Helmer v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 12, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
DAVID HELMER; FELICIA MUFTIC;
FELICIA MUFTIC as personal
representative of the Estate of Michael
Muftic, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 15-1214
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., an
Ohio corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-00685-RBJ-MEH)
_________________________________
Rick D. Bailey, Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh & Jardine, Englewood, Colorado (Diane
Vaksdal Smith, David K. TeSelle, and Seth A. Katz, Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh &
Jardine, Englewood, Colorado, Gary E. Mason, Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP,
Washington D.C., Michael Flannery, and Katherine Van Dyck, Cuneo Gilbert & Laduca
LLP, St. Louis, Missouri, and Washington D.C., with him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
David L. Lenyo, Garfield & Hecht, P.C., Aspen, Colorado (L. Michael Brooks, Jr.,
Wells, Anderson & Race, LLC, Denver, Colorado, Chad J. Schmit, Garfield & Hecht,
P.C., Aspen, Colorado, Roger P. Thomasch, and David M. Strauss, Ballard Spahr LLP,
Denver, Colorado, with him on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________
Before KELLY, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
Plaintiffs David Helmer and Felicia Muftic1 represent a certified class of
homeowners who contend a radiant-heating hose, the Entran 3, manufactured by
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (“Goodyear”) suffered design defects leading to
cracks and leaks. At trial, Goodyear argued the leaks were caused by third parties’
improper installations. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Goodyear, concluding the
Entran 3 was not defectively designed. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that insufficient
evidence supported the district court’s instruction on nonparty fault. They further argue
that the district court failed to require proof of a necessary fact before instructing the jury
regarding Colorado’s presumption that a product is not defective if ten years have passed
since it was first sold. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(3). We conclude that any error in
the third-party liability instruction was harmless, and the inclusion of the instruction as to
the presumption was proper. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I
In the late 1980’s, Goodyear designed and manufactured the Entran 3 hose for
Chiles Power Supply Company d/b/a Heatway Radiant Floors and Snowmelting
(“Heatway”). The hose is used to convey hot fluid to provide radiant heating in
structures, including homes. Thus, it is installed permanently under flooring, in walls and
ceilings, and in concrete. The parties do not dispute that Entran 3 has an expected useful
life of greater than forty years. From 1992 to 1996, Goodyear produced approximately
1
Muftic participates in this appeal in her personal capacity and as the personal
representative of the Estate of Michael Muftic.
2
thirty-three million feet of Entran 3, which it sold exclusively to Heatway. Heatway
provided a product guarantee to homeowners and published an installation manual for the
hose. In 1996, Goodyear ceased manufacture of Entran 3 because “the potential for
product related claims over[rode] the commercial justification for pursuing th[e] market.”
Entran 3 hoses were installed in the Colorado homes of Plaintiffs Helmer and
Muftic. Helmer’s hose was installed when his home was built in 1992-93, and was first
observed leaking in April 2010. He suffered severe leaks in the fall of 2013. The
Muftics’ hose was installed in 1994-95, and developed serious leaks in June 2010 and
December 2014. At trial, Plaintiffs presented evidence that Entran 3 hoses had developed
splits or leaks in five other Colorado homes as well.
In 2012, Plaintiffs filed this class action alleging defective design. They
presented evidence that the ethylene-propylene diene monomer (“EPDM”) rubber used in
the inner layer of Entran 3 was not suitable to carry hot liquid for the lifetime of a home,
and that a design defect caused inconsistent thickness and bonding between the layers of
the hose, allowing oxygen to permeate into the system. Plaintiffs claim these design
choices destined the product to crack, leak, and burst from foreseeable use.
Goodyear argued that the hose was not defectively designed, and that any leaking
hoses resulted from improper installation. It presented evidence suggesting that whoever
installed the relevant systems had used improper clamps and bent the hoses too tightly in
most of Plaintiffs’ homes. It also argued that Heatway negligently failed to provide
custom designs, failed to install Entran 3 heating systems, and failed to provide necessary
instructions for installation and maintenance of the systems, as promised to Goodyear.
3
Specifically, David Maguire, the engineer in charge of developing Entran 3, testified that
Heatway represented to Goodyear that it would design, supervise, inspect, test, and
maintain every system it sold. Maguire documented these promises and representations
in a trip report he prepared after a meeting with Heatway. He also testified the promises
were never kept. Instead, Goodyear argued that Heatway generally sold Entran 3 hoses
for installation by third parties and never inspected or tested the systems. Goodyear thus
designated Heatway as a nonparty at fault under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5(3)(b).
Goodyear also presented evidence that more than ten years had passed since
Entran 3 first went on the market, and the parties agreed that no lawsuit had been filed
alleging the hose was defective in the ten years after Entran 3 was first sold in Colorado.
