Therrien v. Target Corporation

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 9, 2010
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
TIMOTHY S. THERRIEN,
Plaintiff - Appellee/
Cross - Appellant,
v. Nos. 09-5047, 09-5064
TARGET CORPORATION, a
Minnesota corporation,
Defendant - Appellant/
Cross - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. 4:06-CV-00217-JHP-FHM)
Philip R. Richards (Jason T. Seay and Thomas D. Hird, with him on the briefs),
Richards & Connor, PLLP, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant - Appellant/Cross -
Appellee.
Paul DeMuro (J. Michael Medina, with him on the briefs), Frederic Dorwat,
Lawyers, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff - Appellee/Cross - Appellant.
Before HARTZ, HOLLOWAY, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Timothy Therrien was stabbed when he tried to help apprehend a shoplifter
at a Target store. He sued Target Corporation for negligently causing his injuries.
After trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma, the jury awarded Mr. Therrien $500,000 in damages.
Target appeals, contending that (1) there was insufficient evidence to
support the verdict, (2) the district court gave incorrect jury instructions, (3) the
court erred in ruling on the admissibility of certain evidence, and (4) the court
should have granted remittitur or a new trial. Mr. Therrien cross-appeals the
court’s refusal to submit punitive damages to the jury. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Stabbing
On June 3, 2005, Stacie Pavey was the lone security guard patrolling a
Target store in Tulsa, Oklahoma (the Tulsa Store). After observing a man conceal
some merchandise, Pavey decided that he was a shoplifter and planned to
apprehend him. Pavey did not call for assistance. He waited until the suspect
reached the exit vestibule (the space between the two sets of exit doors), ran to
the suspect from behind, and, without identifying himself, put his hand on the
suspect’s arm. A struggle ensued as the suspect tried to flee.
Mr. Therrien was shopping in the store. He saw what was happening and
quickly went to the vestibule. The parties dispute what happened next.
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Mr. Therrien testified that on reaching the vestibule, “I stood there for a couple of
seconds . . . and Mr. Pavey looked at me, I looked at him, and he said, ‘I’m store
security. Please help me.’” Aplt. App., Vol. III at 601. Pavey denied asking for
Mr. Therrien’s help and testified that he had told Mr. Therrien to “back away.”
Id., Vol. IV at 788.
Whatever passed between the two men, Mr. Therrien jumped into the fray.
He tried to restrain the suspect, who pulled out a knife and tried to stab
Mr. Therrien. Despite pleas from Pavey to let the suspect go, Mr. Therrien held
onto him. When the suspect stopped struggling, Mr. Therrien relaxed his grip; the
suspect immediately spun around, stabbed Mr. Therrien in the abdomen, and ran
away. The vestibule episode—from the time Pavey confronted the suspect to the
escape—lasted less than 20 seconds.
Shoplifting is not a rarity at Target stores. Pavey testified that “[t]here was
a consistent level of criminal activity at [the Tulsa] store” and he made
apprehensions “quite frequently.” Id., Vol. III at 693. Also, there were
occasional violent incidents at the store. Pavey had seen assaults, purse-
snatchings, and robberies. Julie Plonczynski, the Tulsa Store’s chief of security
personnel, testified that two shoplifters, in separate incidents, had tried to use
weapons to escape apprehension—one by pulling a knife and one by spraying
mace. On at least one occasion a customer had become involved in an
apprehension. Pavey testified that less than three months before the Therrien
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episode, a customer had tried to help Pavey by grabbing a shoplifting suspect in
the store parking lot.
Target had established policies for dealing with suspected shoplifters. One
manual said:
It is always advisable to intervene as a team of two or more unless
the situation dictates or demands solo intervention. If you are alone
on a unit and an individual breaks a glass and threatens suicide, you
may feel it is, in your best professional judgment, a wise decision not
to leave the scene to obtain assistance. Under all other
circumstances, it is best to intervene as a team.
Id., Vol. V at 1320. The manual explains that a team effort is “much safer for all
involved,” and solo apprehensions tend to “precipitate a confrontive atmosphere.”
Id. The manual also directs security guards to approach the shoplifter from the
“front and slightly to the side,” id. at 1245, and to identify themselves as Target
security personnel. Guards are further advised to give the suspect a chance to
cooperate and return to the store before touching or grabbing him. As
Plonczynski testified at trial, these policies are meant to keep apprehensions as
“low-key and nonviolent as possible.” Id., Vol. IV at 858. When asked about
Pavey’s being the only security officer on duty at the time of Mr. Therrien’s
injury, she said that she was understaffed; although the Tulsa Store had budgeted
security guards for 120 hours a week, it was staffed for only 80 hours a week.
There was evidence that Target encouraged security guards to make
apprehensions. Pavey’s performance review on August 11, 2004, stated that
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Pavey “need[s] to increase [his] External apprehensions.” Id., Vol. V at 1239.
And he testified that “it was [his] perception, that Target had a quota of a certain
number of apprehensions that [he] had to make in order to get a good score on
[his] review.” Id., Vol. III at 694. Although Plonczynski testified that Target
used no quotas, she said that the level of apprehensions “was definitely a
measurement of performance which is why it’s named the key performance
measure.” Id., Vol. IV at 873.
B. Procedural History
Mr. Therrien brought a negligence suit against Target in Oklahoma state
court on March 28, 2006. Target removed the case to federal district court. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1) (diversity jurisdiction), 1441(a) (removal). On June 1,
2006, the district court granted Target’s motion to dismiss on the ground that it
had no duty to protect invitees from criminal acts by third persons. But we
reversed on appeal. See Therrien v. Target Corp., 216 F. App’x 751 (10th Cir.
