Arocho v. S. Nafzinger

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 1, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
NORBERTO PEREZ AROCHO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 09-1095
(D.C. No. 1:07-CV-02603-REB-KLM)
S. NAFZIGER, Clinical Director; (D. Colo.)
RON WILEY, The Warden of U.S.P.
Penitentiary – ADX; HARLEY G.
LAPPIN, Federal Bureau of
Prison – Director,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, Chief Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and HARTZ,
Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Norberto Perez Arocho brought this prison civil rights action
alleging that he was being denied recommended treatment for a Hepatitis C
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
infection damaging his liver and causing him pain. The district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss the case at the pleading stage,
holding that the complaint (1) failed to establish the court’s personal jurisdiction
over defendant Harley G. Lappin (“BOP Director Lappin”), and (2) failed to state
a constitutional claim against defendants Steven Nafziger (“Clinical Director
Nafziger”) and Ron Wiley (“Warden Wiley”), entitling them to qualified
immunity from damages in their individual capacities and precluding injunctive
relief against them in their official capacities. After Mr. Arocho commenced this
appeal, the district court denied him leave to proceed in forma pauperis under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), finding that the appeal was not taken in good faith. We
grant Mr. Arocho’s renewed motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 1
reverse the order of dismissal as to Lappin, affirm the dismissal as to Wiley, and
modify the dismissal as to Nafziger to a dismissal without prejudice.
The Complaint
For purposes of this appeal, we “tak[e] as true all well-pled (that is,
plausible, non-conclusory, and non-speculative) facts alleged in [the] complaint.”
Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir.
1
In Rolland v. Primesource Staffing, L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1077, 1079 (10th Cir.
2007), this court clarified that “a party who seeks in forma pauperis status and is
certified by the district court as not appealing in good faith may nonetheless move
this court for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.” The basis for our
conclusion that this appeal is taken in good faith should be clear from our ensuing
discussion of the merits and need not be set out separately here.
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2008) (citation omitted) (discussing review of order dismissing case on pleadings
for lack of personal jurisdiction); see also Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196,
1200 (10th Cir. 2007) (discussing review of dismissal orders generally and
qualified immunity dismissals in particular). The complaint invokes the court’s
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Mr. Arocho has Hepatitis C. In July 2007, blood tests ordered by Clinical
Director Nafziger revealed that the disease was damaging Mr. Arocho’s liver.
Nafziger recommended treatment with Interferon/Ribavirin. Because this
medication can lead to depression, Mr. Arocho was evaluated for psychological
fitness in September 2007, and was found mentally stable. In October 2007,
Mr. Arocho asked Nafziger about the treatment, but he received no answer. After
another inquiry, in January 2008, Nafziger stated that he was awaiting approval of
the recommended medication from the BOP in Washington D.C. Mr. Arocho has
continuously pressed for his recommended treatment ever since receiving the
psychological fitness evaluation, but to no avail. The failure to provide the
treatment has not only caused him pain and suffering but has exposed him to
life-threatening liver damage, which may, in turn, render him unable to respond to
treatment in the future.
The complaint asserts three claims for relief, one against each defendant.
The Eighth Amendment claim against BOP Director Lappin has both specific and
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general aspects. 2 Specifically, Nafziger “sen[t] the Defendant Harley G. Lappin a
recommendation for plaintiff[’s] Hepatitis C treatment medical needs and
medication, there was no doubt of the s[e]riousness of plaintiff[’s] situation of his
Hepatitis C[,] and . . . Lappin within his knowledge of plaintiff[’s] d[i]sease
. . . refuse[d] to approve the treatment.” R. vol. 1 at 271. More generally, Lappin
“fail[ed] to intervene and correct” the situation after receiving a copy of an
administrative grievance Mr. Arocho filed at Florence in November 2007, and
“ignored his duty imposed by his authority . . . to stop plaintiff[’s] pain suffering,
to prevent and correct the violations, [and] to enforce the institutional rules,
regulations, and policy . . . and constitutional mandates . . . [for] medical care and
treatment.” Id.The Eighth Amendment claim against Clinical Director Nafziger relates to
his conduct after recommending that Mr. Arocho be given Interferon/Ribavirin
treatment. Nafziger allegedly “failed to act for immediate treatment of
plaintiff[’s] condition with deliberate indifference,” put off Mr. Arocho’s repeated
follow-up inquiries, sometimes telling him “to be patient” and on other occasions
simply “ignor[ing] [his] complaints and request[s],” and “did nothing to prevent”
2
While a reference to “Equal Protection” is included in the heading for the
claim, R. vol. 1 at 271, there are no allegations implicating that constitutional
principle in the supporting facts. We agree with the district court’s construction
of the complaint as asserting only an Eighth Amendment claim against Lappin.
On appeal, Mr. Arocho does not take issue with that construction and, in fact,
casts his arguments exclusively in Eighth Amendment terms.
