Mendiola v. Holder

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 22, 2014
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
EDDIE MENDIOLA,
Petitioner,
v.
No. 12-9570
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States
Attorney General,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, EBEL, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Eddie Mendiola petitions this court for review of a
final order issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board” or “BIA”)
on July 11, 2012, denying his third, untimely motion to reopen his removal
proceedings. Mr. Mendiola argued that although the motion to reopen was
untimely and numerically barred, his case nonetheless merited sua sponte
reopening based on intervening fundamental changes in the law. Mr. Mendiola
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
argued that sua sponte reopening was warranted because, due to new Supreme
Court precedent relating to the basis for his removal and to alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel, his initial removal was legally invalid. The Board denied
Mr. Mendiola’s motion, concluding that the ineffective-assistance claim failed on
its merits because Mr. Mendiola had not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by
his attorney’s alleged failings, and finding that Mr. Mendiola had failed to show
that the purported fundamental changes in the law entitled him to relief.
To the extent that Mr. Mendiola challenges the Board’s exercise of
discretion in declining to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings, we dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. With respect to Mr. Mendiola’s ineffective-assistance
argument and his change-of-law argument based on the Supreme Court’s decision
in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010)—to the extent that he
argues that the case affects the fact of his removability—we find that these
arguments fail on their merits; accordingly, we deny Mr. Mendiola’s petition and
affirm the decision of the Board on these points. Finally, with respect to Mr.
Mendiola’s argument that, under Carachuri-Rosendo he is entitled to seek
cancellation of removal, for the reasons set forth below we grant the petition and
remand this claim to the Board to clarify the basis of its decision.
-2-
I
Mr. Mendiola is a native citizen of Peru who became a lawful permanent
resident of the United States on April 28, 1989. Mr. Mendiola has a lengthy
criminal history. On July 29, 1996, he was convicted in the Superior Court of
Orange County, California, for assault with a deadly weapon, a felony, in
violation of section 245(a)(1) of the California Penal Code; and of possession of a
controlled substance (steroids), a misdemeanor, in violation of section 11377(a)
of the California Health and Safety Code. On April 7, 2000, Mr. Mendiola was
convicted once again for possession of a controlled substance (steroids) in
violation of section 11377(a), this time as a felony. 1 On September 25, 2003, Mr.
Mendiola was convicted in the First Judicial District of Kootenai County, Idaho,
of accessory to a felony, in violation of Sections 18–205 and 18–206 of the Idaho
Code.
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) commenced removal
proceedings against Mr. Mendiola on April 16, 2004, in Aurora, Colorado, under
section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), based on Mr. Mendiola’s conviction of an aggravated
felony as defined in section 101(a)(43)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).
1
Under California law, section 11377(a) is a “wobbler,” meaning “the
Legislature has determined that either a misdemeanor or a felony punishment may
be appropriate in the discretion of the sentencing court.” People v. Superior Ct.
(Alvarez), 928 P.2d 1171, 1178 (Cal. 1997).
-3-
On July 14, 2004, the immigration judge entered an oral decision,
concluding that Mr. Mendiola’s conviction for possession of steroids was a “drug
offense [a]s defined in the federal statutes.” R. at 780 (Oral Decision of
Immigration Judge, dated July 14, 2004). The immigration judge further
concluded that Mr. Mendiola was removable as an aggravated felon based on his
second conviction, explaining that “[i]f an individual is convicted of a second
drug offense under the federal code, it is regarded as a felony.” 2 Id. Based on
these findings, the immigration judge ordered Mr. Mendiola removed to Peru.
Mr. Mendiola appealed the decision of the immigration judge to the Board,
which affirmed the decision on November 9, 2004. The Board explained:
[Mr. Mendiola’s] California convictions for possession of a
controlled substance was [sic] a “drug trafficking crime” under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) and therefore an aggravated felony under
. . . 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). In removal proceedings, the
determination [of] whether a state drug offense constitutes a
“drug trafficking crime” is made by reference to decisional
2
The definition of an “aggravated felony” in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(B) includes, inter alia, any “drug trafficking crime” as defined in
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2)—i.e., any “felony punishable under the Controlled
Substances Act.” Under federal law, a felony is a crime for which the “maximum
term of imprisonment authorized” is “more than one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a).
Although simple possession offenses (like Mr. Mendiola’s) are ordinarily
misdemeanors punishable with shorter sentences, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) makes
recidivist simple-possession offenses punishable as felonies. Thus, for a simple-
possession conviction to be an aggravated felony under federal law, it must be a
recidivist simple-possession conviction. That is, the defendant must have
knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance “after a prior
conviction under [federal drug law] or . . . for any drug, narcotic, or chemical
offense chargeable under the law of any State.” 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
-4-
authority from the pertinent [jurisdiction]. The Tenth Circuit has
consistently held that a state drug offense qualifies as a drug
trafficking aggravated felony if it is punishable under federal
narcotics law and classified as a felony in the convicting
jurisdiction. The Immigration Judge found that steroids are
controlled substances under federal law, the possession of which
violates 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), and the respondent has not contested
that finding on appeal. Moreover, California classifies the
respondent’s 2000 offense as a felony. It follows that the
Immigration Judge correctly concluded that the respondent was
an aggravated felon, and ineligible for any form of relief from
removal.
Id. at 726 (Board Order, dated Nov. 9, 2004) (citations omitted).
Mr. Mendiola was removed from the United States on March 2, 2005. He
re-entered the country illegally on or about July 15, 2005. Following re-
entry, Mr. Mendiola petitioned this court for judicial review of the Board’s 2004
order. On July 27, 2006, we dismissed that petition in part and denied it in part.
See Mendiola v. Gonzales, 189 F. App’x 810 (10th Cir. 2006). On November 14,
2006, DHS issued an order reinstating Mr. Mendiola’s prior removal order.
On May 14, 2007, Mr. Mendiola, through his attorney, filed his first motion
to reopen his removal proceedings with the Board. In this motion, Mr. Mendiola
made several arguments, including: (1) that the initial removal order “ha[d] been
collaterally overturned by the Supreme Court” in Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47(2006), which he cited for the proposition that “a possessory offense of a
controlled substance is a misdemeanor under federal law,” R. at 712, 715 (Mot. to
Reopen Removal Proceedings, filed May 14, 2007); (2) that the Board could
-5-
reopen his proceedings sua sponte; and (3) that his motion was not number-barred
or barred on any other procedural grounds. The Board denied this motion for lack
of jurisdiction on June 11, 2007. It explained that under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(d)—the so-called “post-departure bar”—“[a] motion to reopen may not
be made by an alien in removal proceedings subsequent to his departure from the
United States.” 3 Id. at 701 (Board Order, dated June 11, 2007).
