United States v. Villanueva

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 29, 2011
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 10-2239
(D.C. No. 1:10-CR-01006-JEC-1)
OSCAR RAUL VILLANUEVA, (D. N. Mex.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge, and
FREUDENTHAL, District Judge **.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is,
therefore, submitted without oral argument.
Defendant Oscar Raul Villanueva appeals the district court’s sentence of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
The Honorable Nancy D. Freudenthal, Chief United States District Judge
for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
sixty months’ imprisonment for (1) conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 846; and (2)
possession of heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. According to Villanueva, the district
court should have applied the “safety-valve” provision contained in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(f) and sentenced him without regard to the statutory minimum of sixty
months’ imprisonment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm.
I
Factual Background
On March 22, 2010, Jarrell Perry, a Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agent, was on duty at the Limousine Express Bus Station in Albuquerque,
New Mexico. There, he observed passengers disembarking from a bus that had
recently arrived from El Paso, Texas. Agent Perry specifically noticed Villanueva
as he departed from the bus because he was carrying a small black satchel and no
other luggage and because he walked through the bus station without meeting
anyone. ROA, Vol. 2 at 4. Perry also noticed that Villanueva’s tennis shoes were
bulging. Id. Suspecting that he might be transporting narcotics in his shoes,
Perry approached Villanueva, displayed his DEA badge, and asked for permission
to speak with him. Id. Villanueva eventually gave Perry permission to search
him, and Perry then handcuffed him in order to perform the search. Id. While
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conducting the search, Perry lifted up the innersole of Villanueva’s shoe and
found a substance wrapped in plastic wrap that was later confirmed to be heroin.
Id.After Agent Perry removed the handcuffs, Villanueva “attempted to flee the
area on foot.” Id. Following a “short chase,” Agent Perry apprehended
Villanueva and placed him under arrest. Id. Shortly thereafter, Rudy Villarreal,
an officer with the Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Office who speaks fluent Spanish,
approached Agent Perry and offered his assistance. Id. From then on, Agent
Perry communicated with Villanueva through Officer Villarreal. Id. After
Villanueva was informed of his Miranda rights, he agreed to speak with Agent
Perry. Id. Villanueva stated that he was being paid $1,000 to deliver the drugs to
someone in Albuquerque who was going to call him on the cell phone he was
carrying in the black satchel. Id., Vol. 2 at 4-5. At Agent Perry’s request,
Villanueva agreed to call the person and set up a meeting to deliver the drugs.
Id., Vol. 2 at 5.
A few minutes later, Jorge Aispuro-Aristegui drove up to the front of the
bus station, spotted Villanueva, and signaled for him to come to the car. Id.Villanueva walked up to the passenger side of the car and spoke through the
passenger side window, which was slightly open. Id. As Villanueva began to
enter the car, DEA agents opened the driver’s side door and arrested Aispuro-
Aristegui. Id.3
Villanueva was subsequently taken to the DEA office in Albuquerque. Id.There, officers searched his satchel and found a few pieces of paper with illegible
notes scribbled on them and three bundles of cash totaling $4,250.75. Id. Each
cash bundle was folded in half and wrapped in rubber bands. Id. Villanueva
agreed to speak with DEA agents through an interpreter. Id. He admitted to
knowingly transporting drugs, although he claimed that he did not know the type
or quantity of the narcotics that had been placed in his shoes. Id., Vol. 2 at 6.
Villanueva also told the agents that a friend in Mexico had asked him if he
wanted to earn $1,000 by transporting drugs from Mexico to El Paso and that he
agreed to do so because he needed the money. 1 Id.Villanueva further informed DEA agents that two weeks after he spoke with
his friend, he received a telephone call from a man known as “Pariente” asking if
he was willing to transport drugs. Id. Villanueva agreed to travel to El Paso to
meet with him. Prior to traveling to El Paso, Villanueva renewed his visa, which
enabled him to legally travel to and from the United States. Id. Villanueva
initially informed DEA agents that he arrived in El Paso on Friday, March 19 and
spent the weekend in El Paso with Pariente’s friends. Id. However, when DEA
agents told Villanueva that records obtained from the El Paso Intelligence Center
1
In his opening brief, Villanueva states that he has had serious financial
troubles resulting from a car accident in which he fractured his arm and from
medical treatment for his mother’s “diabetes, kidney failure, hypertension, and
lumbar spine problems.” Aplt. Br. at 6.
