United States v. Gilmore

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 23, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 09-3317
v. (D. Kansas)
JEREMY GILMORE, also known as (D.C. No. 2:07-CR-20164-JWL-5)
Hummer,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, EBEL, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
I. Introduction
Jeremy Gilmore appeals his conviction for one count of conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He argues the trial court
erred in refusing his request for an instruction on the lesser included offense of
conspiracy to possess methamphetamine and in giving an instruction on aiding
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
and abetting. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court
AFFIRMS.
II. Background
On April 3, 2007, acting on a confidential tip that occupants of the vehicle
sold methamphetamine, officers stopped Gilmore’s vehicle after observing traffic
violations. During the stop, officers found drug paraphernalia and all occupants
were arrested. Gilmore was indicted with five co-conspirators, Leona Garcia;
Kevin Funk; Wayne Fitts, Jr.; Copper Lesco; and Steve Saindon, for conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of
methamphetamine. Gilmore was convicted by a jury after a four-day trial.
At trial, one Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agent testified
about the DEA’s investigation of a methamphetamine distribution conspiracy in
the Kansas City, Kansas, and St. Joseph, Missouri, areas. The investigation
uncovered two high-level participants in the conspiracy, Miguel Cota-Gastelum,
who received methamphetamine shipped from Mexico into the U.S., and Garcia,
who distributed the methamphetamine for Cota-Gastelum from her residence.
Garcia distributed to Fitts, Funk, and other mid-level distributors, who would then
sell smaller quantities to users. Gilmore, who had one of the lowest level roles in
the conspiracy, facilitated drug deals by allowing Fitts and Funk to use his
vehicle to go to Garcia’s residence in Kansas City to purchase methamphetamine
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in bulk and bring the drugs back to the St. Joseph area for distribution. On
several occasions, he accompanied Fitts to Garcia’s to purchase
methamphetamine.
Fitts testified he dealt with Garcia over a period of about five months,
purchasing two- to eight-ounce quantities of methamphetamine at a time for
resale. Around this time, Fitts met Gilmore through a mutual acquaintance. In a
later encounter, Fitts and Funk were on their way to buy methamphetamine at
Garcia’s house when Fitts’s car broke down. Fitts asked Gilmore to give them a
ride to Garcia’s to purchase methamphetamine, and Gilmore did so. Gilmore then
purchased a quarter-ounce of methamphetamine from Fitts out of the four ounces
Fitts and Funk purchased from Garcia. Gilmore entered Garcia’s house that day
and, as was a standard requirement for new visitors, Garcia required him to inject
methamphetamine in front of her to prove he was not an informant. A few days
later, Gilmore picked up Fitts and the two went riding around, stopping at a few
houses where Fitts would sell methamphetamine. One person to whom Fitts sold
drugs on this occasion was an individual referred to him by Gilmore. In exchange
for the ride, Fitts gave Gilmore drugs.
On another occasion, Gilmore drove Fitts and Funk to Garcia’s house,
where Fitts and Funk purchased nine ounces of methamphetamine in Gilmore’s
presence. Funk and Gilmore tested the drugs to ensure they were of good quality.
On the way back, Gilmore drove Fitts around to deliver drugs to various of Fitts’s
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customers. Fitts again gave Gilmore some drugs on this occasion, and sold him
an additional quantity. On at least two other occasions, Gilmore helped Fitts
collect money owed to him by his customers: on the first occasion, Gilmore
collected money directly from one of Fitts’s customers on Fitts’s behalf; and on
the other, Gilmore drove Fitts around to pick up money owed to him. All
together, Fitts testified Gilmore accompanied him to Garcia’s residence to buy
drugs on at least four, and perhaps as many as six, occasions.
Funk testified he and Fitts grew up together and worked together selling
methamphetamine, including methamphetamine obtained from Garcia. Funk
stated Gilmore’s involvement was premised on his ownership of a legitimately
licenced and insured vehicle, the absence of which had been a problem for Funk
and Fitts in the past. Funk testified as to two separate instances when Gilmore
accompanied him and Fitts to Garcia’s house. He further testified Gilmore
witnessed the transactions at Garcia’s house and on one visit used
methamphetamine at the house. Funk also explained he used Gilmore’s vehicle
on many occasions to deliver drugs, giving Gilmore drugs in exchange. Gilmore
accompanied Funk on the deliveries, and was aware of the purpose of the trips.
