United States v. Kostich

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
September 22, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
__________________________ Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 05-5184
(N.D. Oklahoma)
W A L TER ED WA R D KO STIC H, (D.Ct. No. 05-CR-13-TCK)
Defendant - Appellant.
____________________________
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, BR ISC OE, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
W alter Edward Kostich, Jr., was charged with four criminal counts arising
out of a house fire set by an incendiary device on January 12, 2005. At the time
of the fire, four individuals, including a fourteen month-old child, were in bed or
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
asleep in the house. On June 27, 2005, Kostich pled guilty to the unlawful
possession of a destructive device in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (Count 2).
A jury trial was held on the remaining counts; he was found guilty of the unlawful
manufacture of an unregistered destructive device in violation of 26 U.S.C. §
5861(f) (Count 1). 1 On September 30, 2005, Kostich was sentenced to 63 months
imprisonment on both counts to run concurrently and was ordered to pay
$154,030.36 in restitution. Kostich filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the
calculation of his offense level under the guidelines, the district court’s grant of a
two level upward departure, and the calculation of the amount of restitution. W e
exercise jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
AFFIRM .
Background:
A Presentence Investigation Report (PSR ) was prepared in advance of
Kostich’s sentencing and recommended a base offense level of 18 for a violation
of § 5861(d), (f). 2 See USSG §2K2.1(a)(5). The base offense level was increased
by two levels under USSG §2K2.1(b)(3)(B) because the offense involved a
1
He was acquitted of Counts 3 and 4: malicious damage and destruction, by
means of fire and an explosive, of real property used in activity affecting interstate
commerce (Count 4) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) and use of fire and an explosive to
commit a felony, to wit, malicious damage and destruction of real property (Count 3) in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1), respectively.
2
The 2004 edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual was used in
this case.
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destructive device. The base offense level was increased an additional four levels
under USSG §2K2.1(b)(5) because the destructive device was used in connection
with another felony offense, arson. Thus, the PSR recommended an adjusted
offense level of 24. Based on a Criminal History Category of I, the PSR
calculated the guideline range as 51 to 63 months imprisonment. The PSR also
noted the district court had the option of imposing restitution as a condition of
supervised release and recommended $154,030.36 based on the home owner’s
insurance company’s submission of an affidavit as to the outstanding amount of
loss. Kostich objected to the four level increase under §2K2.1(b)(5), the failure
to include a two level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and to the
calculation of restitution. The district court agreed a two level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility was warranted, but overruled Kostich’s other
objections.
The government moved for an upward departure under, inter alia,
Application Note 8 to USSG §2K2.1, which provides for an upward departure
when the offense level does not “adequately capture the seriousness of the offense
because of the type of destructive device involved, the risk to the public welfare,
or the risk of death or serious bodily injury that the destructive device created.”
Over Kostich’s opposition, the district court granted the government’s motion,
finding a two level upward departure was appropriate. The resulting offense level
was 24, leading to a guideline range of 51 to 63 months imprisonment. After
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considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to ensure a reasonable
sentence, the district court sentenced Kostich to 63 months imprisonment and
directed him to pay $154,030.36 in restitution.
Discussion:
Kostich again challenges the four level enhancement under USSG
§2K2.1(b)(5), the district court’s grant of a two level upward departure under
Application Note 8 to §2K2.1, and the calculation of the amount of restitution.
Kostich does not challenge the reasonableness of the sentence under United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). W e consider each of his arguments in turn.
I. Four Level Enhancement
W e review legal questions involving a district court’s application of an
enhancement under the guidelines de novo and factual findings for clear error.
United States v. M ozee, 405 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
253 (2005).
Section 2K2.1(b)(5) provides that “[i]f the defendant used or possessed any
firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense,” his offense
level is to be increased by four levels. Application Note 1 gives the term
“firearm,” the same “meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3).” 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) includes “any destructive device” within its definition of a
firearm. “Destructive device” includes any incendiary device. 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(4)(i). The term “felony offense” in §2K 2.1(b)(5), “means any offense
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(federal, state, or local) punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year, whether or not a criminal charge was brought, or conviction obtained.”