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the delay and denial of proper treatment. Id. at 269. But the complaint does not
specify what it is that Nafziger could and should have done to secure the
treatment he had recommended, given BOP Director Lappin’s alleged refusal to
approve it.
The claim against Warden Wiley has two Eighth Amendment components
and one Equal Protection component. As for the former, Wiley allegedly
(1) knew of Nafziger’s denial of treatment but ignored his duty as warden to
intervene “to enforce the rules, regulations, program statement and institutional
policy that include pain assessment[,] prescribed medication and proper treatment
in a timely manner”; and (2) responded to an administrative grievance from
Mr. Arocho regarding the recommended Interferon/Ribavirin treatment by
incorrectly stating that it “will be schedule[d] as soon as the Clinical Director[’s]
patient load allow[s].” Id. at 270. As for Equal Protection, the claim broadly
alleges that “other inmates have received the treatment with my same situation in
[a] timely manner” and hence Wiley “violate[d] plaintiff[’s] rights and the Equal
Protection [C]lause that prohibits . . . selectively denying the plaintiff proper
health care, medical treatment, [and] medication.” Id.
The complaint requests three forms of relief. See id. at 273. First, it seeks
an injunction ordering defendants to provide the recommended treatment for his
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medical condition. 3 Second, it seeks compensatory and punitive damages for
pain, suffering, and any irreparable harm caused by the lack of treatment. Third,
for reasons that are not evident from the foregoing allegations, it also seeks a
transfer to a prison in Puerto Rico.
Personal Jurisdiction over BOP Director Lappin
A. District Court’s Analysis
The complaint recites BOP Director Lappin’s Washington, D.C. address.
Thus, the district court noted that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over
him unless the Colorado long-arm statute authorized it to do so and the exercise
of jurisdiction would comport with due process. See Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070
(noting that in the absence of applicable federal statute authorizing nationwide
service of process, personal jurisdiction depends on forum state’s long-arm statute
and overarching constraints of due process). Because the “Colorado long-arm
statute . . . confers the maximum jurisdiction permissible consistent with the Due
Process Clause[,] . . . the first, statutory, inquiry effectively collapses into the
second, constitutional, analysis.” Id. Accordingly, the district court proceeded
directly to the question of Lappin’s contacts with the forum state, which is the
lynchpin of the constitutional analysis.
3
Bivens suits are limited to damages, but equitable relief is available in the
nature of injunction and/or mandamus under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and/or 1361. See
Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225, 1231, 1236 (10th Cir. 2005).
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There are two ways such contacts can satisfy due process:
First, if a defendant has “continuous and systematic general business
contacts” with the forum state, it may be subjected to the general
jurisdiction of the forum state’s courts. Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984). . . .
Second, even in the absence of “continuous and systematic”
contacts, a state’s courts may exercise specific jurisdiction over a
defendant that “purposefully directed” its activities at the state’s
residents, if the cause of action arises out of those activities. Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985).
Melea, Ltd. v. Jawer SA, 511 F.3d 1060, 1066 (10th Cir. 2007) (parallel citations
omitted). The district court did not explicitly distinguish and discuss these lines
of analysis. Rather, it summarily invoked three broad principles to support its
conclusion that BOP Director Lappin had insufficient contacts with Colorado to
support personal jurisdiction in this case. We summarize these principles, and
explain why they do not preclude personal jurisdiction over Lappin, immediately
below. Our own determination of the personal jurisdiction issue, under the
controlling minimum-contacts analysis, is set out in section B below.
1. Mere supervisory responsibility over actions causing injury
The district court cited two unpublished decisions indicating that an
official’s supervisory responsibility over operations and facilities in other states
does not, standing alone, constitute a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction
with respect to injuries resulting therefrom. R. vol. 4 at 142 (citing Hill v. Pugh,
75 F. App’x 715, 719 (10th Cir. 2003), and Hale v. Ashcroft, No. 06-cv-00541,
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2007 WL 2350150, at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 15, 2007)). While we do not necessarily
take issue with this general principle, 4 the critical question is whether it applies to
the allegations in the complaint. The district court did not tie the two together
with any specificity, but broadly characterized Mr. Arocho’s complaint as
basically claiming that “Lappin bears responsibility to ensure that his employees
provide BOP inmates with proper medical care and medication.” Id. If
Mr. Arocho’s claim were fully captured in these passive and indirect terms, we
would agree that the principle invoked by the district court applied here. But as
our examination of the complaint revealed, the more specific thrust of
Mr. Arocho’s claim against BOP Director Lappin is that he was actively and
directly responsible for the denial of the medical treatment recommended for
Mr. Arocho by prison medical personnel. This is simply not a situation where an
official is being haled into an out-of-state court merely because he has a remote
supervisory relationship to the parties or the subject matter of a case.
