United States v. Badilla

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
August 17, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
No. 03-2183
Plaintiff-Appellee,
(CR-02-1791 MV)
(D. N.M.)
v.
SERGIO DURAN BADILLA,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND FROM THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
John D. Kaufmann, Attorney at Law, Tucson, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant.
David N. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney (David C. Iglesias, United
States Attorney, Norman Cairns, Assistant United States Attorney,
on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, HOLLOWAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
Sergio Duran Badilla was convicted by a jury of a single count of
knowingly and intentionally possessing more than one hundred kilograms of
marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)
and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court sentenced Badilla to seventy-eight months’
imprisonment and four years’ supervised release. Badilla brought an appeal to
this court and raised the following three claims: (1) the district court erred in
giving the jury an instruction allowing it to infer that Badilla knew about the
presence of the marijuana in his vehicle because he was the driver and occupant
of the vehicle; (2) the district court should have suppressed the marijuana as the
fruit of an illegal search; and (3) the district court erred when it increased his
base offense level by two levels for obstruction of justice. This court rejected
Badilla’s claims of error and affirmed both his conviction and his sentence.
United States v. Badilla, 383 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 2004). Badilla petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court granted certiorari, vacated our
judgment, and remanded the case to this court for further consideration in light of
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). For the reasons set out below, we
reinstate all portions of our prior decision with the exception of footnote two and
again affirm Badilla’s conviction and sentence.
This court asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the
impact of Booker on this case. In his supplemental Booker brief, Badilla asserts
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as follows: (1) Booker mandates a reconsideration of the propriety of permissive
inference jury instructions; and (2) pursuant to Booker, the district court erred in
enhancing his sentence on the basis of judge-found facts. We address these
assertions in turn.
Badilla was stopped at a permanent Border Patrol checkpoint in New
Mexico. Badilla, 383 F.3d at 1139. He was the sole occupant of a pick-up truck
that contained 217 kilograms of marijuana in a hidden compartment under the
truck bed. Id. Badilla testified at trial that he was unaware of the marijuana until
informed of its presence by the Border Patrol agents. Id. As to Badilla’s
knowledge, the district court instructed the jury as follows: “[w]ith respect to the
question of whether or not a defendant knew that the controlled substance was
present, you may—but are not required to—infer that the driver and sole occupant
of a vehicle has knowledge of the controlled substance within it.” Id. (quotation
omitted). The district court further instructed the jury that
(1) it must consider the jury instructions as a whole; (2) it should not
assume that anything the judge said during trial expressed his opinion
concerning the issues in the case; (3) it must arrive at its own fact
findings; (4) it must consider all of the evidence; and (5) the
government had the burden of proving Badilla’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 1139-40.
On appeal from his conviction, Badilla argued that the district court had
erred in giving the jury the permissive inference instruction. Id. at 1140. This
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court rejected Badilla’s contention, concluding that in the context of this
particular case, the permissive inference instruction “[did] not undermine the
jury’s ability to deliberate, [did] not prevent the jury from considering all the
evidence in the case, [did] not dilute the government’s burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and [did] not shift the burden of proof to Badilla.” Id.
at 1141. In reaching this result, we relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). In Ulster County,
the Court specifically noted that it “has required the party challenging [a
permissive inference] to demonstrate its invalidity as applied to him.” Id. at 157.
Because [a] permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to
credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it
affects the application of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier
could make the connection permitted by the inference. For only in
that situation is there any risk that an explanation of the permissible
inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused the presumptively
rational factfinder to make an erroneous factual determination.
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Id. Based on the facts adduced at trial, 1 this court concluded that “the inference
of Badilla’s knowledge of the hidden drugs [was] more likely than not to flow
from the undisputed fact of his sole possession of the truck.” Badilla, 383 F.3d at
1140. Accordingly, we rejected Badilla’s challenge to the permissive inference
instruction. Id. at 1140-41.
In his supplemental brief, Badilla argues that this court’s previous analysis
of the permissive inference instruction is no longer sound in light of the decision
in Booker. In particular, Badilla asserts that this court’s resolution of his
permissive-inference claim relied on a “judicial non-jury determination that one
fact is more likely than not to flow from another fact.” Badilla Supplemental Br.
at 7; see Badilla, 383 F.3d at 1140 (“A permissive inference instruction is valid if
there is a rational connection between the fact that the prosecution proved and the
ultimate fact presumed, and the latter is more likely than not to flow from the
1
As noted in the prior opinion,
[t]he totality of the evidence in this case supports an inference that
Badilla knew of the marijuana’s presence in the vehicle. Badilla
owned the truck. The marijuana had an estimated street value of at
least $119,515, making it unlikely that the owner of the marijuana
would allow it to be stored and transported in a vehicle which is
owned and driven by someone who had no knowledge of its presence.
