Taylor v. Sebelius

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 21, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
M ICHAEL J. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-3027
(D. Kansas)
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, Governor (D.Ct. No. 04-CV-3063 KHV)
for Kansas; PH ILL KLINE, Attorney
G eneral for K ansas; JO H N /JA NE
DOES, any party to suit which are
Other Representatives for the State of
Kansas; RO GER W ERH OLTZ,
Secretary of Corrections,
Defendants - Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
M ichael J. Taylor, an inmate at the W infield Correctional Facility in
W infield, Kansas, brought a pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He
claimed the application of the Kansas regulation imposing a $25.00 monthly
supervision fee on parolees is an unlaw ful bill of attainder and violated his rights
under the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution and analogous provisions of the Kansas
Constitution. The Defendants, Kathleen Sebelius (Governor of the State of
Kansas), Phill Kline (K ansas’ A ttorney General), and Roger W erhotz (Secretary
of the Kansas D epartment of Corrections) filed a motion for summary judgment,
which the district court granted. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291, we affirm.
Background
Taylor has been convicted three times in Kansas state court. On January
28, 1985, he pled guilty to the sale of cocaine and received a suspended sentence.
On September 2, 1987, he pled guilty to possession of cocaine and again received
a suspended sentence. On January 29, 1990, Taylor pled guilty to possession of
cocaine after a previous conviction and received a sentence of fifteen years to life
in prison, to run consecutive to any sentence he received for his 1985 and 1987
convictions. In M arch 1990, the state court found he had violated the terms of his
suspended sentences on the 1985 and 1987 convictions. The court re-sentenced
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him to indeterminate sentences of five to twenty years for each conviction and
ordered the sentences to run consecutive to each other. In June 1990, the court
reduced Taylor’s sentence on the 1990 conviction to five to twenty years in
prison, but reaffirmed the sentence would run consecutive to his sentences for the
1985 and 1987 convictions.
In 1998, the Kansas Parole Board released Taylor on parole. Pursuant to §
44-5-115(b) of the Kansas Administrative Regulations, the Kansas Department of
Corrections (KDOC) charged Taylor a monthly parole supervision fee of $25.00.
On M ay 24, 2000, Taylor’s parole was revoked. During the following period of
incarceration, the KDOC deducted $50.00 from his inmate trust account to satisfy
the October and November 1999 supervision fees. 1 Taylor was again released on
parole on November 2, 2000. However, his parole was revoked on July 17, 2001.
On September 3, 2002, Taylor was paroled for a third time. This parole was
revoked on December 23, 2002. In February 13, 2003, the KDOC deducted
1
Pursuant to Internal Management Policy and Procedure (IMMP) § 04-106,
outstanding fees from a previous incarceration or post-incarceration supervision shall be
assessed upon the offender’s re-entry into KDOC custody. Although the policy has been
amended several times since it became effective in 1998, its substance has remained the
same.
On appeal, Taylor states he paid the monthly supervision fees from March 1999
through September 1999. The Inmate Fee History documents do not reflect such
payment. Because indigent offenders are exempt from the payment of supervision fees,
see IMPP § 14-107, Defendants suggest the absence of such payment records may well
indicate Taylor’s indigent status. Taylor insists he was not indigent at that time. In any
event, the only fees at issue in 1999 are the October and November fees.
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$25.00 from Taylor’s account for satisfaction of his October 2002 supervision
fees.
On February 20, 2004, Taylor filed a pro se complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2
Specifically, he claimed: (1) Kan. Admin. Regs. § 44-5-115(b) violates the
constitutional prohibition on ex post facto law s because at the time of his
convictions Kansas did not impose a supervision fee; (2) as applied to him, Kan.
Admin. Regs. § 44-5-115(b) is an unlawful bill of attainder; and (3) by deducting
supervision fees from his prison inmate account, Defendants subjected him to
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, unlaw fully
took his property in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, and
violated his right to procedural due process and equal protection under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
On September 10, 2004, Defendants moved for summary judgment on
Taylor’s claims, arguing no material issues of fact remained, Taylor failed to
demonstrate a violation of a constitutional right, and they were entitled to
Eleventh A mendment immunity. The district court granted the Defendants’
motion for summary judgment and on December 29, 2004, the court entered
judgment dismissing the case. See Taylor v. Sebelius, 350 F.Supp.2d 888 (D.