Goodyear thus invoked § 13-21-403(3), which imposes a rebuttable presumption that a
product is not defective if ten years have passed since the product was first sold.
After the close of evidence, Plaintiffs moved for judgment as a matter of law
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), arguing that Goodyear failed to offer any evidence to support
Heatway’s alleged nonparty fault, and that Goodyear was not entitled to the § 13-21-403
presumption. The district court ruled against Plaintiffs, finding sufficient evidence that
Heatway may have contributed to the leaks by failing to inspect or install the systems. In
addition, the district court determined the statutory presumption unambiguously applied.
Accordingly, the court instructed the jury that if it concluded that a design defect in
Entran 3 was a cause of the damages or losses, the jury must then determine whether
improper installation contributed to the damages and decide the comparative percentages
of fault attributable to Heatway and an installer. Similarly, the court’s special verdict
4
form instructed the jury to consider Heatway’s liability only if it determined Goodyear
had not defectively designed the Entran 3. The court also instructed that the jury must
presume that the hose was not defective if it “was sold for the first time for use or
consumption ten or more years before any claimed damages or losses were incurred by
the Plaintiffs.”
During deliberations, the jury inquired of the court: “[w]hen did Heatway go out
of business and why.” The court refused to answer because the question asked for
additional evidence. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Goodyear,
determining that the Entran 3 was not defectively designed. Because it did not find a
design defect, the jury did not reach questions regarding nonparty fault. After trial,
Plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b),
and a Rule 59 motion for a new trial, again raising the issues of Heatway’s nonparty fault
and the statutory presumption. The district court denied both motions and this appeal
followed.
II
We review de novo a district court’s decisions regarding Rule 50(a) and 50(b)
motions, applying the same standards as the district court. Elm Ridge Expl. Co. v.
Engle, 721 F.3d 1199, 1216 (10th Cir. 2013); Hardeman v. City of Albuquerque, 377
F.3d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir. 2004). In diversity cases “federal law governs the
appropriateness of a Rule 50 motion, while the substantive law of the forum state
controls the analysis of the underlying claims.” Wolfgang v. Mid-America
Motorsports, Inc., 111 F.3d 1515, 1522 (10th Cir. 1997). In reviewing the denial of
5
judgment as a matter of law, we “determine whether there is evidence upon which the
jury could have properly found a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. In other
words, we may find error “only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible
to no reasonable inferences supporting the party opposing the motion.” Id. (quotation
omitted). We “construe the evidence and inferences therefrom . . . most favorably to
the nonmoving party.” Id.A
Plaintiffs suggest Goodyear presented insufficient evidence to support the
instruction on Heatway’s nonparty liability. Under Colorado law, a defendant may
designate a nonparty at fault as a defense to liability. § 13-21-111.5(3)(b). Because
Goodyear designated Heatway as a nonparty at fault, the jury instructions and the
verdict form directed the jury to apportion liability if it decided that Entran 3 was
defectively designed. Because the jury found Entran 3 was not defectively designed,
it did not proceed to the subsequent questions on the verdict form concerning
nonparty fault.
Even if Plaintiffs are correct that insufficient evidence supported Heatway’s
nonparty liability, the instruction did not affect the jury’s verdict.2 A jury’s negative
answer to a threshold question of liability may render a verdict form’s subsequent
erroneous questions harmless. See Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 97 F.3d 1365, 1369 (10th
2
Plaintiffs do not contend there was insufficient evidence to support a finding
that the hoses were installed incorrectly, but suggest insufficient evidence supported
a finding that Heatway was liable for any improper installation.
6
Cir. 1996). In Allen, the plaintiff alleged that a boat was unreasonably dangerous
because passengers could be ejected during sharp turns. Id. at 1367. A jury returned
a verdict in favor of the defendant manufacturer. Id. at 1367-68. On appeal, the
plaintiff argued an instruction on the defense of misuse was improper. Id. at 1368.
But because the jury found the boat was not unreasonably dangerous, it never reached
the question of misuse. Id. at 1369. The challenged question thus played no part in
the verdict, and the Allen court concluded there was “no error on the part of the
district court . . . in instructing the jury on the misuse defense.” Id. at 1370.
Similarly, because the jury concluded Entran 3 was not defectively designed, it
did not reach any question as to nonparty liability. Thus, even assuming insufficient
evidence of nonparty fault, any error was harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; Staley v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 1504, 1512 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Because the jury
found no liability on the part of the only named defendant, there was no reason for the
jury to assign or apportion fault to other parties.”). Plaintiffs concede as much when
they argue: “the whole question of Heatway’s negligence is utterly irrelevant to the
question of whether Goodyear was liable for design defect—such negligence could
not affect Goodyear’s liability, only the apportionment of damages.” Absent a design
defect, Goodyear is not liable and nonparty fault is irrelevant.
Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that the instruction on nonparty fault and inclusion of
the issue on the verdict form confused the jury. They highlight the jury’s question
“[w]hen did Heatway go out of business and why,” and contend the question
demonstrates the jury considered Heatway’s role as part of their deliberations as to
7
whether a design defect existed. We decline to conjecture as to why the jury asked
the question. We “properly avoid such [speculative] explorations into the jury’s
sovereign space.” Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 122 (2009); see also Allen,
97 F.3d at 1373 (“[A] verdict will not be upset on the basis of speculation about
possible jury confusion.” (quotation omitted)).
Moreover, “[w]e generally presume that juries follow the instructions given to
them.” Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, 718 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 2013). In
particular, if a “special verdict form was divided into clearly articulated subparts,
there is no reason to question the common sense assumption that the jury proceeded
logically to answer the questions in order, following the judge’s instruction.”
Osteguin v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 144 F.3d 1293, 1295 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998). The
district court instructed the jury to consider whether a design defect existed before
considering third party fault. Jury Instruction No. 9 explained the elements of a
design defect claim, and directed that if the jury found that any element had not been
proved, the verdict must be for Goodyear. It then instructed that only if all elements
had been proved, the jury was to consider Goodyear’s affirmative defenses, including
nonparty fault. Similarly, Jury Instruction No. 13 directed the jury to consider
nonparty fault if it found “that a design defect in Entran 3 was a cause of damages or
losses.” Thus, the instructions and the verdict form together instructed the jury to
consider Heatway’s nonparty fault only if it found the Entran 3 was defectively
designed. We conclude Plaintiffs have not demonstrated prejudice from the
instruction as to Heatway’s liability or inclusion of the issue on the verdict form.
8
Any error as to that instruction was harmless, and the district court did not err in
denying Plaintiffs’ Rule 50 motions.
B
Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in denying their Rule 50 motions as to
presumptions arising in product liability cases. In particular, they argue the court
must consider a product’s useful life in determining whether Colorado’s presumption
applies. In Colorado, “[t]en years after a product is first sold for use or consumption,
it shall be rebuttably presumed that the product was not defective.” § 13-21-403(3).
A district court “shall instruct the jury concerning the presumption” if the court has
determined “by a preponderance of the evidence that the necessary facts giving rise
to a presumption have been established.” § 13-21-403(4). Plaintiffs argue that the
phrase “necessary facts giving rising to the presumption” is ambiguous, and the
presumption should only be triggered if the product has been used beyond its useful
safe life.3
In interpreting § 13-21-403, we must give the statute the meaning it would
have in the Colorado courts. See Kokins v. Teleflex, Inc., 621 F.3d 1290, 1304 (10th
Cir. 2010). Because there is no Colorado decision considering whether “the
necessary facts” include a product’s useful safe life, we “must attempt to predict what
the state’s highest court would do.” Id. (quotation omitted). Our primary duty is to
3
Although we entertain doubts on the matter as to certain parties, we do not
consider whether the presumption was in fact rebutted, as Plaintiffs do not raise that
issue on appeal.
9
give full “effect to the intent of the General Assembly, looking first to the statute’s
plain language.” Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 327 (Colo. 2004). “[T]he statute
should be construed as written since it may be presumed that the General Assembly
meant what it clearly said.” Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Heiserman, 898 P.2d 1049, 1054
(Colo. 1995). “If the statute is unambiguous and does not conflict with other
statutory provisions, we need look no further.” People v. Luther, 58 P.3d 1013, 1015
(Colo. 2002).
A plain reading of the statute as a whole refutes the claim that the phrase “the
necessary facts giving rise” in paragraph four of the statute is ambiguous.4 The
preceding subsections of the statute delineate three other scenarios triggering a
rebuttable presumption as to a product’s defectiveness. For example, § 13-21-403(1)
imposes a rebuttable presumption if the product conformed to the state of the art or
complied with any applicable code, standard, or regulation. Read in this context,
§ 13-21-403(4) simply refers back to the preceding paragraphs, directing courts to
issue an instruction on a rebuttable presumption once the facts in the relevant
subsections have been demonstrated.5 Looking to § 13-21-403(3), the plain language
4
Colorado courts have disagreed about when the ten-year period begins to run.
Compare Downing v. Overhead Door Corp., 707 P.2d 1027, 1031-32 (Colo. App.