4
Indeed, given a recent Supreme Court pronouncement, the basic concept of
§ 1983 or Bivens supervisory liability itself may no longer be tenable. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens
action–where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants–the term
‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer.”). After Iqbal, circuits that had held
supervisors liable when they knew of and acquiesced in the unconstitutional
conduct of subordinates have expressed some doubt over the continuing validity
of even that limited form of liability. See Bayer v. Monroe County Children &
Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009); Maldonado v. Fontanes,
568 F.3d 263, 274 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009).
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2. Mere foreseeability of injury
The district court also cited this court’s acknowledgment in Trierweiler v.
Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir. 1996), that “mere
foreseeability of causing injury in another state ‘is not a sufficient benchmark’ for
exercising personal jurisdiction,” id. at 1534 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at
474) (further internal quotation omitted). R. vol. 4 at 142. Again, the critical
question here is not the underlying principle invoked but whether that principle
applies to the relevant factual allegations in the complaint. From what we have
said in connection with the related point about supervisory responsibility, it
should be clear that the complaint does not attribute liability to BOP Director
Lappin on the basis of nothing more than the mere foreseeability of harm to
Mr. Arocho at the hands of medical personnel at the federal penitentiary in
Florence, Colorado. Mr. Arocho’s claim is that the medical personnel in
Colorado recommended treatment to avoid the harm but were prevented from
following through by Lappin’s specific refusal to approve it.
Of course the possibility of harm to Mr. Arocho may have been
foreseeable—indeed, the subjective component of the deliberate-indifference
standard requires that the defendant “knew [the plaintiff] faced a substantial risk
of harm and disregarded that risk.” Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159
(10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted); see also Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d
1227, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing objective and subjective components
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of deliberate-indifference inquiry clarified in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825(1994)). But that is not to say that Lappin’s liability is based on the mere
foreseeability of harm; it is based, rather, on his allegedly active and direct role in
denying medical treatment in the forum state that could have prevented the harm.
See Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1077 (holding Trierweiler’s “mere foreseeability”
principle inapplicable where plaintiff alleged “defendants here more than foresaw
or knew the harm alleged to have befallen forum residents,” they “undertook
intentional actions that were expressly aimed at that forum state” with such
foresight or knowledge).
3. Official actions as basis for individual-capacity suit
Finally, the district court quoted the following passage from another
unpublished district court decision suggesting that personal jurisdiction over an
official sued in his individual capacity cannot rest on actions taken in his official
capacity: “Further, ‘the actions on which plaintiff relies in support of his
allegations of personal jurisdiction all clearly were taken by [defendant in his
capacity] as [a] federal official[] . . . . Such actions do not suffice to establish
minimum contacts for purposes of an individual capacity suit against a federal
employee.’” R. vol. 4 at 142 (quoting Hale, 2007 WL 2350150, at *3 (alterations
in original)). But Hale should not be read outside its narrow fact pattern to hold
that a defendant’s official actions are irrelevant to the analysis of personal
jurisdiction in a Bivens suit. Such actions are the essence of a Bivens suit. While
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Bivens defendants are sued in their individual capacities, 5 the claim itself must be
based on “constitutional violations committed by federal agents in the
performance of their official duties.” 6 Farmer v. Perrill, 275 F.3d 958, 960 n.4
(10th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added); see United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497,
1514 (10th Cir. 1995) (Bivens suit addresses constitutional violations “committed
by a federal officer in his official capacity”); Romero v. Peterson, 930 F.2d 1502,
1505 (10th Cir. 1991) (describing “federal actors” in Bivens suit as “[o]fficers
acting under color of federal law in their official capacities, but sued in their
individual capacities”).
The jurisdictional analysis cannot ignore the very acts that are the basis for
the suit and concentrate on acts legally immaterial to it. Such an approach would
squarely conflict with the established “specific jurisdiction” inquiry, which
5
Again, “[t]here is no such animal as a Bivens suit against a public
official . . . in his or her official capacity.” Farmer v. Perrill, 275 F.3d 958, 963
(10th Cir. 2001). If equitable relief rather than damages is sought from a federal
official, it must be obtained against him in his official capacity through a claim in
the nature of injunction or mandamus. Simmat, 413 F.3d at 1231.
6
The basic principle here, requiring the official to have acted “under color of
his authority,” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389, has been a source of contention far more
often in the context of state officers sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where many
cases can be cited to illustrate the distinction between actionable official
misconduct and non-actionable private misconduct. For some examples involving
peace officers, see cases collected in Gritchen v. Collier, 254 F.3d 807, 812 n.6
(9th Cir. 2001). One should suffice to make the point: An officer who shoots a
suspect or detainee may be subject to suit under § 1983, but an officer who shoots
his wife (even with a firearm he is required to carry off-duty) is clearly not, see
Bonsignore v. City of New York, 683 F.2d 635, 638-39 (2d Cir. 1982).