2
Taylor also named as defendants unidentified John/Jane Does who implement the
KDOC’s policies, practices and procedures.
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Kan. 2004). This timely appeal followed.
Standard of Review
“W e review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment,
viewing the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment.” Neal v. Lewis, 414 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2005). “Summary
judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986), and F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c)). Because
Taylor represents himself on appeal, w e construe his pleadings liberally. Id.Discussion
In 1994, the Kansas legislature passed a bill authorizing the KDOC to
impose fees on inmates and former inmates on supervision. Specifically, Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 75-52,139 provides:
The secretary of corrections is hereby authorized to adopt rules and
regulations under which offenders in the secretary’s custody may be
assessed fees for various services provided to offenders and for
deductions for payment to the crime victims compensation fund.
In accord, the secretary issued a regulation which provides in relevant part:
(b) Every offender under the department’s parole supervision . . . shall
be assessed a supervision service fee of . . . 25 dollars per month. . . .
A portion of the supervision service fees collected shall be paid to the
designated collection agent(s) . . . . Twenty-five percent of the
remaining amount collected shall be paid . . . to the crime victim s
compensation fund. The remaining balance shall be paid to the
department’s general fees fund for the department’s purchase or lease
of enhanced parole supervision services or equipment. . . . The
department shall establish criteria for the identification of indigent
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offenders who shall be exempt from this subsection of the regulation.
K AN . A DMIN . R EGS . § 44-5-115(b). The procedures to collect the supervision
fees are found in IM PP § 14-107, which reiterates that indigent offenders are not
required to pay a supervision fee. In addition, IM PP § 12-127 provides that the
KDOC w ill provide basic hygiene supplies to indigent inmates. Finally, IM PP §
04-106 states that outstanding fees or charges from a previous incarceration or
supervision shall be assessed upon the offender’s re-entry into KDOC custody.
On appeal, Taylor relies on the arguments raised in his complaint. 3 W e
address each claim in turn.
1. Ex Post Facto Claim
Taylor alleges Kan. Admin. Regs. § 44-5-115(b) violates the constitutional
prohibition on ex post facto laws because at the time of his convictions, Kansas
did not impose a supervision fee. “W e review a challenge to a statute under the
Ex Post Facto Clause de novo.” Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1248 (10th
Cir. 2000).
3
Taylor also contends the district court erred in staying discovery in the case until
the dispositive motions were decided. He claims discovery was necessary to present
evidence regarding Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. Because we
determine Taylor failed to state a claim on the merit, we need not reach the Eleventh
Amendment issue and this argument is moot.
In addition, Taylor filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The district court
did not make a specific ruling on Taylor’s motion. However, when the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, its decision necessarily denied
Taylor’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Because we affirm summary judgment in
favor of the Defendants, our decision affirms the district court’s implied ruling as well.
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Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution prohibits the States from
passing any “ex post facto Law.” U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 10, cl. 1. “[T]he Ex Post
Facto Clause incorporated ‘a term of art with an established meaning at the time
of the framing of the Constitution.’ In accordance with this original
understanding, . . . the Clause is aimed at laws that ‘retroactively alter the
definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.’” Cal. Dep’t of
Corr. v. M orales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497
U.S. 37, 41, 43 (1990)). The focus is “on whether any such change alters the
definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is
punishable.” Id. at 506 n.3. Thus, we must first determine whether the intent of
the Kansas legislature was to establish a civil or criminal penalty and, if a civil
penalty was intended, “we must then inquire whether there exists the ‘clearest
proof’ that the measure is so punitive in purpose or effect as to override the
legislature’s intent.” Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249. In doing so, we consider “(1)
whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) w hether it
has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment— retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the
behavior to w hich it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose
to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) w hether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” Id. (quotations
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omitted).
