (discussing the differences between a § 2254 petition
and a § 2241 petition).
standards for the issuance of a COA, we deny his request and dismiss the matter. We also
deny his request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
I
In 1986, Romero was convicted in Colorado state court of one count of second
degree burglary, a class 3 felony under Colorado state law, one count of theft, a class 4
felony under Colorado state law, and five counts of being an habitual criminal. Romero
was sentenced under Colorado’s then-existing habitual criminal statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. §
16-13-101(2), to a term of life imprisonment. The imposition of that life sentence, under
then-existing Colorado state law, rendered Romero ineligible to apply for or receive
parole for a “period of forty years.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-22.5-104(2)(c).
In 1993, the Colorado legislature amended the habitual criminal statute. Under the
amended statute, a person, like Romero, convicted of a felony in Colorado state court
who “has been three times previously convicted . . . of a felony . . . shall be adjudged an
habitual criminal and . . . punished for the felony offense of which such person is
convicted by imprisonment . . . for a term of four times the maximum of the presumptive
range pursuant to section 18-1.3-401 for the class of felony of which such person is
convicted.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-801(2)(a).2 Further, a person sentenced under the
amended habitual criminal statute is “eligible for parole in accordance with [Colo. Rev.
Stat. §] 17-22.5-403.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-22.5-104(2)(d)(II). For persons convicted of
2
The cited statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-801(2)(a), was enacted in July 2002.
But it accurately reflects the statutory language that was originally included in the 1993
amendment to the habitual criminal statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-13-101(2).
2
a class 3 or class 4 felony, like Romero, that means they “shall be eligible for parole after
[they] ha[ve] served fifty percent of the sentence imposed upon [them], less any time
authorized for earned time granted pursuant to [Colo. Rev. Stat. §] 17-22.5-405.” Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 17-22.5-403(1). Unfortunately for Romero, however, the Colorado
legislature expressly provided that these amendments apply only to persons convicted of
offenses committed on or after the effective date of the amendments. See People v.
Gaskins, 923 P.2d 292, 298 (Colo. App. 1996) (“[W]e are not at liberty to ignore the
General Assembly’s explicit directive that the amendments to the habitual criminal
statutes apply only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1993.”).
In 2010, Romero filed in Colorado state district court a petition for writ of habeas
corpus alleging, in pertinent part, that the enactment of the amended habitual criminal
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause because it imposed disparate penalties on two
distinct classes of similarly situated habitual criminals. On August 17, 2010, the state
district court issued an order denying Romero’s petition on the merits. Romero appealed
the state district court’s order to the Colorado Supreme Court. On August 2, 2011, the
Colorado Supreme Court issued a summary order affirming the judgment of the state
district court.
Romero initiated these federal habeas proceedings on March 19, 2012, by filing a
pro se application for writ of habeas corpus. The application alleged, in pertinent part,
that the amended “habitual criminal statute violates [Romero’s] constitutional rights
because it does not serve a legitimate state interest, lacks a rational basis, and
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intentionally discriminates between (1) persons sentenced under [the old habitual criminal
statute] and (2) persons sentenced under [the amended habitual criminal statute].” Id. at
8.
Respondents filed a preliminary response notifying the district court that they did
not “intend to raise either the affirmative defense of timeliness and/or exhaustion of state
court remedies.” Id. at 37. Respondents subsequently filed a response arguing that (1)
the law in effect at the time Romero’s underlying crimes was committed, i.e., the old
habitual criminal statute, properly governed Romero’s criminal sentence and parole
eligibility, (2) the Colorado legislature expressly indicated that the amended habitual
criminal statute was to apply prospectively only, (3) Romero “is not similarly situated to
other criminal habitual offenders who committed offenses at different times under
different statutory schemes,” id. at 47, (4) “even if it were assumed that [Romero] w[as]
similarly situated to other offenders who committed crimes at different times under
different statutory schemes, [his] equal protection claim would merit a rational basis
standard of review,” id., and he could not prevail under that standard, id. at 48.
On August 6, 2012, the district court issued an order denying Romero’s application
on the merits. In doing so, the district court agreed with the reasoning set forth in
respondents’ response. The district court also noted, citing federal case law, that
“[i]ndividuals who commit offenses at different times and who are subject to different
sentencing schemes are not similarly situated for purposes of an equal protection
analysis.” Id. at 58. Lastly, the district court concluded that, even if Romero could
4
“satisf[y] the threshold requirement of disparate treatment, the disparity withstands
rational basis review.” Id. at 59. Specifically, the district court noted that “[t]he former
and current habitual criminal statutes are rationally related to the legitimate purpose of
punishing more severely offenders who show a propensity toward repeated criminal
conduct,” id. at 60, and “it was rational for the Colorado General Assembly to make the
new statute prospective [only] because it would be costly and burdensome for the courts
to re-sentence offenders who were properly sentenced under the applicable law at the
time,” id. at 60-61. Finally, the district court noted that, “because there is no
constitutional or state statutory right to parole, [Romero] cannot show that he would be
entitled to immediate release even if he were afforded parole eligibility under the new
statute.” Id. at 61. As part of its order denying Romero’s application, the district court
also denied Romero a COA.
Romero has since filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as an application for
COA with this court.
II
Issuance of a COA is jurisdictional. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336
(2003). Thus, a state prisoner such as Romero may appeal from the denial of federal
habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 only if the district court or this court first issues a
COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); see Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir.
2000) (holding that state prisoners proceeding under § 2241 must obtain a COA to
appeal). We may issue a COA, however, only if Romero can make a “substantial
5
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Such a showing
requires Romero to demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that
matter agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
After reviewing Romero’s pleadings and the record on appeal, we conclude that
Romero has failed to make the necessary showing. “Equal protection is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Price-Cornelison v.
Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1109 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). By
comparing himself to prisoners sentenced under Colorado’s amended habitual criminal
statute, Romero fails to state a cognizable equal protection claim because the comparison
class of prisoners is simply not situated similarly to Romero. See McQueary v. Blodgett,
924 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 1991) (reaching similar conclusion with respect to equal
protection claims brought by Washington state prisoner sentenced prior to
implementation of state sentencing reform act). That is, the comparison class of prisoners
committed their offenses after the effective date of, and thus were sentenced under, the
amended habitual criminal statute. Romero, in contrast, committed his crimes prior to the
enactment of the amended habitual criminal statute and thus was sentenced under the
then-existing habitual criminal statute. See Williams v. Meyer, 346 F.3d 607, 616 (6th
Cir. 2003) (noting that a state does not violate equal protection by applying different
criminal justice and sentencing schemes to persons who committed their crimes at
6
different times). Consequently, reasonable jurists cannot dispute that Romero’s
application failed to establish a prima facie case of an equal protection violation.
The application for COA is DENIED and this matter is DISMISSED. Romero’s
motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
7