Garcia testified, generally corroborating Fitts’s and Funk’s characterization
of Gilmore’s presence at, and role in, the transactions. She further described
Gilmore as one of Fitts’s “flunkies” because he would “do anything [Fitts] said.”
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Saindon, Garcia’s ex-boyfriend, also testified and generally corroborated Garcia’s
and Fitts’s testimony.
Several of Fitts’s and Funk’s customers testified Gilmore was present when
they purchased methamphetamine, and that Gilmore’s vehicle was used for
transportation during these exchanges. In addition, Gilmore’s ex-girlfriend
testified Gilmore provided her with methamphetamine which they would use
together. She further testified Gilmore obtained his methamphetamine from Fitts
and that she saw Fitts on a nearly daily basis, getting high on each visit. She was
present on one occasion when Gilmore drove Fitts around delivering drugs,
making between ten and fifteen stops. She testified she expressed concern to
Gilmore about being in the presence of such a large quantity of drugs and that
Gilmore told her it was okay and he had no problem with it.
In a statement to the police and at trial, Gilmore admitted transporting Fitts
and Funk to Garcia’s house, having knowledge of the transactions and purpose of
the trips, getting methamphetamine from Fitts, and using the methamphetamine.
Gilmore also testified he shared the methamphetamine from Fitts with several of
his friends and with his ex-girlfriend. He admitted he attempted to collect money
owed to Fitts on one occasion, but claimed he did so only because Fitts sold
Gilmore bad methamphetamine and Gilmore was trying to collect what he felt
Fitts owed Gilmore as compensation.
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At the close of the government’s case, Gilmore moved for a judgment of
acquittal, which was denied. Again, after the jury’s guilty verdict, Gilmore
moved for a new trial or for judgment of acquittal, claiming the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction and challenging various aspects of the jury
instructions. The district court denied those motions and this appeal followed.
III. Discussion
A. Lesser Included Offense Instruction
Gilmore requested a jury instruction on conspiracy to possess
methamphetamine as a lesser included offense of the charged offense, conspiracy
to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The district court denied
his request, reasoning that the requirements for giving a lesser included offense
instruction were not met. This court reviews whether a lesser offense is included
in the offense charged de novo and the district court’s determination whether the
evidence justifies a lesser included instruction for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Mullins, 613 F.3d 1273, 1284 (10th Cir. 2010).
A defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction only if four
requirements are met: “(1) there was a proper request; (2) the lesser included
offense includes some but not all of the elements of the offense charged; (3) the
elements differentiating the two offenses are in dispute; and (4) a jury could
rationally convict the defendant of the lesser offense and acquit him of the
greater offense.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the district court concluded, and
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the government concedes, the first two requirements were met. The district court
determined, however, that the third and fourth requirements were not met. As to
the third prong, the court explained:
Mr. Gilmore’s request for the lesser-included offense instruction
fails on the third prong because it is not the elements differentiating
the two offenses that are in dispute; rather, the matter in dispute is
whether Mr. Gilmore was a member of the conspiracy or just a
consumer. The government presented overwhelming evidence that
at the very least Mr. Fitts, Mr. Funk, and Ms. Garcia were members
in a conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute
methamphetamine. It is clear that Mr. Gilmore’s theory of the case
was that he was in a simple buyer-seller relationship with at the very
least Mr. Fitts and perhaps Mr. Funk. Therefore, the critical
question is whether Mr. Gilmore was also a member of this
conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute.
The district court’s reasoning is correct. Had the dispute at trial centered on
whether the conspirators’ goal was to distribute or merely to possess
methamphetamine, a lesser included offense instruction would have been proper.
Gilmore, however, did not dispute the nature of the conspiracy at least between
Fitts, Funk, and Garcia. He admitted on the stand that he knew the three were
distributing methamphetamine. He simply disputed his role in that conspiracy,
claiming he was a user, not a co-conspirator. Accordingly, Gilmore’s request for
an instruction on conspiracy to possess methamphetamine is, in essence, a
request for an instruction concerning a different, uncharged conspiracy, not a
lesser included offense of the charged conspiracy. Because the dispute was not
about the objective of the charged conspiracy, but rather about Gilmore’s
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involvement in the conspiracy, the district court correctly concluded the lesser
included offense instruction was not required.