In Roark v. Graves, the K ansas Supreme Court held that Kan. Admin. Regs.
§ 44-5-115(a), which imposes a $1.00 monthly fee to administer an inmate trust
account, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 936 P.2d 245, 247-48 (Kan.
1997). To reach its conclusion, the Kansas Supreme Court cited to the testimony
of Charles Simmons, former Secretary of the KDOC, who testified before the
Kansas Senate Judiciary Committee in support of the bill (which eventually
became Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-52,139) authorizing the collection of fees for
services from offenders in KDOC custody. Simmons testified in part as follows:
Assessing fees to offenders is based on a belief that offenders should be
accountable for their actions, and contributing to the costs of
incarceration or supervision are important components of establishing
that accountability.
Id. (quotations omitted). The Roark court concluded that Kan. Admin. Regs. §
44-5-115(a) is reasonably related to the goals outlined by Simmons and that the
“procedure reasonably prepares [inmates] for reentry into the social and economic
system of the community upon leaving the correctional institution.” Id. at 248.
W e agree with the district court that Roark can be applied to the
supervisory fees at issue here.
Both fees are based on the same authorizing statute, K.S.A. §
75-52,139, and are part of the same regulation, K.A.R. §
44-5-115(a)-(b). . . . [T]he monthly supervision fee cannot be described
as punitive in nature. The Kansas legislature did not intend that the fee
be punitive and the fee is not so extreme as to constitute punishment.
The supervision fee is modest and the regulation specifically exempts
indigent offenders. Finally, collection of the supervision fee is
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reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, i.e. holding
offenders accountable for their actions, and the fee bears a rational
relation to the goal of compensating the State of K ansas for its costs.
Taylor, 350 F.Supp.2d at 896 (citations omitted). It is clear the Kansas
legislature intended Kan. Admin. Regs. § 44-5-115 to be a civil penalty. After
considering the factors set forth in Femedeer, it is also apparent that § 44-5-115 is
not “so punitive in purpose or effect” as to override this intent. Thus, we affirm
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to D efendants on Taylor’s ex post
facto claim.
2. Eighth Amendment
Taylor also claims he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment 4 because the removal of funds from his prison
account left him without the funds necessary to purchase items for his basic hygiene.
Prison conditions may amount to cruel and unusual punishment if they “deprive
inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). To succeed on his claim, Taylor must show Defendants
subjected him to conditions posing a “substantial risk of serious harm” and they had
a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Gonzales v. M artinez, 403 F.3d 1179, 1186
(10th Cir.) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 624 (2005).
The district court carefully reviewed the amounts in Taylor’s account
4
The Eighth Amendment states in full: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. C ONST.
amend. VIII.
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throughout the time his supervisory fees were deducted. Taylor, 350 F.Supp.2d at
892-93. It concluded that “a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff was unable to
purchase basic hygiene items from February 13 through February 25, 2003, when he
had approximately $3.00 in his inmate trust account,” assuming $3.00 was
insufficient to purchase the items. Id. at 894. Nonetheless, as the district court
determined, because the prison provides basic necessities to indigent inmates without
charge, see IM PP § 12-127, and Taylor does not claim he requested or was denied
this accommodation, he cannot show the necessary deprivation or that Defendants
acted with the requisite culpable state of mind. Thus, his claim must fail. See
Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of America, 403 F.3d 1134, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005) (alleged
conduct of treating physician “did not amount to an act or omission sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs”) (quotations
omitted). W e affirm summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Taylor’s Eighth
Amendment claim.
At this point, we note the district court determined Taylor’s remaining claims
were not addressed in Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Consequently, the
district court reviewed these claims sua sponte and determined they should be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. W e
review de novo a dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B). Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of
Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999). W e accept the allegations in the
complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.-10-
However, “we are not bound by conclusory allegations, unwarranted inferences, or
legal conclusions.” Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1465 (10th Cir. 1994).
Dismissal is appropriate “where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the
facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.”
Perkins, 165 F.3d at 806. W ith this standard in mind, we review Taylor’s remaining
claims.