2007). The case was then tried to a jury on two occasions. After Mr. Therrien
rested at the first trial, the court granted Target’s motion for judgment as a matter
of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), explaining that Oklahoma law had not
recognized a duty on business owners to take reasonable precautions against
third-party criminal conduct, unless “the situation involved an immediate event
which the proprietor knew was occurring or about to occur.” Aplt. App., Vol. II
at 362. It said that Oklahoma courts had not followed the rule stated in
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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 cmt. f (Restatement) that prior incidents and
experience can give rise to a duty.
Less than a week after the court’s ruling, however, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court decided Bray v. St. John Health System, Inc., 187 P.3d 721 (Okla. 2008),
which adopted Restatement § 344 cmt. f. Bray was kidnapped in a hospital
parking garage and raped. See id. at 723. She sued the hospital for negligence.
See id. At the hearing on the hospital’s summary-judgment motion, the trial court
rejected Bray’s argument that past criminal activity in the parking garage gave
rise to a duty on the hospital to take reasonable precautions. See id. The state
supreme court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine
whether the hospital had taken adequate precautions. See id. at 725. It endorsed
the following statement from § 344 cmt. f:
Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor’s safety, he is
ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has
reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are
about to occur. He may, however, know or have reason to know,
from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part
of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of
the visitor, even though he has no reason to expect it on the part of
any particular individual. If the place or character of his business, or
his past experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate
careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either
generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take
precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number
of servants to afford a reasonable protection.
Id. at 724 n.2; see id. at 723–24 (adopting the entirety of comment f).
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Citing to Bray, Mr. Therrien moved for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(a), and the district court granted the motion. At the second trial Mr. Therrien
began with two theories of liability—negligence and the rescue doctrine; but after
both sides rested, he withdrew his rescue-doctrine claim. The jury found Target
negligent and awarded Mr. Therrien $500,000 in damages. The jury, which was
instructed on comparative negligence, also found that Mr. Therrien was not
negligent.
Target appeals, arguing (1) that there was insufficient evidence of
negligence, (2) that the jury was not correctly instructed on the elements of
negligence, (3) that the jury should have been instructed on assumption of the
risk, (4) that evidence of past incidents in the Tulsa Store and Target’s security
policies should have been excluded, (5) that it should have been permitted to
introduce evidence of Mr. Therrien’s psychological history and prior bad acts, and
(6) that it should have been granted remittitur or, alternatively, a new trial.
Mr. Therrien cross-appeals, contending that the district court should have
submitted the issue of punitive damages to the jury.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Target claims that there was insufficient evidence that it had been
negligent. Our standard of review reflects our system’s profound respect for fact-
finding by a jury of citizens:
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When a jury verdict is challenged on appeal, our review is limited to
determining whether the record—viewed in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party—contains substantial evidence to support the
jury’s decision. Substantial evidence is something less than the
weight of the evidence, and is defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if different conclusions also might be supported by the
evidence.
Bangert Bros. Constr. Co. v. Kiewit W. Co., 310 F.3d 1278, 1292 (10th Cir. 2002)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, because this is a
case arising under diversity jurisdiction, we must evaluate the evidence in terms
of the substantive law of the forum state, Oklahoma. See Bankers Trust Co. v.
Lee Keeling & Assocs., Inc., 20 F.3d 1092, 1099 (10th Cir. 1994) (in diversity
cases, “federal law provides the procedural measure of the sufficiency of the
evidence, [and] state law on negligence provides the substantive measure.”
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Mr. Therrien’s theory of Target’s liability has been straightforward: In part
because Target had devoted inadequate resources to store security, and in part
because of Pavey’s own poor judgment, Pavey dealt with the suspected shoplifter
in a negligent manner that endangered store customers. 1 In particular, in light of
the potential danger to customers that can arise from attempts to apprehend
suspected shoplifters, (1) Target had an inadequate number of security personnel at
the store; (2) Target should not have evaluated security guards based on the
1
As the jury was instructed, Target is responsible for the acts or omissions
of its employees within the scope of their employment.
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number of apprehensions, because that pressured them to make apprehensions even
when it was not safe to do so; (3) Pavey should not have attempted to apprehend
the suspect without obtaining assistance from other security personnel; (4) he
should have confronted the suspect face-to-face, identifying himself as a security
officer, rather than approaching him from behind; (5) he should have given the
suspect an opportunity to return to the store before placing his hand on the
suspect; (6) he should have released the suspect when he was losing control; and
(7) he should have kept the apprehension low-key.
According to Mr. Therrien’s theory, the above negligence created a
dangerous situation—a potentially armed suspect struggling with a security officer
within the store—and a foreseeable consequence of this situation was that a
customer would try to assist Pavey, particularly after Pavey called for help. In
short, Target’s negligence led to the knifing. Indeed, Plonczynski, Pavey’s
supervisor, noted in a performance review that Pavey’s actions had “caused”
Mr. Therrien’s injury. Aplt. App., Vol. V at 1336.
This theory is supported by Jury Instruction No. 10 (which has not been
challenged on appeal): “Plaintiff alleges Target was negligent in the manner in
which it responded to a known criminal on its premises and that Target was
negligent in its failure to prevent his injury.” Id. at 1113. The theory is also
consistent with Jury Instruction No. 11, which elaborates on the duty of owners of
business premises:
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A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry
for his business purposes is subject to liability to members of the
public while they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical
harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts
of third persons, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise
reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to
be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable visitors to avoid the
harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.
Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor’s safety, he
is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has
reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are
about to occur. He may, however, know or have reason to know,
from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part
of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of
the visitor, even though he has no reason to expect it on the part of
any particular individual. If the place or character of his business, or
his past experience, is such that he should reasonabl[y] anticipate
careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either
generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take
precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number
of employees to afford a reasonable protection.
Id. at 1114.