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(EPIC) indicated he had traveled multiple times between El Paso and Cuidad
Juarez that weekend, Villanueva admitted that he stayed the weekend in a hotel in
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico and not in El Paso. Id. Villanueva then stated that he met
with Pariente at the hotel and discussed the pending drug transaction. Id.Pariente gave Villanueva the shoes, the black satchel, the cell phone, and
instructions regarding how to deliver the drugs to Aispuro-Aristegui in
Albuquerque. Id.On April 5, almost two weeks after his arrest, Villanueva and his attorney
met with DEA agents and the federal prosecutor for a “debriefing.” Id., Vol. 2 at
7. Villanueva stated that he first traveled from El Paso to Albuquerque on March
19 with his friend Cesar Valenzuela, who was looking to purchase a car in
Albuquerque. Id., Vol. 2 at 8. He further stated that while he waited for Pariente
in Cuidad Juarez during the weekend of March 20, he crossed into the United
States several times to shop with money Pariente had previously given him for
expenses. Id.DEA agents questioned Villanueva regarding the notes and money found in
his possession on March 22. Id. When asked about the notes, Villanueva stated
that they were “just notes” and were not related to any other trips from Mexico to
the United States. Id. When asked about the money found on his person,
Villanueva stated that the money belonged to him and that he was going to use it
to pay for arm surgery and to buy vitamins and nutrition supplements, which he
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planned to sell for profit in Mexico. Id., Vol. 2 at 8-9. Villanueva stated that he
arranged the money in the three bundles “for no particular reason,” and he denied
that he had received the money from drug trafficking. He also insisted that he
had never previously delivered drugs to anyone. Id., Vol. 2 at 9.
Sentencing
Villanueva subsequently pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute
and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute. The district court set a date
for sentencing, and the probation office prepared a presentence report. Because
DEA officials recovered over 980 grams of heroin from Villanueva’s shoes, the
probation office set his base offense level at thirty. The probation office gave
Villanueva a two-level reduction for playing a “minor role” in the offense and a
three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See USSG §§ 3B1.2(b),
3E1.1. Because Villanueva had no criminal history, he was given a criminal
history category of I. Combined with an offense level of 25, this created a
guideline range sentence of sixty to seventy-one months with a mandatory
minimum sentence of sixty months under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(I).
At sentencing, Villanueva argued that he qualified for a safety-valve
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which requires district courts to sentence
certain first-time drug offenders without regard to the applicable statutory
minimum sentence. In order to prove this assertion, Villanueva had subpoenaed
Agent Perry, and he was present in the courtroom. Villanueva asked the district
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court to permit him to call Agent Perry to testify regarding Villanueva’s
cooperation with the DEA investigation. The district court denied this request,
stating to Villanueva’s counsel that “You’ve said everything he’s going to say, so
I’ve heard it.” Aplt. Br., Ex. B at 6. The district court then gave the government
the chance to respond. It opposed Villanueva’s request for a safety-valve
sentence, arguing that he did not “truthfully provide[] . . . all information and
evidence” he had relating to his drug-trafficking offense as required by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f). After permitting Villanueva to speak, the district court denied his
request for a safety-valve sentence and sentenced him to sixty months’
imprisonment.
II
Standard of Review
“We review a district court’s factual determination on safety-valve
eligibility for clear error, including whether a defendant has provided the
government with complete and truthful information.” United States v. Cervantes,
519 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). We review de novo a
district court’s “legal interpretation guiding its application of the safety-valve
provision.” Id. We review for abuse of discretion the question of whether a
district court afforded the defendant an adequate opportunity to present evidence.
United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1566 (10th Cir. 1990).