Mr. Mendiola again petitioned this court for judicial review of the Board’s
decision. On May 30, 2008, we affirmed the Board’s jurisdictional ruling. We
rejected Mr. Mendiola’s belated appellate argument challenging the application of
the post-departure bar, explaining that Mr. Mendiola had failed to challenge the
Board’s application of the doctrine in his opening brief and thus had “waived this
argument.” Mendiola v. Mukasey, 280 F. App’x 719, 722 (10th Cir. 2008). We
also noted, however, that even if the post-departure bar did not apply to Mr.
Mendiola, his invocation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez “[would] not
assist him,” because “[u]nder the Controlled Substances Act, a conviction for
possession of a controlled substance committed after a prior possession
3
In a footnote, the Board also observed that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lopez “[did] not assist [Mr. Mendiola] in any event” because his
“second possession conviction [was] an aggravated felony under federal law.” R.
at 702 n.1. That is, while Lopez clarified that only offenses that would be
felonies under federal law qualify as “aggravated felonies” under the INA, and
that simple possession thus ordinarily does not qualify, it also expressly
acknowledged that “recidivist possession” as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) is a
felony under federal law. See Lopez, 549 U.S. at 54–55 & n.6.
-6-
conviction” is a felony. Id.On September 11, 2008, Mr. Mendiola, through new counsel, filed with the
Board a second motion to reopen, styled a “motion to reopen and motion to
reconsider to vacate invalid removal order pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) and 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).” R. at 478 (Mot. to Reopen & Reconsider, filed Sept. 11,
2008) (capitalization altered). In this motion, Mr. Mendiola asked the Board to
exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen his proceedings and vacate his removal
on the basis that his 2005 removal had been unlawful because it was predicated
on the finding that his conviction in 2000 (his second conviction for possession of
steroids) was a felony conviction, whereas “[o]n August 28, 2007, the Superior
Court of the State of California entered an order clarifying that [the conviction]
was and will always be a misdemeanor” under state law. Id. at 486–87.
Alternatively, Mr. Mendiola argued that his removal proceeding should be
reopened “pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) based on ineffective assistance of
counsel,” principally because his former attorney “failed to raise available
defenses and remedies establishing that Mr. Mendiola had not been convicted of
any offense that has adverse immigration consequences.” Id. at 498. Although
the motion was filed well after the ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen, see
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), Mr. Mendiola argued that the motion to reopen was not
time-barred for two reasons: first, because “numerical and time limitations for
filing a motion to reopen do not confine [the Board’s] sua sponte authority to
-7-
reopen proceedings,” R. at 496, and second, because his delay in filing was a
consequence of his “former attorney’s actions and omissions” and thus any
applicable time and number limits should be equitably tolled, see id. at 496–98.
The Board denied Mr. Mendiola’s second motion to reopen on October 7,
2008, once again relying on the jurisdiction-stripping effect of the post-departure
bar. Observing first that the motion to reopen was both untimely and number-
barred, the Board then proceeded to explain that because Mr. Mendiola had
previously been removed from the United States on March 2, 2005, he was
“precluded by [the post-departure bar in] 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) from reopening
proceedings and [the Board thus lacked] authority to reopen or reconsider sua
sponte pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).” R. at 265 (Board Order, dated Oct. 7,
2008).
Mr. Mendiola again sought judicial review of the Board’s decision, and on
October 28, 2009, we again denied Mr. Mendiola’s petition. See Mendiola v.
Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2009), overruled by Contreras-Bocanegra v.
Holder, 678 F.3d 811 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc). In denying review, we held that
the Board had “correctly determined 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d)’s post-departure bar
divest[ed] it of jurisdiction to review a motion to reopen filed by a removed alien,
like [Mr. Mendiola].” Id. at 1310. In light of this holding, we declined to
consider whether the Board should have equitably tolled the time and numerical
limits on filing motions to reopen found in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) based on the
-8-
alleged ineffective assistance of Mr. Mendiola’s prior counsel. See id. at
1310–11. Mr. Mendiola was once again removed to Peru in approximately July
2010.
On March 28, 2012, through his current counsel, Mr. Mendiola filed a third
motion to reopen with the Board, a “motion for sua sponte reopening based on
change in law.” R. at 48–71 (Mot. for Sua Sponte Reopening, filed Mar. 28,
2012) (capitalization altered). In this motion, Mr. Mendiola argued that the Board
should exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen his case based on changes in the
law brought about by our en banc decision in Contreras-Bocanegra and by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Carachuri-Rosendo. Mr. Mendiola also argued once
again that his removal proceedings should be reopened based on his having
received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his prior counsel’s failure to
argue that the substances at issue in his 1996 and 2000 state convictions were not
“controlled substances” under federal law as required by Matter of Paulus, 11 I.
& N. Dec. 274 (BIA 1965). The ultimate relief that Mr. Mendiola hoped to obtain
through reopening was termination of his removal proceedings or, alternatively,
cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
On July 11, 2012, the Board issued a written decision denying Mr.
Mendiola’s motion to reopen. Noting that the motion was both untimely and
numerically barred, the Board rejected each of Mr. Mendiola’s attempts to avoid
these procedural hurdles. First, the Board found that, “[t]o the extent that [Mr.
-9-
Mendiola was] raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against his
former attorney, he [did] not establish[] prejudice such that equitable tolling of
the time and number limits [was] warranted.” R. at 3 (Board Order, dated July
11, 2012). Second, the Board rejected Mr. Mendiola’s request for sua sponte
reopening based on the changes in the law (which would not be subject to time
and numbers bars) because he had “not demonstrated prima facie eligibility for
any immediately available forms of relief” arising out of those changes. Id. at 4.
In that regard, the Board noted that Mr Mendiola had not “contest[ed] that
he was [lawfully] removable as an aggravated felon at the time of his removal
from the United States in 2005,” and it explained that because “[Mr. Mendiola’s]
removal from the United States in March 2005 was lawful[,] . . . this removal
served to terminate [Mr. Mendiola’s] lawful permanent residence status.” Id.