In arguing that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish its liability,
Target focuses on the struggle in the vestibule. It contends (1) that the danger
arising from the struggle between Pavey and the suspect would be apparent to any
reasonable person, so it had no duty to warn Mr. Therrien to stay away or
otherwise protect him from the danger; and (2) anyway, the events in the vestibule
happened so quickly that Target could not have taken any steps to protect
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Mr. Therrien. 2 But Target’s focus on the struggle in the vestibule misses the point
of Mr. Therrien’s case. Mr. Therrien alleges a breach of duty in the conduct that
created the disorder in the vestibule—Target’s failure to provide adequate security
resources and Pavey’s negligent handling of the shoplifting suspect. Target does
not challenge on appeal the proposition that there would have been no vestibule
disorder had it provided more security personnel or had Pavey properly dealt with
the suspect.
Target’s arguments might be appropriate if it were not responsible for the
struggle between Pavey and the suspect. But if Target was responsible, the proper
analysis then is whether it should escape liability because an intervening cause
(say, Mr. Therrien’s entry into the fray) suspended its own negligence. 3 The
2
Although Target’s district-court motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) and its
appellate brief argue that it had no duty to Mr. Therrien because the danger to him
was apparent, neither of its two preverdict motions for judgment under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50(a) mentioned apparent danger. Ordinarily a party cannot raise in a
Rule 50(b) motion an argument not already raised in its Rule 50(a) motion. See
M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 565 F.3d 753, 762 (10th Cir. 2009); 9B
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2537,
at 606 (3d ed. 2008) (“Since the post-submission motion is nothing more than a
renewal of the earlier motion made at the close of the presentation of the
evidence, the case law makes it quite clear that the movant cannot assert a ground
that was not included in the earlier motion.”). But on appeal we can consider
such an argument when the opposing party failed to object to the Rule 50(b)
motion for raising new arguments. See Elliot v. Turner Constr. Co., 381 F.3d
995, 1006 (10th Cir. 2004); Wright & Miller, supra § 2537, at 606–16. Mr.
Therrien did not raise this objection at trial.
3
(the Restatement) Alternatively, Target might argue that Mr. Therrien
assumed the risk of injury when he joined the fray. See Byford v. Town of Asher,
(continued...)
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standard for determining whether there was an intervening cause was established
by unchallenged Jury Instruction No. 17, which stated:
An intervening cause is one that interrupts or breaks the
connection between a defendant’s act or omission and a plaintiff’s
injury. Defendant’s act or omission would not be the direct cause of
Plaintiff’s injury if another event intervened between the two and that
event was:
1. Independent of Defendant’s act or omission;
2. Adequate by itself to cause Plaintiff’s injury; and
3. Not reasonably foreseeable by Defendant.
Id., Vol. V at 1120 (emphasis added).
On the facts of this case, the jury could rationally find that a customer’s
decision to enter the fray was not an intervening cause because it was “reasonably
foreseeable.” Id. Not only is it a natural human instinct to help others in
difficulty (even when rendering aid is foolish), but the jury could have believed
Mr. Therrien’s testimony that Pavey called for assistance. Accordingly, the jury
could properly find that Mr. Therrien’s injury was proximately caused by Target’s
negligence. This is not to say that the obviousness of the danger to Mr. Therrien
was irrelevant. That obviousness could have persuaded the jury that
Mr. Therrien’s actions were negligent, thereby reducing Target’s liability through
principles of comparative fault. But Target would still be partially liable; and in
any event, the jury decided that Mr. Therrien was not negligent.
3
(...continued)
874 P.2d 45, 49 (Okla. 1994) (assumption of the risk is an absolute bar to
recovery). But in its sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, Target has not raised
this defense and we therefore do not consider it.
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In its reply brief Target additionally argues that the evidence of its
experience with shoplifters was insufficient to create a duty because no prior
episode at the Tulsa Store involved a shoplifter’s use of a knife to avoid
apprehension by a customer. This argument probably comes too late. See City of
Colorado Springs v. Solis, 589 F.3d 1121, 1135 n.5 (10th Cir. 2009) (arguments
raised only in reply brief are waived). Moreover, we believe that the jury could
have reasonably found that Target, based on experience at the Tulsa Store and
elsewhere, was sufficiently aware of the danger to customers that could arise in the
apprehension of suspected shoplifters, that its actions (including Pavey’s) were
unreasonable.
Because there was sufficient evidence that Target’s negligence caused
Mr. Therrien’s injury, we affirm on this issue.
B. Jury Instructions
Target complains (1) that the premises-liability instructions should have
stated that Target had no duty to warn or protect Mr. Therrien from apparent
dangers and that it is not liable if there was no time to warn or protect him; and (2)
that the jury should have been instructed on assumption of the risk. We reject
both complaints.
1. Premises Liability
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Target contends that Jury Instruction Nos. 11 and 13 4 “fail to accurately and
fully apprise the jury of the well-established Oklahoma law regarding premises
security liability.” Aplt. Br. at 23. The problem, as Target sees it, is that these
instructions did not say (1) that Target owed no duty to warn or protect customers
from apparent dangers, and (2) that it could be liable only if there was enough
time to warn Mr. Therrien or to protect him. These arguments, however, were not
preserved for appeal.
During the jury-instruction conference, the colloquy on Instruction No. 11
was brief:
THE COURT: No. 11 is premises liability.
[Mr. Therrien’s counsel]: No objection.
[Target’s counsel]: Your Honor, on behalf of Target, I do object to this
requested instruction. I think it’s adequately covered by the instruction on
the elements of negligence, and giving the jury the jurisprudential
4
Instruction No. 13 stated:
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following
essential elements of his negligence cause of action against the
defendant:
1. That the defendant was negligent in one or more of the ways
claimed by plaintiff; AND
2. That the plaintiff was injured and sustained damages; AND
3. That the negligence of the defendant caused the injuries and
damages to the plaintiff.
The defendant has the burden of proving its defense that the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff caused or contributed to
plaintiff’s injuries.
Aplt. App., Vol. V at 1116.
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background of this type of cause of action I think is probably more
confusing than helpful. For that reason, I think it’s more than they need.