USSG §2K2.1, comment. (n.4). Under O klahoma law , if convicted, Kostich’s
conduct w ould constitute first-degree arson. O KLA . S TAT . tit. 21, § 1401. As
Application Note 4 makes clear, the defendant need not be convicted of the
underlying offense. USSG §2K2.1, comment. (n.4).
Kostich does not challenge the classification of arson as a felony for
purposes of §2K2.1(b)(5), nor does he argue the government failed to establish
his conduct met the elements of arson. Rather, Kostich relies on Application
Note 15, which provides that if the “[]other felony offense” in §2K2.1(b)(5) is an
“explosives or firearms possession or trafficking offense[],” it does not apply. H e
claims that because the arson in this case was comm itted by an incendiary device,
it is an “explosives or firearms” offense and thus cannot be used to enhance his
sentence under §2K2.1(b)(5). Kostich further asserts that because the same
destructive device was used in his counts of conviction and the arson offense,
they are “in parity” and §2K2.1(b)(5) does not apply.
W e rejected similar arguments in United States v. Eaton, 260 F.3d 1232(10th Cir. 2001). There, the court enhanced Eaton’s sentence under §2K2.1(b)(5)
because he had transferred three pipe bombs to an individual knowing they would
be used to feloniously destroy a car and/or to comm it murder. Eaton argued “the
comm ission of a felony offense such as arson or murder is coincidental to the
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bombs and not separate from their intended use and the enhancement is therefore
not warranted.” Id. at 1238. W e rejected the argument:
If this court accepts Eaton’s argum ent, a sentence enhancement under
§2K2.1(b)(5) would never be permissible in connection with a
conviction for any crime involving a destructive device. This is not the
rule. The mere fact that a destructive device has the potential to
facilitate a felony does not exempt the application of § 2K2.1(b)(5).
Id.
Similarly, Application Note 15 does not preclude use of arson as “another
felony offense” because it is not an “explosives or firearms possession or
trafficking offense[].” This is true even though it happened to be committed
using an explosive device. Nor is it relevant that Kostich was not charged with
arson or that the same destructive device was used to commit the arson offense
and the offenses of conviction. Like in Eaton, we see no error in applying the
four level enhancement in this case.
II. Upward D eparture
After Booker, “[w]hen reviewing a district court’s application of the
Sentencing Guidelines, we review legal questions de novo and we review any
factual findings for clear error, giving due deference to the district court’s
application of the guidelines to the facts.” United States v. M artinez, 418 F.3d
1130, 1133 (10th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 841 (2005).
W hen review ing upward departures, we employ a four-part test:
(1) w hether the factual circumstances supporting a departure are
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permissible departure factors; (2) whether the departure factors relied
upon by the district court remove the defendant from the applicable
Guideline heartland thus warranting a departure; (3) whether the record
sufficiently supports the factual basis underlying the departure; and (4)
whether the degree of departure is reasonable.
United States v. Wolfe, 435 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).
All of these steps are subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Id. The degree
of an upward departure is “reasonable” if the district court “precisely lay[s] out
its reasoning and analysis as to why it is selecting a particular degree of
departure” sufficient to “give us reasonable indicia that the sentence the district
court pronounces is proportional to the crime committed.” United States v.
Proffit, 304 F.3d 1001, 1012 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). Ordinarily,
“[t]he district court accomplishes this task by using any reasonable methodology
hitched to the Sentencing Guidelines to justify the reasonableness of the
departure.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Application Note 8 to §2K2.1 allows an upward departure where the
defendant’s offense level “does not adequately capture the seriousness of the
offense because of the type of destructive device involved, the risk to the public
welfare, or the risk of death or serious bodily injury that the destructive device
created.” Application Note 8 also cross-references USSG §5K2.2 which
authorizes an upward departure “[i]f significant physical injury resulted” from the
defendant’s conduct. In such a case, “[t]he extent of the increase ordinarily
should depend on the extent of the injury, the degree to which it may prove
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permanent, and the extent to which the injury was intended or knowingly risked.”
