Texaco, Inc. v. Hale

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Tenth Circuit
Byron White United States Courthouse
1823 Stout Street
Denver, Colorado 80294
(303) 844-3157
Patrick Fisher Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk Chief Deputy Clerk
April 23, 1996
TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION
RE: 95-2033, Texaco, Inc. v. Hale
April 8, 1996 by Judge Porfilio
Please be advised of the fillowing correction to the captioned decision:
Page 2, counsel for the defendants-appellees name is incorrectly listed as Lisa M.
Enbfield and should be corrected to read Lisa M. Enfield.
Please make this correction to your copy.
Very truly yours,
Patrick Fisher,
Clerk
By:
Barbara Schermerhorn
Deputy Clerk
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 4/8/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
TEXACO, INC.; TEXAS-NEW MEXICO
PIPELINE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,,
v.
ALBERT HALE, successor to Peterson
Zah as President of the Navajo Nation;
DAVID C. BRUNT, successor to
Nelson Gorman and Stella Saunders as
Commissioner of the Navajo Tax
Commission; VICTOR JOE, successor to
Nelson Gorman and Stella Saunders as
Commissioner of Navajo Tax
Commission; BRUCE KEIZER, successor
No. 95-2033
to Nelson Gorman and Stella Saunders as
Commissioner of the Navajo Tax
Commission; JOE SHIRLEY, successor to
Nelson Gorman and Stella Saunders as
Commissioner of the Navajo Tax
Commission; LEE BERGEN, successor to
Nelson Gorman and Stella Saunders as
Commissioner of the Navajo Tax
Commission; DERRICK WATCHMAN,
member, Navajo Tax Commission;
STEVEN BEGAY, successor to Derrick
Watchman as Executive Director of the
Navajo Tax Commission,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. CIV-87-0124 JC)
Bradford C. Berge, Campbell, Carr & Berge, P.S., Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
Paul E. Frye (Lisa M. Enfield; Herb Yazzie, Attorney General; Marcelino R. Gomez; and
C. Joseph Lennihan, Navajo Nation Department of Justice, with him on the
briefs), Nordhaus, Haltom, Taylor, Taradash & Frye, LLP, Albuquerque, New Mexico,
for Defendants-Appellees.
Before PORFILIO, MCWILLIAMS, and ALARCON,* Circuit Judges.
PORFILIO, Circuit Judge.
Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States Court of
*
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
This case involves the application of the tribal exhaustion
doctrine to a taxation dispute involving land located outside
Navajo Reservation borders but within Navajo Indian Country.
Texaco, Inc. and Texas-New Mexico Pipeline (Appellants) seek
federal declaratory relief against the Navajo Tax Commission and
officials of the Navajo Tribe and the Navajo Tax Commission (the
Tribe). We considered a prior appeal by Appellants in Texaco, Inc.
v. Zah, 5 F.3d 1374 (10th Cir. 1993) (Zah I), and remanded the case
to the district court with specific instructions. Here, following
the district court’s reconsideration of the issues on remand,
Appellants appeal the second dismissal of their claim. We affirm.
Appellants conduct business activities within Navajo Indian
Country.1 Since 1978, the Tribe has imposed an Oil and Gas
Severance Tax on Texaco and a Business Activity Tax on Texas-New
Mexico Pipeline for their activities occurring within Navajo Indian
Country but outside the formal boundaries of the Navajo
Reservation. In 1987, Appellants filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico seeking a declaratory
injunction to prohibit Tribal taxation of Appellants’ business
activities occurring outside the formal boundaries of the Navajo
Reservation. However, the district court dismissed Appellants’
complaint without prejudice after finding Appellants failed to
Texaco possesses several mineral leases within Navajo Indian Country while Texas-New
1
Mexico Pipeline owns and operates an interstate pipeline crossing Navajo Indian Country.
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exhaust tribal remedies before seeking a federal forum.