Also, we’ve offered some—or proffered some alternative instructions on
premises liability that we think accurately states the law.
THE COURT: Anything further from plaintiff on No. 11?
[Mr. Therrien’s counsel]: I incorporate my arguments that I made in
response to the Rule 50 motion, Your Honor.
THE COURT: [Target’s] objection noted; overruled as to 11.
Aplt. App., Vol. IV at 1012–13. Target did not object to Instruction No. 13.
To preserve a challenge to a jury instruction, “[a] party who objects to an
instruction or the failure to give an instruction must do so on the record, stating
distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for the objection.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 51(c)(1). That is, the objection must “proffer the same grounds raised on appeal
with sufficient clarity to render the grounds obvious, plain, or unmistakable.”
Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Choren, 393 F.3d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 2005)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Target’s objection fell far short of that standard with respect to its appellate
challenges. The objection to Instruction No. 11 never mentioned apparent danger.
Rather than saying that the instruction omitted important elements, counsel told
the district court that the subject matter was “adequately covered by the instruction
on the elements of negligence” and that the elaboration in the instruction was
“probably more confusing than helpful.” Aplt. App., Vol. IV at 1012. Target’s
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counsel referred to other instructions that he was submitting, stating: “Also,
we’ve offered some—or proffered some alternative instructions on premises
liability that we think accurately states the law.” Id. But he did not claim that
those proffered instructions were accurate in some respect that Instruction No. 11
was not; he made no attempt to explain that they would cure some error in
Instruction No. 11, much less specify an alleged error. District judges are not
required to be mind readers. This argument was not properly preserved.
To the extent that Target may wish to appeal the district court’s refusal to
give its requested instructions, we decline to consider the issue. Target’s opening
brief mentions the rejected instructions (40, 41, and 42) only once, and in a
footnote at that: “Target’s requested instructions, Aplt. App. at 576-77, 584-85
[pages of the record where the requested instructions appear], which the district
court refused to give, would have instructed the jury as to these legal criteria
[relating to apparent danger] to a finding of premises security liability under
Oklahoma law.” Aplt. Br. at 23 n.4. Because Target mentions the court’s
rejection “only in passing” and “does not present any argument to specifically
challenge” the alleged error, it waived any argument that the court improperly
denied the requested instructions. Kabba v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1239, 1248 (10th
Cir. 2008) (failure to raise an argument sufficiently in the opening brief waives
that argument). “Many courts have . . . held that an argument made only in a
footnote of an appellate brief is waived.” Gregory A. Castanias & Robert H.
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Klonoff, Federal Appellate Practice and Procedure in a Nutshell 48 (2008). But
we need not rely on such a broad rule. Here the footnote does not even contain an
argument. We further note that Target’s reply brief also frames the contention in
terms of error in Instruction No. 11; it does not argue that rejection of Target’s
proffered instructions was error. Finally, neither the opening brief’s text nor the
footnote points to any place in the record where Target preserved an objection to
the failure to give the instructions. This circuit’s local rule states that “[b]riefs
must cite the precise reference in the record where a required objection was made
and ruled on, if the appeal is based on: . . . (b) the giving of or refusal to give a
particular jury instruction . . . .” 10th Cir. Rule 28.2(C)(3).
Target also failed to preserve for appeal its contention that the instructions
should have stated that business owners are not liable if they had no time to warn
or protect the visitor. Its briefs give no record cite of any trial objection made on
this ground. See id. And Target’s reply brief does not dispute the contention in
Mr. Therrien’s answer brief that this argument was raised for the first time on
appeal.
Target suggests that even if it did not preserve its arguments below, it
should prevail on plain-error review. See United States v. Baum, 555 F.3d 1129,
1135 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error). We
disagree.
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To obtain reversal on plain-error review, the appellant must satisfy a four-
prong test. It must show “(1) an error (2) that is plain, meaning clear or obvious
under current law, and (3) affecting substantial rights. If these elements are
satisfied, we may exercise discretion to correct the error if it seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Royal
Maccabees, 393 F.3d at 1180 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks
omitted). Target’s first alleged plain error is that the district court’s premises-
liability instructions did not restrict liability to hidden dangers; in other words, the
instructions inappropriately permitted the jury to find liability even if the danger
was apparent. But even if the instructions were erroneous in that respect, they
were not plainly so. Oklahoma law is far from clear on the point. Indeed, on the
prior appeal in this case we wrote: “Oklahoma’s premises liability cases involving
criminal attacks focus on the invitor’s knowledge of criminal activity; they do not
appear to incorporate the ‘open and obvious danger’ analysis found in
physical-defects cases.” Therrien, 216 F. App’x at 753–54. Target has not
pointed to clarification of the matter in more recent Oklahoma opinions. This
plain-error claim fails on the second prong.
As for Target’s argument that the jury should have been instructed that
Target would not be liable unless it had time to warn or protect Mr. Therrien, we
fail to see how Target’s substantial rights were injured by the absence of such an
instruction. Mr. Therrien’s claim was based on negligence—the failure to exercise
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due care. We doubt that the jury would have found Target negligent for failure to
do the impossible. This plain-error claim fails on the third prong.
2. Assumption of the Risk
Target contends that the district court erred by not giving the jury an
instruction on the defense of assumption of the risk. In its opening brief it
summarizes its argument as follows: “In light of [1] Therrien’s dismissal of his
rescue doctrine claim, and [2] the evidence presented at trial that Therrien was
highly experienced in premises security matters and is an experienced martial arts
fighter, the jury should have been given the opportunity to consider [the
assumption-of-the-risk defense].” Aplt. Br. at 25. Again, however, Target has
failed to show that it raised these two grounds in district court. As we have
previously stated, the appellant “must cite the precise reference in the record
where a required objection was made and ruled on,” 10th Cir. Rule 28.2(C)(3), and
the objection below must “proffer the same grounds raised on appeal with
sufficient clarity to render the grounds obvious, plain, or unmistakable,” Royal
Maccabees, 393 F.3d at 1179. But the only record citations in Target’s brief on
the matter are to pretrial proceedings, before Mr. Therrien dismissed his rescue-
doctrine claim and before the evidence of his security and martial-arts experience
was admitted at trial, so neither of the two grounds for Target’s argument on
appeal could possibly have been raised at those record citations.
