Smith v. Hargett

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 7 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RICHARD DEAN SMITH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 99-6130
(D.C. No. 97-CV-756)
STEVE HARGETT, (W.D. Okla.)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , BARRETT , and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Richard Dean Smith seeks a certificate of appealability in order to
pursue this appeal from an order of the district court denying his petition for
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . The court held that two of
the claims he brought in this action were procedurally barred and the remaining
claim was without merit. Because Smith has failed to make “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” as required under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2), we deny his request and dismiss the appeal. 1
Smith was convicted in an Oklahoma state court of three counts of second
degree murder for intentionally driving his automobile into a group of Indian
children walking on the shoulder of a highway, killing three of them. See Smith
v. State , 674 P.2d 569, 571 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984). He was sentenced to three
consecutive fifteen-year sentences. See id.In his petition, Smith alleged that his signed written waiver and confessions
were coerced and, therefore, inadmissible. Smith contended that he was
administered a central nervous system tranquilizer without his permission at the
bar he was at earlier in the evening. He asserted that evidence of that act should
have been presented to show that he was incompetent to stand trial. The district
court dismissed the petition as his allegations included both claims that had been
exhausted and claims that had not been exhausted.
1
We initially questioned whether Smith’s notice of appeal was timely. Upon
review of materials submitted by Smith and defendant, we conclude that the
notice of appeal was timely.
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On appeal, we concluded that Smith had exhausted his state court remedies.
See Smith v. Hargett , No. 97-6378, 1998 WL 229679 at **2 (10th Cir. May 7,
1998). We remanded the case for a determination of whether Smith’s claims were
procedurally barred, an issue we raised sua sponte. 2
See id. On remand, the court
determined that Smith had exhausted his first claim and that it was without merit.
The court determined that Smith’s other two claims were procedurally defaulted
as Smith had failed to show either cause and prejudice for his default or factual
innocence. See, e.g. , Parkhurst v. Shillinger , 128 F.3d 1366, 1370-71 (10th Cir.
1997). The court denied relief.
On appeal, Smith raises thirty-one issues many with multiple subparts. We
may only examine the issues delineated in our mandate. Cf. Colorado Interstate
Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. , 962 F.2d 1528, 1534 (10th Cir.
1992) (“rule is well established” that district court must strictly comply with
reviewing court’s mandate) .
We have reviewed the district court’s judgment in light of Smith’s
submissions to this court and the record on appeal. We agree that, as to his first
2
Smith argues that the issue of procedural bar was waived as defendant did
not raise the issue to the district court. We may raise the issue sua sponte as long
as the petitioner is permitted an opportunity to respond. See Hardiman v.
Reynolds , 971 F.2d 500, 501 (10th Cir. 1992).
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claim, Smith failed to establish that the state court decision “was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). We also
agree that Smith failed to establish cause and prejudice for his failure to raise his
other claims in state court. Neither has he shown factual innocence.
We DENY Smith’s request for a certificate of appealability and DISMISS
this appeal. We GRANT his motion for in forma pauperis status. All remaining
pending motions are DENIED. We will not address any of the other issues Smith
has raised in his various affidavits to this court as they were not raised to the
district court. See Walker v. Mather (In re Walker) , 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir.
1992). The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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