Trujillo v. Shields

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 11 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CAROL TRUJILLO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PAUL SHIELDS, individually, and as
an officer of the City of Pueblo Police
No. 97-1309
Department,
(District of Colorado)
(D.C. No. 96-D-406)
Defendant,
and
THE CITY OF PUEBLO, a
municipality,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Carol Trujillo appeals from the District Court of Colorado’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the City of Pueblo (the “City”). Trujillo sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the City violated her federal civil rights by
failing to adequately train and supervise its police officers to prevent them from
sexually assaulting female crime victims while on duty. This court exercises
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirms.
Review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo, and this court applies
the same legal standard used by the district court. See Charter Canyon Treatment
Ctr. v. Pool Co., 153 F.3d 1132, 1135 (10th Cir. 1998). A district court properly
grants summary judgment if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
. . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c).
The facts giving rise to Trujillo’s claim are brief. On May 17, 1995,
Trujillo called the Pueblo Police Department to report a burglary at her residence.
Two officers, including Paul Shields, responded to the call. The burglary suspect
was apprehended near Trujillo’s home and Shields remained in Trujillo’s home,
unaccompanied, to finalize the report. Trujillo claims that during this time
Shields sexually assaulted her.
-2-
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. Citing
Gates v. Unified School District, 996 F.2d 1035, 1041 (10 th Cir. 1993), the court
stated that Trujillo provided no evidence that sexual assaults by Pueblo officers
were a widespread practice which “would have brought to the attention [of] the
chief that there was a problem that he needed to correct.” The court noted that
Trujillo’s claim was based upon a theory that because the police chief could have
foreseen a claim such as Trujillo’s, he created liability by failing to take measures
to prevent it. Citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-90 (1989), and
Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997), the court ruled
that this is not a viable theory for a § 1983 claim against a municipality.
Trujillo claims that City of Pueblo police officers receive no training on
how to prevent sexual misconduct or claims of sexual misconduct when they
answer calls which require them to be alone with women. Additionally, Trujillo
claims that officers are inadequately supervised when they answer calls which
require them to be alone with women.
Trujillo argues two facts in her favor. First, she claims that Pueblo police
officers are frequently alone with women, and second, she states that high-ranking
officers in the Pueblo Police Department have known of other incidents of sexual
misconduct perpetrated by officers. These two factual allegations lead Trujillo to
argue that the City is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Trujillo’s
-3-
constitutionally protected rights because they evince a custom or policy of
“grossly inadequate training and supervision of patrolmen” which caused Trujillo
to be deprived of her constitutional rights. 1
Municipal liability under § 1983 is very narrow. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at
1389. Municipalities may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat
superior. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818 (1985). Rather,
in order for a municipality to be held liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove
that a municipal policy or custom caused the plaintiff’s alleged deprivation. See
Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1388. Furthermore, a plaintiff who seeks to establish
municipal liability “on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has led
an employee to violate a plaintiff’s rights must demonstrate that the municipal
action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious
consequences.” Id. at 1390.
The Brown court conceded that an inadequate training program could be the
basis for § 1983 liability, but only in “limited circumstances.” Id. In order for
1
Trujillo also argues that the deliberate indifference standard does not
apply and should be limited to Eighth Amendment contexts. She argues that a
“gross negligence” standard should be used instead. Trujillo failed to raise the
issue in the district court and thus waives it. See United States v. Allen, 16 F.3d
377, 379 (10 th Cir. 1994). Nonetheless, there is no question that the appropriate
standard is deliberate indifference. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1390; Canton, 489
U.S. at 388.
-4-
liability to attach for failure to train, a pattern of constitutional violations arising
directly from the failure to train must exist. Thus, “[i]f a program does not
prevent constitutional violations, municipal decisionmakers may eventually be put
on notice that a new program is called for.” Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore,
“the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct . . . may tend to show that the lack
of proper training . . . is the ‘moving factor’ behind the plaintiff’s injury.” Id.
(emphasis added).
Consonant with Brown, the Tenth Circuit has created a three-part test that a
plaintiff must prove in order to hold a municipality liable in a § 1983 suit: (1)
“The existence of a continuing, persistent and widespread practice of
unconstitutional misconduct by the [municipality’s] employees”; (2) “Deliberate
indifference to or tacit approval of such misconduct by the [municipality’s]
policymaking officials . . . after notice to the officials of that particular
misconduct”; and (3) Injury to the plaintiff “by virtue of the unconstitutional acts
pursuant to the [municipality’s] custom and the custom was the moving force
behind the unconstitutional acts.” See Gates, 996 F.2d at 1041.
Trujillo has not proved that sexual misconduct in the manner alleged here is
a continuing, persistent, and widespread practice to which the policymaking
officials in the Pueblo Police Department have demonstrated deliberate
indifference or tacit approval. Taking all of Trujillo’s factual allegations as true,
-5-
she has proved only one other incident, occurring in 1980, of nonconsensual
sexual contact by an officer with a citizen while on-duty. In addition to the
Pueblo Police Department having a policy prohibiting sexual contact while on
duty, the officer in the 1980 sexual misconduct case was terminated, as was
Shields, the officer Trujillo claims to have sexually assaulted her.
After a de novo review of the parties’ briefs and contentions, the district
court order, and the entire record on appeal, this court finds no reversible error
and affirms for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court’s
Order Granting Motions for Summary Judgment. The judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
-6-