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Although we have no obligation to consider Target’s argument further, we
provide additional detail to establish that Target could not have prevailed simply
by adding additional record cites in its brief. This detail confirms that Target did
not alert the district court to the grounds raised on appeal.
Before trial Mr. Therrien filed a motion in limine to preclude Target from
arguing that he had assumed the risks of injury by participating in the struggle. In
an order entered the week before trial, the district court definitively ruled on the
motion, stating that it would be granted with respect to both Mr. Therrien’s rescue-
doctrine claim and his premises-liability claim under the Oklahoma Supreme
Court’s recent Bray decision. It explained:
The facts of this case do not establish Plaintiff voluntarily consented
to being exposed to a danger that he knew and appreciated. While
there remains a question of fact as to whether Plaintiff voluntarily
entered the fr[a]y, there is no question the shoplifter’s possession of a
weapon was unknown to Plaintiff.
Aplt. App., Vol. III at 555 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Target
has not challenged this order.
At the jury-instruction conference, Target reiterated its pretrial request for
an instruction on assumption of the risk, but its statement was perfunctory. The
only reason it offered was that “we believe that this case does present an
appropriate case for assumption of the risk.” Id., Vol. IV at 1026. It did not
explain why the pretrial order no longer made sense in light of Mr. Therrien’s
dropping his rescue-doctrine claim or the evidence presented at trial.
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When developments during trial potentially affect the continuing propriety
of an order, the party opposing the order has the “responsibility to ask the court to
reconsider its earlier decision in light of the new evidence”; failure to do so
precludes the party from relying on appeal on the new evidence. See Century 21
Real Estate Corp. v. Meraj Int’l Inv. Corp., 315 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir. 2003).
We do not impose on the trial court the burden to construct a party’s arguments for
revisiting its prior rulings. Because Target’s request for the district court to
reconsider its pretrial order did not mention the abandonment of the rescue-
doctrine claim or the trial evidence of Mr. Therrien’s background in security, we
decline to consider its argument on those grounds.
C. Evidentiary Rulings
Before trial Target filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior
incidents at the Tulsa Store and its security policies. The district court denied the
motion except as to a few episodes. Also, the court granted Mr. Therrien’s motion
in limine to exclude evidence of his psychological history and prior bad acts. On
appeal Target challenges these rulings.
In diversity cases, federal law generally governs the admissibility of
unprivileged evidence. See Blanke v. Alexander, 152 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir.
1998). We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
See Elliot v. Turner Constr. Co., 381 F.3d 995, 1003 (10th Cir. 2004). Under this
standard we reverse only if the district court “made a clear error of judgment . . .
-21-
and the complaining party’s rights were adversely affected.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
1. Past Incidents at Target
At trial, Pavey and Plonczynski testified that assaults, purse-snatchings, and
robberies had occurred in the Tulsa Store before Mr. Therrien’s stabbing. Both
also mentioned “other crimes” at the store but gave no details. Aplt. App., Vol. III
at 693. Pavey said that there was a “consistent level of criminal activity” in the
store. Id. In addition, he recounted an attempted apprehension in March 2005
during which he had chased a suspected shoplifter into the parking lot, where a
customer tried to help Pavey by grabbing the suspect. Plonczynski testified to the
following incidents at the Tulsa Store: (1) a suspected shoplifter attempted to cut
himself with a knife outside the store during a domestic dispute; and (2) on two
separate occasions suspected shoplifters brandished weapons (a knife and mace) at
a Target security guard to avoid apprehension.
Target contends that these incidents were irrelevant because they were “not
sufficiently similar such that Target should have reasonably foreseen that a
shoplifter would brandish a knife and stab a patron who voluntarily intervened in
the attempted apprehension of the shoplifter.” Aplt. Br. at 37–38. The evidence,
it argues, was “clearly prejudicial,” id. at 37, and the prejudice “outweighed any
semblance of relevance,” id. at 38. We are not persuaded.
-22-
Under Fed. R. Evid. 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
Oklahoma law charges business owners with the duty to take precautions if “the
place or character of [the] business, or [the owner’s] past experience” indicates
that third-party criminal conduct is reasonably likely. Bray, 187 P.3d at 724 n.2.
Thus, a matter of consequence in this case was whether experience alerted Target
to the possibility of criminal conduct that may endanger its customers. Evidence
that shoplifters can be violent, that they may carry weapons, and that customers
may get involved in apprehending shoplifters, all could suggest to a reasonable
person that the apprehension of shoplifters should be conducted carefully to
minimize the risks to customers.
Of course, not all relevant evidence is admissible. Relevant evidence “may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial,”
however, “simply because it is damaging to an opponent’s case. To be unfairly
prejudicial, the evidence must have an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” United
States v. Caraway, 534 F.3d 1290, 1301 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Target does not explain how it was unfairly prejudiced
by admission of past incidents in its store. It is not clear to us why the jury would
-23-
have thought less of Target simply because third parties committed crimes on its
premises. For example, even if there is little probative value to the evidence that a
suspected shoplifter attempted to cut himself with a knife, the evidence was hardly
likely to inflame passions against Target. Target’s real concern appears to be that
the jury might give the evidence more weight than Target believed it deserved.
But the district court could reasonably find otherwise. It was not necessary that
the evidence concern incidents identical to the one in which Mr. Therrien was
injured. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
2. Target’s Security Policies
At trial Mr. Therrien introduced evidence of Target’s security policies,
including recommended procedures for apprehending shoplifters. Mr. Therrien
also presented evidence that the botched apprehension did not conform to those
procedures—for example, Pavey attempted the apprehension by himself,
approached the suspect from behind, and placed his hand on the suspect before
identifying himself as Target security.
