Patillo v. Larned State Hospital

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 30, 2012
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MARY PATILLO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 11-3184
(D.C. No. 2:09-CV-02545-EFM-DJW)
LARNED STATE HOSPITAL; (D. Kan.)
TRANSITIONAL HOUSE SERVICE;
KANSAS HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION; DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION
SERVICES, State of Kansas;
DONALD JORDAN, Secretary of
SRS; SHARI CAMPBELL, Regional
Director; STACEY CLARK-PAIGE,
Transitional House Services Director;
MARK SCHULLER, Larned State
Hospital Superintendent; ADELE
DUNN, LBSW - Licensed
Baccalaureate Social Worker, Human
Resources Director; KERRI
BARNARD, LSH Human Resources
Employee Relations/EEO; SHELLY
BLANN, Assistant Transitional House
Services Director; JOYCE
HAMMOND-PERRY, Director of SRS
EEO; JOHN BADGER, General
Counsel of SRS; CORY TURNER,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
(continued...)
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Mary Patillo appeals from the dismissal of her pro se employment
discrimination/civil rights suit based on various legal deficiencies. We review the
dismissal de novo, see Merryfield v. Jordan, 584 F.3d 923, 926 (10th Cir. 2009),
and affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court. 1
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT - FIRST DISMISSAL ORDER
Plaintiff’s initial pleading, naming only defendant Larned State Hospital,
was a form complaint for employment discrimination on which she checked the
spaces for claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), and Equal Pay Act provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (EPA).
She included little factual detail to flesh out the nature and basis of these claims,
which she alleged arose out of her work with Transitional House Services (THS)
*
(...continued)
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Plaintiff’s appellate brief is completely lacking in substantive argument,
and defendants contend in their answer brief that we can summarily affirm on the
basis of this deficiency. We agree, though we explain the substance of the district
court’s disposition for plaintiff’s benefit.
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at Osawatomie State Hospital. THS implements a sexual predator treatment
program in conjunction with defendant Larned State Hospital. The defendant
hospital moved to dismiss on a number of grounds. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied it in part.
The district court correctly dismissed the ADA and ADEA claims as barred
by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Unless waived or abrogated, such immunity
extends to state entities. 2 Ross v. Bd of Regents of Univ. of New Mexico, 599 F.3d
1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 2010). Kansas has not waived its immunity, Ellis v. Univ.
of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1195 (10th Cir. 1998), nor has Congress
effectively abrogated state immunity under either the ADA, Bd. of Trustees of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001), or the ADEA, Kimel v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000). The EPA claim was based on the
hospital’s advertisement of an overly high pay range for applicants at plaintiff’s
position. Because the ad applied to all applicants, the district court correctly
dismissed this claim for lack of the sine qua non of EPA liability—a pay
differential based on sex, Mickelson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1304,
1311 (10th Cir. 2006). As for the Title VII claim, which the hospital challenged
as inadequately pled under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
2
Larned State Hospital and Osawatomie State Hospital are state institutions
under the authority of the Kansas Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services.
See Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 76-12a06; 76-1201, 76-1301.
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and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the district court noted that plaintiff
had sought leave to file an amended complaint to include additional facts, and
therefore delayed any ruling on pleading deficiencies until it was filed.
AMENDED COMPLAINT - SECOND DISMISSAL ORDER
The amended complaint added as defendants THS, the Kansas Department
of Social and Rehabilitative Services (SRS), several SRS officers and employees,
and the Kansas Human Rights Commission (KHRC). It included rambling
allegations littered with conclusory constitutional and statutory references lacking
details to clarify the claims asserted and the grounds for asserting them against
specific named defendants. The district court summarized:
Plaintiff’s amended complaint is difficult to understand. Her
complaints seem[] to arise from her employment with the state of
Kansas at the Transition House Services. . . . Plaintiff claims
defendants “violated her constitutional rights through a campaign of
continuing unlawful employment practices and patterns, [and] race
discrimination . . . .” Her action is apparently primarily one for
employment discrimination under the “Kansas Act Against
Discrimination, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, [42 U.S.C.]
Sec. 1981, 1983, 1985(1), and (2), 1985(3), 1986 . . . and the Fair
Labor Standards Act.”
R. Vol. 1 at 295 (quoting Amended Complaint ¶ 1, R. Vol. 1 at 145) (footnote
omitted). Defendants moved to dismiss on various grounds. 3
3
Two defendants, Shelly Blann and Joyce Hammond-Perry, were never
served and hence did not join in the motions. But, as the time for service under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) had expired, the district court dismissed them from the case
without prejudice when it granted defendants’ motions to dismiss.
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A. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986
The district court noted that KHRC and SRS were immune from suit under
the Eleventh Amendment and that this immunity had not been abrogated or
waived in connection with §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, or 1986. See Ellis, 163 F.3d at
1195-96. Thus, dismissal of these claims against these state entities was correct. 2
The district court also noted that the complaint lacked sufficient factual
allegations of personal involvement in any actionable conduct to state a claim
against the individual state defendants under the cited statutes. See generally
Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009); Northington v.
Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1521-22 (10th Cir. 1992). Keeping in mind that
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” “mere conclusory
statements,” and “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” do not
state a claim, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted) we agree with the district court that the amended complaint fails to
include sufficient specific factual allegations to support a claim under the cited
statutes. The few passing references to individual defendants scattered through
the amended complaint fail to describe particular misconduct warranting
2
The court also held that plaintiff’s theory of liability against KHRC--that it
should be held liable for employment discrimination it failed to discover and
stop--reflected a misunderstanding of the law, in that administrative agencies
investigating alleged civil rights violations are not subject to liability for the
results, right or wrong, of their investigation. We need not delve into the matter,
as KHRC’s immunity renders the question academic.