The district court also correctly decided the fourth prong of the test was
not met because the jury could not rationally have convicted him of conspiracy to
possess methamphetamine, but not conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
methamphetamine. There was no evidence presented at trial from which a jury
could have found Gilmore engaged in or was associated with a conspiracy merely
to possess methamphetamine. All evidence showed distribution was central to
the charged conspiracy, including Gilmore’s own testimony.
Gilmore makes no attempt to demonstrate the instruction was justified
under the four-prong test. Rather, he argues the district court impermissibly
engaged in fact finding reserved for the jury by referencing Gilmore’s admission
at trial to sharing methamphetamine with friends and acquaintances and
concluding Gilmore was precluded from arguing his participation was limited to
possession as a result. 1 This argument is without merit. The district court was
required to determine whether the lesser included offense instruction was
justified by the evidence presented at trial, and this court reverses the district
court’s evaluation of the evidence only when it constitutes an abuse of
discretion. See id. at 1284. No such abuse of discretion occurred here. As the
1
The district court denied Gilmore’s separate request for an instruction that
distribution does not include sharing drugs among drug users, and Gilmore has
not appealed that denial.
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district court concluded, there was no evidence that would support a jury finding
that Gilmore conspired only to possess methamphetamine, but not that he
conspired to possess it with intent to distribute. Contributing to the calculus was
Gilmore’s own testimony, referenced by the district court, that he obtained
methamphetamine from Fitts, and “shared” that methamphetamine with friends,
which bears on the distribution aspect of the conspiracy. The district court did
not err in denying Gilmore’s request for a lesser included offense instruction.
B. Aiding and Abetting Instruction
Gilmore also appeals the district court’s decision to give an aiding and
abetting instruction to the jury, to which Gilmore objected below, arguing it
unconstitutionally lowered the government’s burden of proof. The district court,
however, gave the jury a special verdict form in which the jury had to indicate
whether it found Gilmore to be guilty as a principal or as an aider and abettor,
and the jury marked “principal.” Given the verdict form evidencing the jury’s
conviction of Gilmore as a principal, this court need not decide whether the
aiding and abetting instruction was erroneous. Any error was harmless because
it did not contribute to the verdict. See United States v. Hamilton, 587 F.3d
1199, 1218 (10th Cir. 2009) (“A constitutional error is harmless if it appears
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained.” (quotations omitted)).
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C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Lastly, Gilmore challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction. This court reviews a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence de
novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.
United States v. Pulido-Jacobo, 377 F.3d 1124, 1129 (10th Cir. 2004). To prove
conspiracy, the government must show that (1) two or more persons agreed to
violate the law, (2) the defendant knew at least the essential objectives of the
conspiracy, (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a part of it, and
(4) the alleged coconspirators were interdependent. Id.The evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to sustain
Gilmore’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute methamphetamine. As to the first element, an agreement to violate the
law can be implied, rather than express. United States v. Wardell, 591 F.3d
1279, 1287 (10th Cir. 2009). Here, the jury could rationally infer an agreement
to distribute methamphetamine based on evidence that Gilmore jointly traveled
with Fitts and Funk to Garcia’s residence where Fitts and Funk would obtain
methamphetamine, Gilmore traveled with them to customers’ houses where they
would sell methamphetamine and collect money, and Gilmore was often present
for these transactions. Moreover, Gilmore actively participated in some of these
transactions by, at least on one occasion, collecting money on Fitts’ behalf and
on another, testing the methamphetamine to ensure its quality before Fitts
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purchased it. Gilmore also brought a new customer to Fitts. This evidence,
taken as a whole, is sufficient to permit a jury to infer an agreement to violate
the law.
As to the second element, the government must prove the defendant knew
of the common purpose of the conspiracy. See United States v. Johnston, 146
F.3d 785, 789 (10th Cir. 1998). Here, as alleged, the essential objective of the
conspiracy was to distribute methamphetamine. The same evidence that
supported the finding Gilmore agreed to violate the law is also sufficient for a
jury to find Gilmore knew the essential objective of the conspiracy. Gilmore,
moreover, testified that he knew Fitts, Funk, and Garcia were dealing
methamphetamine and he knew the purpose of the trips to Garcia’s house and to
Fitts’s customers’ houses.
