Brooks v. Sauceda

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 22 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JAMES L. BROOKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MELINDA SAUCEDA, Kansas City, No. 00-3025
Kansas Department of Development (D.C. No. 99-CV-2396)
Rental Licensing; DELIA M. YORK; (Dist. Kan.)
UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF
WYANDOTTE COUNTY/KANSAS
CITY, KANSAS; and JANE ROE.
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff-Appellant James L. Brooks (“Brooks”) appeals the district court’s
grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss his case for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Brooks is a white male who owns two residential properties in Kansas City,
Kansas. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 31.) The Unified Government of Wyandotte
County/Kansas City, Kansas (“Unified Government”) has adopted a set of
ordinances stating that “no person shall allow to be occupied, or rent to another
for occupancy, any rental dwelling unit unless the owner has first obtained a
license or provisional license under the terms of this article.” Unified
Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, Kan., Ordinance 19-492. Brooks
paid for and received a license under the ordinance for one of his properties, but
did not do so for the other. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 44, 13.) Believing Brooks’s unlicenced
property to be inhabited by renters, the Unified Government first notified him by
mail that it had reason to believe he was in violation of the ordinance. 1 (Doc. 1 at
¶ 3.) Brooks’s reply, although not set forth in the record, was apparently
unsatisfactory, so a Unified Government official placed a notice on the front door
of the residence informing tenants that the building failed to meet its licencing
requirements because: (1) Brooks had not paid a required $20 licencing fee; and
1
It is unclear from the pleadings and the district court’s opinion whether
any such tenants exist. However, whether in fact Brooks had actually rented the
property is immaterial to an analysis of his claims against the Defendants.
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(2) the building was in substandard condition. (Id.) The notice further stated that
tenants of the building would have to move if these violations either were not
corrected or appealed within fifteen days. (Id.) (notice attached to complaint.)
Brooks responded to the notice by mailing a letter refusing to comply and
threatening to sue the Unified Government if it posted additional notices in the
future. (Id.) (letter attached to complaint.) On July 23, 1999, the Unified
Government posted a second notice of its final decision that the residence was not
covered by a rental license, and that any tenants present would be required to
leave no later than August 26, 1999. (Id.) (notice attached to complaint.)
Brooks responded by filing a lawsuit against Melinda Sauceda (“Sauceda”),
the Unified Government Official whose signature was affixed to the notice; the
Unified Government itself; Delia York, an attorney working in the Unified
Government’s legal department; and an unidentified third party designated in the
complaint as Jane Roe (collectively “the Defendants”). The complaint alleged
that the Unified Government ordinance in question constituted a bill of attainder,
see U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, 2 and that the Unified Government’s actions violated
his right to due process, his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985(3), 1986 and 1988, and his rights under the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and
Art I, § 10 reads, in relevant part, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
2
Law shall be passed.”
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Tenth Amendments. Brooks further alleged that the Unified Government
specifically violated § 1982 by requiring him to pay for the license fee for his
second rental property within Kansas City. Finally, Brooks claimed damages
under a variety of Kansas constitutional provisions and criminal statutes. (Id.)
Prior to filing a responsive pleading, the county sought and received a ten-
day extension in its time to reply pursuant to Rule 77.2 of the Local Rules of the
District of Kansas. 3 (Doc. 7.) At the end of this period, the Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss Brooks’s complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brooks then filed a motion with
the district court seeking a default judgment on the grounds that the Defendants
had failed to answer, which was denied in an order dated November 11, 1999.
The district court then dismissed Brooks’s complaint, holding, inter alia, that
Brooks failed to state claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985(3) and 1986
because he failed to allege facts demonstrating racial discrimination. (Aplee. Br.
at Attachment 4, pp. 6-9.) The district court found that Brooks’s allegations
3
Rule 77.2 states, in relevant part:
(a) Orders and Judgments: The clerk is authorized to grant the following
orders and judgments without direction by the court ...
(2) Orders extending once for ten days the time within which to
answer, reply or otherwise plead to a complaint, cross-claim or
counterclaim if the time originally prescribed to plead has not
expired.
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failed to supply a basis for his due process claims and his remaining
constitutional claims, and therefore dismissed his claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983.
The district court found as a matter of law that the ordinances in question do not
constitute bills of attainder, and it dismissed Brooks’s Fourth Amendment claim
because he failed to allege a search or seizure of property sufficient to give rise to
a claim. Brooks did not appeal the dismissal of the remainder of his federal
constitutional claims or any of his state statutory or constitutional claims, and so
they are not specifically addressed in this opinion.
The Court has jurisdiction over this suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 4
As a preliminary matter, Brooks asserts that the district court erred in
accepting the Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion in lieu of an answer, asserting that the
Rules of Civil Procedure instead require an answer to be filed before any
subsequent motions can be filed or ruled upon by a district court. Therefore, he
4
We note that the district court had not yet dismissed Brooks’s claims
against Jane Roe when he filed his notice of appeal on January 14, 2000, and that
this Court did not then have subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The district court issued a second order dismissing Brooks’s remaining claims on
February 15, 2000, and he filed his Brief in Chief on February 22, 2000.
Although no new formal notice of appeal was filed within the thirty-day deadline
set by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, this brief was
sufficient to set forth the notice required by Fed. R. App. Proc. 3(c), and we
therefore hold that we have jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case. See
Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1992) (“If a document filed within the time
specified by Rule 4 gives the notice required by Rule 3, it is effective as a notice
of appeal.”)
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argues that he was entitled to a default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brooks also interprets Rule 55(a) of the
Federal Rules, which provides for a default judgment if a defendant has “failed to
plead or otherwise defend” the claims against him, to stand for the proposition
that the defendant can only“otherwise defend” by raising 12(b) motions after first
filing a formal answer. Brooks offers no authority in support of these argument
other than what he suggests are plain readings of the rules, and, for substantially
the reasons set forth in the district court’s order of November 3, 1999, we hold he
was not entitled to a default judgment under Rule 55(b).
In addition, Brooks appeals the district court’s holding that he failed to
allege claims upon which relief could be granted under §§ 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985(3), 1986 and 1988, that the Unified Government’s ordinance does not
constitute a bill of attainder, and that the Defendants did not “search or seize” his
property by placing notices upon it.
The district court correctly held that claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1982 require intentional discrimination resulting from the defendant’s racial
animus. See, e.g., Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609 (1987)
(construing § 1981); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 616
(1987) (construing § 1982). Brooks is Caucasian and has specifically disclaimed
any allegation of intentional discrimination in the facts giving rise to this suit.
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(Doc. 21 at pp. 4-5.) Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed these
claims. Further, it is well established that § 1985(3) applies only to conspiracies
motivated by “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus.” Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971)). Since Brooks
alleged no facts sufficient to establish such racial animus, it follows that he can
assert neither a claim under§ 1985(3) nor under § 1986 for failing to prevent a
violation of § 1985(3). Likewise, he is not entitled to recovery of attorneys fees
and court costs as a “prevailing party” under § 1988(b).
The district court also correctly dismissed Brooks’s claim that the Unified
Government’s ordinances constitute a bill of attainder because he has failed to
allege facts showing that they are punitive in nature or that the legislative record
evinces an intent to punish. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest
Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984); United States v. Patzer, 15 F.3d 934,
941 (10th Cir. 1993).
Finally, for substantially the reasons set forth in the district court’s opinion,
we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Brooks’s claims that his due process
rights were violated, that Sauceda’s act of posting two paper notices on his
property constituted a seizure of property for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,
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or that the Unified Government violated § 1982 by requiring him to obtain a
rental license for his second Kansas City property.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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