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Analysis
Villanueva claims the district court erred by (1) concluding that he was not
entitled to a safety-valve sentence, and (2) refusing to permit him to call Agent
Perry to testify. We address both arguments in turn.
A. Safety-Valve Sentence
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), district courts are required to sentence certain
first-time drug offenders “without regard to any statutory minimum sentence.”
See also United States v. Jeffers, 329 F.3d 94, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2003). The basic
purpose of this “safety-valve provision” is to “mitigate the harsh effect of
mandatory minimum sentences on certain first offenders who played supporting
roles in drug-trafficking schemes.” United States v. Ortiz-Santiago, 211 F.3d
146, 152 (1st Cir. 2000). “[W]ithout such a safety valve, for ‘the very offenders
who most warrant proportionally lower sentences—offenders that by guideline
definitions are the least culpable—mandatory minimums generally operate to
block the sentence from reflecting mitigating factors.’” United States v. Acosta-
Olivas, 71 F.3d 375, 378 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-460, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess.). Thus, this provision is designed to prevent the “least culpable
offenders [from] receiv[ing] the same sentences as their relatively more culpable
counterparts.” United States v. Pena-Sarabia, 297 F.3d 983, 988 (10th Cir. 2002)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-460).
A defendant must meet five requirements in order to qualify for a safety-
8
valve sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The defendant has the burden to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she meets each of these
requirements. United States v. Altamirano-Quintero, 511 F.3d 1087, 1098 (10th
Cir. 2007). There is no dispute in this case that Villanueva satisfies the first four
requirements, which are: (1) the defendant does not have more than one criminal
history point; (2) the defendant did not use violence (or the threat of violence) or
possess a weapon in connection with the offense; (3) the offense did not result in
death or serious bodily injury to any person; and (4) the defendant was not an
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense. 18 U.S.C. §
3553(f)(1)-(4). In order to satisfy the fifth requirement, the requirement at issue
in this case, the defendant must “truthfully provide[] to the Government all
information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses
that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” Id.§ 3553(f)(5).
The meaning and scope of the phrase “same course of conduct or of a
common scheme or plan” in § 3553(f)(5) is important. The Sentencing
Guidelines state that this phrase refers to “the offense of conviction and all
relevant conduct.” Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d at 378 (quoting USSG § 5C1.2,
comment (n.3)). Offenses are considered “relevant conduct”—and therefore part
the same course of conduct or a common scheme or plan—if they are
“substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as
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common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus
operandi.” USSG § 1B1.3, comment (n.9(A)). Such offenses must be
“sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that
they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.” Id.,
comment (n.9(B)). In other words, there must be “distinctive similarities”
between the offenses “that signal that they are part of a single course of conduct
rather than isolated, unrelated events.” United States v. Ortiz, 613 F.3d 550, 558
(5th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted).
Villanueva claims the district court clearly erred in not granting his request
for safety-valve relief because “the record reflects that [he] provided the
government with all the information he knew about the instant offense and its
relevant conduct.” Aplt. Br. at 27. In support of this assertion, Villanueva points
to his cooperation at the time of his arrest in securing the arrest of Aispuro-
Aristegui and at his subsequent debriefing with DEA officials and the federal
prosecutor. Villanueva alleges that, in both instances, he “truthfully provided to
the Government all information and evidence” he had regarding his criminal
conduct, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5).
We disagree. Villanueva would have us limit the “same course of conduct
or of a common scheme or plan” in § 3553(f)(5) to his actions on the date of his
arrest and his subsequent debriefing. But while Villanueva cooperated with DEA
officials on these occasions, the record indicates that he did not “truthfully
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provide[] to the government all information and evidence,” 18 U.S.C. §
3553(f)(5), about a number of important facts relating to “the offense of
conviction and all relevant conduct.” USSG § 5C1.2, comment (n.3). First,
Villanueva was not truthful with law enforcement authorities regarding when he
arrived in El Paso or where he stayed prior to March 22. Villanueva initially told
DEA officers that he did not arrive in El Paso until March 19 and that he stayed
in El Paso with Pariente’s friends until March 22. ROA, Vol. 2 at 6. Villanueva
changed his story, however, when DEA officials informed him that they had
evidence that he had crossed from Mexico into El Paso on March 15 and 16 and
everyday from March 18 until March 22, the day of his arrest. Id., Vol. 1, Dkt.
