United States v. Stroud

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 10 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 02-1347
v. (District of Colorado)
(D.C. No. 00-CR-260-N)
LAWRENCE ERNEST STROUD,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Lawrence Stroud (“Stroud”) was convicted by a jury of assault
within the maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6). The district court sentenced Stroud to 96 months’
imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Stroud argues on appeal that
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) during its inquiry into the assault.
Stroud also contends that the district court erred in allowing the government to
impeach a defense witness with the witness’ mental health history. Exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms. The statement
Stroud challenges as involuntary was made prior to any allegedly misleading
comment by FBI investigators concerning the sentencing guidelines. In addition,
even if the district court erred in admitting impeachment testimony concerning the
mental health history of a witness, the error was harmless.
II. BACKGROUND
Stroud was an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in
Englewood, Colorado. On May 4, 2000, Stroud got into an argument with his
cellmate, Marlo Pittman (“Pittman”), over Pittman smoking a cigar in their cell.
Stroud testified that when he asked Pittman and two other inmates to “take the
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cigar elsewhere,” Pittman and the two inmates lifted their shirts so that Stroud
could see the homemade knives or “shanks” placed in their waistbands.
Stroud testified that early the next morning, he heated water in the
microwave in order to make coffee. He stated that upon returning to his cell,
Pittman confronted him with a knife and made threatening statements. In
response, Stroud threw the cup of hot water at Pittman.
In contrast, Pittman testified that he was sleeping at the time of the incident
and did not confront Stroud. He stated that he woke up in pain with Stroud
swinging at him. Stroud then chased Pittman to the bathroom area. Pittman
stated that Stroud continued to swing at him and landed a blow just before
officers restrained Stroud. Pittman testified that he returned to his cell and,
shortly thereafter, an officer noticed that he had been burned. Pittman was treated
by a physician’s assistant at FCI and was then transferred to a hospital for
medical treatment. Pittman suffered partial thickness burns on the right side of
his face, his shoulders, the right side of his neck, and his left arm.
During an investigation of the incident, two FBI agents interviewed Stroud
in a large conference room located in a facility at the FCI separate from where
Stroud was housed. Agent James Berry (“Agent Berry”) had Stroud read aloud
from the Miranda rights advisement form. Stroud refused to sign the form but
agreed to talk with the agents and stated that he did not require an attorney.
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During the interview, Stroud explained what had taken place on May 4, 2000.
Specifically, as Agent Berry’s report noted:
Stroud stated that he felt scared and threatened
after the confrontation with Pittman, [and the
other two inmates]. He began thinking of ways to
get out of the situation, and felt that some sort of
retaliation against Pittman would be necessary;
thereby preventing Pittman from injuring him.
Stroud advised that if he voluntarily went to the
Segregated Housing Unit (SHU) he would be
considered a “snitch.” Stroud stated that the
retaliation “Had to be bad enough so I or the other
person never hit the compound.” In addition,
Stroud stated “I had to have a way out without
killing somebody,” and “Could put dirt on myself
and get out unscathed.”
After describing the events that occurred on the evening before the early
morning incident, Stroud declined to further discuss the matter. At that point,
Agent Berry stated that acceptance of responsibility could potentially benefit
Stroud at sentencing. Agent Berry mentioned the possible reduction in order to
obtain specific details concerning Pittman’s injuries. Stroud refused to provide
further details about the incident, except to mention that he intended to hit
Pittman in front of officers so that he could be placed in the Segregated Housing
Unit (“SHU”).
On June 21, 2000, Stroud was indicted on one count of assault within the
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Prior to trial, Stroud
filed a motion to suppress the statements made to FBI agents during the assault
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investigation on the basis that his statements were not voluntary. In support, he
claims he did not sign the Miranda rights advisement form and the interrogation
atmosphere was coercive. The district court denied Stroud’s motion to suppress.
The court found Stroud’s statements to be mostly exculpatory and noted that
Stroud was not admitting to causing or having knowledge about Pittman’s
injuries. The court also found Agent Berry’s statements to Stroud concerning the
acceptance of responsibility sentencing adjustment were misleading. The court,
however, determined that Stroud did not “give in and tell the agent the whole
story.” The court concluded that Stroud was given the Miranda warning and that
his statements were voluntary.
On February 11, 2002, Stroud was tried before a jury. At trial, Stroud
called Samuel Robinson (“Robinson”), a fellow inmate in the SHU, as a defense
witness. During cross-examination, the government asked whether Robinson had
past mental problems. Stroud objected and noted that “[t]here ha[d] been no
suggestion [Robinson was] not competent to testify.” The district court overruled
Stroud’s objection. Robinson then testified about his prior hospitalizations for
depression and his current and past medications for manic depression and
depression. Robinson also stated that an evaluation revealed that he did not
suffer from diminished capacity.
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The jury found Stroud guilty on the assault charge. The district court
sentenced him to 96 months’ imprisonment with three years of supervised release.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Voluntariness of Statements
Stroud alleges that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
the statements made to the FBI because such statements were involuntarily made.
This court reviews the voluntariness of incriminating statements de novo. United
States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1449 (10th Cir. 1991). Underlying factual
findings by the district court, however, are subject to review under the clearly
erroneous standard. United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 1003 (10th Cir. 1999).
In an appeal of the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress,
this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.
Short, 947 F.2d at 1449.
To determine whether the defendant’s statements were voluntarily made,
this court must “examine the entire record and make an independent determination
of the ultimate issue of voluntariness.” Lugo, 170 F.3d at 1004. Voluntariness is
determined from the totality of the circumstances. Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d
1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 1997). This court examines several factors, including:
(1) the defendant’s age, intelligence, and education;
(2) the length of the detention and interrogation; (3)
the length and nature of the questioning; (4) whether
the defendant was advised of his constitutional
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rights; and (5) whether the defendant was subjected
to or threatened with any physical punishment.