“Consequently,” Mr. Mendiola was “statutorily ineligible for cancellation of
removal under section 240A(a) of the Act[, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a),] because he
[wa]s no longer lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Id. Similarly, the
Board found that “termination of [Mr. Mendiola’s] removal proceedings [was] not
appropriate” because “[a] decision of [the] Board granting [Mr. Mendiola’s]
motion would not restore him to his prior lawful permanent resident status . . .
because such an order is merely an interlocutory measure authorizing the
submission of new evidence; it does not abrogate the existing removal order or
confer lawful immigration status on the movant.” Id. Accordingly, the Board
-10-
denied Mr. Mendiola’s motion, and the instant petition for judicial review timely
followed.
II
We first address our jurisdiction. The government argues that we lack
jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the government contends that we lack
jurisdiction “to review the Board’s decision not to reopen Mr. Mendiola’s order
of removal pursuant to [section 241(a)(5) of the INA], 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5),
which provides that a reinstated order of removal ‘is not subject to being
reopened or reviewed . . . .’” Aplee. Br. at 18. Second, the government argues
that we lack jurisdiction “to review Mr. Mendiola’s petition for review to the
extent that it challenges the Board’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte
authority to reopen his removal proceedings.” Id. We address each of these
jurisdictional arguments in turn.
A
The government first argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) precludes our
review of Mr. Mendiola’s motion to reopen. Under § 1231(a)(5):
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the
United States illegally after having been removed or having
departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order
of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject
to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may
not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the alien shall be
removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (emphasis added).
-11-
It is undisputed that Mr. Mendiola was removed from the United States on
March 2, 2005, and then reentered the United States illegally on or about July 15,
2005. DHS reinstated the prior order of removal on November 14, 2006, and Mr.
Mendiola was removed again. Mr. Mendiola argues that it is unclear whether
§ 1231(a)(5) applies because “it is not clear from the record that [Mr. Mendiola]
was removed pursuant to an order of reinstatement of removal.” Aplt. Reply Br.
at 3. He bases this argument on the fact that in August 2006, it appears as though
DHS counsel considered not executing the November 2006 reinstatement order
and instead placing Mr. Mendiola in new proceedings. 4 However, there is nothing
in the record to indicate that DHS ever followed through with this course of
action, and Mr. Mendiola was never placed into new proceedings. As such, for
purposes of analyzing our jurisdiction—and because we ultimately conclude that
we have jurisdiction regardless of whether Mr. Mendiola’s reinstatement order
was executed—we accept the government’s assertion that the signed reinstatement
order was executed. See Aplee. Br. at 22 n.3.
In Lorenzo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2007), we considered
whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) deprived us of jurisdiction to consider a
petitioner’s claim where the petitioner had been subject to a reinstatement of
4
The DHS record states: “AUSA Aitken had been in [contact] with
ICE District Counsel Kevin Riley. Information from his [sic] was not to reinstate
MENDIOLA but to once again have him go through formal deportation
proceedings.” R. at 32 (Form I-213, dated Aug. 7, 2008).
-12-
removal order. 508 F.3d at 1281. We concluded that we did in fact have
jurisdiction. Specifically, we noted that the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005), added 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) to the INA, which
authorizes us to review constitutional claims or questions of law despite the
language in § 1231(a)(5). 5 See Lorenzo, 508 F.3d at 1281 & n.4; see also
Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 659 F.3d 1029, 1031 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Section
1252(a)(2)(d) . . . preserve[s] our ability to review ‘constitutional claims or
questions of law,’ notwithstanding other provisions in the [INA] that limit or
eliminate judicial review.”); Debeato v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 505 F.3d 231, 235 (3d
Cir. 2007) (“Accordingly, we conclude that . . . § 1252(a)(2)(D)[] permits us to
exercise jurisdiction over legal and constitutional challenges to final orders of
removal, including those final orders that the Attorney General has reinstated
pursuant to § 1231(a)(5).”); Ramirez-Molina v. Ziglar, 436 F.3d 508, 513–14 (5th
Cir. 2006) (“Because § 1231(a)(5) limits judicial review, § 1252(a)(2)(D)
prevents its operation in cases, such as this one, in which the validity of an
underlying order is questioned on constitutional or legal grounds.”).
5
Section 1252(a)(2)(D) provides that “[n]othing in subparagraph (B)
or (C), or in any other provision of this chapter (other than this section) which
limits or eliminates judicial review [i.e., 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)], shall be
construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised
upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance
with this section.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see also Lorenzo, 508 F.3d at 1281
n.3.
-13-
In assessing our jurisdiction, the relevant question is thus whether Mr.
Mendiola’s petition raises “constitutional claims or questions of law.” We have
previously construed § 1252(a)(2)(D)’s “constitutional claims or questions of
law” language to reach “constitutional and statutory-construction questions,” but
“not discretionary or factual questions.” Lorenzo, 508 F.3d at 1282 (quoting
Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274, 1281–82 (10th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, Mr. Mendiola argues that he was prejudiced as a result of
ineffective assistance of counsel and that changes in the law require the Board to
reopen his removal order. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 4. Because claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings are grounded in the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, we conclude that Mr. Mendiola’s
ineffective-assistance claim sufficiently raises a constitutional issue and that we
have jurisdiction to review it under § 1252(a)(2)(D). 6 We also conclude that
6
Although the Attorney General’s opinion in In re Compean, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 710 (Att’y Gen. 2009) (“Compean I”), found—in a departure from prior
cases—that the Constitution categorically did “not confer a constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings” under either the Fifth or
Sixth Amendments, see id. at 714, that opinion was subsequently vacated by In re
Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (Att’y Gen. 2009) (“Compean II”). Compean II
directed the Board to apply pre-Compean I standards pending issuance of a new
final rule addressing the appropriate treatment of ineffective assistance claims in
removal proceedings.
The Department of Justice has yet to propose such a rule; in the interim,
panels of this court have repeatedly made clear that aliens claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel in removal proceedings do so under the Due Process Clause
(continued...)
-14-
whether changes in the law require the Board to sua sponte reopen is a question of
law over which we likewise have jurisdiction pursuant to § 1252(a)(2)(D).