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imposition of liability and, though there are conclusory allegations of conspiracy,
such allegations without supporting factual detail are plainly inadequate, Brooks
v. Gaenzle, 614 F.3d 1213, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2010).
B. Equal Pay Act
The fatal deficiency of this claim in the amended complaint is basically the
same as it was in the original complaint. The essential premise for an EPA claim
is a pay differential improperly based on sex, Mickelson, 460 F.3d at 1311, and
the amended complaint, even with its additional factual allegations, does not
include any facts showing a difference in pay based on plaintiff’s gender. 3
C. Title VII and Kansas Act Against Discrimination (KAAD)
The district court correctly noted that exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite for Title VII claims, see Shikels v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 426 F.3d 1304, 1317 (10th Cir. 2005), and as such it is
something plaintiff must “plead and show” to avoid dismissal, Cudjoe v. Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 12, 297 F.3d 1058, 1063 (10th Cir. 2002). The court concluded
that the amended complaint failed to demonstrate that plaintiff had exhausted her
administrative remedies and dismissed her Title VII claim accordingly.
3
Plaintiff alleged pay discrimination based on the advertisement noted
earlier, which she stated resulted in the hire of two applicants at a higher rate of
pay than she was receiving. Again, even assuming the truth of these allegations,
the advertised positions were open to applicants regardless of gender, race, or
age, and plaintiff does not allege that those hired for the positions were chosen
for discriminatory reasons.
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We agree that the following conclusory allegation, which includes no
reference to dates (of the complaint, its resolution, or the underlying incident),
persons, misconduct, or asserted statutory violation for the complaints alluded to,
is plainly inadequate to show exhaustion of remedies for any particular Title VII
claim: “[Plaintiff] states that she filed several complaints by certified mail to
Kansas Human Rights Commission, U.S. Attorney Office of Kansas, Kansas
Attorney General Office, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Regional
Director for SRS, SRS EEO department[, but] no department would make the
terrible abuse to stop.” R. Vol. 1 at 147. And subsequent passing references did
not correct the many inadequacies. 4
These pleadings deficiencies could have been obviated had plaintiff
provided the court sufficient documentation to demonstrate exhaustion, but she
failed to do so. She did attach a complaint and EEOC right-to-sue letter to her
original pleading, id. at 16-18, but the complaint relates to the ADA claim we
have already held was properly dismissed for other reasons in the district court’s
4
An allusion to “several complaints filed from 2003-2009,” R. Vol. 1 at 150,
is devoid of content except its plainly deficient reference to a six-year time period
for the unspecified complaints. Plaintiff later stated that she “received Dismissal
and Notice of Rights, on August 9, 2003, March 09, 2004, March 17, 2005,” id. at
155, but (in addition to the lack of any specification of content) these are not
related closely enough in time to the filing of this case in October 2009 to be
pertinent, see Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. 501, 465 F.3d 1184, 1186 (10th Cir.
2006) (explaining deadlines applicable to Title VII suit in Kansas). She added
that she “filed a complaint on February 14, 2009,” R. Vol. 1 at 155, but did not
indicate with whom, under what statute, or over what particular incidents.
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initial order. She later attempted to submit some additional administrative
documentation, but the magistrate judge rejected it for procedural deficiencies in
an order issued pursuant to his authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Since
plaintiff never sought review of this order from the district court, we have no
jurisdiction to consider the matter, SEC v. Merrill Scott & Assocs., 600 F.3d 1262,
1269 (10th Cir. 2010); Boyd Motors, Inc. v. Emp’s Ins. of Wausau, 880 F.2d 270,
271 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam), and thus take the record as we find it. 5
Although district court did not expressly say so, the same basic deficiency
was fatal to plaintiff’s KAAD claim, for which full exhaustion of remedies is also
a jurisdictional prerequisite, see Sandlin v. Roche Labs., Inc., 991 P.2d 883,
887-89 (Kan. 1999). Where the statutory procedure is terminated by the KHRC
short of a formal adjudication, exhaustion is complete upon the KHRC’s issuance
of a finding of no probable cause. Van Scoyk v. St. Mary’s Assumption Parochial
Sch., 580 P.2d 1315, 1317-18 (Kan. 1978); Mattox v. Dep’t of Transp., 747 P.2d
174, 175 (Kan. App. 1987). Our record does not contain either a finding of no
probable cause or an order after formal adjudication by the KHRC.
5
The new documentation would not have dictated a different result. It
included two EEOC right-to-sue letters issued after this case was filed. While
post-filing actions may, in very limited circumstances, cure exhaustion defects,
Mires v. United States, 466 F.3d 1208, 1209, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 2006), even if
such circumstances were evident here, the EEOC letters would not have aided
plaintiff’s case. One just refers to her pay claim, R. Vol. 107-08, which we have
noted is fatally deficient for other reasons, while plaintiff did not include any
materials to show the nature of the other claim at all, see id. at 106, 109.
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The decision of the district court to dismiss this action is AFFIRMED. We
note, however, that many of the grounds for dismissal are jurisdictional, which
dictate a dismissal without prejudice. We therefore REMAND this matter to the
district court solely for it to modify its judgment to specify that the claims that
fail on jurisdictional grounds are dismissed without prejudice.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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