#57 at 3.
Second, Villanueva’s explanation for the money found in his possession—
more than $4,000 arranged in three separate bundles—is unconvincing.
Villanueva stated that he arranged the money this way for “no particular reason.”
Id., Vol. 2 at 9. The government claims Agent Perry would have testified at
sentencing that, based on how the money was arranged, the bundles were
“proceeds for acting as a drug courier on previous occasions.” Aple. Br. at 19.
Although the district court did not permit Agent Perry to testify, it could have
easily made the same inference on its own. Further, Villanueva’s claim that he
had more than $4,000 in cash to pay for arm surgery and to purchase vitamin
supplements is unconvincing because he told DEA officials that he agreed to
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smuggle the heroin to improve his dire financial situation. ROA, Vol. 2 at 5-6.
Given Villanueva’s alleged financial troubles, his claim that he went back and
forth several times from Mexico to El Paso prior to March 22, not to peddle
drugs, but “to go shopping,” is also hard to believe. Id., Vol. 2 at 8.
Finally, Villanueva never provided a satisfactory explanation for the
illegible notes found in his possession. He claimed the documents were “just
notes” but never actually explained what the notes were for. ROA, Vol. 2 at 8.
The fact that Villanueva never provided an explanation for these notes
undermines his claim that he fully disclosed to the government all of the
information he possessed regarding “the offense of conviction and all relevant
conduct.” See USSG § 5C1.2, comment (n.3).
B. Testimony from Agent Perry
Villanueva argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
permit Agent Perry to testify at the sentencing hearing. According to Villanueva,
Perry’s testimony would have supported his request for a safety-valve sentence
because Perry would have testified that Villanueva (1) cooperated at the time of
his arrest; (2) gave truthful information regarding the transaction and the parties
involved; (3) assisted in Aispuro-Aristegui’s arrest; and (4) answered every
question asked of him in the debriefing interview. Aplt. Br., Ex. B at 3-4.
Defendants must be given an “adequate opportunity to present relevant
information to the court,” but they do not have an automatic “right to introduce
12
live testimony” at sentencing. United States v. Pena-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108,
1116 (10th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, this court has held that the representations of
counsel alone will “[r]arely ever be sufficient . . . to grant safety-valve request
over the objection of counsel.” United States v. Cervantes, 519 F.3d 1254, 1258
(10th Cir. 2008). Consequently, “[a]bsent a favorable recommendation from the
government, a defendant needs to put on evidence at the sentencing hearing to
meet his burden of showing that he truthfully and fully disclosed everything he
knew and to rebut the government claims to the contrary.” Id. Such evidence
will, “in all likelihood,” include “testimony from the defendant or a representative
of the government subject to cross examination.” Id.The better approach for the district court would have been to permit Agent
Perry to testify. Id. Nonetheless, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion because Perry’s testimony would not have changed the fact
that Villanueva was not entirely truthful with DEA agents. Even if the district
court accepted Agent Perry’s proffered testimony as true, the substance of this
proffered testimony was not disputed. Further, the fact remains that Villanueva
provided incomplete or misleading information regarding (1) when he crossed
between Mexico and El Paso; (2) his financial situation and whether a lack of
funds was the reason he agreed to smuggle drugs; (3) what the notes in question
addressed; and (4) why he was carrying over $4,000 arranged in three separate
bundles. Thus, while Agent Perry might have testified regarding to extent to
13
which Villanueva cooperated with DEA agents, these facts were not disputed.
His testimony would not have established that Villanueva “truthfully provided to
the Government all information and evidence” regarding the crime of conviction,
as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (emphasis added).
III
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Villanueva’s unopposed
motion to seal the briefs is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
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