The five-inch lift of the truck’s cab and bed was visible from outside
the vehicle, making the hidden compartment readily discoverable by
Badilla. The large volume and weight of the marijuana further
supports the inference that Badilla knew of its presence within his
vehicle.
United States v. Badilla, 383 F.3d 1137, 1140 (10th Cir. 2004).
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former.”). According to Badilla, judges have no right to make such a
determination under Booker. Badilla Supplemental Br. at 7 (“The judicial
determination of ‘more likely than not’ is an invasion of the jury function and a
violation of the Sixth Amendment.”).
The problem with Badilla’s argument is that it is squarely foreclosed by the
Court’s decision in Ulster County. Ulster County makes clear that permissive
inference instructions like the one at issue in this case do not invade the jury’s
factfinding function as long as there is a “rational way the trier could make the
connection permitted by the inference.” 442 U.S. at 157; see also United States v.
Cota-Meza, 367 F.3d 1218, 1221-22 (discussing Ulster County). Such a
connection is rational in this case in light of the facts developed at trial. See
supra note 1 (setting out the totality of evidence in this case supporting an
inference that Badilla knew of the marijuana’s presence in the vehicle); Ulster
County, 442 U.S. at 157 (holding that a party challenging a permissive inference
instruction is required to demonstrate its invalidity as applied to him). Contrary
to Badilla’s assertions, there is simply nothing in Booker that calls into question
the Court’s decision in Ulster County. 2
2
Even assuming that there is some tension between Booker and Ulster
County, a dubious assumption at best, this court is obligated to apply Ulster
County to resolve Badilla’s claims regarding the permissive inference instruction.
As the Supreme Court has made clear, “if a precedent of [the] Court has direct
(continued...)
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Badilla also argues that he is entitled to resentencing in light of Booker.
Because Badilla did not raise this claim before the district court, we review only
for plain error. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 U.S. 727, 732 (10th Cir.
2005) (en banc). “Under that test, before an appellate court can correct an error
not raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affects
substantial rights.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) (quotations
and alteration omitted). “If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may
then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 631-32 (quotation and alteration omitted).
There are two distinct types of sentencing errors that a court could make in
light of Booker. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 731. 3 A sentencing court could
2
(...continued)
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls,
leaving to [the] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (quotation and alteration omitted).
3
The dichotomous nature of Booker errors flows from the “unique” nature
of the remedy adopted by the Booker court. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta,
403 F.3d 727, 731 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc). As this court has noted,
In Booker, the Court “reaffirm[ed its] holding in Apprendi: Any fact
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established
by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Booker,
125 S. Ct. at 756. As a result, the Court held that mandatory
(continued...)
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violate the Sixth Amendment “by relying upon judge-found facts, other than those
of prior convictions, to enhance a defendant’s sentence mandatorily.” Id.
Alternatively, “a sentencing court could err by applying the Guidelines in a
mandatory fashion, as opposed to a discretionary fashion, even though the
resulting sentence was calculated solely upon facts that were admitted by the
defendant, found by the jury, or based upon the fact of a prior conviction.” Id. at
731-32.
With this as background, Badilla argues that the district court committed
Booker error when it increased his base offense level by two levels for obstruction
of justice. The government concedes that the district court committed
constitutional Booker error when it increased Badilla’s offense level based on a
judicial finding that Badilla lied to the jury at trial when he testified that he was
(...continued)
3
application of the Guidelines violates the Sixth Amendment when
judge-found facts, other than those of prior convictions, are
employed to enhance a sentence. The Court constructed a unique
remedy to this constitutional infirmity. It severed two provisions of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et
seq. Namely, it excised 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which made the
imposition of a Guidelines sentence mandatory in the vast majority of
cases, and those portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) that established
standards of review on appeal. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764.
Henceforth, courts are still required to consider the Guidelines in
determining sentences, but they are not required to impose a sentence
within the Guidelines range. Id.
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 731.
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unaware of the presence of the marijuana in the vehicle. 4 The propriety of the
government’s concession that the district court committed constitutional Booker
error is far from clear. 5 As noted in this court’s prior opinion, Badilla specifically
testified at trial that he was unaware of the presence of the marijuana until he was
informed by the Border Patrol agents that the dog had alerted. Badilla, 383 F.3d
at 1139, 1141-42. In finding Badilla guilty of possession with intent to distribute,
the jury must have necessarily found that Badilla’s testimony on this key question
was false. Thus, it could certainly be argued that the jury implicitly found beyond
4
Although not raised by Badilla, the government also suggests the district
court committed constitutional Booker error when it set Badilla’s offense level by
referencing the amount of marijuana Badilla possessed. See generally United
States Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2D1.1 (setting out method of
calculating offense levels in offenses involving drugs). The government’s
suggestion is unfounded. The district court did find, as noted by the government,
that Badilla’s offense of conviction involved 217 kilograms of marijuana. This
judge-found-fact, however, had no ultimate impact on Badilla’s offense level.