Target contends that the policies should not have been admitted because
they “are not relevant to define the standard of care,” Aplt. Br. at 30, or to show
that it had breached any duties and caused Mr. Therrien’s injuries. We disagree.
Although a company’s internal policies “do not alter the applicable standard of
care, they are admissible to show negligence,” even if the policies demand a
higher standard of care than the applicable law. Robinson v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 16
-24-
F.3d 1083, 1091 (10th Cir. 1994). We have permitted admission of such policies
when the jury is instructed that they are “‘not admitted as legal standards of duty,
but as evidence of the measure of caution which ought to be exercised in situations
to which the rules apply.’” Id. (quoting Fulton v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.,
675 F.2d 1130, 1133 (10th Cir. 1982)). Here, Jury Instruction No. 18 properly
informed the jury how the policies could and could not be used:
Any Target policies or procedures admitted into evidence are
not admitted as legal standards or legal duties in this case. As such,
the finding of a violation of policy or procedure should not be equated
with a finding of negligence. Although Target’s policies and
procedures do not alter the negligence standard of care, they are
admissible to show negligence.
Aplt. App., Vol. V at 1121.
Target argues that Robinson and Fulton are inapplicable because those cases
did not deal with premises liability. It fails to explain, however, why that
difference is material; and the materiality escapes us. In both circumstances a
company’s policy is offered to inform the jury’s decision on what precautions are
reasonable in light of the risk.
In addition, Target contends that admission of the policies was prejudicial,
asserting that Mr. Therrien used the policies to “impassion and inflame the jury by
arguing Target intentionally violates its policies and procedures on a regular
basis.” Aplt. Br. at 34. But “[t]he jury’s awareness that [a company] failed to
comply with its own rules is not the sort of prejudice the Federal Rules of
-25-
Evidence contemplate.” Fulton, 675 F.2d at 1133. The district court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting this evidence.
3. Mr. Therrien’s Psychological History and Prior Bad Acts
The district court granted Mr. Therrien’s motion in limine to exclude
evidence that posttraumatic stress disorder or other mental illness caused him to
act violently. It also excluded the following evidence of prior bad acts: (1) a
14-year-old felony conviction for marijuana possession; (2) two protective orders
entered against Mr. Therrien in 1999, on behalf of his sister and brother-in-law;
(3) a protective order entered against Mr. Therrien in 2004, on behalf of his ex-
wife and issued in response to an assault allegation; (4) Mr. Therrien’s 2007
no-contest plea to a charge of misdemeanor assault; and (5) two charges that he
violated the 2004 protective order by attempting to speak to his son and calling his
ex-wife.
Target argues that Mr. Therrien’s run-ins with the law demonstrate a
“propensity to act unreasonably and contrary to authority—precisely the
circumstance of Therrien’s conduct in relation to Target in this case.” Aplt. Br. at
38–39. According to Target, the evidence would help the jury decide whether
Pavey asked Mr. Therrien for help or told him to stay away, because it would
“show that even if Therrien was told to stay away, his history of violence and
mental illness would tend to establish that he would engage anyway.” Id. at 39. It
further argues that the evidence was relevant to Target’s comparative-fault and
-26-
assumption-of-the-risk defenses. Target contends that the evidence is not
impermissible character evidence because it was offered to show Mr. Therrien’s
“motive, intent, and knowledge in voluntarily injecting himself into the
apprehension of the shoplifter.” Aplt. Reply & Resp. to Cross-Appeal Br. at 26.
We are unpersuaded. The evidence that Target wished to offer was, at best,
minimally probative of whether Mr. Therrien would act unreasonably in response
to Pavey’s struggle with the shoplifter. And if not character evidence offered to
prove conduct in conformity with that character, the evidence was closely akin to
it. Most importantly, the evidence could be unfairly prejudicial by causing the
jury to reject Mr. Therrien’s claim on the ground that he was a bad person. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.
D. Remittitur
Target’s final argument is that the district court erred in denying a motion
for remittitur or, alternatively, a new trial. The $500,000 damages award, Target
contends, is tainted by improper remarks in Mr. Therrien’s closing argument and is
not supported by the evidence. We reject both contentions.
In diversity actions, federal law governs the grant of motions for remittitur
or a new trial. See Blanke, 152 F.3d at 1235–36.
We review the district court’s denial of [a] motion for remittitur or a
new trial due to excessive damages under a highly deferential
standard, reversing only if we can discern a manifest abuse of
discretion. Under this standard, the jury’s award is inviolate unless
we find it so excessive that it shocks the judicial conscience and
-27-
raises an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption, or
other improper cause invaded the trial.
M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 565 F.3d 753, 766 (10th Cir. 2009)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
We begin with Mr. Therrien’s closing argument. Target complains that the
argument (1) “clearly and repetitively asked the jury to punish Target,” Aplt. Br.
at 48; (2) impermissibly asked the jury to put themselves in his position; and (3)
mentioned Target’s wealth and its expert’s fees. Because Target concedes that it
did not object to the remarks that it now challenges on appeal, we accept its
position that plain-error review applies. As stated earlier, a party claiming plain
error must show, among other things, that its substantive rights were affected. See
Royal Maccabees, 393 F.3d at 1180. Target has not made that showing. Although
some of the remarks may have been inappropriate, they were not so inflammatory
as to have prejudiced Target.
We also hold that the jury award is supported by sufficient evidence.
Because Mr. Therrien stipulated that he would not seek compensation for mental
or psychological harm, the jury was instructed that it could not award “any
damages or other compensation for emotional distress, mental injury or
psychological harm as a result of this incident.” Aplt. App., Vol. V at 1123.