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focuses on precisely those actions of the defendant that have given rise to the suit,
see Melea, Ltd., 511 F.3d at 1066. To the extent that the unpublished district
court decision in Hale embraces the view that official actions of a Bivens
defendant are categorically excluded from the analysis of personal jurisdiction,
we disapprove it. 7
B. Controlling Analysis for Specific Jurisdiction
As we have already indicated in general terms, for the exercise of specific
jurisdiction “the ‘minimum contacts’ standard requires, first, that the out-of-state
defendant must have ‘purposefully directed’ its activities at residents of the forum
state, and second, that the plaintiff’s injuries must ‘arise out of’ defendant’s
forum-related activities.” Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071 (citing Burger King,
471 U.S. at 472). “Additionally, exercising personal jurisdiction over defendants
must always be consonant with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” Id. (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
7
We note that the district court supplemented its reliance on Hale here with
a reference to a footnote in Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1218 n.9
(10th Cir. 2006), addressing a § 1983 complaint that offered jurisdictional
allegations in support of its official capacity claims but not its individual capacity
claims. R. vol. 4 at 142. But recognizing that personal jurisdiction over an
individual official and personal jurisdiction over the office or entity he represents
are distinct matters is entirely proper. More to the point, Trujillo did not say, as
the district court did in Hale, that personal jurisdiction over an individual officer
cannot be based on his official actions. Trujillo just noted, rather, that the
plaintiff had not alleged any jurisdictional contacts with the forum state in
connection with his individual capacity claims. 465 F.3d at 1218 n.9 (“Nowhere
in his complaint does [plaintiff] allege that any defendants acting in their
personal capacities have contacts with the [forum] State.”).
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The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating sufficient minimum contacts, but
once that is done, “it is incumbent on defendants to present a compelling case that
the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable.” Id. at 1080 (internal quotation omitted).
1. “Purposefully directed” element
We draw guidance on the “purposefully directed” aspect of the inquiry
from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), which encompasses the following
elements: “(a) an intentional action . . . that was (b) expressly aimed at the forum
state . . . with (c) knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be felt in the
forum state.” Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1072 (“Distilling Calder to its essence [in
these three elements].”). Because we assess personal jurisdiction here at the
pleading stage, our review is de novo and we require only a prima facie showing
of the requisite elements. Id. at 1070.
The complaint alleges that BOP Director Lappin refused to approve the
medication recommended for Mr. Arocho’s Hepatitis C infection by his treating
physician. Whether or not that decision is ultimately found to have violated
Mr. Arocho’s Eighth Amendment rights, it is clearly pled as an intentional act.
And it was aimed at the forum state: Lappin did not allegedly issue some
generalized prohibition on Interferon/Ribavirin treatment in federal prisons; he
denied a specific treatment request by a Colorado prison physician, precluding
use of the requested medication to an inmate in the federal facility in Florence,
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Colorado. Finally, under the circumstances, it can hardly be denied that Lappin
knew the brunt of the injury would be felt in Colorado. In sum, the actions
alleged were “performed for the very purpose of having their consequences felt in
the forum state,” and thus “are more than sufficient to support a finding of
purposeful direction under Calder.” Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1078 (internal
quotation omitted).
Of course, the question of personal jurisdiction can always be revisited at a
post-pleading stage of the proceedings, where the evidence may show that the
relevant facts are other than they have been pled (by showing, for example, that
Lappin actually had nothing to do with the denial of Hepatitis C treatment, or was
connected with the denial of treatment only through application of a broad policy
issued at the national level and was unaware of any harm that would specifically
befall Mr. Arocho in Colorado). See id. at 1069 n.3. And when personal
jurisdiction is assessed at an evidentiary hearing or at trial, the plaintiff generally
must substantiate his allegations with proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id. at 1070 n.4. But for present purposes, the requisite “purposeful direction” is
more than adequately pled in the complaint.
2. “Arising out of” element
“Having determined that defendant[] ‘purposefully directed’ [his] activities
at the forum state, due process requires us next to ask whether plaintiff[’s]
injuries ‘arise out of’ defendant[’s] contacts with the forum jurisdiction.” Id. at
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1078. Regardless of whether this involves a basic but-for or a more restrictive
proximate-cause inquiry, see id. at 1079 (noting but not choosing between these
two tests where alleged facts would satisfy either one), the answer is obvious
here. Given that the alleged injury (pain and liver deterioration associated with
untreated Hepatitis C) is a direct and immediate function of the allegedly
wrongful act purposefully directed at Colorado by BOP Director Lappin (denial of
Mr. Arocho’s treatment for Hepatitis C at the Florence facility), the actionable
harm in this case clearly arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum
state.
3. Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
Because Mr. Arocho has established the requisite minimum contacts
between BOP Director Lappin and the forum state for purposes of the particular
claim asserted here, exercising personal jurisdiction over him is proper absent “a
compelling case” that to do so would “offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Id. at 1080 (internal quotations omitted). Appellees’ brief
just reasserts the points and authorities cited by the district court with respect to
minimum contacts and makes no case, much less a compelling one, that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction based on the contacts here would somehow be
unfair or unjust. 8 See Aplee. Br. at 16-17.
8
Lappin also asks us to affirm the district court on the alternative basis that
Mr. Arocho’s pro se brief, which challenges the dismissal of his claims in general
(continued...)