In Zah I, we considered two issues. First, Appellants
contended the Tribe lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute. We
rejected that argument, holding “whether tribal courts have
jurisdiction over non-Indians in civil cases ‘should be conducted
in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself,’” Zah, 5 F.3d at
1376 (quoting National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985)), unless one of the three
exceptions to the tribal exhaustion rule is applicable.2 We
further held those exceptions were inapplicable to Appellants’
case.
Second, Appellants’ argued even if the Tribe had jurisdiction,
the federal court should not have been deprived of its jurisdiction
to determine the propriety of taxing Appellants’ activities
occurring outside the Navajo Reservation. In response, we noted
the importance of comity and referred to the federal concerns
behind the tribal exhaustion rule. We then stated, in reference to
activities arising on reservation lands, “we have characterized the
tribal exhaustion rule as ‘an inflexible bar to consideration of
the merits of the petition by the federal court.’” Zah, 5 F.3d at
1378 (quoting Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131 (1987)).
2
In National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985),
the Supreme Court held tribal courts should determine whether they have jurisdiction over non-
Indians in civil cases unless the “assertion of trial jurisdiction ‘is motivated by a desire to harass
or is conducted in bad faith,’ or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional
prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity
to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.” Id. at 856 n.21 (citations omitted).
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However, we further noted:
When the dispute involves non-Indian activity occurring
outside the reservation ... the policies behind the
tribal exhaustion rule are not so obviously served.
Under these circumstances, we must depend upon the
district courts to examine assiduously the National
Farmers factors in determining whether comity requires
the parties to exhaust their tribal remedies before
presenting their dispute to the federal courts.
Id. Because the district court failed to examine those factors, we
were unable to determine whether the district court abused its
discretion. As a result, we vacated the district court’s order and
remanded the case “for further examination of the comity factors
articulated in National Farmers.” Id. Those factors are: (1)
furtherance of “the congressional policy of supporting tribal self-
government;” (2) promoting the “orderly administration of justice;”
and (3) obtaining “the benefit of tribal expertise.” Id. at 1377-
78 (citing National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856-57).
On remand, after making a point by point analysis of the
National Farmers factors, the district court concluded abstention
was appropriate and again dismissed Appellants’ case. Appellants
now appeal, contending, despite the limited remand in Zah I, the
district court’s decision must be reversed for three reasons.
First, they assert the district court’s National Farmers analysis
was improper. Second, they argue the district court erred in
assuming Appellants consented to tribal jurisdiction. Third, they
maintain the district court, and this court in Zah I, erroneously
held Indian Country defined the boundaries of the Tribe’s civil
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jurisdiction.
We start from the premise that the scope of the district
court’s jurisdiction was narrow following remand. The only matter
returned to the district court was the “assiduous examination” of
the National Farmers comity factors. Cf. Sierra Club v. Lujan, 949
F.2d 362, 365 (10th Cir. 1991)(a limited remand circumscribes the
scope of the issues for litigation to those defined in the remand
order). Likewise, the only issue before us is whether that
examination was performed.
Appellants argue the district court could not properly analyze
the National Farmers factors on remand without an evidentiary
hearing and further discovery because there were factual issues in
dispute. Quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 414 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981), Appellants contend, when
faced with a motion to dismiss raising factual issues, “the
plaintiff should have an opportunity to develop and argue the facts
in a manner that is adequate in the context of the disputed issues
and evidence.” Here, Appellants assert they “vigorously contested”
the Tribe’s allegation that all of their business activities
occurred within Indian Country. Appellants also contend they
contested the Tribe’s allegation that Appellants consented to
tribal jurisdiction by contract. Under this court’s decision in
Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531 (10th
Cir. 1995), Appellants argue the district court was required to
allow further development of the facts to determine whether any of
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the dispute occurred in Indian Country and the extent to which the
dispute lay within an independent Indian community.
These questions, however, were not within the scope of the
remand. The case was not postured as though the district court was
just commencing consideration of a motion to dismiss. More
importantly, however, in Zah I, Appellants conceded the disputed
land fell within the definition of Navajo Indian Country as well as
Indian Country. Zah, 5 F.3d at 1376, n.3.