Instead, damages were limited to “the amount of money which will reasonably and
fairly compensate [Mr. Therrien] for the following elements of damage proved by
-28-
the evidence to have resulted from, or be directly caused by, the negligence of the
defendant”: (1) past and future physical pain and suffering, (2) physical condition
before and after the accident, (3) nature and extent of injuries, (4) disfigurement,
(5) physical impairment, (6) reasonable expenses of necessary medical care, and
(7) age. Id. at 1122.
Mr. Therrien presented evidence that his injuries included a spleen
laceration, a stab wound through the abdominal wall, and a sprained shoulder. The
knife wound was life-threatening and the extent of internal bleeding forced doctors
to perform open surgery (as opposed to laparoscopic surgery, a less invasive
procedure) to examine fully and repair the damage. Mr. Therrien was hospitalized
for six days, though his recovery lasted much longer. He testified that in the six
months following surgery, he remained mostly bed- and chair-ridden, and gained
almost 100 pounds. It was not until the second year after surgery that he could
engage in his normal activities. Mr. Therrien’s medical expenses totaled
$34,041.67.
The jury also heard evidence that Mr. Therrien’s injuries caused him much
pain. According to Mr. Therrien, in the first month after surgery he was in “very
terrible, terrible pain” and had difficulty sleeping and walking. Id., Vol. III at
629. His doctor testified that recovery from open surgery is slow and painful,
because the operation involves cutting through muscles and nerves. In addition,
the blood in his abdomen “cause[d] a large inflammatory response, and that’s quite
-29-
painful.” Cross-Aplt. Supp. App. at 103. During his recuperation Mr. Therrien’s
abdominal pain worsened and the problem was diagnosed as a chronic-pain
syndrome, probably caused by scar tissue from the surgery. Mr. Therrien still
experienced significant abdominal pain five months after the stabbing. By April
2006—nearly a year after the incident—his doctor characterized Mr. Therrien’s
pain as “static and stable. A lot of it he had gotten used to, to some extent.” Id. at
107. Mr. Therrien testified: “I hurt every day. I have a dull, aching pain where
the knife went into my spleen.” Aplt. App., Vol. III at 635.
Considering Mr. Therrien’s life-threatening injury, the invasive medical
procedure needed to repair it, the pain he experienced, and his physical
impairment during recovery, we cannot say that $500,000 is so excessive as to
shock our conscience. To be sure, the jury award exceeds Mr. Therrien’s medical
expenses. But medical expenses are not the only measure of compensatory
damages, which, as the jury was instructed, also account for factors such as the
nature and extent of injury, physical impairment, and pain and suffering. We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Target’s
motion for remittitur or a new trial. See Blanke, 152 F.3d at 1228, 1236 (affirming
a $500,000 jury award in 1995).
E. Punitive Damages
Mr. Therrien raises one issue on cross-appeal: whether the district court
erred when it refused to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. We
-30-
review de novo whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, would support a jury award of punitive damages. See Woodworker’s
Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1999).
In Oklahoma a jury may award punitive damages if it finds by clear and
convincing evidence that “[t]he defendant has been guilty of reckless disregard for
the rights of others,” Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 9.1(B)(1) (2010), or “acted
intentionally and with malice towards others,” id. § 9.1(C)(1), (D)(1). The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has interpreted § 9.1 to require evidence of “reckless
disregard toward another’s rights from which malice and evil intent may be
inferred.” Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 121 P.3d 1080, 1106 (Okla. 2005).
One acts with reckless disregard if he “was either aware, or did not care, that there
was a substantial and unnecessary risk that [his] conduct would cause serious
injury to others.” Okla. Unif. Civil Jury Instruc.—Civil 5.6, available at
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=73977.
Further, the conduct “must have been unreasonable under the circumstances, and
also there must have been a high probability that the conduct would cause serious
harm to another person.” Id.; see Black v. M & W Gear Co., 269 F.3d 1220, 1239
(10th Cir. 2001). Mr. Therrien contends that the trial evidence would have
supported a jury finding of such reckless disregard.
We disagree. Mr. Therrien proffered no evidence that Target’s conduct
created a high probability of serious harm to another person. Although there was
-31-
evidence of several incidents involving armed shoplifting suspects, none had
resulted in injury to a customer, or even to a security officer. And however
negligent Target may have been, it would be unreasonable to infer from that
conduct that Target possessed an evil intent. We therefore reject Mr. Therrien’s
cross-appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment below. Target’s motion to seal its Combined
Reply and Response Brief is DENIED and the brief will be unsealed 30 days from
the filing of this opinion unless Target files (under seal) a motion setting forth
precisely what information should be kept confidential and why lesser measures
(such as submission of a redacted brief) would not provide effective protection.
-32-
OSCN Found Document: EXEMPLARY OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES- FIRST STAGE
Oklahoma Jury Instructions- Civil
Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions
Oklahoma Jury Instructions- Civil
Chapter 5
Section Instruction 5.6 - EXEMPLARY OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES- FIRST STAGE
Cite as: O.S. §, __ __
Instruction No. 5.6
EXEMPLARY OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES- FIRST STAGE
20 10.
If you find in favor of [Plaintiff], and grant [him/her] actual damages, then you must also find by a separate verdict, whether
hether
12,
owar other
[Defendant] (acted in reckless disregard of the rights of others) (and/or) (acted intentionally and with malice towards others).
Ju ly
[Plaintiff] has the burden of proving this by clear and convincing evidence. By that I mean that you must be persuaded, considering all
the evidence in the case, that the proposition on which the party has this burden of proof is highly probable and free from serious
igh
n
n o aware, or did not care, that there
doubt.
he
efendant] w
[The conduct of [Defendant] was in reckless disregard of another's rights if [Defendant] was either
Ccircumstances, and also there must have been a
nable ue
ld serio
was a substantial and unnecessary risk that [his/her/its] conduct would cause serious injury to others. In order for the conduct to be in
tz/S
reckless disregard of another's rights, it must have been unreasonable under the
high probability that the conduct would cause serious harm to another person.]p
r of a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse.]