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Nor do we discern circumstances indicating that such a case could be made.
In this regard, we consider such factors as:
“(1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the forum state’s interests in
resolving the dispute, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in receiving
convenient and effectual relief, (4) the interstate judicial system’s
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,
and (5) the shared interest of the several states [or foreign nations] in
furthering fundamental social policies.”
Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1080 (quoting OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of
Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1095 (10th Cir. 1998)) (alterations in original). The
plaintiff’s interest certainly favors the local forum he has chosen, and given that
the majority of relevant testimonial and documentary evidence is directly
available there, overall judicial efficiency aligns with his interest. While the
facility involved is a federal prison, the forum state is not disinterested in the
proper treatment of inmates residing there (even if they may be citizens of another
8
(...continued)
terms and does not present any argument specifically as to personal jurisdiction,
has waived the matter. Aplee. Br. at 14-15. Whether to disregard an erroneous
ruling on waiver grounds is a matter committed to our discretion. Sorbo v. United
Parcel Serv., 432 F.3d 1169, 1179 n.8 (10th Cir. 2005). We note Lappin was not
prejudiced by the pro se briefing here; the only ground stated by the district court
for dismissing the claim against him was lack of personal jurisdiction, so he was
clearly on notice of the ruling he needed to defend on appeal and he has briefed
the issue. Moreover, this court has favored ruling on the merits notwithstanding
grounds for waiver where the dispute involves a question of law and its resolution
is certain. See Counts v. Kissack Water & Oil Serv., Inc., 986 F.2d 1322, 1325-26
(10th Cir. 1993); see also Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1271
(10th Cir. 2000) (citing several cases). As our discussion of the personal
jurisdiction issue demonstrates, that is the case here, and we resolve the matter
accordingly in the interest of justice.
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state 9). And even assuming Lappin would prefer to litigate the claim against him
in Washington D.C. (i.e., that his challenge to jurisdiction here countenances
transfer to or re-filing in Washington D.C., rather than just the immediate tactical
advantage of dismissal 10), the “burden on the defendant” factor would not suffice
to tip the scale compellingly in his favor. As these proceedings reflect, the BOP
Director can count on the resources and legal staff of the United States Attorney
for Colorado to defend his interests in this pro se lawsuit. We cannot say “that
the exercise of jurisdiction in the chosen forum will ‘make litigation so gravely
difficult and inconvenient that [BOP Director Lappin] unfairly is at a severe
disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.’” Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance
Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at
478).
In sum, sufficient contacts exist between Lappin and the forum State of
Colorado to support specific personal jurisdiction in this case, and the exercise of
9
“[I]ncarceration in a state does not make one a citizen of that state.”
Bontkowski v. Smith, 305 F.3d 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2002); accord Smith v.
Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2006).
10
We note that if we agreed with the district court’s analysis of personal
jurisdiction, its dismissal of the claim against Lappin without an evaluation of
whether justice warranted, rather, a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 would require
a remand for consideration of that alternative. See Trujillo, 465 F.3d at 1223.
And we would in any event have to correct the district court’s dismissal of the
claim with prejudice; when a court lacks jurisdiction over a party, the proper
disposition is dismissal without prejudice to permit refiling where personal
jurisdiction may be exercised, Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193,
1216 (10th Cir. 2002).
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such jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. Dismissal of the action against Lappin on this basis was, therefore, in
error. We note, however, that, in conjunction with their defense of the dismissal
of the other defendants on the merits, appellees contend we may affirm Lappin’s
dismissal from the case on the alternative basis that Mr. Arocho failed to state a
claim against him. We take up that argument below, considering de novo whether
Mr. Arocho “plausibly (not just speculatively) has a claim for relief.” 11 Corder v.
Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1223, 1224 (10th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation omitted), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009).
11
We recognize that, absent cross-appeal, an appellee may argue alternative
grounds only to affirm the order under review and may not urge grounds “with a
view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his
adversary.” Montgomery v. City of Ardmore, 365 F.3d 926, 944 (10th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation omitted). And converting a dismissal without prejudice (the
proper disposition for lack of personal jurisdiction, see supra page 17, note 10),
to a dismissal with prejudice (the disposition that would attend a merits ruling),
represents an enlargement of an appellee’s rights requiring a cross-appeal. See,
e.g., Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 560 F.3d
118, 126 (2d Cir. 2009); Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 471 (7th Cir.
2003). But the order under review here actually did dismiss the claim against
Lappin with prejudice (albeit erroneously), so arguing now for a merits dismissal
would not entail an enlargement of the rights granted Lappin by the district court.
The fact that the disposition was erroneous does not bar alternative arguments for
affirmance; indeed, error in the order under review is the occasion for raising
such arguments.