3. Bill of Attainder
A bill of attainder is “a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a
judicial trial.” Selective Serv. Sys. v. M inn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S.
841, 846-47 (1984) (quotations omitted); see Bledsoe v. United States, 384 F.3d
1232, 1238 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 810 (2004). To determine w hether a
statute comes within this definition, there are three necessary inquiries: “(1) whether
the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment;
(2) whether the statute, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed,
reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes; and (3) whether
the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish.” Selective Serv. Sys.,
468 U.S. at 852 (quotations omitted). As discussed above, the regulation authorizing
supervisory fees is not punitive in nature, but rather, reasonably serves a legitimate
nonpunitive legislative purpose. For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of
Taylor’s bill of attainder claim.
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4. Takings
Taylor alleges the deduction of the supervision fees from his account violates
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment which provides: “[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. C ONST . amend.
V. Its purpose “is to prevent the government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.” Pittsburg County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of M cAlester, 358 F.3d
694, 718 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522 (1998)).
“A party challenging governmental action as an unconstitutional taking bears a
substantial burden” and we evaluate a regulation’s constitutionality by examining
“the justice and fairness of the governmental action.” Id. (quotations omitted).
“[T]he Supreme Court has identified several factors . . . that have particular
significance: the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable
investment backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action.” Id.(quotations omitted).
The Supreme Court has specifically held the character of the governmental
action here constitutional. In United States v. Sperry Corp., it stated, “[A]
reasonable user fee is not a taking if it is imposed for the reimbursement of the cost
of government services.” 493 U.S. 52, 63 (1989). The amount of the fee need not be
“precisely calibrated to the use that a party makes of Government services.” Id. at
60. It is only required to be “a fair approximation of the cost of benefits supplied.”
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Id. (quotations omitted).
Taylor does not contest the supervision fee is used, in part, to fund the
KDOC’s “purchase or lease of enhanced parole supervision services and equipment
(including electronic monitoring, drug screening and surveillance services).” 5
Taylor, 350 F.Supp. 2d at 900; see Kan. Admin. Regs. § 44-5-115(b)(2). Neither
does Taylor allege the supervision fee is excessive in relation to the cost of inmate
supervision. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Taylor’s takings
claim.
5. Equal Protection
Construing Taylor’s complaint in a most liberal fashion, it appears he is
claiming the retroactive application of Kan. Admin. Regs. § 44-5-115(b) to him,
placed him in a class of prisoners who received a harsher total sentence than those
who were sentenced prior to the existence of the regulation but were not required to
pay the fee. 6 Taylor fails to provide any cogent argument for this claim, citing only
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), for the proposition that the “Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect individuals from sanctions which are
down right irrational.” (R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 61.) Because we have determined that Kan.
5
Although twenty-five percent of the supervision fee (after collection costs) goes
to the crime victims compensation fund, Taylor does not allege the supervision fee is
invalid because a portion of it goes to costs other than parole supervision. Therefore, we
need not determine whether this aspect of the statute is invalid as an unlawful taking of
property.
6
The remainder of his allegations under this heading are indecipherable.
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Admin. Regs. § 44-5-115(b) is neither punitive nor irrational, this claim fails. As to
any further discussion, we do not consider arguments raised in a perfunctory manner,
unaccompanied by any effort at developed argumentation. M urrell v. Shalala, 43
F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted); see, e.g., Femedeer, 227
F.3d at 1255 (declining to consider argument where only a perfunctory reference to
the issue was raised); United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995)
(declining to consider issues that were nominally raised).
6. Procedural Due Process
Finally, Taylor alleges the deduction of the supervision fees from his prison
account without any pre-deprivation process violates his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no “State [shall]
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. W e pose two questions when reviewing a claimed
procedural due process violation: “[T]he first asks whether there exists a liberty or
property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines
whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally
sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thom pson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations
omitted). Even if a liberty or property interest is implicated, “due process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands” in
order “to minimiz[e] the risk of error.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal &
Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979) (quotations omitted).