B
Satisfied that we are not deprived of jurisdiction over these issues by
6
(...continued)
of the Fifth Amendment, and thus—we may infer—raise a constitutional issue.
See, e.g., Morales v. Holder, 546 F. App’x 762, 768–69 (10th Cir. 2013) (relying
on pre-Compean I circuit precedent assessing ineffective-assistance claims under
the Fifth Amendment); Mukhia v. Holder, 507 F. App’x 824, 828 (10th Cir. 2013)
(“The Fifth Amendment guarantees aliens subject to deportation the right to a
fundamentally fair deportation proceeding. And although there is no right to
appointed counsel in deportation proceedings, an alien can state a Fifth
Amendment violation if he proves that retained counsel was ineffective and, as a
result, the petitioner was denied a fundamentally fair proceeding.” (brackets
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hernandez v. Holder, 412 F. App’x
155, 158 (10th Cir. 2011) (stating that “[a]liens in removal proceedings . . . have
a right to effective representation grounded in the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee
of due process”); Raju v. Holder, 421 F. App’x 795, 797 (10th Cir. 2010)
(“Removal proceedings are civil in nature and therefore a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel arises only from the due process guarantees of the Fifth
Amendment.”); Santos v. Holder, 369 F. App’x 922, 925 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010)
(“[B]ecause the question of ineffective assistance of counsel in immigration
proceedings is grounded in the constitutional claim of a due-process violation, we
have jurisdiction to consider [the petitioner’s] claim under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).” (second alteration in original)).
Many of our sister circuits have reached the same conclusion in published
cases post-Compean II. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Chavez, --- F.3d ----,
2014 WL 2978488, at *5 (9th Cir. 2014) (assessing ineffective assistance claim in
immigration proceedings under Fifth Amendment due process framework);
Muyubisnay-Cungachi v. Holder, 734 F.3d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 2013) (same);
Zambrano-Reyes v. Holder, 725 F.3d 744, 749–50 (7th Cir. 2013) (premising
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) on ineffective assistance of counsel
claim under the Fifth Amendment); Singh v. Holder, 658 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir.
2011) (same); Denis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 633 F.3d 201, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2011)
(same).
-15-
§ 1231(a)(5), we next turn to the government’s second jurisdictional
argument—that we lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision not to invoke
its sua sponte authority to grant Mr. Mendiola’s motion to reopen because such
decisions are by definition discretionary and non-reviewable. It is true, as the
government contends, that we have consistently held that we lack jurisdiction to
review the Board’s actual exercise of discretion in deciding whether or not to sua
sponte reopen removal proceedings. See, e.g., Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d
1359, 1361 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e do not have jurisdiction to consider [a]
petitioner’s claim that the [Board] should have sua sponte reopened
. . . proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) because there are no standards by
which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”); Belay-Gebru v. INS, 327
F.3d 998, 1001 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Because we have no meaningful standard
against which to judge the BIA’s exercise of its discretion, we hold that we do not
have jurisdiction to review [petitioner’s] claim that the BIA should have sua
sponte reconsidered the immigration judge’s order denying asylum and
withholding of deportation.”).
Furthermore, though the Supreme Court’s decision in Kucana v. Holder,
558 U.S. 233 (2010), found that federal courts have jurisdiction to review motions
to reopen generally, the Court specifically reserved the question of whether sua
sponte motions to reopen are subject to judicial review, and expressly
acknowledged that pre-Kucana circuit authority weighed against allowing judicial
-16-
review of sua sponte motions to reopen because the decision not to reopen “[was]
committed to agency discretion by law,” id. at 251 n.18. That Kucana did not
upend the earlier cases rejecting jurisdiction has been confirmed in the
intervening years by a panel of this court, see Bakanovas v. Holder, 438 F. App’x
717, 722 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Kucana provides no ground for us to depart from
circuit precedent. . . . [W]e lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to reopen
sua sponte . . . .”), and, in published and unpublished decisions, by panels of
many of our sister circuits, see, e.g., Bi Ying Lian v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 546 F.
App’x 917, 919 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Neves v. Holder, 613 F.3d 30,
34–35 (1st Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Gashi v. Holder, 382 F. App’x 21, 22–23 (2d
Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Ozeiry v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 400 F. App’x 647, 649–50
(3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Ochoa v. Holder, 604 F.3d 546, 549–50 & n.3 (8th
Cir. 2010).
While it is thus clear that we generally lack jurisdiction to review the
BIA’s discretionary decision to grant or deny sua sponte reopening, we have also
recognized that we do have limited jurisdiction to review certain legal issues
underpinning such decisions. For example, we recently explained that while we
lack “jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen removal proceedings
sua sponte,” Salgado-Toribio v. Holder, 713 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2013), we
nevertheless retain jurisdiction to “review ‘constitutional claims or questions of
law’ raised in a petition for review,” id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D));
-17-
accord Arambula-Medina v. Holder, 572 F.3d 824, 828 (10th Cir. 2009). There is
increasing circuit support for this proposition from our sister circuits, as well.
See, e.g., Pllumi v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 642 F.3d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e
may exercise jurisdiction to the limited extent of recognizing when the BIA has
relied on an incorrect legal premise.”); Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469
(2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the Agency may have declined to exercise its sua sponte
authority because it misperceived the legal background . . . , remand to the
Agency for reconsideration in view of the correct law is appropriate.”).
Accordingly, even in matters involving the Board’s exercise of its
discretionary authority to deny a motion to reopen sua sponte, we retain
jurisdiction to review whether the Board applied the proper constitutional and
legal framework in making its decision. To be sure, this review is limited, and
the Board retains the ultimate authority to decide whether or not to grant a motion
to sua sponte reopen. As such, in cases where we identify legal or constitutional
error in the Board’s reasoning, our response is necessarily limited to remanding to
the Board “so it may exercise its authority against the correct ‘legal
background.’” Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 160 (quoting Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 469).
And we emphasize that “[o]n remand, the BIA [is] then . . . free to deny or grant
reopening sua sponte, and we . . . have no jurisdiction to review that decision.”
Id.; see Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 471 (recognizing that on remand, the BIA could
“choose not to exercise its sua sponte authority” and “that such a decision would
-18-
be unreviewable”).