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Dismissal of Bivens Damages Claims on the Merits
A. BOP Director Lappin
An Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim may be shown if “a
prison official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health,” where
a serious medical need—such as a condition diagnosed as requiring treatment—is
involved. Martinez v. Garden, 430 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation omitted). Defendants assert that “there is no allegation that Defendants
Wiley or Lappin—who are not doctors—knew that Mr. Arocho required access to
this specific treatment [i.e., Interferon/Ribavirin], and on an emergency basis, or
that failure to approve that treatment would seriously and irreparably harm him.”
Aplee. Br. at 23. On the contrary, as our prior review of the complaint shows, the
crux of the claim against Lappin is that he knew the serious disease Mr. Arocho
suffers from and knew that Clinical Director Nafziger recommended treatment of
the condition with Interferon/Ribavirin, and yet refused to approve the treatment.
The facts alleged make out a plausible case of deliberate indifference. That
Lappin is not a doctor does not undermine such a claim; rather it only focuses the
claim on a long-recognized scenario of deliberate indifference: acts by lay
officials that prevent access to treatment recommended or prescribed by medical
personnel. See, e.g., Martinez, 430 F.3d at 1304; Ledoux v. Davies, 961 F.2d
1536, 1537 (10th Cir. 1992); Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 307 n.3
(10th Cir. 1985); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980).
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Of course, Lappin may still attempt to show that he had a constitutionally
legitimate justification for denying treatment. But, at this stage, Mr. Arocho has
stated a plausible claim of deliberate indifference against him. Factual challenges
to that claim must be pursued through summary judgment. 12
12
We note an erroneous line of analysis in this vein in the district court’s
decision, which is repeated in appellees’ briefing. The court cited an affidavit
submitted by defendants indicating that nine months after this suit was filed,
another physician at Florence conducted additional tests on Mr. Arocho and
determined that he was then (in October 2008) not a candidate for treatment due
to blood-count parameters. R. vol. 4 at 147-48. In the district court’s view, this
showed that Mr. Arocho’s claim turned on a mere difference of medical opinion,
which cannot demonstrate deliberate indifference. Id. at 148. There are
procedural and substantive problems with this analysis.
As for procedure, it is improper to decide a motion to dismiss on the basis
of evidence submitted by the defendant–that is what summary judgment is for.
The court considered its course of action authorized by the fact that it “may take
judicial notice of court documents and matters of public record.” Id. (quotation
omitted). But a party’s evidentiary materials are not “court documents” that may
be judicially noticed as true: “a court cannot notice pleadings or testimony as
true simply because these statements are filed with the court” and “a court cannot
take judicial notice of the truth of a document simply because someone put it in
the court’s files.” 21B Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 5106.4 at 232, 234 (2d ed. 2005). Thus, for example,
the content of an affidavit generated to support a party’s case does not become
judicially noticeable fact when the party files the affidavit with the court.
See, e.g., United States v. Burch, 169 F.3d 666, 672 (10th Cir. 1999). If it were
otherwise, a party could just attach all of his evidence to a motion for dismissal
and thereby vitiate the critical distinction between dismissal proceedings, which
are supposed to challenge the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and summary
judgment proceedings, which properly encompass opposing evidence.
As for substance, defendant’s affidavit, indicating that the treatment
recommended in 2007 was no longer appropriate in October 2008, does not
demonstrate a difference of opinion as to the initial recommendation. And, of
course, as Mr. Arocho has consistently claimed, the failure to treat his disease for
(continued...)
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B. Clinical Director Nafziger
Before we get to the nub of Mr. Arocho’s claim against Nafziger, we wish
to clear away two meritless points advanced against it. First, defendants seize
and expand upon the district court’s characterization of the case as involving
nothing more than a difference of medical opinion in light of the more recent
October 2008 blood tests that, in the testing physician’s opinion, disqualified
Mr. Arocho for treatment. Aplee. Br. at 20-23. What we have just said about this
procedurally improper and substantively inadequate line of argument in
connection with the claim against Lappin, see supra page 20, note 12, is equally
pertinent here. Second, to the extent Nafziger is included in appellees’
indiscriminate statement that “there is no allegation that the Defendants were
aware of any emergent need for Interferon/Ribavirin,” Aplee. Br. at 20, the
contention borders on the frivolous. Nafziger allegedly recommended the
Interferon/Ribavirin treatment because his testing revealed that Mr. Arocho’s
Hepatitis C was causing liver damage.
The general theme of the complaint, attributing primary responsibility for
the denial of treatment to Lappin, appears to supply Nafziger with grounds for
exoneration rather than liability: Nafziger discovered the immediate threat posed
12
(...continued)
such an interval itself may give rise to cognizable harm. See generally Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 92 (2007) (recognizing sufficiency of claim that prisoner
“will suffer irreparable damage if his [Hepatitis C] disease goes untreated”).
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by the Hepatitis C, concluded that Interferon/Ribavirin treatment was appropriate,
and recommended that Lappin approve the treatment. As the district court
concluded, this “does not evidence the degree of neglect sufficient to find that
Defendant Nafziger was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs.
Indeed, it evidences no neglect at all.” R. vol. 4 at 148-49 (citation omitted).