Lugo, 170 F.3d at 1004. “No single factor is determinative.” Id.Upon reviewing the record and giving the appropriate deference to the
district court’s factual findings, this court concludes that Stroud’s statements were
voluntary. At the time of the interview, Stroud was not “unusually susceptible to
coercion” because of his age, intelligence, or education. Id. In fact, Stroud was
over thirty years old, had received his GED, and had prior experience with the
criminal justice system. In addition, the interview took place at the FCI where
Stroud was serving a separate term of imprisonment. Although he was
handcuffed and shackled during the interview, Stroud was placed in the handcuffs
and shackles in order to transport him to a more accommodating interview room
within the institution. The interview was short in duration, lasting no more than
45 minutes. Also, Stroud concedes on appeal that he was properly advised of his
Miranda rights during the interview. Moreover, Stroud’s refusal to sign the
waiver form while orally agreeing to speak with the agents in the absence of an
attorney does not weaken the Miranda advisement. See id. at 1004-05 (noting
that a defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights is not invalidated because the waiver
is oral rather than written). Finally, Stroud was not subjected to physical
punishment during the interview.
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Stroud, however, argues that the statements obtained during the interview
were the result of coercion or deception because the interviewing FBI agent
misled him about the availability of the acceptance of responsibility sentence
reduction. “Incriminating statements obtained by government acts, threats, or
promises that permit the defendant’s will to be overborne are coerced confessions
running afoul of the Fifth Amendment and are inadmissible at trial as evidence of
guilt.” Short, 947 F.2d at 1449. Specifically, a promise of leniency made in
exchange for an inculpatory statement is a “product of inducement, and thus not
an act of free will.” Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1540, 1543 (10th Cir. 1993)
(quotation omitted).
The district court determined that the interviewing FBI agent’s comments
concerning the acceptance of responsibility and implication that the defendant
would receive the reduction in exchange for speaking was “a misleading thing for
the agent to do.” The district court also noted that, despite the agent’s error, the
defendant refrained from speaking about the assault.
Similarly, this court concludes that Stroud was not subject to coercion
because the statements that he challenges were made prior to any reference to the
acceptance of responsibility reduction. See United States v. Glover, 104 F.3d
1570, 1580 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding in part that because the government’s
promise of leniency occurred after the interview, the defendant’s will was not
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overborne and her confession was voluntary). Although the agent implied that
Stroud’s sentence could be impacted by explaining what happened to Pittman on
the morning of the assault, Stroud neither discussed the assault nor provided any
details about the events that unfolded that morning. Thus, there was no exchange
of a promise of leniency for Stroud’s incriminating statements; he was not
induced to speak. Moreover, the jury was instructed that they could disregard any
statement that was not knowingly made. Because the statements were voluntary
and were not coerced, 1 the district court did not err in denying Stroud’s motion to
suppress.
B. Impeachment Testimony
Stroud contends that the district court abused its discretion by permitting
the government to inquire into the mental health history of Robinson on cross-
examination. This court reviews the district court’s determination to permit the
impeachment of a witness based upon his mental health history for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 84 (1st Cir. 1992). “An
evidentiary ruling will be overturned on appeal only if the abuse of discretion
suggests an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable
judgment.” United States v. Hinkle, 37 F.3d 576, 579 (10th Cir. 1994)
1
Because we conclude that Stroud’s statements to the FBI were voluntarily
made and not coerced, it is not necessary for this court to address whether the
statements were exculpatory or inculpatory.
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(quotations omitted). Unless Stroud’s substantial rights were affected, however,
the district court’s decision to admit the impeachment evidence was harmless.
United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999). An error
affecting the substantial rights of a defendant is one that has a "substantial
influence on the outcome or which leaves one in grave doubt as to whether it had
such effect." Id. (quotations omitted).
Stroud argues that there was no evidence suggesting Robinson’s mental
problems affected his ability to perceive or recall events or to testify accurately.
He also asserts that questions concerning Robinson’s mental condition were not
relevant to his credibility. After review of the record, this court concludes that
the district court’s admission of Robinson’s impeachment testimony did not
substantially influence the outcome or leave this court in grave doubt that the
jury’s verdict would have differed had the district court precluded the government
from questioning Robinson about his mental health history. Although Robinson
was asked about his current and past medications and prior hospitalizations, he
also explained on both cross-examination and redirect examination that his mental
condition did not affect his ability to perceive events and that a formal evaluation
acknowledged that he did not suffer from a diminished capacity. Furthermore,
there was other evidence which made the attempted impeachment less likely to
have had a substantial influence on the jury verdict, namely that Stroud admitted
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to throwing the hot water at Pittman, that no weapon was discovered after the
incident took place, and that there was corroborating testimony from the treating
physician that Pittman was laying down when the water was thrown on him.
Moreover, the jury was instructed that they were “the sole judges of the
believability of the witnesses and the weight their testimony deserves” and thus
could have disregarded the impeachment testimony. See United States v. Moore,
923 F.2d 910, 913 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that the question of whether mental
health interferes with a witness’ ability to perceive or recall events or to testify
accurately is within the province of the jury); see also Fed. R. Evid. 601 advisory
committee’s note (stating that mental incapacity goes to the weight and credibility
of the witness).
In sum, this court need not decide whether the district court abused its
discretion in allowing the government to inquire about Robinson’s mental health
history because any error was harmless.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons, this court AFFIRMS Stroud’s
conviction.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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