Having determined that we have jurisdiction to review the constitutional
claims and questions of law raised in Mr. Mendiola’s petition, we next proceed to
address the two arguments raised by Mr. Mendiola that fall within these narrowly
defined jurisdictional bounds. First, we address Mr. Mendiola’s ineffective-
assistance claim. We then proceed to address Mr. Mendiola’s argument based on
intervening changes in the law brought about by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Carachuri-Rosendo. To the extent that Mr. Mendiola raises additional claims
relating to the Board’s exercise of discretion in declining to sua sponte reopen
that do not implicate constitutional claims or questions of law, we dismiss those
claims for lack of jurisdiction.
III
“We review the BIA’s decision on a motion to reopen only for an abuse of
discretion.” Gurung v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 718, 720 (10th Cir. 2004) (brackets
omitted) (quoting Tang v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1192, 1194 (10th Cir. 2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, “any
error of law is presumptively an abuse of discretion.” S. Utah Wilderness
Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 750 (10th Cir. 2005). In
conducting our abuse-of-discretion analysis, we review the BIA’s legal
determinations de novo. See Schubler v. Holder, 472 F. App’x 867, 870 (10th
Cir. 2012); Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 974 (10th Cir. 2011) (“In our review
-19-
of the [BIA’s] decision, we decide purely legal questions de novo.”); Lorenzo,
508 F.3d at 1282 (noting that we review the Board’s determination of
“constitutional and legal questions de novo”); Nguyen v. INS, 53 F.3d 310, 311
(10th Cir. 1995) (“We review the BIA’s findings on questions of law de novo.”);
see also Infanzon, 386 F.3d at 1362 (finding no abuse of discretion where, inter
alia, the BIA’s “statements [were] a correct interpretation of the law”). The BIA
may deny relief on a motion to reopen where, inter alia, “the movant has not
established a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought.” INS
v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988).
In reaching a conclusion concerning the propriety of the BIA’s action,
“[w]e are not at liberty to search the law and the record for reasoning to support
the BIA’s decision because a court may not uphold an agency action on grounds
not relied on by the agency.” Mickeviciute v. INS, 327 F.3d 1159, 1162–63 (10th
Cir. 2003) (quoting St. Anthony Hosp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
309 F.3d 680, 699 (10th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As
discussed above, in reviewing the BIA’s decision whether or not to reopen
removal proceedings sua sponte, our review is constrained by our limited
jurisdiction; we review only constitutional claims and questions of law.
IV
Generally, an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal
proceedings, and that motion must be filed within ninety days of the final
-20-
administrative order sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that the motion to reopen giving rise to
this appeal was numerically barred, as it was Mr. Mendiola’s third such motion.
It is also clear that this motion was untimely, as it was filed more than seven
years after entry of the final removal order that took effect on November 9, 2004.
In light of these circumstances, this appeal is ultimately focused on two
arguments that Mr. Mendiola advanced to avoid these procedural bars, both of
which were rejected by the Board.
First, Mr. Mendiola asserts that the Board abused its discretion in declining
to reopen on the basis of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, which Mr.
Mendiola has consistently asserted was insulated from the applicable time and
number restrictions by the doctrine of equitable tolling. Second, Mr. Mendiola
argues that the Board erred in its determination that the intervening changes in
law cited by Mr. Mendiola as a basis for sua sponte reopening did not
“demonstrate[] prima facie eligibility for any immediately available forms of
relief.” R. at 4. We address each of these arguments in turn.
A
When Mr. Mendiola first raised his ineffective-assistance claim—which he
did in his second motion to reopen—he argued that it was not barred by time or
number limits because any failure to timely raise the claim was a result of his
attorney’s failings, and thus he was entitled to equitable tolling. See Aplt.
-21-
Opening Br. at 7–8; R. at 499 (“Mr. Mendiola’s motion to reopen based on
ineffective assistance of counsel may equitably toll the numerical and time
limitations under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).”). But, as noted above, the Board never
reached the merits of the ineffective-assistance claim in ruling on the second
motion to reconsider, because it concluded as a threshold matter that it lacked
authority to consider the motion due to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d)’s post-departure bar.
In light of our intervening en banc decision in Contreras-Bocanegra finding the
post-departure bar unlawful, 7 the Board appropriately revisited the ineffective-
assistance claim in addressing Mr. Mendiola’s third motion to reopen and
considered its merits. 8 We now conclude that the Board did not abuse its
7
In Contreras-Bocanegra we held that the post-departure bar
regulation contravened Congress’s intent to provide each noncitizen the right to
file one motion to reopen, regardless of whether the noncitizen remained in or had
departed from the United States. See 678 F.3d at 813, 816–19.
8
The Board itself did not frame its consideration of the ineffective-
assistance claim as being a response to Contreras-Bocanegra—indeed, the Board
appears to have operated on the assumption that the post-departure bar had
continuing vitality after Contreras-Bocanegra. As the government concedes, this
assumption “misconstrue[d] this Court’s reasoning” in that case. Aplee. Reply
Br. at 27–28 n.5. However, as the government also correctly observes, the
Board’s misreading of Contreras-Bocanegra was ultimately harmless, given that
it relied in part on other, valid bases in declining to reopen Mr. Mendiola’s
proceedings—viz., Mr. Mendiola had failed to demonstrate the requisite prejudice
for a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel, and his reliance on the change
of law effected by Carachuri-Rosendo was unavailing, insofar as he sought to
invalidate the legality of his removal. And, to the extent that Mr. Mendiola’s
Carachuri-Rosendo change-of-law argument pertains to cancellation of removal,
we conclude infra that a remand is warranted for the BIA to clarify the legal basis
for its decision, obviating the need for any further inquiry here into the possibility
(continued...)
-22-
discretion in rejecting Mr. Mendiola’s ineffective-assistance claim as a basis to
reopen.
To make out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, see supra note 6, Mr. Mendiola had to show
both that his prior counsel’s conduct was deficient and that he was prejudiced by
his counsel’s ineffectiveness. See Akinwunmi v. INS, 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 n.2
(10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (“[A]n alien must show that his counsel’s
ineffective assistance so prejudiced him that the proceeding was fundamentally
unfair.”). In this context, proof of prejudice requires that there was “a reasonable
likelihood” the outcome would have been different were it not for the allegedly
ineffective assistance. United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1208–09
(10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
In his motion to reopen, Mr. Mendiola argued that “he suffered prejudice
due to [his] prior counsel’s failure to challenge the government’s charge that the
1996 and 2000 convictions involved substances under the Controlled Substances
Act.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 12. Specifically, Mr. Mendiola pointed to the Board’s
decision in Matter of Paulus, which held that the substance at issue in a state
controlled-substance conviction must be a controlled substance under federal law
8
(...continued)
of any harm stemming from the Board’s apparent misreading of Contreras-
Bocanegra.