But there is a second, counter-theme evident, though less prominent, in the
claim directed specifically at Nafziger. Mr Arocho attributes the continuing delay
in obtaining the recommended treatment, at least in part, to Nafziger’s own
inaction and indifference. He alleges that since his favorable psychological
assessment for the treatment in September 2007, he has “contact[ed] . . . the
health care service, S. Nafsinger [sic], requesting the treatment – medication –
status of his case and complaint about symptoms of the Hepatitis C as pain and
other symptoms and they answered to be patient and in other oc[c]asions have
ignored [his] complaints and request[s] – intentionally – with deliberate
indifference.” R. vol. 1 at 269. And, though Nafziger recommended the
Interferon/Ribavirin regimen, he then “failed to act for plaintiff’s im[m]ediate
treatment” and is at least partially responsible for the subsequent delay, which he
“did nothing to prevent.” Id.These are factually thin allegations. Indeed, the only facts stated concern
the insensitive response given to Mr. Arocho’s inquiries about the status of his
recommended treatment. But complaints about poor patient-communication do
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not, at least standing alone, evince deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need. So long as Nafziger adequately pursued the treatment recommended for
Mr. Arocho’s medical condition, an Eighth Amendment claim cannot be made out
on the basis that he simply neglected to keep Mr. Arocho fully apprised of the
status of the recommendation. Of course, Mr. Arocho also considers Nafziger
partly to blame for the delay and ultimate denial of the recommended treatment,
as the more general allegations quoted above reflect. But he offers no suggestion,
much less a plausible factual specification, as to what Nafziger failed to do in
making and medically supporting his recommendation or in prompting a more
appropriate response to its exigency.
“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]
announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). A complaint
must include “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” and where its
allegations “are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). Here, the most that can be said about Nafziger’s alleged
actions–recommending the Interferon/Ribavirin treatment upon discovering that
Hepatitis C was damaging Mr. Arocho’s liver, and then waiting on approval of the
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treatment by the authorities–is that they do not necessarily preclude his liability
for the alleged delay and denial of medical treatment. But such liability is
nothing more than a theoretical possibility in the absence of other, unnamed acts
about which the court can only speculate at this point. We therefore agree with
the district court that Mr. Arocho has not stated a claim for relief against
Nafziger.
But there are additional considerations here, particularly given our
reinstatement of the case against BOP Director Lappin, that weigh in favor of
providing Mr. Arocho an opportunity to cure this pleading deficiency. While the
conclusory allegations regarding Nafziger’s role in the delay/denial of treatment
fall short of stating a claim, when viewed in light of the litigation position
espoused by BOP Director Lappin, they nevertheless warrant the exercise of some
caution in foreclosing the possibility of liability on Nafziger’s part. The claims
against these two defendants are to some degree in direct opposition, creating a
“zero-sum game” of liability: the stronger the claim that Nafziger failed to
properly support or press for treatment, the weaker the claim that Lappin should
be held liable for not approving it; conversely, the more Nafziger did to satisfy
his duty to secure the necessary treatment, the stronger the claim against Lappin
for denying it. And the litigation positions separately advanced by these
defendants do seem to exploit (however innocently) this situation. Nafziger notes
that he recommended Interferon/Ribavirin and insists his “efforts to gain approval
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of this medication for Mr. Arocho are not indicative of negligence, but rather of
diligence.” Aplee. Br. at 20. But, as we have seen, Lappin’s position is that he
was not aware that this particular treatment was needed, or that the need for
treatment was urgent, or that Mr. Arocho could suffer serious and irreparable
harm if Lappin failed to approve it. See id. at 23. All of which begs the crucial
question: what did Nafziger convey to Lappin about Mr. Arocho’s condition, the
need for Interferon/Ribavirin, and the harm involved if the treatment was denied
or delayed?
Obviously, the facts known to and alleged by Mr. Arocho cannot settle that
question. He knows only what he has experienced and what he has been told by
defendants, i.e., that Hepatitis C is causing him pain and damaging his liver, that
Nafziger recommended he be treated with Interferon/Ribavirin, and that Lappin
refused to approve the treatment. The nature and extent of the exchange between
Nafziger and Lappin, which may exonerate one (or both) while implicating the
other (or both), is known only by defendants. In such circumstances, to dismiss
the claim against Nafziger without one more chance at amendment following the
reinstatement of the claim against Lappin could lead to a real injustice: after the
dismissal, Lappin could oppose the claim against him by submitting evidence on
summary judgment indicating that all of the fault lay, rather, with Nafziger who,
having been dismissed with prejudice from the case, could not be brought back in
to answer for his now-demonstrated liability.
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Under the unique circumstances here, and particularly given our
reinstatement of the case against BOP Director Lappin, we deem it appropriate to
afford Mr. Arocho an opportunity to amend his pleadings on remand to state a
claim, if possible, against Nafziger. See Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124,
127 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of pro se prisoner complaint, but
remanding “with instructions that the dismissal be without prejudice to plaintiff's
filing an amended complaint.”).