Id.
Relying on Application Note 8, the district court agreed to a departure
based on “the risk of death or serious bodily injury to the [homeowner and his
family] and to other families living on either side of the house had the fire spread
to neighboring homes,” as well as the fact the homeow ner suffered smoke-
inhalation as a consequence of the fire started by Kostich. (R. Vol. VI. at 40.) It
settled on two levels because “[m]ost analogous guidelines provide a two-level
increase for this subject.” (Id.) The district court noted the departure “could be
more, there’s no question,” but based on the offenses charged and Kostich’s lack
of a criminal history decided to impose only two levels. (Id.)
K ostich challenges the propriety of granting an upward departure at all. H e
argues the unadjusted guideline range w as “adequate” and that “the only injury
noted at sentencing and testified to at trial was minor smoke inhalation [suffered
by the homeow ner, which] certainly [was] not life threatening or serious.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 18.) Kostich also notes that no other members of the
household received medical treatment. Thus, he argues, property damage was the
main issue at sentencing and the application of Note 8 was “unnecessary, and is
not justified for the small increase in the sentence imposed by the district court.”
(Id. at 19.)
W e disagree. Enhancement of a defendant’s offense level may be
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warranted either where his conduct causes physical injury or poses the risk of
causing injury. See USSG §2K2.1, comment. (n.8); §5K2.2. Here it is
undisputed the owner of the home suffered smoke inhalation and had to receive
medical treatment. As the district court correctly noted, “[h]is injury meets the
guideline definition for bodily injury set forth in [the] sentencing guideline[s].”
(R. Vol. VI at 40.); see USSG §1B1.1, comment. (n.1(B)). Even if such an injury
did not warrant a two-level upward departure by itself, Application Note 8 of
§2K2.1 allow s upw ard departures where the defendant’s conduct poses the “risk
of death or serious bodily injury.” Despite his evident lack of concern for the
health of the individuals reposed in the home to which he set fire, Kostich
concedes “his conduct was reckless and could [have] caused personal harm and
injury.” (Appellant’s Br. at 18.) Kostich notes that “[l]uckily, no one was
seriously hurt.” (Id.) He is correct — it was fortunate for the victims and
fortunate for himself. In any event, Kostich’s conduct clearly falls within the
meaning of the applicable guideline provisions. Kostich provides no convincing
reasons the district court’s imposition of a two level enhancement was an abuse of
discretion.
III. Restitution
“In evaluating the district court’s award of victim restitution, we review its
factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1156
(10th Cir. 2003). “W e review its calculation and ultimate award of restitution for
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abuse of discretion . . . .” Id.The substance of Kostich’s objection to the amount of restitution is that the
amount was impermissibly speculative because the calculation was premised on
an undocumented business run out of the victim’s home. This argument ignores
the factual record considered by the district court below . Contrary to K ostich’s
assertion that the amount of loss was undocumented, the district court expressly
relied upon an affidavit submitted by the victim’s homeowner insurance company,
Farm Bureau, as to the amount of loss. Additionally, as the district court
specifically addressed below, the victim’s Farm Bureau policy covered only
personal property, not business related loses. The district court stated:
I don’t think any of [the business losses are] being reimbursed. It was
the destruction of the house, the personal property in the house, and the
living expenses . . . – there’s nothing here other than w hat Farm Bureau
has filed an affidavit on. There’s nothing about business expenses or
business losses or any of that. And if that’s not included -- if you have
information that’s included, why, I w ant to hear it, but otherwise you’re
arguing about something that’s not part of this restitution.
(R. Vol. VI. at 31-32.) Kostich could not provide the district court a basis for his
objection, nor can he on appeal. Unsubstantiated concerns that a restitution order
is overinclusive is insufficient to overturn a district court’s restitution order.
Given the record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
$154,030.36 in restitution.
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A FFIRME D.
Entered by the C ourt:
Terrence L. O ’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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