-23-
in order to render a noncitizen subject to deportation. Mr. Mendiola argued that
“California law identifies at least two steroids on the controlled substances
schedule that are not included in the federal list, and therefore the government
could not have met its burden of establishing” that Mr. Mendiola was removable
for an aggravated felony. Aplt. Opening Br. at 11. Thus, according to Mr.
Mendiola, “[h]ad the Paulus defense been raised, it is reasonably likely that the
immigration judge would have terminated removal proceedings,” and “[t]he
Board’s failure to recognize this prejudice due to ineffective assistance of counsel
was an abuse of discretion.” Id.In rejecting Mr. Mendiola’s argument, the Board stated:
While [Mr. Mendiola] urges that his prior counsel should have
argued that he was not removable pursuant to the Board’s
decision in Matter of Paulus, [Mr. Mendiola] has not established
that the specific controlled substance of “steroids” was not listed
on the Federal controlled substances schedule for both 1996 and
2000. [Mr. Mendiola’s] reliance on the current controlled
substances schedules to assert that the California and Federal
controlled substances schedules do not coincide, is misplaced.
As such, [Mr. Mendiola] has not shown that he was prejudiced by
his prior counsel’s actions or inactions such that equitable tolling
of the time and number limits is warranted.
R. at 3 (citation omitted).
The Board’s determination did not constitute an abuse of discretion. As
noted by the Board, Mr. Mendiola fails to recognize that the relevant inquiry is
whether the substances were listed on both schedules in 1996 and 2000, not
whether the schedules coincide today. Mr. Mendiola failed to present any
-24-
evidence to the Board of discrepancies between the state and federal schedules in
1996 and 2000 that would have resulted in a different outcome in his proceedings.
Nor did he produce any evidence that his convictions for steroid possession
involved substances not listed in the federal controlled-substances schedules in
the relevant years. In other words, although Mr. Mendiola argues generally that
California regulates steroids not regulated by federal law, he has not specifically
alleged or demonstrated that he was convicted of possessing a substance that
would not be considered a steroid under the federal controlled-substances
schedules for the years of his convictions.
Accordingly, Mr. Mendiola has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by
any deficient performance of his counsel, i.e., that there is a “reasonable
likelihood” that the outcome of his proceedings would have been different but for
the actions or inactions of his counsel. 9 Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d at 1209. As
such, the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding that Mr. Mendiola failed to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus it did not rely on a mistaken
9
Indeed, although the BIA did not rely on this ground and thus nor do
we, it is questionable whether Mr. Mendiola’s counsel rendered deficient
performance at all. Contrary to Mr. Mendiola’s assertions, his prior counsel did
raise the argument to the immigration judge that the steroids Mr. Mendiola was
convicted of possessing were not the same type of steroids referred to in the
federal schedule. The immigration judge rejected this argument and found that
the steroids in Mr. Mendiola’s possession were included in Schedule III of the list
of federally recognized controlled substances.
-25-
view of this “constitutional claim” in deciding that sua sponte reopening was not
warranted.
B
We turn next to Mr. Mendiola’s argument that the Board erred when it
determined that sua sponte reopening was not warranted based on the
“fundamental change in law” effected by Carachuri-Rosendo. We begin with a
brief discussion of the general principles relating to the Board’s sua sponte
authority to reopen removal proceedings. We then address the holding in
Carachuri-Rosendo, to determine whether the Board relied on a mistake of law in
denying Mr. Mendiola’s petition to sua sponte reopen. While we conclude that
the Board correctly apprehended the significance vel non of the Carachuri-
Rosendo decision with respect to Mr. Mendiola’s removability, we find that we
are unable to perform a meaningful review of the Board’s decision regarding Mr.
Mendiola’s eligibility for cancellation of removal, and thus we remand this claim
to the Board so that it might more fully articulate its reasoning.
1
Irrespective of the otherwise applicable time and number limitations on
motions to reopen, the Board possesses the authority to reopen a case sua sponte.
The Board’s authority to sua sponte reopen an alien’s removal proceedings is
-26-
defined by regulation:
The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own
motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. . . . The
decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is
within the discretion of the Board, subject to the restrictions of
this section. The Board has discretion to deny a motion to
reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case
for relief.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (emphases added). As the text of regulation makes clear, the
Board’s discretion in deciding whether to exercise its sua sponte authority is
considerable, even to the extent that the Board may deny reopening despite a
petitioner’s meritorious claim for relief. In practice, the Board generally invokes
this “authority sparingly, treating it not as a general remedy for any hardships
created by enforcement of the time and number limits in the motions regulations,
but as an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly exceptional situations.” In re
G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1133–34 (BIA 1999). Indeed, the Board has said
that it “must be persuaded that the respondent’s situation is truly exceptional
before [it] will intervene.” Id. at 1134; see also In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976,
984 (BIA 1997) (recognizing the Board’s authority “to reopen proceedings sua
sponte in exceptional circumstances”).
Notwithstanding this general policy of forbearance, the Board has
acknowledged that sua sponte reopening may be warranted in certain cases that
involve a fundamental change in law. See In re G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1135.
Even in such cases, however, sua sponte reopening is only appropriate where the
-27-
case “manifestly turn[s] on the cited change in the law,” and the change is more
than an “incremental” one. Id. As the Board noted in In re G-D-:
New case law regularly emerges from this Board and the
federal courts. . . . If each incremental development in the case
law were considered to be a change warranting reopening on
the Board’s own motion, the implications for the motions
regulations and for the finality of proceedings would be
profound. In our judgment, granting reconsideration or
reopening in response to such “changes” would substantially
erode the regulatory time and number limitations and
undermine the goal of finality that we understand Congress
sought to achieve.
Id.
