Blazier v. Larson

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 4, 2011
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SHAWN P. BLAZIER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 11-4056
(D.C. No. 2:09-CV-01132-DAK)
CURTIS L. LARSON, as an individual (D. Utah)
and in his official capacity; UTAH
COUNTY, a body politic, in its
official capacity, a/k/a Utah County
Attorney’s Office,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Shawn P. Blazier appeals from a district court order dismissing
this civil rights action. Blazier sued Utah County and deputy county attorney
Curtis L. Larson, claiming they violated his constitutional rights in connection
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
with an aborted prosecution under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508.3 (“Retaliation
against a witness, victim or informant”). We review the legal grounds for
dismissal de novo, see Merryfield v. Jordan, 584 F.3d 923, 926 (10th Cir. 2009),
and affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court.
While facing prosecution for assaulting Troy Menlove, Blazier launched an
adverse publicity campaign on the internet against Menlove and his girlfriend.
This prompted Larson to charge Blazier under § 76-8-508.3(2), which makes it a
felony to “cause[] harm,” including “injury or damage to . . . reputation,” through
“threat or action against a witness or . . . victim of any crime” in “retaliation or
retribution against the witness [or] victim.” Blazier moved to dismiss, contending
that application of the statute to truthful speech was illegal and unconstitutional. 1
Before the motion was resolved, Larson dismissed all charges against Blazier.
But he also sent an email to Blazier’s counsel indicating that he would consider
reinitiating criminal proceedings should Blazier resume his campaign against
Menlove and his girlfriend. Blazier filed this suit claiming that both the initial,
aborted prosecution and the threatened future prosecution violated his
constitutional rights. The district court dismissed, and this appeal followed.
1
Blazier’s contention that Larson had applied the statute illegally, as distinct
from and in addition to unconstitutionally, rests on Blazier’s view that his internet
attacks were a form of “legal redress” within the meaning of § 76-8-508.3, which
provides an exception for “seeking any legal redress to which the person is
otherwise entitled.” The grounds for our disposition here do not require us to
address this issue of statutory interpretation.
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We limit our review to the rulings challenged by Blazier on appeal.
See, e.g., Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1202 n.2 (10th Cir. 2003).
These involve the claims for damages and injunctive relief against Larson, whom
Blazier sued in his individual and official capacities. 2
With respect to the individual-capacity claim, the district court held Larson
was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. We agree. “Prosecutors are
entitled to absolute immunity for their decisions to prosecute, their investigatory
or evidence-gathering actions, their evaluations of evidence, their determinations
of whether probable cause exists, and their determination of what information to
show the court.” Nielander v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1164
(10th Cir. 2009). The allegations against Larson fall within this broad category of
conduct. The decision to file criminal charges “is a quintessential prosecutorial
function protected by absolute immunity.” Stein v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme
Ct. of N.M., 520 F.3d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2008). And this immunity extends to
“conditional prosecutorial decisions,” which provisionally withhold charges in
exchange for a quid pro quo, so long as the threat of prosecution is not tied to a
demand “manifestly or palpably beyond [the prosecutor’s] authority.” Schloss v.
Bouse, 876 F.2d 287, 291 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); see,
e.g., Arnold v. McClain, 926 F.2d 963, 967 (10th Cir. 1991) (granting absolute
2
The district court dismissed the claims against Utah County for several
reasons that have not been challenged on appeal.
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immunity to prosecutor who threatened to file perjury charges against police
officer unless officer resigned). Threatening to bring charges for conduct a
prosecutor believes to be felonious could hardly be manifestly or palpably beyond
his authority. 3
With respect to the official-capacity claim for injunctive relief against
future witness-retaliation charges, the district court held such relief was not
warranted because
[t]he possibility of such a charge being filed against Mr. Blazier if he
posted on his website the truthful information he seeks to post is far
too speculative, and the specific circumstances surrounding any such
charge simply cannot be known at this time. More importantly, this
court declines to interfere with any future state criminal
prosecutions. Mr. Blazier is not without a remedy if he were to be
improperly charged in the future, as he could challenge the charge
within the context of any future criminal case and/or file a § 1983
action after the fact.
Aplt. App. at 106. This ruling also reflects a proper application of the governing
law. “[G]enerally a court will not enjoin the enforcement of a criminal statute
even though unconstitutional, since such a result seriously impairs the State’s
interest in enforcing its criminal laws, and implicates the concerns for federalism
which lie at the heart of Younger [v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)].” Wooley v.
3
Blazier’s contention that Larson is not entitled to qualified immunity in
light of clearly established law is simply inapposite. Absolute immunity–which
involves an entirely different analysis, turning on the scope of the prosecutorial
function rather than the established nature of the right allegedly violated, see
Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 1381 (10th Cir. 1989)–obviates any
consideration of qualified immunity, Arnold, 926 F.2d at 967-68.
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Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 712-13 (1977) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “[T]his is not an absolute policy,” but “[t]o justify such interference
there must be exceptional circumstances and a clear showing that an injunction
is necessary in order to afford adequate protection of constitutional rights.”
Id. at 713 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The kind of exceptional circumstances contemplated by Wooley are evident
from the egregious facts in that case, which are not replicated here. In Wooley,
one of the plaintiffs had been prosecuted three times for violating the challenged
law, resulting in two fines and fifteen days in jail, id. at 708–a circumstance
“quite different from . . . when a prosecution is threatened for the first time,”
id. at 712. Only one charge was brought against Blazier and it was voluntarily
dismissed after he challenged application of the statute to his conduct. This fact
not only attenuates the extant prejudice to Blazier, it also (1) undercuts the
likelihood that charges would actually be brought for similar conduct in the future
(Larson’s threat notwithstanding) and, more importantly, (2) leaves open the
possibility that, should such charges be brought, the state courts would accept his
defense that the statute was unconstitutionally applied to his conduct, thus
undercutting the showing he must make that a preemptive federal injunction is
necessary to afford adequate protection of his constitutional rights. Indeed, these
two points are what the district court meant when it characterized Blazier’s claim
as speculative and stated that he was not without a remedy in any event.
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In addition, for the plaintiffs in Wooley, avoiding future prosecution under
the challenged law (which required use of license plates with a motto repugnant
to their religious beliefs) would have required them to give up “their ability to
perform the ordinary tasks of daily life which require an automobile.” Id.Nothing so extensively intrusive into daily life activities is remotely involved
here.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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