C. Warden Wiley
The Bivens claim against Warden Wiley was properly dismissed with
prejudice. Mr. Arocho’s allegation that Wiley erroneously denied a grievance he
had filed regarding his Hepatitis C treatment does not state an actionable claim.
This court has repeatedly held, albeit in unpublished decisions, “that ‘the denial
of . . . grievances alone is insufficient to establish personal participation in the
alleged constitutional violations.’” Whitington v. Ortiz, 307 F. App’x 179, 193
(10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Larson v. Meek, 240 F. App’x 777, 780 (10th Cir.
2007)); accord George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Ruling
against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to
the violation.”). We do not mean to rule out the possibility of liability where the
officer denying a grievance has an independent responsibility for the wrong in
question and the grievance provides the necessary notice of the wrong or the
effective means to correct it. But, as explained below, the complaint fails to
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allege grounds on which Warden Wiley could be held responsible for the medical
decisions involved here.
Mr. Arocho’s allegation that Wiley failed to properly supervise the medical
facility at Florence is also facially inadequate. The traditional standard for
supervisory liability in this circuit “requires allegations of personal direction or of
actual knowledge and acquiescence” in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.
Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1400 (10th Cir. 1992); see also
Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1165 (10th Cir. 2008). As alluded to earlier,
the Supreme Court’s recent discussion of supervisory liability casts doubt on the
continuing vitality of even this limited formulation of such liability:
Respondent . . . argues that, under a theory of “supervisory
liability,” petitioners can be liable for knowledge and acquiescence
in their subordinates’ use of discriminatory criteria to make
classification decisions among detainees. That is to say, respondent
believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s
discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the
Constitution. We reject this argument. Respondent’s conception of
“supervisory liability” is inconsistent with his accurate stipulation
that petitioners may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their
agents. In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action–where masters do not
answer for the torts of their servants–the term “supervisory liability”
is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official,
his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
misconduct. In the context of determining whether there is a
violation of clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity,
purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability
on the subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination; the same
holds true for an official charged with violations arising from his or
her superintendent responsibilities.
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Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citation and quotations omitted; emphasis
added). In any event, Mr. Arocho’s allegations do not satisfy our extant standard.
His claim here is that “warden [Wiley] was in the position to correct plaintiff[’s]
rights violation and fail[ed] to do so.” R. vol. 1 at 270. To the extent the rights
violation was a function of BOP Director Lappin’s decision, Lappin is obviously
not Wiley’s subordinate and any allegation that Wiley was in a position to
“correct” Lappin’s decision would be facially implausible. With respect to
Nafziger, there are no facts alleged to suggest that Wiley knew of and acquiesced
in any act of deliberate indifference by Nafziger, who had tested Mr. Arocho,
recommended treatment, and was simply waiting for approval. The complaint
bespeaks nothing more than a warden’s reasonable reliance on the judgment of
prison medical staff, which negates rather than supports liability. See McRaven v.
Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 981 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoted in Weatherford ex rel.
Thompson v. Taylor, No. 09-7018, 2009 WL 3164727, at *2 (10th Cir. Oct. 5,
2009) (unpub.)); Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2008); Durmer v.
O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993).
Finally, Mr. Arocho’s claim that Wiley violated his right to equal
protection is patently deficient. The sole allegation in this respect is: “Other
inmate’s [sic] have received the treatment [presumably Interferon/Ribavirin] with
my same situation in [a] timely manner.” R. vol. 1 at 270. In addition to its
utterly conclusory nature, this allegation does not remotely suggest a plausible
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factual basis for attributing such differential treatment to the warden of the
prison, who is not responsible for the recommendation of medical treatment or the
approval of such treatment.
Dismissal of Claims for Injunctive Relief
The district court held injunctive relief unavailable because its “finding that
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendants necessarily means that his
claim for injunctive relief, although not prohibited on jurisdictional grounds
[i.e., sovereign immunity], cannot stand.” R. vol. 4 at 150 n.4. The premise for
this holding has been significantly altered by our analysis of the Bivens claims
against Lappin and Nafziger. Injunctive relief from Lappin is obviously no
longer legally foreclosed, and the dismissal of the claim for injunctive relief
against Nafziger should be without prejudice.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and
REVERSED in part, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this order and judgment. Specifically, we affirm the dismissal
with prejudice of the claims against defendant Wiley, reverse the dismissal of the
claims against defendant Lappin, and direct that on remand Mr. Arocho be
provided on opportunity to amend his pleadings, if possible, to state a legally
sufficient claim against defendant Nafziger. In addition, appellant’s motion for
appointment of appellate counsel is DENIED, his motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, i.e., without prepayment of the filing fee, is GRANTED, and we
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remind appellant that he is obligated to continue making partial payments until
the entire fee has been paid. Finally, appellant’s request to file new documents as
evidence before this court is DENIED, without prejudice to renewal of the request
in the proceedings on remand.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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