Thus, for example, the Board has explained that it properly exercised its
sua sponte authority to reopen in In re X-G-W-, 22 I. & N. Dec 71 (BIA 1998),
because “[t]he statutory revision was so profound that the respondent . . . clearly
acquired eligibility for relief by virtue of that particular change in the law, a
change amounting to a reversal in the principles of asylum law applicable to
coercive population control practices in China.” In re G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at
1135. In contrast, the Board declined to exercise its authority to sua sponte
reopen in In re G-D- because the impact of the change in law was “less obvious”
and “far more subtle.” Id. In that case, the Board observed that even if it
reopened the case, it “would be required to completely readjudicate the
respondent’s claim in light of [the] new precedent before [it] could discern
whether it would have any impact on the outcome of [the respondent’s] claim. Id.
at 1135–36. As the Board noted, “[e]ngaging in such a readjudication would be
-28-
tantamount to granting reconsideration, with its concomitant expenditure of
adjudicatory resources, even if [the Board] were ultimately to determine that the
new precedent did not alter the outcome.” Id. at 1136.
With these general principles in mind, we turn now to Mr Mendiola’s
argument that the Board abused its discretion in denying his motion to sua sponte
reopen based on the change in law effected by Carachuri-Rosendo.
2
Mr. Mendiola advances two distinct arguments for why the Supreme
Court’s 2010 decision in Carachuri-Rosendo represented a fundamental change in
law warranting sua sponte reopening. First, he argues that the case “was a
fundamental change in law warranting reopening because [he] was not removable
for an aggravated felony conviction, as charged in the Notice to Appear.” Aplt.
Opening Br. at 26. Second, he argues that reopening is warranted because if
under Carachuri-Rosendo he was not convicted of an aggravated felony, he is
now—in light of that case—eligible for cancellation of removal. As we have
already explained in discussing our limited jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Board regarding sua sponte reopening, we cannot and do not review the Board’s
actual decision not to exercise sua sponte authority. Rather, our review is limited
to determining whether, in exercising its discretion, the Board relied on erroneous
understanding of a question of law. Thus, we inquire only whether the Board
erred as a matter of law in concluding that Carachuri-Rosendo did not represent
-29-
the sort of fundamental change that the Board has recognized as a basis for sua
sponte reopening—that is, a shift by which Mr. Mendiola “clearly acquired
eligibility for relief.” In re G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1135.
The changes caused by Carachuri-Rosendo can be succinctly described. At
the time of the Board’s 2004 removal order, a state felony conviction for
possession of a controlled substance constituted an “aggravated felony” under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). As noted above, the Supreme Court partly modified this
in Lopez, which clarified that in order to qualify as an “aggravated felony” for
immigration law purposes, a state drug conviction must be punishable as a felony
under federal law. 549 U.S. at 55, 60. Carachuri-Rosendo elaborated further on
this topic, clarifying the application of Lopez in situations where an alien is
convicted of a state misdemeanor that is, under federal law, punishable as a
felony. See Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 580. Specifically, the Court
considered whether a lawful permanent resident convicted of two state-law
misdemeanor drug offenses was removable for an aggravated felony under federal
law. See id. at 570, 581–82. The Court held that although a second or subsequent
simple-possession offense is technically punishable as a felony under federal law
as recidivist possession, see 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), such a conviction does not
qualify as an aggravated felony under the INA unless the state conviction was
itself enhanced based on the fact of the prior conviction, i.e., unless the defendant
was actually convicted in state court of a felony as a recidivist. See Carachuri-
-30-
Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 581–82 (“We hold that when a defendant has been convicted
of a simple possession offense that has not been enhanced based on the fact of a
prior conviction, he has not been ‘convicted’ under § 1229b(a)(3) of a ‘felony
punishable’ as such ‘under the Controlled Substances Act.’”).
a
According to Mr. Mendiola, the impact of Carachuri-Rosendo, then, is that
he can no longer be held to have committed an aggravated felony by virtue of his
two state misdemeanor convictions. However, the Board correctly understood
that—even if Mr. Mendiola was correct about this—Carachuri-Rosendo’s effect
on the question of his removability would be negligible. The problem for Mr.
Mendiola on this score is that regardless of whether or not he was removable as
an aggravated felon, he was still lawfully removable in 2004. That is,
notwithstanding the Carachuri-Rosendo decision, Mr. Mendiola was removable in
2004 based on the uncontested fact that he had been convicted of a state offense
“relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21).”
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
Carachuri-Rosendo thus hardly looks like the sort of profound reversal
that prompted sua sponte reopening in In re X-G-W-, at least as it concerns Mr.
Mendiola’s removability. Our review confirms the Board’s conclusion
that—whatever effects the case may have had—it did not make Mr. Mendiola
eligible for relief based on any change to his legal removability. Accordingly, we
-31-
are confident that the Board did not rely on an incorrect legal understanding of
Carachuri-Rosendo in concluding that, as to Mr. Mendiola’s case, the
“extraordinary intervention of [the Board’s] sua sponte authority,” In re G-D-, 22
I. & N. Dec. at 1135, was not warranted.
b
We cannot say with the same confidence that the Board made its decision
based on a correct understanding of Carachuri-Rosendo’s effect on Mr.
Mendiola’s eligibility to seek cancellation of removal. In rejecting Mr.
Mendiola’s claim that Carachuri-Rosendo rendered him eligible for this
previously foreclosed avenue of relief, the Board found that, because Mr.
Mendiola did not contest that his removal was lawful,
this removal served to terminate [his] permanent residence status.
See Matter of Lok, 18 I&N Dec. 101, 106 (BIA 1981); Matter of
Mosqueda, 14 I&N Dec. 55, 56–57 (R.C. 1972). Consequently,
[Mr. Mendiola] is statutorily ineligible for cancellation of
removal under section 240A(a) of the Act[, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a),]
because he is no longer lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.
R. at 4. Put simply, the Board concluded that the lifting of one categorical ban on
cancellation of removal (for aggravated felons) was immaterial to Mr. Mendiola’s
access to that remedy because he remained subject to another (for those whose
permanent residence has been terminated through removal).
What gives us pause—and ultimately prompts us to remand this particular
issue back to the Board for elaboration—is that the Board did not attempt to
-32-
reconcile this rationale with Carachuri-Rosendo itself. We note, as did Mr.