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As the district court recognized, Taylor has a protected property interest in his
prison account. See Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 938-39 (10th Cir. 1989)
(“To the extent that [the funds] constitute monies received from friends and family
outside the prison, plaintiff clearly has a property interest in them. Likewise, it
appears that he has a property interest in any wages he has earned or may earn while
incarcerated. . . .”).
In determining what process is due, courts must balance (1) the private interest
that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3)
the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative costs of additional
process. M athews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see Gillihan, 872 F.2d at
940.
Taylor claims the proper procedure for the KDOC to collect outstanding
supervision fees is found in the attachment and garnishment procedures set forth in
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-701-744. If those procedures are not required, he claims he is,
at least, entitled to be heard before the delinquent fees are removed from his prison
account. W e can easily dispose of Taylor’s allegation that the KDOC must use the
statutory attachment and garnishment procedures. The attachment and garnishment
statutes do not incorporate the procedure for the management of prison accounts.
The relevant provision is Kan. Admin. Regs. § 44-5-115 as implemented by IM PP
§ 04-106.
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As to the first M athews factor, the private interest that is affected is Taylor’s
interest in avoiding an erroneous assessment of the supervision fees authorized to be
collected from his inmate trust account. The district court correctly concluded such
an interest is not compelling because Taylor has an opportunity to contest an
erroneous assessment through the prison grievance process and the KDOC provides
items and services to indigent inmates, such as basic hygiene supplies, free of
charge. W ith regards to the second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation, the
district court correctly concluded the collection of supervision fees involves routine
matters of accounting with a low risk of error. See Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr.
Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000) (collection of fees from inmates for cost
of housing). In addition, IM PP § 04-106 requires each offender be provided a
monthly listing of any outstanding fees as part of the Inmate Trust Fund A ccounting
Report, which is generated pursuant to IM PP § 04-103. Taylor has not alleged that
he lacked notice of the outstanding fees and obligations. Given adequate notice and
the routine accounting involved in the collection of outstanding obligations, the risk
of erroneous deprivation is minimal.
As to the third factor, the district court concluded:
Here, the collection of supervision fees advances a policy of offender
accountability and rehabilitation, and reimburses the State of Kansas for
services provided. To require a pre-deprivation hearing before the
collection of outstanding supervision fees (of which the offender has prior
notice) w ould substantially increase the burdens of enforcement.
Taylor, 350 F.Supp.2d at 898 (citing Tillman, 221 F.3d at 422 (no pre-deprivation
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proceeding required for deduction of room and board fees from inmate account;
proceeding would be impractical, significantly increase transaction costs and hinder
correctional facility’s ability to reduce costs of incarceration)). W e agree.
In Gillihan we stated:
[W ]hen the deprivation is not random and unauthorized, but is pursuant to
an affirmatively established or de facto policy, procedure, or custom, the
state has the power to control the deprivation and, therefore, generally
must, in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, give the
plaintiff a predeprivation hearing.
827 F.2d at 939-40 (citations omitted). W e find the interest of the state is
compelling in this instance.
Here, Taylor does not contest the amount he owed in delinquent monthly
supervision fees. As we have discussed at length, his various claims regarding the
constitutionality of the supervision fees are without merit. Rather, his procedural
due process claim is tethered only to his belief that he is entitled to a pre-deprivation
proceeding before the unpaid fees may be deducted from his account upon his return
to prison. However, the collection of supervision fees is totally automated and is
controlled by a comprehensive computer program. See IM PP § 04-106. Taylor does
not allege any facts relating to the ability of the KDOC to provide a pre-deprivation
hearing without substantial expense and/or burden. In short, there is nothing in the
record to suggest a pre-deprivation hearing for inmates who have outstanding
supervision fees would be practicable. The purpose of supervision fees and the
procedure for the collection of those fees are entirely reasonable and provide all the
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process due under the circumstances.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Defendants on Taylor’s ex post facto and Eighth A mendment claims and its sua
sponte dismissal of Taylor’s takings, bill of attainder, equal protection and
procedural due process claims.
Entered by the C ourt:
Terrence L. O ’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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