1985) (ten-year time period begins on date individual product was first sold), with
Patterson v. Magna Am. Corp., 754 P.2d 1385, 1387 (Colo. App. 1988) (ten-year
period runs from date product line was first sold). But that question does not play
any part in our analysis because the hoses sold to Plaintiffs satisfy either test.
5
Plaintiffs appear to agree with this assessment. They argue that § 13-21-
403(4), which was enacted in 2003, merely refers to the legislature’s “previous
understanding” of the “necessary facts” to trigger the § 13-21-403(3) presumption.
10
states that the presumption is triggered when more than ten years have passed since
the product was first sold on the market.
We acknowledge that the Colorado Supreme Court has read an additional fact
into the language of § 13-21-403(3)—namely, that no other strict liability claims
have been established against the particular product. Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc.,
723 P.2d 1322, 1331 & n.10 (Colo. 1986). However, the Uptain court observed that
“implicit in th[e] statutory language is the assumption that no other strict liability
claims have been established against the particular product” because “the mere fact
that a product has been marketed for ten years or more does not, without more, lead
to the natural inference that the product is not defective.” Id. Far from deeming the
statutory language ambiguous, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the plain
language of the statute necessarily required defendants to demonstrate that prior strict
liability claims had not been established.
Similarly, Plaintiffs ask us to infer a useful safe life requirement. But Uptain
notwithstanding, when Colorado courts “construe a statute, [they] do not adopt a
construction that . . . injects additional terms.” Dillard v. Indus. Claim Appeals
Office, 134 P.3d 407, 409 (Colo. 2006). And nothing in the plain language of § 13-
21-403(3) or (4) suggests courts must consider a product’s useful safe life. To the
contrary, in Mile Hi Concrete, Inc. v. Matz, 842 P.2d 198 (Colo. 1992), superseded
on other grounds as stated in Kokins, 621 F.3d at 1305-06, the Colorado Supreme
Thus, Plaintiffs argue that any ambiguity in § 13-21-403(4) stems from ambiguity in
§ 13-21-403(3).
11
Court observed that a similar Kansas statute expressly created a presumption after a
product’s “useful safe life” had expired, whereas § 13-21-403(3) did not. Mile Hi,
842 P.2d at 204 n.11. Thus, Mile Hi suggests that the Colorado Supreme Court
would not read a “useful life” requirement into § 13-21-403(3).
Plaintiffs do not cite any authority counseling against our conclusion. They
suggest that the Model Uniform Products Liability Act (the “Model Act”), published
after § 13-21-403(3), would create a presumption when the product has been used
beyond its useful safe life. But even if the legislature could have relied on a model
act not yet published, if “a legislature models an act on another statute but does not
include a specific provision in the original, a strong presumption exists that the
legislature intended to omit that provision.” Kirchner v. Chattanooga Choo Choo, 10
F.3d 737, 738-39 (10th Cir. 1993).6 Thus, the inclusion of a product’s useful safe life
in the Model Act weighs against reading the requirement into § 13-21-403(3).
Plaintiffs also cite the statute’s legislative history, highlighting legislators’
concern with the originally-proposed statute of repose, which would have served as
an absolute cutoff for product liability claims after six years. The legislators were
6
For the contrary proposition, Plaintiffs cite Fraley v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 570
F. Supp. 497, 503 (D. Colo. 1983), disapproved of on other grounds in Tafoya v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 884 F.2d 1330, 1336 (10th Cir. 1989). In Fraley, the district court
looked to the Model Act to determine the date from which the ten-year period runs. Id.Because the ten-year period in that case had not yet expired, the court found that the
presumption did not apply. Id. In dicta, the court also observed that, after ten years, the
Model Act imposes a presumption that the product has been used beyond its useful safe
life, and that “Colorado law utilizes this approach.” Id. (quotation and emphasis
omitted). For the reasons set forth herein, Fraley’s observation is not persuasive.
12
concerned that, for some products, this date would be before the product’s useful safe
life had expired. But the final enacted statute is a rebuttable presumption, not a
statute of repose. The legislators’ concerns about a statute of repose play no part in
our reading of the enacted presumption. Under § 13-21-403(3), a plaintiff advancing
a strict liability claim against a product whose useful safe life has not expired may
present evidence to rebut the presumption. But we decline to infer a useful safe life
requirement as a “necessary fact” giving rise to a jury instruction as to the
presumption. “Had the General Assembly intended otherwise, it could have used
language to that effect.” E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Kortum Inv. Co., 121 P.3d
331, 333 (Colo. App. 2005). We thus reject Plaintiffs’ sole challenge to this
instruction.7
III
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
7
Plaintiffs also appeal the denial of their Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion, raising the
same arguments as against the denials of their Rule 50 motions. We reject these
arguments for the same reasons described supra.
13