Mendiola in his briefing, that the language of a footnote in that opinion arguably
contradicts the Board’s apparent assumption that removal, or an order of removal,
can operate as a categorical bar on seeking cancellation of removal. Specifically,
the Court stated there:
Since the Court of Appeals issued its decision in this case,
Carachuri-Rosendo has been removed. Neither party, however,
has suggested that this case is now moot. If Carachuri-Rosendo
was not convicted of an “aggravated felony,” and if he continues
to satisfy the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), he may still
seek cancellation of removal even after having been removed.
Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 573 n.8 (citation omitted). At least one of our
sister circuits has recently interpreted this language as “stat[ing] that a petition
for review is not rendered moot by merit of the petitioner’s removal,” and that
such a petitioner thus “may still seek cancellation of removal from abroad.”
Garcia v. Holder, --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL 2937020, at *2 (5th Cir. 2014); see also
Espinal v. Holder, 636 F.3d 703, 707 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Although Espinal has
already been removed . . . the case is not moot if (1) Espinal was not convicted of
an ‘aggravated felony’ and (2) he continues to satisfy the requirements of 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(a).” (citing Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 573 n.8)).
The tension between the Board’s apparent rationale and the language of the
Carachuri-Rosendo footnote, combined with the fact that the Board made no
attempt to reconcile the two or to address the apparent conflict, raises a particular
-33-
problem for this court in light of the settled principle that “[w]e are not at liberty
to search the law and the record for reasoning to support the BIA’s decision
because a court may not uphold an agency action on grounds not relied on by the
agency.” Mickeviciute, 327 F.3d at 1162–63 (quoting St. Anthony Hosp., 309
F.3d at 699) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d
792, 800 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[O]ur review is confined to the reasoning given by the
[agency], and we will not independently search the record for alternative bases to
affirm.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d
1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ritonga, 633
F.3d at 974–75 (same); Carpio v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1091, 1103 (10th Cir. 2010)
(“[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of
such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.” (alteration in original)
(quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). That is, we can affirm the decision of the Board only on the
same grounds relied on by the Board, but in the present case we are unable to
discern on what basis, if any, the Board resolved the apparent tension noted here,
and “[w]e cannot perform a meaningful review where the Board does not
sufficiently articulate its reasoning.” Mickeviciute, 327 F.3d at 1162. Moreover,
if there is some way of reconciling the Board’s decision with Carachuri-Rosendo
such that we could affirm on that basis, we are not aided in identifying that basis
-34-
by the government, which inexplicably fails to address this issue at all,
notwithstanding that Mr. Mendiola squarely raised it in his opening brief in
several places. 10 See Aplee. Br. at 26 (stating only that the Board “properly
concluded” that “the execution of Mr. Mendiola’s removal order . . . terminated
his prior lawful permanent resident status,” and citing three pre-Carachuri-
Rosendo cases). 11
Because the Board’s decision does not articulate its reasoning on this issue
in a manner that permits the court to engage in meaningful review, we now
remand to the Board with instructions to consider the effect of Carachuri-
Rosendo footnote eight on removed persons’ eligibility for cancellation of
10
Mr. Mendiola specifically invoked footnote eight of Carachuri-
Rosendo no less than four times in his opening brief. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 2
(“Carachuri-Rosendo . . . itself recognizes that a noncitizen may proceed with his
immigration case from outside of the Unites States when there is a change in
law.”); id. at 21 (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . instructed that a petitioner could
continue with his case after a removal order was executed, if he had not been
convicted of an aggravated felony offense.”); id. at 31 (“[I]n Carachuri-Rosendo,
[the Supreme Court] not[ed] that even after the execution of a removal order, the
petitioner could seek cancellation of removal if he had not been convicted of an
aggravated felony.”); id. at 31–32 (“Petitioner, then, is in the same position as
Carachuri-Rosendo himself, and the Supreme Court acknowledged that assuming
he was not convicted of an aggravated felony, Carachuri-Rosendo could apply for
cancellation of removal even after the deportation order was executed.”).
11
We do not mean to suggest, however, that we could affirm on the
basis of an alternative ground offered by the government, if it offered one.
Rather, we highlight the government’s silence here only to emphasize that, to the
extent there might have been some way of interpreting the plain terms of the
Board’s decision such that the decision was not in tension with Carachuri-
Rosendo, the government has waived its obvious opportunity to offer us such an
interpretation.
-35-
removal, and to explain—if it persists in its conclusion that Mr. Mendiola is, as a
consequence of his removal, categorically barred from seeking cancellation—on
what basis it purports to reconcile that conclusion with the seemingly
contradictory indication in footnote eight. Cf. Mukhia, 507 F. App’x at 827–28
(“In this case, we cannot perform a meaningful review of the Board’s decision,
which fails to sufficiently articulate its reasoning. We therefore remand to the
BIA for further explanation of the bases for its denial of [the petitioner’s] motion
to reopen.” (citation omitted)); Krylov v. Holder, 407 F. App’x 290, 293–95 (10th
Cir. 2011) (remanding where “[b]ased on our review of the BIA’s order . . . we
find that we cannot perform a meaningful review because the BIA did not
sufficiently articulate its reasoning” (brackets omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Mickeviciute, 327 F.3d at 1164–65 (noting that where an agency’s
decision fails to articulate a reviewable rationale, “the proper course, except in
rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or
explanation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We observe once again,
however, the ultimate decision whether or not to grant sua sponte reopening
remains entirely in the Board’s discretion.
V
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Mendiola’s petition is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part. With respect to Mr. Mendiola’s legal and constitutional
claims relating to his removability—that is, his ineffective-assistance claim and,
-36-
in part, his change-of-law claim based on the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Carachuri-Rosendo—Mr. Mendiola’s petition is DENIED and the decision of the
Board is AFFIRMED. With respect to Mr. Mendiola’s claim that under
Carachuri-Rosendo he alternatively is eligible to apply for cancellation of
removal, we GRANT his petition and REMAND to the Board to clarify the legal
basis for its decision, and—in light of that clarification—to rule on Mr.
Mendiola’s motion for sua sponte reopening as it sees fit in the exercise of its
discretion. Finally, to the extent that Mr. Mendiola’s briefs raise any claims
challenging the Board’s exercise of discretion in refusing to reopen sua sponte,
we DISMISS for lack of jurisdiction.
Entered for the Court
JEROME A. HOLMES
Circuit Judge
-37-