United States v. Cervantes-Samaniego

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 13, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 10-3043
(D.C. No. 2:07-CR-20099-JWL-DJW-17)
CARLOS CERVANTES- (D. Kan.)
SAMANIEGO,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Carlos Cervantes-Samaniego pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to conspiracy to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana and
5 kilograms of cocaine. The district court sentenced defendant to a total of
235 months’ imprisonment. This sentence was below the statutory maximum of
life imprisonment and within the advisory guideline range determined by the
*
This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
district court. In his plea agreement, the defendant “knowingly and voluntarily
waive[d] any right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter in connection with
[his] prosecution, . . . conviction, or the components of the sentence to be
imposed,” if the sentence was “within the guideline range determined appropriate
by the [c]ourt.” Mot. to Enforce, App., Vol. I, at A12. Nevertheless, the
defendant filed a notice of appeal, seeking to challenge his sentence. The
government has moved to enforce the appeal waiver under United States v. Hahn,
359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). We grant the
government’s motion and dismiss the appeal.
In Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325, this court held that “in reviewing appeals
brought after a defendant has entered into an appeal waiver,” this court will
determine “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of
appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a
miscarriage of justice.” A miscarriage of justice will result if (1) “the district
court relied on an impermissible factor such as race”; (2) “ineffective assistance
of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver
invalid”; (3) “the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum”; or (4) “the waiver is
otherwise unlawful.” Id. at 1327 (internal quotations marks omitted).
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The defendant contends that his intended appeal does not fall within the
scope of the appeal waiver. He bases this on his counsel’s statement to the
court at the plea colloquy that the defendant was not stipulating in his plea
agreement to the amount and kinds of drugs attributed to him with respect to
a relevant-conduct sentencing enhancement or to a weapons sentencing
enhancement. He argues that the broad language of his appeal waiver was
narrowed by these reservations, such that his waiver is limited to an appeal from
the minimum sentence which could statutorily be imposed. We disagree, and find
that nothing said at the plea colloquy altered the broad and unambiguous appeal
waiver in the plea agreement.
At the plea colloquy, the court carefully explained the sentencing process
to the defendant, App., Vol. I, at A25-A30, including his right to file objections to
the presentence investigation report, id. at A28, and his right, at the sentencing
hearing, to put on evidence concerning sentencing and to make arguments about
sentencing, id. at A28 to A29. The defendant told the court he understood the
sentencing process, he understood that only the court would make the sentence
determination, and he understood that he could not withdraw his guilty plea if he
did not agree with the court’s sentencing determination. Id. at A29-A30, A38.
The court explained the appeal waiver to the defendant, and the defendant told the
court he understood he was giving up his right to appeal the sentence imposed by
the court. Id. at A38-A39.
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The defendant’s counsel did make clear at the plea colloquy that the
defendant was not stipulating in the plea agreement to any relevant-conduct or
weapons sentencing enhancements. Id. at A34 to A37. But these statements did
not alter the plea agreement or its broad appeal waiver. The plea agreement did
not limit the defendant’s right to file objections to, or put on evidence regarding,
sentencing matters prior to the district court’s imposition of the sentence,
including relevant conduct and weapons sentencing enhancements. But once the
district court imposed the sentence, the broad appeal waiver prohibited the
defendant from challenging the sentence or “any component” of the sentence,
unless the sentence exceeded the advisory sentencing guideline determined
appropriate by the court. Id. at A12.
The appeal waiver did not provide any exception permitting the defendant
to challenge the sentence enhancements determined by the district court to be
appropriate, including relevant-conduct or weapons enhancements. The only
reservation in the appeal waiver was if the sentence imposed by the court
exceeded the advisory guideline determined by the court. The sentence imposed
by the court was within the guideline range the court determined appropriate, and
therefore, the defendant’s proposed appeal challenging his sentence is within the
scope of the appeal waiver. Cf. United States v. Lyons, 510 F.3d 1225, 1233
(10th Cir. 2007) (holding that defendant’s appeal of the denial of his motion to
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dismiss was within scope of his appeal waiver because the plea agreement’s
waiver provision did not reserve this issue as an exception to the waiver).
Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion to enforce the appeal
waiver and DISMISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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