Ha
he doi
[Malice involves either hatred, spite, or ill-will, or else the doing
u dge later part of this trial. If you find that [Defendant] did not act (in reckless
kless disreg
If you find that [Defendant] acted (in reckless disregard of the rights of others) or (intentionally and with malice towards others), you
may award punitive damages against [ efe
y J and with malice towards others), you may not award punitive damages against
ainst [Defendant] in a
thers) b
ed
(int
disregard of the rights of others) or (intentionally
[Defendant].
Notes on Use vi
ew
L astis for use in actions filed on or after August 25, 1995. For actions filed before then, see Instruction No. 5.5, supra.
nstruc
This Instruction
This Instruction should be given when the jury retires to determine liability and the amount of actual damages if there has been a
showing of reckless disregard or malice in an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract. The trial court should
select between the alternatives in the first paragraph, or should give both of them, as the evidence warrants. The trial court should
give one or both of the alternatives in the last paragraph, as appropriate, in order to inform the jury of the effect of its findings on the
award of punitive damages. The Verdict Forms in Instruction Nos. 5.7 and 5.8 should accompany this Instruction.
If the jury finds reckless disregard or malice by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court should then give the second stage
instruction in Instruction No. 5.9, infra, in order for the jury to determine the amount of punitive damages.
All evidence relating to liability for punitive damages should be admitted in the first stage, and evidence which relates solely to the
amount of punitive damages should not be admitted until the second stage.
Comments
This and the following Instruction are drafted to conform to Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 9.1 [23-9.1] (Supp. 1995), which provides:
A. In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the jury, in addition to actual damages, may,
subject to the provisions and limitations in subsections B, C and D of this section, give damages for the sake of example
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OSCN Found Document: EXEMPLARY OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES- FIRST STAGE
and by way of punishing the defendant based upon the following factors: the seriousness of the hazard to the public
arising from the defendant's misconduct; the profitability of the misconduct to the defendant; the duration of the
misconduct and any concealment of it; the degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard and of its excessiveness;
the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct or hazard; in the case of a defendant which
is a corporation or other entity, the number and level of employees involved in causing or concealing the misconduct;
and the financial condition of the defendant.
B. Category I. Where the jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of reckless
disregard for the rights of others, or an insurer has recklessly disregarded its duty to deal fairly and act in good faith with
its insured, the jury, in a separate proceeding conducted after the jury has made such finding and awarded actual
damages, may award exemplary damages in an amount not to exceed the greater of:
1. One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00); or
2. The amount of the actual damages awarded.
C. Category II. Where the jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
1. The defendant has acted intentionally and with malice towards others; or
2. An insurer has intentionally and with malice breached its
duty to deal fairly and act in good faith with its insured,
10.
the jury, in a separate proceeding conducted after the jury has
20
made such finding and awarded actual damages, may award exemplary
12,
damages in an amount not to exceed the greatest of:
a. Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00),
b. twice the amount of actual damages awarded, or
Ju ly
n
no
efenda
c. the increased financial benefit derived by the defendant or insurer as a direct result of the
f othe
conduct causing the injury to the plaintiff and other persons or entities.
ges awarde C he
D. The trial court shall reduce any award for punitive damages awarded pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph c of
e
/ Su
h
this paragraph by the amount it finds the defendant or insurer has previously paid as a result of all punitive damage
artz
lahoma
verdicts entered in any court of the State of Oklahoma for the same conduct by the defendant or insurer. D. Category III.
cing evidenc
Where the jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
H
2. An insurer Ju
t
dge and with malice breached its duty to deal fairly and act in good faith with its
acte
1. The defendant has acted intentionally and with malice towards others; or
by
insure has intentionally
insur d, an
insured, and the court finds, on the record and out of the presence of the jury, that there is evidence
d
e weconductreasonable doubttothat the defendant or insurer acted intentionally and withafter theand engaged
beyon
beyond a malice
t vi
in life-threatening humans, the jury, in a separate proceeding conducted jury has
made such finding and awarded actual damages, may award exemplary damages in any amount the jury
L as deems appropriate, without regard to the limitations set forth in subsections B and C of this section.
E. In determining the amount, if any, of exemplary damages to be awarded under either subsection B, C or D of this
section, the jury shall make the award based upon the factors set forth in subsection A of this section.
F. The provisions of this section are severable, and if any part or provision thereof shall be held void, the decision of the
court shall not affect or impair any of the remaining parts or provisions thereof.
G. This section shall apply to all civil actions filed after the effective date of this act.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided in Smith v. Grizzi, 564 P.2d 1009, 1013 (Okla. 1977) that Okla. Const. art. 7, § 15 required a
jury to know the effect of its answer in order to render a general verdict. Accordingly, the Committee has included the last paragraph
to explain to the jury the effect of its findings.
The definition of malice is based on that found in Malik v. Apex Int'l Alloys, Inc., 762 F.2d 77, 80 (10th Cir. 1985) ("Malice is defined
as a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse."), and Bennett v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 549 P.2d 393, 397
(Okla. Ct. App. 1975) ("Malice is defined as the intentional doing of a wrongful act without justification or excuse.").
Citationizer© Summary of Documents Citing This Document
Cite Name Level
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OSCN Found Document: EXEMPLARY OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES- FIRST STAGE
None Found.
Citationizer: Table of Authority
Cite Name Level
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals Cases
Cite Name Level
1975 OK CIV APP 71, 549 P.2d 393, BENNETT v. CITY NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST CO. Cited
Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases
Cite Name Level
1977 OK 91, 564 P.2d 1009, SMITH v. GIZZI Cited
20 10.
ly 12,
n Ju
he no
e C
/ Su
H artz
Ju dge
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