Badilla was indicted and tried for possession with intent to distribute 100
kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B). Applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, the jury found him
guilty of this charge. The Guidelines prescribe a base offense level of twenty-six
if the defendant possessed “[a]t least 100 KG but less than 400 KG of
Marihuana.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3), (c)(7). Accordingly, using only the amount
of marijuana found by the jury, Badilla’s offense level was correctly set at
twenty-six. Because all of the facts necessary to support an offense level of
twenty-six for the crime of conviction were submitted to the jury and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no constitutional Booker error with regard to
the drug-quantity component of Badilla’s offense level. United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005).
5
Because the district court treated the Guidelines as mandatory in
sentencing Badilla, there is no doubt that the district court committed non-
constitutional Booker error. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 731-32.
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a reasonable doubt the facts necessary to support the application of a U.S.S.G. §
3C1.1 adjustment for obstruction of justice. Nevertheless, it is unnecessary to
resolve the propriety of the government’s concession because, even utilizing the
more relaxed plain-error standard applicable to constitutional errors, Badilla has
failed to demonstrate his entitlement to relief. See United States v. Trujillo-
Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 818 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that the plain-error “analysis
is relaxed when applied to potential constitutional error”).
For those reasons set out above, we proceed under the assumption that the
district court committed a constitutional Booker error when it increased Badilla’s
offense level by two levels for obstruction of justice. This error amounts to plain
error sufficient to satisfy the first two prongs of the plain-error analysis. United
States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 2005). Moving to the third
prong of the plain-error analysis, Badilla has the burden of establishing that the
district court’s plain error affected his substantial rights. Id. at 1175 (“The
burden to establish prejudice to substantial rights is on the party that failed to
raise the issue below.”). “For an error to have affected substantial rights, the
error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district
court proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In a case of constitutional Booker error, there are at least two
ways a defendant can make this showing. First, if the defendant
shows a reasonable probability that a jury applying a reasonable
doubt standard would not have found the same material facts that a
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judge found by a preponderance of the evidence, then the defendant
successfully demonstrates that the error below affected his
substantial rights. This inquiry requires the appellate court to review
the evidence submitted at the sentencing hearing and the factual basis
for any objection the defendant may have made to the facts on which
the sentence was predicated. Second, a defendant may show that the
district court’s error affected his substantial rights by demonstrating
a reasonable probability that, under the specific facts of his case as
analyzed under the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the
district court judge would reasonably impose a sentence outside the
Guidelines range. For example, if during sentencing the district
court expressed its view that the defendant’s conduct, based on the
record, did not warrant the minimum Guidelines sentence, this might
well be sufficient to conclude that the defendant had shown that the
Booker error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.
Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1175 (footnotes omitted).
Badilla does not satisfy either of the two alternative methods of
demonstrating an effect on substantial rights identified in Dazey. As to the
second alternative identified in Dazey, Badilla does not point to any evidence in
the record that the judge believed the Guidelines range was excessive in light of
the record before the court. In fact, as candidly admitted by Badilla, “[t]he record
in this case does not provide an answer to whether the judge would have imposed
a different sentence had the [G]uidelines been viewed as advisory.” Badilla
Supplemental Br. at 9. Without any evidence in the record indicating that the
district court would likely impose a sentence outside of the Guidelines range,
Badilla falls back on a request that this court “remand the matter back to the trial
judge for determination of whether his sentence would have been different under
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non-mandatory [G]uidelines.” Id. This court has specifically held, however, that
such an approach is “inconsistent with plain error doctrine” because “plain error
must be assessed based upon the record on appeal.” Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d
at 733 n.4.
Badilla does not even argue that he can establish that his substantial rights
were affected under the first alternative identified in Dazey. In any event, a
review of the record on appeal makes clear that the jury would most certainly
have found beyond a reasonable doubt the predicate facts necessary to support the
district court’s obstruction of justice enhancement. As noted above, despite
Badilla’s trial testimony that he was unaware of the presence of marijuana in the
vehicle, the jury found Badilla guilty of possession of more than 100 kilograms of
marijuana with intent to distribute. Implicit in the jury’s guilty verdict is a
conclusion that Badilla lied on the witness stand about the central issue in the
case.
Because there is no doubt that the jury would have found beyond a
reasonable doubt the factual predicates necessary to support the district court’s
obstruction of justice enhancement and because there is no indication in the
record on appeal that the district court would impose a sentence outside the
Guidelines range, Badilla has not demonstrated that the application of that
enhancement on the basis of judge-found facts affected this substantial rights. As
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Badilla has failed to establish that his substantial rights were affected by the
district court’s application of the obstruction of justice enhancement, there is no
need to proceed on to the fourth prong of the plain error analysis.
For those reasons set out above, this court reinstates all portions of our
prior decision, with the exception of footnote two, and again affirms Badilla’s
conviction and sentence.
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