Adams v. Wiley

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 30, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ERIC ADAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 07-1467
v. (D.C. No. 07-cv-1357-ZLW-BNB)
(D. Colo.)
R. WILEY,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Mr. Eric Adams, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the denial of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)
motion to amend or alter the dismissal of his action by the district court. Exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM for the reasons outlined herein.
*
This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. After
examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). The case is therefore ordered submitted
without oral argument.
1
Because Mr. Adams is proceeding pro se, we construe his submissions
liberally. See Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
Mr. Adams, a federal prisoner, filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 asserting that
prison officials were refusing to allow him to receive copies of a magazine to which he
subscribes and seeking injunctive relief. After reviewing the motion, the magistrate judge
determined that Mr. Adams’s habeas corpus claims were more appropriately characterized
as civil rights Bivens2 claims. The magistrate judge therefore ordered Mr. Adams to file the
proper court-approved forms for his prisoner complaint and for a prisoner’s motion and
affidavit for leave to proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Mr. Adams was warned that if
he failed to comply with the order within thirty days, his action would be dismissed without
further notice. Mr. Adams did not comply with the magistrate judge’s instructions; instead,
he filed a motion captioned as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, which the district court
construed as an objection to the magistrate judge’s order. The district court overruled the
objection and granted Mr. Adams ten days to comply with the magistrate judge’s order.
After Mr. Adams failed to comply within the time allowed, the district court dismissed
his action without prejudice for failure to prosecute and entered judgment in favor of the
defendant. Mr. Adams then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e), as well as shortly thereafter an amended motion. The district court denied the
motion (as amended) as redundant, unnecessary, and malicious. Mr. Adams now appeals the
denial of his Rule 59(e) motion.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), a party may file a motion to alter or amend a judgment
within ten days after the entry of judgment. A district court’s ruling on a motion to alter or
amend judgment under Rule 59(e) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Brown v.
2
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
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Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir. 1996). A district court’s
dismissal for failure to prosecute or to comply with the court’s orders likewise is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Olsen v. Mapes, 333 F.3d 1199, 1204
(10th Cir. 2003).
Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court’s decision will not
be disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm
conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or
exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances. When
we apply the “abuse of discretion” standard, we defer to the trial court’s
judgment . . . . In this circuit, abuse of discretion is defined as an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.
Brown, 101 F.3d at 1331 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In his Rule 59(e) motion, Mr. Adams argued that the district court’s dismissal was
improper because the magistrate judge failed to consider his § 2241 application on the merits
and deliver a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) to the district court, which he alleges
was required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). On appeal, Mr. Adams raises the same argument
regarding the impropriety of the dismissal. He additionally argues that because the
magistrate judge’s order was not an R&R submitted to the district court, it was error for the
district court to “untimely” consider his Rule 59(e) motion as an “objection” to the magistrate
judge’s order. Construing his filings liberally, it appears that Mr. Adams may also be
challenging the underlying dismissal of his lawsuit on the grounds of failure to prosecute.
Mr. Adams’s arguments are meritless. It is undisputed that despite being warned of
the consequence that his action would be dismissed, he failed to submit the forms as ordered
by the court. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to dismiss his
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action, as he had failed to prosecute and to comply with the court’s orders. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 41(b); Olsen, 333 F.3d at 1204 & n.3. Further, it is true that under 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), a magistrate judge that is designated to consider a
prisoner petition challenging conditions of confinement must conduct the required
proceedings and enter a recommended disposition. See, e.g., Clark v. Poulton, 963 F.2d
1361, 1363-65 (10th Cir. 1992). Neither the magistrate judge nor the district judge in this
case, however, was ever presented with a proper application containing such a challenge to
conditions of confinement, despite repeatedly offering Mr. Adams the opportunity to file an
application. Next, there was nothing erroneous about the magistrate judge issuing an order
requiring Mr. Adams to file a proper application. While a magistrate judge may not hear and
determine “a motion for injunctive relief,” section 636(b)(1)(A) does not prohibit a
magistrate judge from determining that a motion containing such a request is improperly
filed and ordering that a petitioner use the proper forms to file the motion. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(A) (allowing a district judge to “designate a magistrate judge to hear and
determine any pretrial matter pending before the court,” with some exceptions).
Finally, the district court’s dismissal was neither untimely nor based on a
determination that Mr. Adams’s Rule 59(e) motion was an objection to either the magistrate
judge’s order or to an R&R that Mr. Adams asserts should have been filed. Giving the
language its most natural reading, the district court’s reference in its order to the Rule 59(e)
motion and amended motion as “successive objections” is not a literal description of the
filings with reference to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Rather, the language simply reflects the district
court’s recognition that, through his motion and amended motion, Mr. Adams had filed
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successive and redundant arguments challenging the district court’s own determination that
Mr. Adams had not complied with its filing requirements (including the ten-day deadline)
for moving forward with his action. The order specifically notes that Mr. Adams’s motion
and amendment are filed “pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e),” with no mention of 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b), and denies, rather than overrules, the motion.
Thus, the district court’s denial of the Rule 59(e) motion was well-taken and did not
constitute an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
Mr. Adams’s motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees is
DENIED, and he is ordered to make immediate payment of any unpaid balance due.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
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