Third, a finding of knowing and voluntary participation can be premised
on evidence of only slight participation, so long as that participation is
established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Gilmore vigorously contests this
element, arguing the evidence at trial merely established he was a drug user, not
a member of the conspiracy. He specifically points to a lack of evidence that he
personally sold drugs for money. He argues the conspiracy evidence was based
only on his associations with conspirators and knowledge about the conspiracy,
but that no evidence showed his intent to participate. See Wardell, 591 F.3d at
1288 (noting mere association is insufficient to demonstrate conspiracy). The
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evidence presented at trial, however, forecloses Gilmore’s argument. Evidence
showed Gilmore’s conduct was not limited to purchasing drugs and using drugs,
but that he also facilitated drug purchases and sales by testing drugs, providing
transportation, making contacts with clients, bringing in a new client, collecting
money owed, and being present for transactions. This evidence is more than
sufficient for a jury to find that Gilmore knowingly and voluntarily participated
in the conspiracy.
In addition, Gilmore’s assertion that there was no evidence introduced at
trial that he personally distributed drugs is incorrect. First, a customer of Fitts’s
testified that he paid not only Fitts, but also Gilmore, for methamphetamine by
stealing clothes and giving them to Gilmore in a size dictated by Gilmore. Fitts
also testified that based on conversations with Gilmore himself, Fitts believed
Gilmore was reselling some of the methamphetamine Fitts provided to him.
Although not necessary to sustain his conviction for conspiracy, this evidence
would allow a jury to find Gilmore himself distributed drugs.
Gilmore also testified that he “shared” methamphetamine with his
girlfriend, friends, and acquaintances. But the question of whether and when
mere “sharing” of drugs constitutes their “distribution” remains unresolved in
this circuit. In United States v. McIntyre, 836 F.2d 467 (10th Cir. 1987), this
court suggested sharing drugs would not be distribution. See id. at 471 (noting
“[t]here [wa]s no indication that defendant was making a profit or distributing
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cocaine when he merely shared his purchases with his friends present at the time
of sale”). But, because that case was directly addressing what was sufficient
evidence to prove a conspiracy to distribute, see id., its suggestion that sharing
would not be distribution is dicta. Later, in United States v. Santistevan, 39 F.3d
250 (10th Cir. 1994), this court noted generally that distribution does not require
a sale, but only actual, constructive or attempted physical transfer of drugs from
one person to another. See id. at 257 (applying 21 U.S.C.§ 802(8) and (11)). In
Santistevan, however, the government argued only that an actual transfer had
occurred and this court rejected that argument because there was no evidence
that the defendant ever transferred physical possession of the drugs to another
person. See id. at 257 & 258 n.10. Therefore, Santistevan’s general statements
about what constitutes distribution are also only dicta. Because we need not
address here whether “sharing” drugs can constitute their “distribution,” we
leave resolution of that question for another day.
Finally, interdependence is present if the defendant facilitated the
endeavors of other conspirators or facilitated the venture as a whole. Wardell,
591 F.3d at 1291. The facts already discussed are sufficient to support a jury
finding on this element. Although Gilmore argues the use of his vehicle was
provided in exchange for drugs, consistent only with Gilmore’s status as an
addict and desire to use drugs, not to distribute them, the jury was not required to
take that view of the evidence. Specifically, evidence showed Gilmore’s vehicle
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was used heavily by Fitts and Funk, and testimony at trial indicated Gilmore was
needed to complete transactions because he had a licensed and insured vehicle,
which Fitts and Funk were lacking. Gilmore’s further argument that Fitts and
Funk were not dependent on Gilmore as evidenced by the comparatively few
times that Gilmore took them to see Garcia in contrast to the approximately fifty
times that they bought from her is also unavailing. At trial, witnesses repeatedly
testified that Gilmore helped Fitts and Funk in a variety of ways to complete
their purchases and sales of methamphetamine. Gilmore was also involved in
efforts to collect money from Fitts’s customers, a fact that alone would support a
jury finding of interdependence. Hamilton, 587 F.3d at 1209-10. It was not
necessary for the government to prove Gilmore was the crucial link without
which the conspiracy could not have succeeded, but merely, as explained above,
that he facilitated the endeavors of the conspiracy. The jury verdict was clearly
supported by sufficient evidence that he did so.
IV. Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, Gilmore’s conviction is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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