Nevertheless, Appellants now argue Watchman required the
district court to make preliminary factual findings which, in turn,
required further discovery in this case. Even though we stated in
Watchman, “the application of the [tribal abstention] doctrine may
differ outside the formal boundaries of a reservation,” Watchman,
52 F.3d at 1537, we also noted, “[t]he facts and circumstances of
each individual situation will determine whether comity requires
abstention in that particular instance.” Id.Contrary to the circumstances of this case, however, in
Watchman, one of the issues contested throughout the proceedings
was whether the area subject to Indian taxation was Indian Country.
Naturally, on remand the district court was instructed to determine
the appropriate community of reference and to make detailed factual
findings to determine whether the area was in fact a dependent
Indian community. Id. at 1546. Thus, under the circumstances, it
was appropriate in Watchman for the district court to further
develop the facts to reach its conclusion on remand.
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In this case, however, the district court was not required to
further develop the facts because they had been conceded in Zah I.
Moreover, even in their original complaint Appellants did not seek
a declaration of what portion of the land constituted Indian
Country. The relief they sought was a declaration that “the
imposition and enforcement of the Navajo Oil and Gas Severance Tax
and the Navajo Business Activities Tax on Plaintiffs’ activities
beyond the borders of the Navajo Reservation [is] illegal, invalid
and void.”
We believe the circumstances of this case make Watchman
inapposite. In short, Watchman simply does not require fact-
finding hearings when the operative fact issues have been resolved
through other means.
Appellants make no other challenge to the district court’s
National Farmers analysis. Our review of the district court’s
careful and detailed consideration of the circumstances leads us to
conclude its judgment is free of error on this issue.
Appellants next argue the district court erroneously assumed
certain facts as true. We review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error. Steiner Corp. Retirement Plan v. Johnson
& Higgins of California, 31 F.3d 935, 939 (10th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 732 (1995). “A finding of fact is ‘clearly
erroneous’ if it is without factual support in the record or if the
appellate court, after reviewing all the evidence, is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Raydon
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Exploration, Inc. v. Ladd, 902 F.2d 1496, 1499 (10th Cir. 1990).
Appellants contend the district court erred in assuming all of
their activities occurred within Indian Country. Appellants argue
they sought to show the district court, on remand, that some of
their business is conducted on land that is not part of a dependent
Indian community. Appellants also assert Indian Country is not
synonymous with Navajo Indian Country. However, as discussed
above, this is a latter day change of position from Appellants’
previous concession that the disputed land was within the
definition of both Navajo Indian Country and Indian Country. Even
had the scope of the remand allowed the district court to consider
this issue, it was entitled to rely upon Appellants’ concession,
and they are now without a basis for objection.
Appellants also assert the district court erred in assuming
Appellants entered contractual relationships with the Tribe and
“acknowledged the authority of Navajo Law and its application to
the extraction activities.” Appellants argue the contracts were
limited to activities and facilities within the Navajo Reservation.
Nevertheless, the Tribe points to contractual language in which
Texas-New Mexico Pipeline agreed to resolve disputes by applying
“the laws of the Navajo Nation ... in the conduct of all activities
of [Texas-New Mexico] within the Navajo Nation.” Again, this issue
is beyond the scope of the remand. Nevertheless, the district
court did not, as suggested by Appellants, find Texaco was a party
to this agreement. The court simply viewed the agreement as
“another consideration” for determination of the Tribe’s taxing
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power. The district court further found, although that agreement
did not include Texaco, the business dealings of both Texaco and
Texas-New Mexico Pipeline with the Tribe, including mineral leases
with individual Navajo allotment owners, were sufficient to subject
Texaco to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation as well.
After viewing the record as a whole, we conclude there is
factual support for the trial court’s findings on both issues. The
district court did not clearly err.
AFFIRMED.
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